Judgment : A2, the sole petitioner in this case, is convicted and sentenced under Sec.306, I.P.C. to suffer R.I. for 3 years and also to pay a fine of Rs.100 in default to suffer R.I. for one month. This sentence is imposed by the Principal Assistant Sessions Judge, Tenali. On appeal, the District and Sessions Judge, Guntur confirmed the conviction and modified the period of imprisonment from 3 years to 2 years R.I., against which the present revision is preferred. The facts of the case are as follows. 2. A1 is the husband of the deceased. He was addicted to vices and he used to beat the deceased very often. On 6.12.1986 at about 10 a.m. A1 tried to take away brass binde from his house to sell it for his drink; the deceased objected and on which A1 beat the deceased. Then the deceased threatened that she will commit suicide, if A1 takes away the vessel. Then A1 gave Rs.5 to the deceased and abetted the deceased to commit suicide, and went away. After A1 left the house, the deceased complained about the incident to her father A2 (the petitioner herein) who was present at that time. On that, the Petitioner stated that it was their family affair and he cannot interfere in their matter, and at the end he said that if she chooses to die, she can die. Thereafter, the deceased secured kerosene through her brother with the money given by A1 and poured the same on her body and set fire to herself. She was immediately taken to the Government hospital, Tenali where her dying declaration was recorded by II Additional Munsif Magistrate, Tenali. The deceased died due to burn injuries at 6.30 p.m. on 6.12.1986. On intimation, P.W.9 the S.I. of Police came to the hospital, took up investigation, and registered the crime. P.W.7 the medical officer who conducted post mortem on the dead body of the deceased opined that the deceased died of shock due to extensive burns. Ex.P11 is the post-mortem certificate. Prosecution in all examined P.Ws.1 to 10. P.Ws.1 and 2 are the mother and brother of the deceased (i.e., P.W.1 is the wife of the petitioner and P.W.2 is his son). P.W.3 is the mother of A1, and P.W.4 is the brother of A1 P.Ws.1 to 4 turned hostile and did not support the prosecution case. 3. Prosecution in all examined P.Ws.1 to 10. P.Ws.1 and 2 are the mother and brother of the deceased (i.e., P.W.1 is the wife of the petitioner and P.W.2 is his son). P.W.3 is the mother of A1, and P.W.4 is the brother of A1 P.Ws.1 to 4 turned hostile and did not support the prosecution case. 3. When the accused were examined, they denied the offence. The appellate Court, after considering the entire material evidence on record, confirmed the conviction imposed by the Assistant Sessions Court but modified the sentence from three years R.I. to two years R.I. confirming the fine, against which A2 the father of the deceased preferred this revision. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Bali Reddy contended that even taking into account the allegation against the petitioner as it is, it cannot be said that the same amounts to an offence of abatement to commit suicide. The learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand, contended that there are no merits in this case and the revision is liable to be dismissed. 5. In this case, it is not in dispute that the deceased died due to burn injuries by pouring kerosene and that A1 has not preferred any revision. As stated supra, P.Ws.1 to 4 turned hostile, and there is no direct evidence on record, except the dying declaration of the deceased. P.W.5 is the mediator, P.Ws.6 and 7 are the medical officers, P.W.9 is the police officer and P.W.10 is the Munsif Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration. There is no allegation of cruelty on the part of the petitioner, as the petitioner is no other than the father of the deceased. Then, it has to be seen whether the allegation made against the petitioner amounts to an offence of abatement to commit suicide. As per the contents of Ex.P7, after the husband of the deceased left the house asking her to commit suicide, the father of the deceased, i.e., the petitioner came there and then the deceased informed him about the incident. On that, the petitioner told her that it was their family affair and therefore he cannot interfere, and causally asked her to die, as said by her husband. These words, are spoken by the petitioner in a mood of disgust and after getting vexation, but not with an intention to abet committing of suicide. On that, the petitioner told her that it was their family affair and therefore he cannot interfere, and causally asked her to die, as said by her husband. These words, are spoken by the petitioner in a mood of disgust and after getting vexation, but not with an intention to abet committing of suicide. The petitioner is no other than the father of the deceased. In this context, it is relevant to refer the decision of Supreme Court in Shri Ram v. State of U.P Shri Ram v. State of U.P A.I.R. 1975 S. C. 175 in which it is held: “In order to constitute abatement, the abettor must be shown to have ‘intentionally’ aided to commission of the crime. Mere roof that the crime charged could not have been committed without the interposition of the alleged abettor is not enough compliance with the requirements of Sec.107. A person may, for example, invite another casually or for a friendly purpose and that may facilitate the murder of the invitee. But unless the invitation was extended with intent to facilitate the commission of the murder, the person inviting cannot be said to have abetted the murder. It is not enough that an act on the part of the alleged abettor happens to facilitate the commission of the crime. Intentional aiding and therefore active complicity is the gist of the offence of abatement under the third paragraph ofsection 107.” 6. In Raj Kumar v. State of Punjab Raj Kumar v. State of Punjab 1983 Crl.L.J. 706 the facts of the case are as follows: “One Sita Devi, the deceased married to one Rajindar Kumar, appellant. Ranjinder Kumar left the house for some days prior to the occurrence, as there were some differences between the husband and wife. Ranjinder Kumar was employed in the shop of Raj Kumar, another appellant. One day at about 8 a.m. the deceased came to the shop of Raj Kumar to make a final bid at persuading her husband to resume normal visit to the matrimonial home, for which her husband refused. Then the deceased threatened her husband that she will commit suicide by pouring kerosene on her and setting fire. Then the husband of the deceased and Raj Kumar (the shop owner) are said to have told her that she could go ahead with her plan, the same would not affect their health. Then the deceased threatened her husband that she will commit suicide by pouring kerosene on her and setting fire. Then the husband of the deceased and Raj Kumar (the shop owner) are said to have told her that she could go ahead with her plan, the same would not affect their health. Then the deceased sprinkled kerosene oil on her body and set herself on fire, and later died in the hospital. In para 13 of the above judgment, it is observed thus: “The resort made by the accused when the deceased threatened to commit suicide of Rajinder Kumar did not agree to her request, did not amount to instigation by any stretch of imagination. If such a retort is accepted to the constituting instigation them to cite only one example, the parents would be guilty of abatement of suicide if even when most unreasonable demand is made by their child, which they are not in a position to comply with on the threat of committing suicide and they were to retort that the child could do so as they were not in a position to agree to his/her request. The framers of the Code surely could never have intended this to happen.” In para 8 of the above judgment, it is observed that ‘Clause 3 of Sec.107 envisages not a simple omission but an illegal omission. The omission would be illegal only if what has been omitted to be done by the accused was required under the law to be done by him.’ 7. In view of the judgment referred to above, it is clear that unless the act is done with an intention to aid the commission of an offence, it cannot be said that it amounts to abatement, as per Sec.107, Indian Indian Indian Penal Code. In the present case, there is no evidence to show that the petitioner has assisted the deceased to set fire herself; he only casually told the deceased in a disgusted mood that the quarrel was in between the deceased and her husband in which he cannot interfere, and at that end told her that if she wanted to die, she could. Therefore, there is no intention to abet committing of suicide on the part of the petitioner father. 8. Therefore, there is no intention to abet committing of suicide on the part of the petitioner father. 8. The next question is, whether the presumption under Sec.1l3-A of the Evidence Act applies to the father of the deceased - Woman to clothe him with the liability under Sec.306, Indian Indian Indian Penal Code. Sec.1l3-A of the Evidence Act reads: “113-A: Presumption as to abatement of suicide by a married woman-When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abated by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Explanation: For the purpose of this section ‘cruelty’ shall have the same meaning as in Sec.498-A of the Indian Indian Indian Penal Code.” As seen the presumption envisaged is against the husband and his relatives. The petitioner herein is the father of the deceased-woman and cannot be said to be the relative of her husband for purposes of Sec.113-A of the Evidence Act. The petitioner does not belong to the family of the deceaseds parents-in-law. He became father-in-law of her husband only by virtue of the marriage between them. Further, Sec.498-A, Indian Indian Indian Penal Code is covered by Chapter XX-A, the heading of which is ‘of cruelty by husband or relatives of husband’. Moreover the very Sec.498-A clothes liability against the husband or the relative of the husband of the victim-woman and not the father of the woman. Therefore, when the father is not liable for the offence under Sec.498-A, Indian Indian Indian Penal Code muchless it is so to clothe him with the liability under Sec.113-A of the Evidence Act by virtue of the consequential presumption. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, the criminal revision case is allowed by setting aside the conviction and sentence imposed against the petitioner. The fine amount if paid, shall be refunded to him. The petitioner is accordingly acquitted.