Judgment :- 1. The above appeal has been filed against the order of the Sub Court, Pondieherry dated 19-4-1982 in O.P. No. 12 of 1981 dismissing the petition filed seeking leave to sue as an indigent person under O. 33, R. 1 C.P.C. 2. The appellant sought leave as above to file a suit against the respondent-Bank for recovery of Rs. 61,53,296.34 towards the alleged loss of profit and damages. The case of the appellant was that for establishing his industry, he approached the respondent-Bank and got sanctioned a loan through the Director Small Industries Services Institute, Guindy, that subsequently he approached for increasing the loan to cover Tuning cost, that the Bank failed to act deliberately to draw the funds at the appropriate time for being utilised resulting in charging of higher rate of interest and that the Bank did not allow the prescribed holiday period for repayment, and for other reasons set out in the petition the appellant suffered a financial crisis resulting in serious problems and stalemate in the running of the industry. It was further contended that the Bank locked the stores room and denied him facility to operate accounts and effectively to run the industry and that, therefore, the Bank was responsible for all the loss an J damage suffered including the damage under the heading of whit the appellant will call as criminal damage for the alleged loss of prestige, credibility and mental agony. It has been further staled by the appellant that he was not possessed of any property worth even Rs 150, that he was unable to pay court fee and, therefore, he has filed the above petition under O. 33, R. 1, C.P.C. 3. The respondent Bank opposed the application disputing the claim that the anpel-iant was an indigent person on the basis of his earlier claims and statements given before the Bank and also denying the various other claims made by the appellant. It was specifically pleaded in paragraph 5 of their counter that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action at all and even the vague cause of action indicated in the plaint is barred by limitation and that the appellant cannot seek to revive or prosecute any claim apparently time-barred by way of a pauper suit and, therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed on the sole ground under O. 33, R. 5(d), C.P.C. 4. The court below, after a consideration of the matter and the materials available, sustained the plea of the respondent on grounds specified under O. 33, R. 5 (b)(d) & (f) C.P.C., and rejected the petition filed by the appellant. 3 months time was granted for payment of the court fee on the plaint Aggrieved against the same, the above appeal has been filed. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the order of the court below rejecting the petition on three grounds is liable to be set aside and that there was no detailed consideration of some of the aspects by the trial court and consequently the order calls for interference in the hinds of this court. Learned counsel for the appellant referred to the decision reoorted in Vijai Pratap v. Dukh Haran Nath 1 , and a series of decisions wherein the ratio of the said decision has been applied. I am not proposing to deal with them in detail since those decisions have no direct relevance to the aspect and the points that arise for consideration in this case Learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that though the order may not discuss all the matters in such greater detail, on the available materials and on the averments made in the petition itself, the conclusions of the court below were well justified. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant invited my attention to an order passed by a learned single Judge of this court in C.M.P. No. 16819 of 1985 in Appeal S.R. No. 33929 of 1983 dated 16-6-1987 and contended that having regard to the said orders of this court, it stood established that the appellant is an indigent person entitled to the leave as prayed for. From the copy of the order and on a perusal of the proceedings, it could be seen that the said appeal was filed by the appellant herein from the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 3 of 1978 on the file of the sub court, Pondich?rry, a suit filed bv the respondent herein a; a plaintiff therein. On the basis of the said orders, counsel for the appellant contended that in respect of the said appeal, which arose out of a suit for recovery of about Rs. On the basis of the said orders, counsel for the appellant contended that in respect of the said appeal, which arose out of a suit for recovery of about Rs. 3 lakhs and odd/the appellant was found to be not possessed of the required means which will be a fortiori a fact for the purpose of the present case that he was not possessed of the required means to pay court fee on the sum of Rs. 61,53,296. 34. In meeting the said claim, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that he has nothing to say on the said submission in view of the orders of this court referred to above which had been passed after notice to them But the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the court below really found fault with the appellant for not disclosing in the petition in full about his property affairs and held that the same constituted suppression of facts on account of which the petition would lack bona fides . In the circumstances, this court finds that notwithstanding the fact that this court permitted the appellant in the other case to pursue an appeal as an indigent person, no exception could be taken with reference to the conclu sion of the court below which is really based on the conduct of the appellant in not disclosing all his property affairs in the petition filed for leave under O. 33, R. 1, C.P.C. Consequently, the order passed by this court in another matter cannot by itself be sufficient to enable the appellant to have the leave sought for in this case also. 7. With reference to the averments based on O. 33, R. 5(b) and (1), no doubt the court below has not dealt with this aspect in detail In view of this, the respective counsel referred me to the petition as well as the evidence on record On going through the same and after considering the submissions of the learned counsel, this court finds that the plaint allegations in respect of the claim are not only vague but do not specify as to how for some of the alleged lapses either the respondent could be found f ault with or the alleged damages said to be the direct cause and result of the so called lapses. This Court finds total absence of any details with reference to the claim made under the so called heading “criminal damages”. Having regard to all these, this court is of the view that inspite of the fact that the petition is a lengthy one, it does not sufficiently disclose the legal existence of the cause of action. Further in paragraph 32 with reference to cause of action, it has been stated as follows :— “The cause of action for this suit arose at Pondicherry when the petitioner applied to the respondent/defendant Bank for loan in February 1973, when the respondent/defendant Bank sanctioned the loan on 13-10-1973. when the petitioner plaintiff signed the promissory notes on 13-2-1974 when the respondent/defendant Bank increased the loan amounts on 9-3-1975, when the respondent/defendant Bank locked the store room 23-12 1976, when the respondent/defendant Bank brought back the consignment booked for various parties to Pondicherry in February/March 1977, when the respondent/defendant Bank lodged a criminal complaint for cheating with Police, on July 10, 1977, when the respondent/defendants lawyer sent a notice for repayment of loan on 25-7-1977, when the respondent/defendant Bank instituted the civil suit O.S. No. 3 of 78 on November 28, 1977 and for various acts of commission and omission by the respondent/defendant Bank at different ttmes during the aforementioned period.” On the very averments contained therein, the suit would be squarely barred by limitation. This is a suit for damages for the alleged wrongful acts of commission and omission on the part of the respondent-bank The maximum period of limitation that could be pressed into service by the appellant in respect of his claim will be 3 years and the limitation will commence running from the date of the alleged injury or act of commission and omission referred to At any rate, it cannot be, from the date of filing of O.S. No. 3 of 1978 on 28-11-1977 by the respondent bank for recovery of its money from the appellant personally and from out of his properties viz, the industry. It appears that this petition came to be filed by the appellant only on 27-11-1980. Therefore, on the face of it, the suit claim appears to be clearly barred. It appears that this petition came to be filed by the appellant only on 27-11-1980. Therefore, on the face of it, the suit claim appears to be clearly barred. That apait, as noted by the court below, it appears to have been filed only as a counterblast and a pure after thought to the suit filed by the bank and particularly, as noted by the court below, at a stage practically nearing completion of trial on the plaintiffs side and when O.S. No. 3 of 1978 was pending for defendants witnesses. Consequently, the appeal fails and dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.