Judgment :- The question raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that a decree for mesne profits on the basis of a trespass committed by the defendant is an Avyavaharika debt within the meaning of the Hindu Law and the sons of the defendant are not liable under the doctrine of pious obligation to discharge the said debt. It must be pointed out at the outset that the learned counsels argument has not been put forward in that form before the courts below. Consequently, the facts which are relevant for the purpose of deciding whether the decree for mesne profits is based upon a criminal act of trespass or a civil trespass have not been established. Without the relevant facts it is not possible to accept the argument of counsel that in the present case the decree is based upon a criminal trespass. Learned counsel places reliance on the judgment of V. Ramaswami, J. in Perumal v. Devarajan and others 1 . That was a case of theft and the father was directed to return the money which he was found to have stolen. The Court held that the debt was Avyaharika and the sons were not liable. Referring to the judgments of the Calcutta High Court and Bombay High Court, the learned Judge observed thus: “In this connection I may refer to the decision in Poreman Dass v. Bhattu Mahton 2 and Govindaprasad v. Raghunathprasad AIR 1939 Bom 289 is very similar to the one on hand. There a person disposed of the property of another wrongfully and deprived the original owner of that property. In a suit claiming the value against the legal heirs it was held that the son was not liable as the debt incurred by the father was due to his dishonest conduct in wrongfully disposing of the property of the plaintiff. In Hindu Law and Precedents by M.R. Raghavachariar (Sixth Edition) the learned author has given a summary of what debt could be considered as Avyavaharika debt with element of criminality, at page 345 and classifies one such debt as decree for money obtained by thefts. The learned author cites (1897) I.L.R. 24 Cal. 672 and AIR 1939 Bom. 289 as authorities for that position. The facts in I.L.R. 24 Cal. The learned author cites (1897) I.L.R. 24 Cal. 672 and AIR 1939 Bom. 289 as authorities for that position. The facts in I.L.R. 24 Cal. 672 were as follows: A decree was passed against one Mangru and Sobha Mahton for damages for theft and misappropriation of paddy. When this decree was sought to be executed against the sons in respect of the joint family properties it was held that the sons were not in a pious duty to pay the debt and that therefore the interest of the sons could not be sold in execution.” Learned counsel submits that the translation of Avyavaharika debts as given by Colebrooks, has been accepted by Mulla in his book on Hindu Law and also by the Supreme Court in S.M. Jakati v. S.M. Borkar 1 . Colebrooks has translated Ayyavaharika debts as debts for a cause repugnant to good morals. Learned counsel draws my attention to a passage in the judgment of Justice C.M. Lodha in State of Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal 2 which reads as follows: “It is well settled that a debt for a cause repugnant to good morals is immoral or Ayyavaharika. As stated by Mulla in his Book on Hindu Law, 13th Edition, Colebrooke, translates avyavaharika debts as debts for a cause repugnant to good morals. In S.M. Jakati v. Brokdr , AIR 1959 SC 282 it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the translation of the term given by Colebrooke may well be taken to represent its correct meaning, and that the term did not admit of a more precise definition”. But unfortunately for the appellant, the matter is directly covered by a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Minor Palanivel Ramasubramania Pillay v. Sivakami Ammal 3 . That was also a case of a decree for mesne profits. The Division Bench held that the decree was not an avyavaharika debt within the meaning of Hindu Law. After referring to the old texts of Hindu Law as well as all the earlier judgments of different courts, the Bench observed thus: “I would state the rules thus:— (1) If the debt is in its inception not immoral subsequent dishonesty of the father does not exempt the son. (2) It is not every impropriety or every lapse from right conduct that stamps the debt as immoral. (2) It is not every impropriety or every lapse from right conduct that stamps the debt as immoral. The son can claim immunity only, when the fathers conduct is utterly repugnant to god morals, or is grossly unjust or flagrantly dishonest.” Later on the learned Judge observed that the act of the father in that case was not by any means honest; but at the same time, his conduct in being in unlawful possession of the properties was not so grossly unjust or immoral, or so flagrantly dishonest as to make the debt avyavaharika within the meaning of the Hindu Law. That was the judgment of Justice Venkatasubba Rao. The other learned Judge Mr. Justice Madhavan Nair referred to the Judgment of Justice Mookarjee, J. in Pearl Bal Singh v. Choudi Charan Singh 4 and quoted a passage from the said judgment. That passage reads thus: “The original Judgment debtor became liable to pay a large sum of money, because he had kept the respondent out of possession of property, which lawfully belonged to the later and to the profits of which he was entitled. By unlawful receipt of those profits, the judgment-debtor enriched his own estate, which has now by survivorship passed into the hands of the appellants. We cannot discover any intelligible principle, upon which a debt of this character may be described as immoral and illegal.” The judgment of the Division Bench has not been referred to by Justice Ramaswami in his judgment, probably because the facts of the case before the learned Judge did not warrant such a reference. But in so far as the present case is concerned, it is covered by the ruling of the Division Bench. As it is a direct judgment on the point, I cannot hold differently. In view of the judgment of the Division Bench, the question of law sought to be raised by learned counsel in this appeal does not really arise. At any rate, it is not a substantial question of law to warrant the admission of C.M.A. Hence the appeal fails and is dismissed.