Judgment : In both the writ petitions, it is the Tiruppathur Co-operative Sugar Mills which is seeking to quash the order dated 6. 1979 issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and irrigation (Department of Food), Directorate of Sugar, New Delhi. While in the first writ petition, an affidavit is filed in support of the writ petition, by the Special Officer (In-charge) on the date of the writ petition, in the second writ petition, the affidavit is filed by the Special Officer of the Society at the time of occurrence of the alleged contravention. Further in the second writ petition, W.P.No.5433 of 1982, there is also a prayer to quash the charge-sheet filed by the second respondent in RC.l 1/79-E dated 18. 1980. But the points raised in both the writ petitions arc the same. Therefore, I proceed to pass a common order in these writ petitions. 2. The Tiruppathur Co-operative Sugar Mills is a Society registered under the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act. In G.O.Ms.No.715, Industries Department, dated 6. 1976, the Government of Tamil Nadu superseded the Board of Directors of all the Co-operative Sugar Mills in Tamil Nadu and decided to appoint Special Officers. It is under these circumstances that the deponent of the affidavit in W.P.No.5533 of 1982 who is the Joint-Director of Co-operative Societies, came to be appointed as the Special Officer of the Sugar Mills between the period 16. 1976 till 7. 1979. After the said period, the deponent of the affidavit in W.P.No.1633 of 1982 came to be appointed as the Special Officer. .3. Sugar is an essential commodity, the production, price, movement and distribution of sugar have been regulated in the interest of the public by the Sugar Control Order, 1966. Sugarcane is the only raw material in the Sugar Industry. The Sugarcane crop is perishable in nature and cannot be stored for use at a later point of time. Therefore, it must be harvested and utilised within a short period of its maturity. It is stated that almost the entire sugar is produced by vacuum pan sugar mills within a period of five months from December to April. It is also stated that sugar is generally in short supply though it is not disputed that there were periods of abundant sugar supply. The statutory control on sugar is stated to have been first imposed in April, 1942. It is also stated that sugar is generally in short supply though it is not disputed that there were periods of abundant sugar supply. The statutory control on sugar is stated to have been first imposed in April, 1942. The special feature of the control of sugar industry and trade is that the production of sugar is limited to a short period of five months, but its availability in the market should be ensured throughout the year. Consequently, some of the directions given by the statutory authorities are peculiar and known only to the sugar industry. .4. The policy of regulation regarding release of sugar is said to be in vague for over 25 years except for a short period between 18. 1978 and 6. 1979. .The Government had also been following the policy of partial control on price, distribution etc., of sugar since August, 1967 except for a short period from 25. 1971 till 30.6.1972. Under the policy of the partial control, substantial portion of sugar production each year is taken over for controlled distribution through fair price shops at fair prices determined on the basis of ex-factory prices fixed under Sec.3(3-C) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, hereinafter called as ‘the Act’. The remaining portion of the sugar production is allowed to be sold by the sugar mills in the open market without any price, movement or other restrictions. This is what is generally called as levy sugar and non-levy sugar. But it is stated that both the levy and non-levy sugar are subject to orders of monthly releases. 5. It is stated in the counter-affidavit that the sugar stocks at the end of the sugar season 1976-77 with a further record production in 1977-78 season, led to a steep fall in the prices of non-levy sugar and a crisis developed in the sugar industry. A number of sugar mills were threatened with closure. It is under these circumstances that the Government reviewed its sugar policy and removed all controls of price, movement, distribution and sale of sugar with effect from 18. 1978. Even the mechanism of monthly releases of sugar was discontinued. Thereafter, for some time, there was a downward trend in the price of sugar. But from March, 1979 onwards, there was an unwarranted rising trend of prices and after watching the situation carefully, the Government had to intervene. 1978. Even the mechanism of monthly releases of sugar was discontinued. Thereafter, for some time, there was a downward trend in the price of sugar. But from March, 1979 onwards, there was an unwarranted rising trend of prices and after watching the situation carefully, the Government had to intervene. As a first measure, the Government introduced the system of monthly releases of sugar from individual factories with a view to regulate the availability of adequate stocks in the market throughout the year. This was done by the issue of an order on 6. 1979 issued under clause 4 of the Sugar Control Order, 1966, The order is extracted below: "G.S.R. 345(F)/Ess, COMM/Sufar -in exercise of the powers conferred by clause 4 of the Sugar (Control) Order, 1966, the Central Government hereby directs that no producer of sugar by vaccum pan process shall sell or agree to sell or otherwise dispose of or deliver or agree to deliver sugar or remove sugar from the bonded go downs of the factory in which it is produced, except under and in accordance with the direction issued in writing by the Central Government." A series of other steps like control on the ex-factory and retail prices and the reintroduction of partial control on sugar followed, We are concerned in these two writ petitions only with the release order dated 6. 1979 close on the heals of the order quoted above issued under clause 5 of the Sugar Control Order, 1966 which directed the petitioner-society to sell in India in open market 1692.1 tonnes of sugar subject to certain conditions. It is better to quote the order in extenso: "In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause 5 of the Sugar (Control) Order, 1966, read with the Notification of the Government of India ion the erstwhile Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Community Deve, and Co-operation (Dept. of Food) No.CSR/1750/ESS.Com./Sugar dated the 20th November, 1967, I.A.B. Nagrare, Deputy Director, Directorate of Sugar Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (Dept. of Food) hereby direct that M/s Tirupattur Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd., Tirupattur, Dist. North Arcot, shall sell in India in open market 1692.1 (one thousand six Hundred Ninety two decimal one), tonnes of sugar subject to the following conditions, namely. .1. of Food) hereby direct that M/s Tirupattur Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd., Tirupattur, Dist. North Arcot, shall sell in India in open market 1692.1 (one thousand six Hundred Ninety two decimal one), tonnes of sugar subject to the following conditions, namely. .1. The Sugar which shall conform to ISS specification shall be sold despatched or delivered only to a sugar dealer licensed to deal in sugar under the order relating to the licensing of sugar dealers for the time being in force in a State or Union Territory or to a nominee of the Government of Bhutan and the sale invoice issued by the producer in respect of sugar shall indicate the name and full address of the consignee and his licence number. Provided further that the producer may out of the quality of sugar allowed to be sold by him under this order utilise such quantity as he may consider necessary for the production of sugar products, food products, in which sugar is used and soft drinks in a factory owned by him. 2. There will be no restriction of inter-state movement of sugar including Government of Bhutan. 3. Deliver/despatch of the above said quantity of sugar shall not commence before 5th June, 1979 and the deliver/despatch of the entire quantity shall be completed by the 30th June, 1979". .6. The petitioner felt constrained by a Circular dated 3. 1979 issued by the Director of Sugar, Madras, which prescribed the method of sale of sugar. According to the Circular, the sale of sugar is to be conducted in the premises of the Tamil Nadu State Federation of Co-operative Sugar Factories at Madras. The sale is conducted at 11 A.M. on Tuesdays or Fridays of the next working day. On the date of tender, all the tenders are scrutinised by the Special Officer. If the tenders offered were at par and above the rale at which it was considered normal, having regard to the market rates ascertained in respect of other States, the tenders used to be accepted. The Special Officer of the Federation will communicate the tender results to the concerned Mills. On receipt of the intimation from the Federation, the Mills used to deliver the sugar to the tenderers after collection of the cost. The Special Officer of the Federation will communicate the tender results to the concerned Mills. On receipt of the intimation from the Federation, the Mills used to deliver the sugar to the tenderers after collection of the cost. According to the petitioner, after issue of the impugned order, the petitioner intimated its stock position to the State Federation of the Co-operative Sugar Factories at Madras. As usual, tenders for the sale of sugar had been conducted at the premises of the sugar Federation at Madras on 6. 79, 6. 79, 6. 79, 16. 79, 16. 79, 16. 79, 22679, and 26. 79. It is stated that on those dates, there were tenders only in respect of 2205 bags of sugars which were sold to the respective tenderers during the month of June, 1979. In July, 1979, it is stated that details were furnished to the Chief Directorate, New Delhi, the details regarding the quantity released, the quantity despatched and the quantity lapsed with the reasons for the default on the part of the sugar mills. By a letter dated 27. 1979, the petitioner was called upon to explain its failure to despatch the entire quantity of sugar within the prescribed time. The petitioner-sugar mills submitted its explanation on 37. 1979. 7. The affidavit filed in support of the writ petition further states that there was a meeting of the Officers of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (Department of Food) with the Joint Secretary (S), as Chairman. The Director (Sugar Control) also participated in the meeting. The Committee laid down certain guidelines to be followed in respect of the mills which could not comply with the directions issued by the Government of India. The Committee decided to condone the defaults where the lapses were up to 2.5%. Warning was to be given in respect of lapses between 2.5% and 10%. Even in respect of lapses between 10% and 20%, the committee decided to issue only warning letters provided their performance in July was satisfactory. Where the lapses were more than 20%, it was decided to take suitable steps for launching prosecution. In cases of major defaulters like factories which had reported more than 80% lapses, it was decided to refer the matter to Central Bureau of Investigation for making investigation and launching prosecution. Where the lapses were more than 20%, it was decided to take suitable steps for launching prosecution. In cases of major defaulters like factories which had reported more than 80% lapses, it was decided to refer the matter to Central Bureau of Investigation for making investigation and launching prosecution. Admittedly, in the case of the petitioner, the default was more than 80% and therefore, a complaint was launched with the Central Bureau of Investigation on 211. 1979. It is on that basis, the charge-sheet has been filed on 18. 1980. It is under these circumstances, the petitioner challenges the validity of the notification dated 6. 1979, directing the petitioner to sell in India in open market 1,692.1 tonnes of sugar between 6. 1979 and 30.6.1979. The grounds on which the said order dated 6. 1979 is challenged are as follows: (1) The impugned order is referable only to Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act. The power under Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act can be exercised only if there is a corresponding obligation or liability on certain persons to purchase the goods and the price of the goods is fixed under Sec.3(3-C) of the Act. Therefore, inasmuch as all the requirements of Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act not having been complied with, the impugned order is invalid. (2) There cannot be a blanket direction to dispose of the goods within a particular time without specifying the persons to whom the sugar has to be sold and the price at which the sugar is to be sold. (3) The adverse circumstances referred to by the petitioner-mills in their explanation which are peculiar to the petitioner-mills had not been taken note of. (4) The Special Officer of the petitioner-mills being a Government servant, was bound to follow the directions of the Director of Sugar as contained in the Circular dated 3. 1979 which prevented the petitioner, from accepting any tender which was below the rates ascertained from other States by the Federation of Co-operative Sugar Factories situated at Madras Mr.P.D. Dinakaran, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.5433 of 1982 supports all the above arguments advanced by Mr.N.T. Vanamamalai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.1633 of 1982. In addition, Mr.P.D. Dinakaran, learned counsel argues that the impugned order is totally illogical and therefore in violation of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. In addition, Mr.P.D. Dinakaran, learned counsel argues that the impugned order is totally illogical and therefore in violation of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Secondly, the Special Officer having been appointed under Tamil Nadu Act 25 of 1976, is bound to follow the directions of the Director of Sugar in the Circular already cited above. In fact, the argument is that in respect of any action of the Special Officer done in good faith, there can be no action in law. Mr.P.D. Dinakaran learned counsel also emphasises the fact that the impugned order is referable only to Scc.3(2)(f) of the Act because Sec.3(2) (c) and (d) arc only relateable to dealers. 8. For the purpose of understanding, the arguments addressed by Mr.N.T. Vanamamalai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.1633 of 1982 we have to first go through the provisions of law. 8. For the purpose of understanding, the arguments addressed by Mr.N.T. Vanamamalai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.1633 of 1982 we have to first go through the provisions of law. Sec.3(1) of the Act is as follows: "(1) If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, or for securing any essential commodity for the defence of India or the efficient conduct of military operations, it may, by order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein." Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act is as follows: "(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-sec.(1), an order made thereunder may provide- .(f) for requiring any person holding in stock, or engaged in the production, or in the business of buying or selling, of any essential commodity,- .(a) to sell the whole or a specified part of the quantity held in slock or produced or received by him, or .(b) in the case of any such commodity which is likely to be produced or received by him, to sell the whole or a specified part of such commodity when produced or received by him, to the Central Government or a Slate Government or to an Officer or agent of such Government or to a Corporation owned or controlled by such Government or to such other person or class of persons and in such circumstances as may be specified in the order." Sec.3(3-C) of the Act is as follows: "(3-C) Where any producer is required by an order made with reference to clause (f) of Sub-sec.(2) to sell any kind of sugar (whether to the Central Government or a State Government or to any Officer or agent of such Government or to any other person or class of persons) and either no notification in respect of such sugar has been issued under Sub-sec.(3-A) or any such notification, having been issued, has ceased to remain in force by efflux of time, then, notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-sec.(3), there shall be paid to that producer an amount therefor which shall be calculated with reference to such price of sugar as the Central Government may, by order, determine, having regard to- .(a) the minimum price, if any, fixed for sugarcane by the Central Government under this section; .(b) the manufacturing cost of sugar; .(c) the duty or tax, if any, paid or payable thereon; and .(d) the securing of a reasonable return on the capital employed in the business of manufacturing sugar, and different prices may be determined from lime to time for different areas or for different factories or for different kinds of sugar. Explanation: For the purposes of this sub-sec. ‘producer’ means a person carrying on the business of manufacturing sugar." The next set of provisions which require consideration are clauses 4 and 5 of the Sugar Control Order and they are extracted below: "4. Power to restrict sale etc. of sugar by producers: The Central Government may direct that no producer shall sell or agree to sell or otherwise dispose of, or deliver, or agree to deliver any kind of sugar or remove any kind of sugar from the bonded go downs of the factory in which it is produced, except under and in accordance with a direction issued in writing by the Centra! Government: Provided that this clause shall not affect the pledging of such sugar by any producer in favour of any Scheduled Bank, as defined in clause (e)of Sec.2 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (2 of 1934), or any corresponding new bank constituted under Sec.3 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (5 of 1970) and no such bank shall sell the sugar pledged to it except under and in accordance with a direction issued in writing by the Central Government. 5. Power to issue directions to producers and dealers: The Central Government may, from lime to time by general or special order, issue to any producer or recognised dealer, or any class of producers or recognised dealers, such directions regarding the production, maintenance of stocks, storage sale, grading, packing, making weighment, disposal, deliver and distribution of any kind of sugar as it may deem fit." 9. According to Mr.N.T. Vanamamalai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, these provisions of law taken along with the impugned order which I have already quoted above, clearly establish that the impugned order is meaningless and impracticable and cannot be traced to any of the provisions of the Act or the Sugar Control Order. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the impugned order is wholly illegal and unconstitutional inasmuch as neither the persons who will take delivery of the sugar nor the price of the sugar at which the petitioner should sell had been specified. 10. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the impugned order is wholly illegal and unconstitutional inasmuch as neither the persons who will take delivery of the sugar nor the price of the sugar at which the petitioner should sell had been specified. 10. Mr.N.T. Vanamamalai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.1633 of 1982 relies on a number of judgments to bring home the points that without specifying the persons who will purchase the quantity of sugar ordered to be sold and without specifying the price at which the sugar is to be sold, the impugned order cannot be given effect to at all. The first judgment is directly on the point. It is an unreported judgment of the Bombay High Court in a Criminal Application No. 1472 of 1980 Shri Jagadamba Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra and others. In that case, the petitioner before the Court was directed to sell in India in open market a quantity of 397.5 tonnes of sugar with a rider that the deliver/despatch of the aforesaid quantity of sugar shall not commence before 5th June, 1979and the delivery/despatch of the entire quantity shall be completed by the 30th June, 1979. In that case also all the persons concerned with the manufacturing company were charge-sheeted before the judicial magistrate and the application was to quash the said charge-sheet. The Bombay High Court has proceeded on the basis that the impugned order was referrable to Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act and proceeded to decide the case and that basis. This will be clear from the following passage: "The provisions of Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act read with Scc.3(3-C) of the Act clearly shows that the power of the Government extends to directing the persons such as the petitioner to sell their sugar stocks either to the Government or to any particular person indicated by the Government. But, that power cannot be exercised so as to require the persons such as the petitioner to sell the sugar at a loss or without any margin of profit. But, that power cannot be exercised so as to require the persons such as the petitioner to sell the sugar at a loss or without any margin of profit. The amplitude of the power does not extend to giving any blank direction to the persons such as the petitioner to sell the goods within an arbitrarily specified period regardless of the price to be fetched for the same." The learned Judge then proceeded to say that a direction to sell the goods must necessarily involve the corresponding obligation or liability on some person to purchase the goods. Further, such purchase shall be at a price specified, by the Government under Scc.3(3-C) of the Act. The learned Judge proceeds to say that while fixing the price, the requirements of Sec.3(3-C) of the Act have to be taken into account and a reasonable return on the capital should be assured for the manufacturer. Therefore, the learned Judge held that the impugned order was a blanket order and not authorised by the Sugar Control Order, 1966. Accordingly, the learned Judge quashed the charge-sheet in that case. This being a direct judgment on the point, I would have simply followed the same but for the fact that the learned counsel for the respondent says that the impugned order is not at all referable to Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act. Therefore, the initial presumption of the Bombay High Court, according to the learned counsel for the respondents is without any basis. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, the impugned order is referable to Sec.3(2)(d) of the Act. 11. Before going to the other decisions cited at the Bar, it is better that I first decide whether the impugned order is referable to Sec.3(2)(f) of the ActorSec.3(2)(d)oftheAct. After carefully going through the entire Sec.3 of the Act, 1 am of the opinion that the provisions like Sec.3(3), (3-A), 3(3-B) and 3(3-C) of the Act relate to the orders passed under Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act While Sec.3(3) of the Act says that in respect of an order under Sec.3(2)(f) there shall be paid to the person a price therefor as fixed under Sub-Clauses (a) to (c), Sec.3(3-A) of the Act provides for a special fixation of price where the Government was considering a case of rise in prices or preventing the hoarding of any foodstuff. 12. 12. Sec.3(3-B) of the Act refers to a case of an order under Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act in respect of sale of foodstuffs to the Central Government, or the State Government or to the Officers of such Government or to a Corporation owned or controlled by such Government. Sec.3(3-C)of the Act provides a fixation of price in respect of an order under Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act not only to Governments or Government Corporations but also to any other person or class of persons. It is under this last clause the learned counsel for the petitioner wants to bring the instant case and contends that as per subclause (d), the Government should secure a reasonable return on the capital employed in the business of manufacture in sugar. This is precisely the sub-clause which has been relied on by the Bombay High Court. It appears to me that on a reading of the entire Sec.3 of the Act, the question of fixation of price in respect of goods directed to be sold under Sec.3(2)(f) is alone dealt with by Sub-sec.3(3), 3(3-A), 3(3-B) and 3(3-C) of the Act. 13. There is also one other angle from which this can be approached. If the interpretation of the learned counsel for the petitioner is to be accepted, the normal practice among the manufacturers of sugar would be to look for the price fixation as soon as an order is passed directing the sale of sugar. Therefore, when the impugned order was passed on 6. 1979 directing the petitioner to sell 1,692.1 tonnes of sugar, the immediate reaction would have been to write to the authorities and ask them as to the price fixed under the above quoted sub-sections. The very fact that the petitioner did not raise any such question, during the relevant period itself shows that the manufacturers of sugar are well aware that in respect of monthly release orders passed by the first respondent the question of fixation of price does not at all arise. The petitioner has not shown even a single case where in respect of such release orders, there was price fixation under any of the above sub-sections. 14. Clause 9 of the Sugar Control Order, 1966 also throws light on the issue in question. Clause 9 of the said order is quoted below: “9. The petitioner has not shown even a single case where in respect of such release orders, there was price fixation under any of the above sub-sections. 14. Clause 9 of the Sugar Control Order, 1966 also throws light on the issue in question. Clause 9 of the said order is quoted below: “9. Utilisation of sugar taken delivery of, in pursuance of an order under Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act where any person, class of persons or organisation takes delivery of sugar from any producer in pursuance of a direction made under clause (f) of sub-sec.(2) of Sec.3 of the Act, such person, class of persons or organisation, as the case may be, shall- .(i) utilise the sugar so taken delivery for the purpose for which such delivery was taken and for no other purpose; .(ii) submit to the Chief Director within fifteen days of the utilisation of the sugar so taken delivery of, a certificate to the effect that the sugar has been utilised for the purpose for which it was taken delivery of.” Therefore, if an order is passed under Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act, normally the person or class of persons to whom the sugar is directed to be sold have a responsibility to utilise the sugar and also to send Certificates to that effect. Therefore, it follows that if an order is passed under Sec.3(2)(f), necessarily the person or class of persons shall also be named in the order and consequently, the question of price fixation will also will also be undertaken. Inasmuch as in the instant case, neither the person nor the class of persons who are bound to purchase the sugar have been named, it follows that the impugned order is not referable to Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act. It may look as if, that I am putting the cart before the house. Normally, the respondents who passed the orders like the impugned orders and who have been passing such orders for several decades, cannot be expected to pass an order which no reasonable person can pass without mentioning the person or class of persons who are bound to purchase the sugar released. As I have already pointed cut, when such an impugned order is passed, omitting the significant requirement under law, the petitioner should have immediately protested. As I have already pointed cut, when such an impugned order is passed, omitting the significant requirement under law, the petitioner should have immediately protested. The silence on the part of the petitioner also gives room for the interpretation that the impugned order is not at all one passed under Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act. .15. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in both the writ petitions sought to gain support from the provisions of the Act which deal with producers separately and dealers separately. Secs.3(l) and 3(2) of the Act are of general character and they will apply to producers and dealers. Sec.3(3-C) of the Act refers only to a producer called upon to sell sugar. Similarly, Clause4 of the Sugar Control Order, 1966 refers only to a producer whereas Clause 5 refers to a producer or a recognised dealer. I am unable to see as to how the distinction between the producer and a recognised dealer vis-a-vis the provisions of the Act and the Control Order can help us to understand whether the impugned order has been passed under Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act or under Sec.3(2)(d) of the Act. The argument of Mr.Dinakaran that any order under Secs.3(2)(c) and 3(2)(d) of the Act can only relate to dealers and therefore the impugned order should be considered to be one under Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act, does not also find favour with me. I am unable to see from the wording of Secs.3(2)(c) and 3(2)(d) of the Act that will be restricted only to dealers. It is not disputed that Sec.3(l) of the Act generally applies to both producers and dealers. Sec.3(2)(c) of the Act and (d) being only the specific instances of the general power should also apply to both producers and dealers. 16. One other argument addressed on behalf of the petitioners as well as the respondents is that sub-sec.(2) of Sec.3 of the Act is only illustrative of the main provision sub-sec.3(1) of the Act. I am of the opinion that whether we call it as illustrative or conferring independent powers, the fact remains that sub-sec.(2) starts by saying “without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-sec.(l)”, thus implying that all the powers conferred under Sec.3(l) of the Act. I am of the opinion that whether we call it as illustrative or conferring independent powers, the fact remains that sub-sec.(2) starts by saying “without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-sec.(l)”, thus implying that all the powers conferred under Sec.3(l) of the Act. What is important is that even if sub-sec.(2) has omitted to refer to any specific power, it will be always open to the authorities to bring a particular order within the general power conferred under Sec.3(l) of the Act. This is only way we should understand the section. .17. One other circumstance which can be taken note of while considering the question whether the impugned order is referable to Sec.3(2)(d) of Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act is to find out what is the purpose of the Act and the control orders. The concept of securing equitable distribution of an essential article involves a consideration of not only the requirements of the consumers but also building up of stocks and the question of equitable distribution of such stocks which in turn has a bearing on the price fluctuations. Therefore, the repeated reference of securing a reasonable return on she capital employed in the business of manufacturing sugar in Sec.3(3-C) of the Act does not help the petitioners in interpreting the impugned order. Learned counsel for respondents says that orders under Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act are passed only in respect of compulsory levy of essential articles. Then the persons to whom the levy should be surrendered and the price at which the levy should be surrendered are taken care of. 18. The last question, one has to consider before taking a final decision on this point, is whether Sec.3(2)(d) of the Act authorises the passing of the impugned order. 19. Mr.N.T. Vanamamalai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P:No.l633 of 1982, argues that clause (d) of sub-sec. (2) of Sec.3 of the Act refers to only regulation by licences and permits. He also adds that the word ‘otherwise’ following the words ‘licences, permits’ should be read ejusdem generis with the words ‘licences and permits’. Therefore, it is contended that the impugned order cannot at all be brought under Sec.3(2)(d) of the Act. (2) of Sec.3 of the Act refers to only regulation by licences and permits. He also adds that the word ‘otherwise’ following the words ‘licences, permits’ should be read ejusdem generis with the words ‘licences and permits’. Therefore, it is contended that the impugned order cannot at all be brought under Sec.3(2)(d) of the Act. I am unable to agree with this contention because we have to read Sec.3(2) of the Act in the following manner: An order made underSec.3(1) of the Act may provide for regulating by licences, the storage, transport, distribution etc., or an order made under Sec.3(1) of the Act may provide for regulating by permits, the storage transport, distribution, etc. or the order may provide for regulating the storage, transport, distribution etc., by any other mode. Therefore by bringing it under the lest method of reading Sec.3(2)(d) of the Act, as indicated above I am of the opinion that the impugned, order can certainly be construed as an order regulating the distribution and disposal of an essential commodity by sale. 20. Having given my anxious consideration to all the points discussed above, I am of the view that the impugned order is not one referable to Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act and therefore, the failure to describe a corresponding obligation on the part of the dealers to purchase the sugar and the failure to fix the price under Sec.3(3-C) of the Act do not vitiate the impugned order. Having come to this conclusion, the question now is whether the order construed as one under Sec.3(2)(d) of the Act is reasonable or in any way contravenes Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. While referring to the decisions dated at the Bar, it will be seen that some of the decisions support the view taken by me that the impugned order is not referable under Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act. 1 am now referring to the other decisions cited on behalf of the petitioners as well as the respondents. In oudu Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1070, the Supreme Court was concerned with a similar question. But the issue involved in that case was slightly different. In that case also, company was directed to dispose of sugar released for sale in the open market on or before a particular date. In oudu Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1070, the Supreme Court was concerned with a similar question. But the issue involved in that case was slightly different. In that case also, company was directed to dispose of sugar released for sale in the open market on or before a particular date. But in that case immediately after receiving the order, producers entered into contracts with the dealers for the sale of sugar. They also applied for railway wagons for transport of that sugar to the States out side their own. Most of the sugar released for open sale, was removed from their go downs within the time prescribed, but each of the producers was not able to put into open market a fraction of the sugar released for sale in the open market as the railway wagons were not made available to them in time due to some difficulty or other on the part of the railways. It was also found as a matter of (act, that while in all the cases 30 days’ time has been given, in the case of the appellants before the Supreme Court only 26 days’ time had been given. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the time of 26 days granted to the appellants before their request for extension of lime was one requiring serious consideration. The Supreme Court did not consider any other question of law. Therefore, I am unable to rely on the said judgment for upholding the contention raised in these writ petitions. In P.P. Enterprises v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1016: 1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 341: (1982)2 S.C.C. 33 : (1982)2 S.C.J. 56, the validity of a notification by the Central Government directing recognised dealers to keep only particular qualities of stock at any time was challenged on the ground of discrimination between one dealer and another. The impugned notification in that case was upheld on the ground that it was only with a view to prevent hoarding and block-marketing and the court has always to strike, a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed under Art.19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and the social control permitted by clause (6) of that Article. The argument was also advanced that the said notification was not covered by Sec.3 of the Act. The argument was also advanced that the said notification was not covered by Sec.3 of the Act. It is significant to point out the Supreme Court pointed out Sec.3(1) of the Act was wide enough and in particular that the order could be brought under Scc.3(2)(d) of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the impugned order was fully protected and not ultra vires Sec.3 of the Act. There was also an argument in that case that there was no scheme in respect of sugar for procurement of the same by the Government and therefore at any particular point of time, if the slock was found to be in excess of the prescribed limit in the hands of the dealer, he was exposed to punishment. In considering this question, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "15. The argument though attractive cannot be accepted. Over the years sugar has become a scarce commodity and people have to purchase it even at a prohibitive price. In the circumstances, it cannot be expected that the dealers would not be able to sell the sugar in their stock. There is absolutely no difficulty in selling the sugar at any time at the prevalent market price. If in a rare case, there is difficulty on that score we hope and trust that the concerned Government would allow a reasonable time within which the petitioners arc permitted to dispose of the excess quantity of sugar, if any. In any case, in some given case there may be some hardship but it cannot be said on that account that the impugned order is violative of Art.14 of the Constitution". 21.This judgment, in my opinion, far from helping the petitioners supports the stand taken by the respondents. In fact, the learned counsel for the respondents has relied on the very same judgment to buttress his argument. In particular, the learned counsel for the respondents relies on para 13 of the judgment which deals with the very argument addressed on behalf of petitioners and rejects the same as untenable. The only sentence which is relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Supreme Court has expressed a found hope that the concerned Government will allow a reasonable time within which the petitioners in that case should be permitted to dispose of the excess quantity of sugar. The only sentence which is relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Supreme Court has expressed a found hope that the concerned Government will allow a reasonable time within which the petitioners in that case should be permitted to dispose of the excess quantity of sugar. So far as the question of reasonable time being given to the petitioners, I will deal with the question at a later stage. The next judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is in A.C.S. Kandaswamy Reddiar v. Textile Commissioner of Government of India, I.L.R. (1953) Mad. 51: (1951)2 M.L.J. 658 : A.I.R. 1952 Mad. 409. It was held in that case that the notification issued under the Cotton Control order, 1950 had the effect of preventing most of the merchants from carrying on any business and resulting in extension of their trade and there was no demonstrable advantage to the Public. It was under those circumstances, the notification was declared as unconstitutional. On facts, I do not think that the said judgment can help the petitioners. 22. In Union of India and another v. Cynamide India Ltd,, and another, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1802, the question related to the fixation of price in respect of Essential Commodity, the Supreme Court was considering as to in which cases, the principles of natural justice will apply. They held that in respect of price fixation under Sec.3 of the Act, the question of principles of natural justice will not arise, because the authority was exercising legislative action but when the subordinate authority fixes the price under Sec.3(3-C) of the Act, the question will be slightly different. While on this decision, the following passage may be noticed to decide the question whether the impugned order is under Sec.3(2)(f) of Sec.3(2)(d) of the Act: "The order requiring him to sell the sugar to the Government was made under Sec.3(2) (f) of the Essential Commodities Act under which the Central Government was enabled to make an order requiring any person engaged in the production of any essential commodity to sell the whole or a specified part of the quantity produced by him to the Government or its nominee. It will straightway be seen that an order under Sec.3(2)(f) is a specific order directed to a particular individual for the purpose of enabling the Central Government to purchase a certain quantity of the commodity from the person holding it. It is an order for a compulsory sale. When such a compulsory sale is required to be made under Sec.3(2)(f) the question naturally arises what is the price to be paid for the commodity purchased? Sec.3(3-C) provides for the ascertainment of the price." The said passage, in my view, supports the stands taken by the respondents that the impugned order is not one under Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act. The Judgment in Vishundas Hundumal Etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1636: (1981)2 S.C.C. 410 , is relied on by Mr.Dinakaran, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner, to contend that when the Authority makes a mistake and such a mistake results in gross discrimination then the Court has necessarily to strike it down. The argument is that the Central Government in passing the impugned order has failed to fix the price of the sugar and the persons, who will purchase the sugar. Therefore, if the Central Government had committed a mistake or due to their inadvertence they have omitted to fix the price and as a result, the petitioner is put to difficulties, the impugned order has to be struck down this argument will require consideration only if I take the view that the impugned order is referable to Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act. I have already held that the impugned order is referable to Scc.3(2)(d) of the Act and not Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act. 23. One other judgment cited on behalf of the respondents is in Panipat Co-operative Sugar Mills etc.v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 537: (1973)2 S.C.J. 665. In that case, the Central Government had directed certain manufacturers to sell sugar to the Government 60% of their production during the year 1970-71 at prices fixed by the Central Government. Two principal questions which came up for consideration before the Supreme Court were (1) What the true interpretation of Sec.3(3-C) of the Act; (2) Whether the price of Rs. 124.63 was in accordance with the provisions of Sec.3(3-C) of the Act. Two principal questions which came up for consideration before the Supreme Court were (1) What the true interpretation of Sec.3(3-C) of the Act; (2) Whether the price of Rs. 124.63 was in accordance with the provisions of Sec.3(3-C) of the Act. The case before the Supreme Court was a clear case where there was not only a direction to sell but there was also a direction to sell sugar at prices fixed by the Government. The Supreme Court, therefore, was considering the manner of fixation of price under Sec.3(3-C) of the Act. Learned Counsel for the respondents relies on the following passage to contend that Sec.3(2)(f) of the Act relates only to orders of levy or compulsory procurement by the Government or its agencies: “The two concepts, viz., the amount payable to the producer and the price to be determined by Government are distinct and much of the confusion in interpreting the sub-section would be dispelled if they were seen distinctly. The words ‘amount therefore’ mean the amount to be paid to the manufacturer in respect of such quantity of his stock as is required to be sold under an order made with reference to sub-sec.2(f). That amount, is, therefore, referable to the stock of sugar, specified in such order, that is to say the levy-sugar”. I do not think that the said statement of the Supreme Court is of any help to decide the present case because the Supreme Court was dealing with an order which not only directed to sell 60% of the production but also fix the prices at which they should be sold. In the case before us, there is only a direction to sell unaccompanied by an order fixing the prices or naming the persons who shall purchase the sugar. 24. Mr.R. Muthukumaraswami, learned counsel for the respondents then relies on the decision in M/s. Prag Ice and Oil Mills v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1296. The Supreme Court was concerned with the validity of Mustard Oil (Price Control) Order, 1977. The following observations are relevant for the purpose of meeting the case of the petitioners: “And though patent injustice to the producer is not to be encouraged, a reasonable rate of profit is not the sine quo non of the validity of action taken in furtherance of the powers conferred by Sec.3(1) and Sec.3(2)(c) of the Essential Commodities Act. The following observations are relevant for the purpose of meeting the case of the petitioners: “And though patent injustice to the producer is not to be encouraged, a reasonable rate of profit is not the sine quo non of the validity of action taken in furtherance of the powers conferred by Sec.3(1) and Sec.3(2)(c) of the Essential Commodities Act. The interest of the consumer has to be kept in the forefront and the prime consideration that an essential commodity ought to be made available to the common man at a fair price must rank in priority over every other consideration.” 25. The argument addressed on behalf of the petitioners and which found favour with the Bombay High Court in the unreported judgment cited above is adequately met in the following passage of the Supreme Court: “.....We are of the opinion that the circumstance that the petitioners may have to suffer a loss over a short period immediately following upon the promulgation of the Price Control Order will not render the Order constitutionally invalid......” Again, the Supreme Court says: “..... that such provisions have to be viewed through a socially constructive, not legally captious microscope to discover a glaring unconstitutional infirmity, that when laws affecting large chunks of community are enacted stray misfortunes are inevitable and that social legislation without tears, affecting vested rights, is virtually impossible.” The decision cited at the Bar in support of their respective contentions have been analysed by me and when applied to the proposition whether the impugned order is unreasonable and in violation of Art.l9(1)(g) of the Constitution of India or Art.14 of the Constitution, I must hold that the impugned order is intra vires the said Articles of the Constitution of India and is perfectly valid. I have come to the above conclusion relying on the decisions of the Supreme Court In M/s. Prag ice and Oil Mills and another v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1296 and P.P. Enterprises v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1016. Having thus elaborated on the questions of law, let me now consider the facts leading to the grievance of the petitioner. The two aspects which are projected in the forefront are: (1) the Circular issued in Rc. No. 7422/ 79/B2. dated 3. Having thus elaborated on the questions of law, let me now consider the facts leading to the grievance of the petitioner. The two aspects which are projected in the forefront are: (1) the Circular issued in Rc. No. 7422/ 79/B2. dated 3. 1979 by the Director of Sugar, Madras prescribing the mode of conducting sales by the Co-operative Societies to which I have already made reference in narrating the facts. The argument is that the Special Officers appointed under the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies (Appointment of Special Officers) Act, 1976 are bound to carry out the directions of the higher authorities and no suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of the said Act (Sec.7). (2) Bona fide attempts were made by the Petitioners on several dates like 6. 1979, 6. 1979, 6. 1979, 16. 1979, 16. 1979, 16. 1979, 26. 1979 and 26. 1979 when tenders for sale of sugar were called for but the petitioners could sell only 2,205 bags of sugar. The second aspect of the case relates to the disadvantages of the petitioner sugar mills, compared to the other sugar mills. To put it in the words of the petitioner, it is as follows: “I state that the Sugar Mills has got a number of disadvantages in disposing of its production. The Mill is situated at a far off distance from a large Sugar Marketing Centres and the dealers prefer to have their requirements either from Vellore Cooperative Sugar Mills or other Mills which are nearer to them than from this Sugar Mills. Further, the dealers used to stale that it was always difficult to get lorries to lift sugar from the petitioner Mills as it is located far away from the Centre where lorries would be available in sufficient numbers. Therefore, generally the tenderers in respect of these mills were not forth coming as in the case of other Mills in spite of the best efforts. Added to this, in the month of June, 1979, there was transport difficulties due to agitation, by Lorry Drivers. Consequently, the traders were hesitating to give offers for purchase of sugar from the petitioner-mills. Therefore, generally the tenderers in respect of these mills were not forth coming as in the case of other Mills in spite of the best efforts. Added to this, in the month of June, 1979, there was transport difficulties due to agitation, by Lorry Drivers. Consequently, the traders were hesitating to give offers for purchase of sugar from the petitioner-mills. In view of the stringent conditions imposed in the tenders that the Sugar purchased should be cleared before the end of June, the traders were further reluctant to offer tenders. All these factors contributed to the noncompliance of the direction issued by the Government of India on 6. 1979.” 26. While interpreting the law, I had to keep in mind the observations of Ray, C.J., in Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 366: (1974)2 S.C.R. 398, which areas follows: “In determining the reasonableness of a restriction imposed by law in the field of industry, trade or commerce, it has to be remembered that the mere fact that some of those who are engaged in these are alleging loss after the imposition of law will not render the law unreasonable. By its very nature, industry or trade or commerce goes through periods of prosperity and adversity on count of economic and sometimes social and political factors. In a largely free economy when controls have to be introduced to ensure availability of consumer goods like foodstuff, cloth and the like at a fair price, it is an impracticable proposition to require the Government to go through the exercise like that of a Commission to fix the prices.” Another passage from the judgment of the learned Chief Justice which has an important bearing on the instant case is to the following effect: When available stocks go underground and.... “the Government has to step into control, distribution and availability in public interest, fixing of price can be only empirical. Market prices at a time when the goods did not go underground and were freely available, the general rise in prices, the capacity of the consumer specially in case of consumer goods like food-stuff, cloth etc. “the Government has to step into control, distribution and availability in public interest, fixing of price can be only empirical. Market prices at a time when the goods did not go underground and were freely available, the general rise in prices, the capacity of the consumer specially in case of consumer goods like food-stuff, cloth etc. the amount of loss which the industry is able to absorb after having made huge profits in prosperous years, all these enter into the calculation of a fair price in an emergency created by artificial shortages.” But when faced with the difficulty experienced by a particular producer giving facts and figures as to why they could not comply with the impugned order, I cannot take a rigid attitude. I am not satisfied with the contention that as a Special Officer, the petitioner was bound to follow the directions of the Director of Sugar because the Circular of the Director of Sugars cannot militate against a statutory direction issued under the Sugar Control Order, 1966. Similarly, the difficulties expressed by the petitioners have not been totally ignored by the respondents. This is because there was a meeting of the Officers of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation with the Joint Secretary wherein the Director of Sugar, New Delhi was also participating. The Committee laid down certain guidelines, to which I have already made reference and it is only in the cases of major defaults resulting in more than 80% lapses, it was decided to have the matter investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation and to launch prosecution. Admittedly, in the case of the petitioner, the lapse was more than 80%. I must recall here the observations of the Supreme Court in P.P. Enterprises Etc. v. Union of India and others, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1016: (1981)2 S.C.C. 33. The following observations assume importance; “There is absolutely no difficulty in selling the sugar at any time at the prevalent market price. If in a rare case, there is difficulty on that score we hope and trust that the concerned Government would allow a reasonable time within which the petitioners are permitted to dispose of the excess quantity of sugar, if any.” Mr.P.D. Dinakaran, learned counsel for the petitioner, has given me the data in respect of the Cooperative Sugar Mills giving particulars of the quantity sold by each area. It is interesting to peruse the same. It is interesting to peruse the same. I have therefore quoted below the data given by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Sugar Mills Quantity Released in June, 1979 M. Tonnes Quantity sold in June, 1979 in M. Tonnes Quantity lapsed in June, 1979 in M. Tonnes Sale price per bag (quintal) in Rs. 1. Maduranthakam 1821.7 1814.7 7.0 215 to 219.25 2. Vellore 1458.3 1458.3 - 208 to 219 3. Ambur 2899.9 1370.0 1529.0 208 to 217.50 4. Kallakurichi 1909.3 831.0 1078.3 5. Tirupathur 1692.1 220.5 1471.6 208 to 217.50 The above date proves that the directions of the Central Government had been fully complied with by the Co-operative Sugar Mills in Maduranthakam and Vellore. In Ambur area, nearly 50% of the quantity released had been sold. It is only in Kallakurichi and Tirupathur, the compliance was very poor. In this connection, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Oudh Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India and others, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1070 comes to the help of the petitioners where the grant of 26 days for clearance of the goods was found to be inadequate and the Supreme Court granted reliefs to the petitioners. Mr.N.T. Vanamamalai, learned senior counsel for the petitioner also attacks the decision to prosecute the petitioner on the basis of a post facto decision fixing the percentage of losses, In my opinion, this argument cannot be accepted, because the liability to be punished is there in the Sugar Control Order itself. The subsequent decision was only to drop prosecution against cases where the percentage of lapses was minimal. There is, therefore, no violation of the Art.20 of the Constitution Mr.N.T. Vanamamalai, learned Senior counsel also places before me the letter dated 27. 1981 addressed by the Hon’ble the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu to the Union Minister for Home, making a special plea on behalf of the petitioner Sugar mills entreating the Central Government to withdraw the case pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate at Chengalpattu. There was again a telegram from the Honourable Minister for Industries, Government of Tamil Nadu to the Honorable Minister for Food and Agriculture, New Delhi. There was again a telegram from the Honourable Minister for Industries, Government of Tamil Nadu to the Honorable Minister for Food and Agriculture, New Delhi. The learned counsel for the petitioner also says that in respect of penalties provided under the Essential Commodities Act, mensrea be a necessary ingredient for constituting any offence under the Act, and if, notwithstanding the best efforts of the Sugar Factories concerned, there was not enough registered dealers to come forward to purchase the quantities to be sold by the producer or if the price offered by the purchasers was absolutely unreasonable or the movement of goods was impeded by shortage of railway wagons, the Sugar Factories would not be guilty of the offence for want of mens rea. There is also a letter written by the Director of Sugar, Madras to the Government of India pleading for withdrawal of the Criminal Cases. 27. I must also take into consideration of the facts that the writ petitions were entertained in the year 1982 and all further proceedings have been stayed pending disposal of the writ petitions. I am therefore inclined to view the particular lapse on the part of the petitioners leniently and sympathetically having regard to the predicament in which the Special Officer was placed. The legal position having been made clear, the petitioner also can be let off with a serious warning. While, therefore, rejecting the prayer in the writ petition to quash the impugned notification dated 6. 1979, I issue a direction to the respondents not to prosecute the petitioners and instead administer severe warning not to commit any further disobedience of the directions of the Central Government issued under the Sugar Control Order, 1976. The charge sheet 11/79E dated 18. 80 will stand quashed. The writ petitions are ordered in the above terms. There will be no order as to costs.