JUDGMENT Amarendra Nath Verma, J. - This petition presents yet another instance of house, grab, a galloping social menace which is all too common these days. 2. The petitioner has approached this Court with the complaint that she was in lawful occupation of the disputed accommodation as a tenant thereof until the forenoon of February 12, 1990. On return from the Court that day she found to her horror that some miscreants and criminals had forcibly occupied the accommodation after breaking open the locks without any legal right or authority in total disregard of the orders repeatedly passed by this Court recognising the right and occupation of the petitioner over the accommodation. The petitioner immediately made an attempt to lodge a report with the Cantonment police narrating the entire episode and praying for immediate action. The police flatly denied to register the report or to do anything whatever in the matter without an order of the Court specifically directing restoration of possession to the petitioner over the accommodation. It is asserted that the petitioner ran from pillar to post and knocked at the door of the authorities the same evening beseeching them to intervene and remove the miscreants and restore possession of the disputed accommodation but to no avail. 3. Not having succeeded in persuading the respondents - the District Magistrate and the Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad, to intervene in the matter, the petitioner approached this Court on March 1, 1990. The Bench took up the matter on March 2, 1990 and passed the following order : "Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel. The grievance expressed by the petitioner is that inspite of the various orders passed in the past by this Court, the petitioner is being disturbed in continuing to be a tenant of the accommodation in question and, in fact, inspite of this Court holding as far back as on 10.11.1986 that the possession of the petitioner be not disturbed and subsequently declaring the petitioner as a tenant of the accommodation in question the petitioner is again being troubled by certain persons trying to grab the accommodation in question. Serious allegations in this case have been made by the petitioner. However, we do not like to express any opinion at this stage about the allegation whether the accommodation in question is being grabbed by certain miscreants or not. Serious allegations in this case have been made by the petitioner. However, we do not like to express any opinion at this stage about the allegation whether the accommodation in question is being grabbed by certain miscreants or not. Suffice it to say that in view of the facts and circumstances of this case and the various orders passed by this Court, that the petitioner is the tenant of the accommodation in question. We, therefore, direct the SSP, Allahabad that if the possession of the petitioner as tenant has been disturbed, he shall restore her possession and protect the petitioner from anti-social activists so that the petitioner may continue to live as a tenant peacefully. Certified copy of this order be issued to the Counsel for the petitioner on payment of usual charges today. Sd/- A.P.M., J, Sd/- R.K.G., J". 4. After this order, the third respondent, viz, Upendra Singh alias Loha Singh, filed counter-affidavit and contested the claim of the petitioner asserting that he was himself in occupation in the disputed property as a care-taker on behalf of the landlady Mrs. S.D. Penn. In the counter-affidavit it has also been alleged that he was wrongfully dispossessed from the accommodation by the police under the interim orders of this Court, dated March 2, 1990 in regard to which he has lodged a report with the Senior Superintendent of Police. It is further alleged that he is a student of LL.B. (Second Year) in the Allahabad University. 5. This case has had a little history. The disputed accommodation described as an out-house in the previous proceedings, is part of bungalow No. 22, Drummond Road, Allahabad admittedly belonging at one time to H.C.R. Gomes. The accommodation consists of a cottage and an out-house. The petitioner claims that she was inducted as a tenant at a monthly rental of Rs. 150/- by Gomes in March 1976 both of a portion of the cottage as well as the out-house. Gomes died on December 21, 1980 a bachelor. After his death, the Administrator General of U.P. filed an application in the High Court to seek an interim grant in respect of the estate of Gomes. By an order, dated July 20, 1981, this Court authorised the Administrator General to take possession of the property, namely, 22, Drummond Road, Allahabad. After this order, the petitioner started paying rent to the Administrator General. Therefore, Mrs. By an order, dated July 20, 1981, this Court authorised the Administrator General to take possession of the property, namely, 22, Drummond Road, Allahabad. After this order, the petitioner started paying rent to the Administrator General. Therefore, Mrs. S.D. Penn, the sister of Gomes who claimed to be the sole heir of the latter, filed an application for allotment of the cottage and the out-house to Shri B.B. Paul, an advocate of this Court. The aforesaid application of the Administrator General was registered as Testamentary Case No. 10 of 1981. On August 31, 1982, the Administrator General filed another application under Section 10 (registered as Testamentary Case No. 9 of 1982) for an interim grant with respect to the share of the G.R. Gomes. In both these cases Nos. 9 and 10, Mrs. S.D. Penn was allowed to be impleaded. She herself filed three testamentary cases registered as suit Nos. 10, 11 and 12 of 1982. All these suits and cases were consolidated and decided together by the Testamentary Judge, S.D. Agarwal, J. by a common judgment and order, dated January 10, 1983. The learned Judge recorded the following findings with respect to the occupation of the applicant : "In so far as the possession of Miss Sharda Chauhan is concerned, the Administrator General in his report, dated 31st May, 1982 has stated that Miss Sharda Chauhan is in possession of the cottage, except one room, one store, kitchen and bath room in which the assets of Harold were found. It has been further stated that she was in possession of the out-house also and that she alleged herself to be a tenant of the cottage as well as of the out-house since lifetime of Harold. In the report it has been further stated that Miss Sharda Chauhan had paid the entire arrears of the rent after the death of the landlord and is continuing to pay the rent. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that Miss Sharda Chauhan is in unauthorised possession of the portion of the cottage and out-house. In the report it has been further stated that Miss Sharda Chauhan had paid the entire arrears of the rent after the death of the landlord and is continuing to pay the rent. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that Miss Sharda Chauhan is in unauthorised possession of the portion of the cottage and out-house. The rights between the landlord and Miss Sharda Chauhan need not be finally decided in these proceedings but prima facie it is clear that Miss Sharda Chauhan is occupying the portion of the cottage as well as the out-house and since she had been paying rent to the landlord and thereafter, to the Administrator General, U.P., prima facie her possession does not appear to be unauthorised". 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, Mrs. Penn filed special appeals during which a compromise was reached between the Administrator General and Mrs. Penn. In the compromise, the out-house which was in occupation of the applicant came in the portion which was to be retained under the management of the Administrator General and the rest of the accommodation came in the portion representing three-fourth share of Mrs. Penn. As a result of this compromise the Division Bench dismissed all the five appeals with certain directions by its judgment and order, dated Nov. 4, 1986. The direction was that the Administrator General shall deliver actual possession of the part of the property in his occupation to Mrs. Penn and hand over symbolic possession of the remaining portion which is in occupation of third parties. As there was a possibility of the judgment being misinterpreted and used against the petitioner, she immediately filed an application for clarification on November 4, 1986 which was disposed of on November 10, 1986. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, the Bench observed as follows : "At the instance of Smt. Sharda Chauhan, we have heard the matter further in the chamber today. Her complaint is that the Administrator General is in actual possession of only one room, the access to which is nowhere except from the office and bed room which are under her occupation......... The Administrator General of the appellant is, therefore, directed not to disturb the possession of the applicant, except for the purpose of unlocking the doors, that too, with the consent, and in the presence of the applicant. The Administrator General of the appellant is, therefore, directed not to disturb the possession of the applicant, except for the purpose of unlocking the doors, that too, with the consent, and in the presence of the applicant. We also reserve liberty to the applicant thereafter, to secure the doors of her portion by locking it from her side or by raising a wall. It is also made clear that the applicant's peaceful enjoyment of the premises in her occupation shall not be disturbed. With these directions, our original order is kept undisturbed. Sd/- K.J. Shetty, C.J. Sd/- R.K. Gulati, J". 7. After the Administrator General handed over the key of the aforesaid portion of the cottage to Mrs. Penn, Sri B.B. Paul began to reside in one room which was previously occupied by Gomes. The petitioner alleges that since then Mr. B.B. Paul was out to harass her and it is alleged that the out house in which she was residing was set on fire on January 1, 1987 with regard to which she lodged a First Information Report under Sections 436/427 IPC giving rise to Crime Case No. 1 of 1987. This incident confirmed the fear of the petitioner that every attempt was being made to throw her out under the shelter of the aforesaid allotment proceedings pending since 1982. The petitioner consequently filed writ petition No. 4813 of 1987 for quashing the proceedings on which this Court passed an order on March 5, 1987 that till further orders the allotment proceedings shall remain stayed. Meanwhile the accused named in the First Information Report was sent to Jail and a charge sheet was also submitted. It is alleged that inspite of this the petitioner and her family continued to live under constant threat and fear, consequently she made a written report to the police to provide protection but to no avail. On October 17, 1987, the household goods and articles of the petitioner were looted by breaking open the locks and the cottage was forcibly occupied and grabbed by the accused. The petitioner filed a First Information Report on October 17, 1987 and prayed in desperation for police possession and restoration of possession but to no avail. The result was that the petitioner was left only with the out-house. The petitioner filed a First Information Report on October 17, 1987 and prayed in desperation for police possession and restoration of possession but to no avail. The result was that the petitioner was left only with the out-house. While these Civil and Criminal cases were going on, with the intervention of some Senior Advocates of the Court, a compromise was arrived at between the parties. Under this compromise the petitioner was required to give up her tenancy rights in the cottage relating to the three fourth share of the house belonging to Mrs. Penn, while the remaining one-fourth portion of the property, namely, the out-house and the land appurtenant thereto was to remain with the petitioner as its tenant. As a result of this compromise, writ petition No. 4810 of 1987 filed by the petitioner against the allotment proceedings was disposed of as follows : "The unfortunate litigation between the three practising lawyers of this Court, has taken a happy turn resulting into a compromise. Accordingly, this case without entering deep into the matter is being decided. The disputed premises is 22, Drummann Road, Allahabad. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Since I have already held in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 10905 of 1989, B.B. Paul v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, regarding this very premises, that there was no vacancy, the proceedings for allotment in respect of the same were wholly without jurisdiction. It is not necessary for me to record fresh findings in this case as well. Smt. Sharda Chauhan, the petitioner is living as a tenant in one of the out-house situated towards the northern side which is neither disputed by Shri B.B. Paul nor Smt. S.D. Penn. The proceedings in case No. 227 of 1982 connected with Misc. Case No. 949 of 1986 are quashed. The writ petition is accordingly allowed without any order as to costs. Her possession in the said accommodation would not be disturbed. Sd/- M.P.S., J. 12.2.1990". 8. The proceedings in case No. 227 of 1982 connected with Misc. Case No. 949 of 1986 are quashed. The writ petition is accordingly allowed without any order as to costs. Her possession in the said accommodation would not be disturbed. Sd/- M.P.S., J. 12.2.1990". 8. Before, however, the ink on the compromise application and the order passed in pursuance thereof on October 12, 1990 could dry, the petitioner was confronted by yet another trauma which was more pernicious than in the past in that some miscreants and criminals forcibly grabbed and occupied the surviving portion of the accommodation which was left with her, namely, the out-house, during her absence in the Court, the miscreants broke open the locks of the out-house and forcibly entered in utter defiance of the judgment of the Court. It appears that the fresh assault was designed to frustrate the order passed by this Court on 12.2.1990. 9. The petitioner rushed to the police for help and made an attempt to lodge a report of the incident. The police declined even to record the report whereupon the petitioner approached the District Magistrate and the Senior Superintendent of Police the same evening and narrated her tale of woes to them. The authorities, however, expressed their unwillingness to do anything in the matter without an express order from the Court. 10. It is in this backdrop that the petitioner approached this Court on March 1, 1990 and in which the above-quoted interim order dated March 2, 1990 was issued by this Court. The simple relief claimed by the petitioner is neither more nor less than the law enforcing agencies, the District Magistrate and the Senior Superintendent of Police and the officers working under them may be directed to put the petitioner back into possession of the disputed accommodation from which she has been thrown out by unsocial elements by use of criminal force and to extend to her protection from such elements. 11. No counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the authorities though the copy of this petition was served on them through the learned Standing Counsel as far back as March 1, 1990. The learned Standing counsel was also heard by the Court before passing the aforesaid interim order on March 2, 1990. In pursuance of this order, the petitioner was put back in possession of the disputed property. 12. The learned Standing counsel was also heard by the Court before passing the aforesaid interim order on March 2, 1990. In pursuance of this order, the petitioner was put back in possession of the disputed property. 12. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the petition is being disposed of finally at the stage of admission. The main contest against the petition has come from the third respondent Shri Upender Singh alias Loha Singh who claims to have been in possession of the property from Mrs. Penn. 13. It will be seen from the narration of the facts stated above as well as from a perusal of the orders passed by this Court in various proceedings from time to time that the petitioner's possession over the disputed property is being recognised by this Court repeatedly. The earliest order was passed on September 13, 1983 by Brother S.D. Agarwala, J., disposing of the testamentary suits. The learned Judge had recorded a categorical finding that the occupation of Mrs. Sharda Chauhan over the disputed property then comparing both a portion of cottage as well as the out house was lawful and not unauthorised as claimed by Mrs. Penn. In the special appeals again a Bench of this Court presided over by the learned Chief Justice Hon'ble K.J. Shetty, CJ. (as he then was) directed on November 10, 1986 that the petitioner's possession over the out-house shall not be disputed. Finally, the possession was recognised and reiterated in the compromise to which both Mrs. Penn and Mr. B.B. Paul were parties. The order dated February 12, 1990 states : "Smt. Sharda Chauhan is residing in the out-house as a tenant - a fact 'which is neither disputed by Shri B.B. Paul nor Smt. S.D. Penn". 14. Lastly, the learned Judge issued a specific injunction that her possession in the said accommodation would not be disputed. 15. There is, thus, overwhelming material comprising judicial orders passed by this Court time and again in support of the petitioner's claims that she was in lawful possession of the disputed accommodation until she was thrown out by use of criminal force on February 12, 1990. 15. There is, thus, overwhelming material comprising judicial orders passed by this Court time and again in support of the petitioner's claims that she was in lawful possession of the disputed accommodation until she was thrown out by use of criminal force on February 12, 1990. It does not require much debate to support the premise that if a person who has been in lawful occupation of a property is thrown out by use of criminal force by unsocial elements he is entitled to request the law-enforcing agencies to remove such squatters and intruders from the property and to restore possession to the person who was in occupation. In the present case, the district authorities had the orders of the High Court to go by. The orders were all one way and left little doubt that the petitioner was in lawful occupation until February 12, 1990. The authorities should, therefore, have moved in the matter on their own. It was not necessary in the face of these orders for the authorities to require the petitioner to obtain yet another judicial order in their favour. If, therefore, the authorities have failed to perform what was their clear, duty, namely, to remove the intruders and restore possession to the petitioner, this Court could legitimately be approached for appropriate directions to the authorities to perform their duty according to law. 16. Sri A.P. Singh, learned counsel for the private respondent, Sri Upender Singh alias Loha Singh, vehemently contended that the said respondent was in occupation as a care-taker from Mrs. Penn, and consequently he could not be dispossessed except in accordance with law, that is, by instituting a civil suit for that purpose and not otherwise. 17. We regret there is a fallacy in the argument. The rule which Sri Singh is seeking to invoke in support of the private respondent, applies, with much greater force, to the petitioner. The petitioner's possession right upto February 12, 1990 has been recognised even by Mrs. Penn in the compromise entered into between the parties in this Court in the above writ petition. Before that the petitioner's possession was recognised in a series of judicial orders passed by this Court referred to here-in-above. That being so, it is the petitioner who is entitled to urge that her possession cannot be disturbed except in accordance with law and except by a person having a superior title. Before that the petitioner's possession was recognised in a series of judicial orders passed by this Court referred to here-in-above. That being so, it is the petitioner who is entitled to urge that her possession cannot be disturbed except in accordance with law and except by a person having a superior title. As regards the private respondent, he does not have even a pretence of a title or right to the disputed accommodation. His claim that he was a care-taker from Mrs. Penn is belied by Mrs. Penn herself. Her statement given in testamentary suit No. 11 of 1982 has been extracted in the judgment of S.D. Agarwala, J. There is not a word in that statement that the out-house is in occupation of Loha Singh. A certificate copy of the statement of Mrs. Penn was produced before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Not only is there no reference Upender Singh's possession over the out house, the statement goes to support the claim of the petitioner that she was in possession of the out house. Mrs. Penn conceded this fact in special appeal as will be evidence from the order passed upon the petitioner's application by the Bench on November 10, 1986. Not only this, as late as February 12, 1990, neither Mrs. Penn nor Mr. Paul disputed the fact that the petitioner was residing as a tenant in the out house in question. In this report, the Administrator General also confirmed that the petitioner was paying rent to him in respect of that house. The claim of the third respondent, therefore, that he was a care-taker from Mrs. Penn is demonstrably false. 18. Be that as it may, there is overwhelming evidence to show that the petitioner was in occupation and had been continuing as such in the disputed accommodation for the last several years right upto February 12, 1990 when she was forcibly dispossessed. 19. We do venture to think that squatters and house grabbers cannot claim to be in possession of the property grabbed by them so as to invoke the doctrine that a person in occupation of a property cannot be dispossessed except in accordance with law and except by a person having a better title. 20. 19. We do venture to think that squatters and house grabbers cannot claim to be in possession of the property grabbed by them so as to invoke the doctrine that a person in occupation of a property cannot be dispossessed except in accordance with law and except by a person having a better title. 20. As admittedly the petitioner has already been put back in possession in pursuance of the interim mandamus issued by this Court on March 2, 1990 quoted above, it is not necessary to issue another direction towards the same end. 21. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The interim mandamus issued by this Court on March 2, 1990 is made absolute. No order as to costs.