JUDGMENT G.D. Dube, J. - This revision has been preferred against the judgment and order of Sessions Judge, Jhansi, rejecting the criminal appeal of the appellant against the order of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jhansi, convicting the revisionist under section 7(i)/16(I)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and sentenced him to six months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. In default of payment of fine, the revisionist is to undergo three months simple imprisonment. 2. The brief facts are that the Food Inspector had taken a sample of milk from the appellant. This was sent to the public analyst who found that it was deficient in milk fat by approximately twenty per cent according to the standard of mixed milk of cow and goat. After obtaining the sanction, the prosecution was launched by filing a complaint. The revisionist had denied the charges framed against him under section 7/16 of the Act. The prosecution examined the Food Inspector, R.P. Srivastava and one J.B. Singh. The accused had admitted during trial (hat milk was taken but had alleged that only milk was taken. The accused had not produced any witness in defence. The learned Magistrate found that the revisionist was guilty of the offence under section 7/16 of the Act. The appeal preferred by him was also rejected and the order of the lower court was confirmed. 3. It has been argued from the side of the revisionist at the admission stage that the provisions of sections 10(7) and 13(2) of the Act were not complied. It was further urged that the provisions of rule 9(f) of the Rules framed under the Act were also not complied. Lastly it was contended that if the standard of cow milk is taken, then the milk cannot be said to be deficient in its fat contents. 4. Since the facts on which the above arguments were based are concluded by concurrent findings of two courts below, I do not find it expedient to summon the record. I am disposing of this revision at the admission stage. 5. 4. Since the facts on which the above arguments were based are concluded by concurrent findings of two courts below, I do not find it expedient to summon the record. I am disposing of this revision at the admission stage. 5. Sub-section (7) of section 10 of the Act provides that if the Food Inspector takes any sample as provided in sub-section (1) of the Act, then he shall call one or more persons to be present at the time when such action is taken and take his or their signatures. It has come in evidence that at the lime of taking of sample one Sripat was present. The two courts below have held that the thumb impression of Sripat is present on the receipt for sale of milk. The two courts below have also found that Sripat was present throughout the whole proceedings of taking of the sample. It is established that at least one person was present at the time when the sample was taken. Therefore, substantial compliance of sub-section (7) of section 10 of the Act has been made. 6. It has been contended that the sample was taken on 27.12.1985 and the prosecution vas launched on 10.8.1987. Hence by that time the sample must have deteriorated and in that way the revisionist was prejudiced by not providing him an opportunity to get their sample examined by Central Food Laboratory. The Trial Court has found that the copy of the report of public analyst was sent to the revisionist by registered post. Despite receipt of this notice, he had not applied to the court concerned to send the other sample to the Central Laboratory within ten days. Even after the start of the proceedings he had not moved the court for sending the sample to Central Laboratory. On that basis, the Trial Court held that the revisionist had not been prejudiced in the way for he himself was responsible for not taking any action under the provisions of section 13(2) of the Act. The above finding of the Trial Court was not challenged in the appellate, court. It is, therefore, now concluded that the revisionist had received the copy of the report of public analyst by registered post. 7. The above finding of the Trial Court was not challenged in the appellate, court. It is, therefore, now concluded that the revisionist had received the copy of the report of public analyst by registered post. 7. Learned counsel for the revisionist has relied upon a case in Makhan Singh v. State of U.P. 1988(2) FAC 62, in support of his contention that the delay in prosecution prejudices the accused in not providing him opportunity to avail the benefit of section 13(2) of the Act. 8. The lower court has relied upon several case laws. One of them is Ajit Prasad v. State of Maharashtra 1972 FAC 545. In this case, the Supreme Court observed that delay and laches of complainant is not fatal to the prosecution in every case. There should be evidence to show that the sample had deteriorated when the prosecution was launched. No attempt has been made by the revisionist to get the sample examined by the Central Food Laboratory. He had not moved the Trial Court to send his sample to the Central Food Laboratory. If the Laboratory had found that the sample was found as unlit for analysis, then any adverse conclusion can be drawn against the prosecution. In the case, the revisionist has not taken the plea about non-compliance of section 13(2). of the Act in the appellate court. Considering these circumstances, the revisionist cannot be said to be aggrieved. 9. The other case law relied upon by the Trial Court is Municipal Corporation, Bhopal v. Hayat Khan 1986(2) FAC 105. In this case, the Madras High Court has held that where the accused did not apply under section 13(2) of the Act for sending the sample of milk to the Central Food Laboratory, then the delay in Filing the complaint is not material. 10. From what has been said above, come to the conclusion that the delay in filing the complaint is not material in this case. No evidence has been brought forward to show that material sample has disintegrated at the time of filing of complaint. This point, therefore, fails. 11. The next contention about non-compliance of rule 9(f) of the Rules is also not attracted. No evidence has been brought forward to show that material sample has disintegrated at the time of filing of complaint. This point, therefore, fails. 11. The next contention about non-compliance of rule 9(f) of the Rules is also not attracted. Rule 9(f) says that it shall be the duty of the Food Inspector to make such enquiry and inspections as may be necessary to detect the manufacture, storage or sale of articles of food in contravention of the Act or Rules framed thereunder. It has come in evidence and the two courts below have held that on enquiry by the Food Inspector the accused had disclosed that the milk sold by him was a mixed milk of cow and goat. These circumstances, therefore, go to show that the Food Inspector had made necessary enquiry from the accused. He was informed that the milk was mixed milk of cow and goat in equal proportion. This also answers the contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist that if the milk is adjudged at the standard of cow milk, then the milk cannot I be said to be deficient in fat contents. 12. The last argument by learned counsel for the revisionist about non-examination of Sripat is not of much consequence. The two courts below have believed the statement of Food Inspector. If the Food Inspectors version was trustworthy, then there was no necessity to examine Sripat. It is not necessary for the prosecution to examine all the witnesses. It may examine such witnesses which it considers to be material on the facts. Nothing transpires from the material on record that the examination of Sripat would have revealed such facts which would have helped the accused in proving his innocence. Thus this point too fails. No other point has been pressed. The revision has, therefore, no force. It is rejected.