JUDGMENT S.K. Dhaon, J. :- This and the, companion Writ Petition No. 18348 of 1989 are interconnected. They have not been formally admitted. However, in both the petitions affidavits have been exchanged between the parties. They are ripe for hearing with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, we heard them together with a view to finally dispose them of. We are proceeding to do so. 2. In November, 1985, the petitioner was recommended by the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) constituted under the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Board Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for being appointed as a Principal of the Sanathan Dharam Inter College, Muzaffarnagar (hereinafter referred to as the Institution). On 16th December, 1985, in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, preferred by the management of the Institution, the Supreme Court in Writ petition No. 12872 of 1985 by means of an interim order restrained the appointment of the petitioner. On 16th December, 1987, the interim order was vacated. On 30th December, 1987, the Committee of Management of the Institution resolved that the petitioner should be appointed as the Principal On 31st December, 1987, a letter of appointment was issued to the petitioner and on 2nd January, 1988, the petitioner joined on the post of the Principal. He was appointed on probation. On 7th November, 1988, the Committee of Management passed a resolution recommending the termination of the services of the petitioner. On 23rd December, 1988, the Commission disapproved the recommendation of the Committee of Management for terminating the services of the petitioner. On 27th December, 1988, a notice was issued for convening an emergent meeting of the Committee of Management on 30th December, 1988. On 30th December, 1988, the Committee of Management resolved to extend the probation period of the petitioner till 30th June, 1989. On 9th February, 1989, the Committee of Management preferred a petition before the Commission seeking the review of its order dated 23rd December, 1988, refusing to approve its,resolution terminating the services of the petitioner. On 6th May, 1989, the District Inspector of Schools cancelled the resolution dated 30th December, 1988, of the Committee of Management extending the probation of the petitioner till 3oth June, 1989. On 13th May, 1989, the Committee of Management again resolved that the services of the petitioner should be terminated. On 6th May, 1989, the District Inspector of Schools cancelled the resolution dated 30th December, 1988, of the Committee of Management extending the probation of the petitioner till 3oth June, 1989. On 13th May, 1989, the Committee of Management again resolved that the services of the petitioner should be terminated. On 29th June, 1989, the Secretary of the Commission sent a communication along with the order dated 28th June, 1989, of the Commission' granting approval to the resolution of the Committee of Management whereby the petitioner's services had been terminated. On 29th June, 1989, the Committee of Management again resolved to extend the period of probation of the petitioner. On 30th June, 1989, the Manager of the Institution issued a notice to the petitioner, whereby he purported to terminate his services. 3. In the fore-front the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner was that the resolution dated 30th December, 1988, of the Committee of Management extending the period of Probation of the petitioner till 30th June, 1989, having been set aside by the District Inspector of Schools on 6th May, 1989, the services of the petitioner stood automatically confirmed and, therefore, the resolution dated 13th May, 1989, of the Committee of Management, whereby.the services of the petitioner had been terminated on the footing that he was a probationer, was ill-founded. The services of the petitioner could be done away with only after treating him as a confirmed employee and after following the detailed procedure as provided in the relevant Regulations. This having not been done, the resolution of the Committee of Management was void and the approval of the Commission too was void. 4. The Management countered the submission made on behalf of the petitioner and it was argued on its behalf that the District Inspector of School not only acted without jurisdiction in setting aside the resolution of 30th December, 1988, but also acted illegally in doing so in so far as he did not consider the explanation offered by the Management in defence of the said resolution dated 30th December, 1988, and also on account of the fact that the District Inspector of Schools had himself acted upon the said resolution by stopping the increment of the petitioner. 5. 5. During the course of the hearing of this petition, the companion writ petition was filed by the Management and in this petition the prayer is that the order dated 6th May, 1989, passed by the District Inspector of Schools should be quashed. 6. The fate of this petition, in our opinion, depends upon decision of two questions. First, whether the petitioner (Om Prakash) is entitled to canvass for the acceptance of the theory of automatic confirmation in service? Secondly, whether the resolution dated 30th December, 1988, passed by the Committee of Management extending the period of probation of the petitioner till 30th June, 1989, is a valid one? We are, therefore, proceeding to answer the two questions in the order passed. Before the enforcement of the Act, the terms and conditions of service of a Principle of an intermediate College were governed by the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (U.P. Act 2 of 1921) (hereinafter referred to as the U.P. Act 2 of 1921) and the Regulations framed thereunder. S. 16-E of the U.P. Act 2 of 1921 lays down a detailed procedure for the selection of teachers and Head of Institutions. S. 16-G deals with the conditions of services of the Head of Institutions, teachers and other employees. Sub-section (1) of this provision enjoins, inter alia, that every person employed in a recognised institution shall be governed by such conditions of service as may be prescribed by Regulations. Sub-sec. (2) of the said provision, inter alia, states that the Regulations may provide for the period of probation, the conditions of confirmation and the procedure and conditions for promotion, punishment etc. Chapter III of the Regulations has the heading "conditions of service." It deals with appointment, probation, confirmation and promotion. Regulation 8, inter alia, provides that the period of probation for a Head of Institution or teacher, whether appointed by direct recruitment or promotion, shall be one year. Regulation 9 says that no teacher or Head of an Institution shall be confirmed in his appointment until he has passed the High School Examination with compulsory Hindi as one of his subjects (in the instant case, it is nobody's case that the petitioner, on the relevant date, had not passed the High School Examination with compulsory Hindi as one of his subjects). Regulation 10 provides that a person placed on probation shall be confirmed if he fulfils the requirements of Regulation 9, has worked with diligence, has otherwise proved himself fit for the post for which he was recruited and his integrity is certified. Regulation 11 is important and may be extracted :- "Unless before the expiry of the period of probation, the service of a Headmaster, Principal or teacher is terminated or action is taken to dismiss, discharge or remove him or reduce him in rank or in the case of Headmaster or Principal the period of probation is extended under Regulation 12 following he shall be confirmed on the post and in the grade at the end of his probation." Regulation 12 provides that the period of probation of a Headmaster or Principal can be extended by a maximum period of 12 months. 7. In S. 2(k) of the Act "teacher' is defined to mean "a person employed for imparting instruction in an institution and includes a Principal or a Headmaster". Section 16, inter alia, provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the U. P. Act 2 of 1921 or the Regulations made thereunder, every appointment of a teacher shall, on or after July 10, 1981, be made by the Management only on the recommendation of the Commission. S. 32 of the Act provides that the provisions of the U.P. Act 2 of 1921 and the Regulations made thereunder, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act or the Rules or Regulations made thereunder, shall continue to be in force for the purposes of selection, appointment, promotion, dismissal removal or reduction is rank of a teacher. Rules and Regulations have been framed under the Act; but none of them provides for the conditions of service of a Principal, Headmaster or teacher appointed on probation. It, therefore, follows that the Regulations aforementioned, not being inconsistent with the provisions of the Act or the Rules or Regulations framed thereunder, will continue to operate and govern the conditions of the service of persons appointed on probation either as teacher or as the Head of an institution. We have, therefore, to focus our attention to the Regulations aforementioned. 8. We have, therefore, to focus our attention to the Regulations aforementioned. 8. Before analysing the relevant Regulations, we may refer to the law settled by the Supreme Court in Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1711 . It has been held in this case that a probationer cannot, after the expiry of the probationary period automatically acquire the status of a permanent member of a service unless of course the Rules under which he is appointed expressly provide for such a result. Therefore, even though a probationer may have continued to act in the post to which he is appointed on probation, for more than the initial period of probation, he cannot become a permanent member of the service merely because of the efflux of time, unless the Rules of service, which govern the conditions of service, specifically lay down that the probationer will be automatically confirmed after the initial period of probation is over. 9. Regulations 10, 11 and 12 should be given a combined reading. Before doing so, we may revert to Regulation 11 and read it again. Leaving aside the unnecessary words. This Regulation provides that unless before the expiry of the period of probation, in the case of Headmaster or Principal, the period or probation is extended under Regulation 12, he shall be confirmed on the post and in the grade at the end of his probation. It will be immediately seen that the auxiliary verb "shall" has been deliberately used by the Regulation making authority and the context and setting in which it has been used gives a clear indication that it is intended to be given mandatory effect. In other words, it means that, if the period of probation of a Principal is not extended under Regulation 12 before the expiry of the period of probation, it is imperative to confirm him in the service. No choice is left to the appointing authority if action is not taken in accordance with regulation 12 before the expiry of the period f probation. Even Regulation 10 provides that the person placed on probation shall be on firmed if he fulfills the requirement contained therein. The requirements laid own in Regulation 10 imposes limitations on the powers of the appointing authority. The requirements of Regulation 10 have positive as well as negative aspects. Even Regulation 10 provides that the person placed on probation shall be on firmed if he fulfills the requirement contained therein. The requirements laid own in Regulation 10 imposes limitations on the powers of the appointing authority. The requirements of Regulation 10 have positive as well as negative aspects. regulation 10 mandates that if the conditions numerated in it are fulfilled, the authority concerned is bound to confirm a probationer. on the negative side, it lays down that the authority concerned can refuse to confirm probationer if the person concerned (the probationer) does not conform to the requirements contained therein. But a, decision has to be taken by the authority concerned before the expiry of the period of probation. We have, therefore, no hesitation n taking the view that the scheme of regulations 10, 11 and 12 does provide for the automatic confirmation of the services of probationer, if before the expiry of the period of probation an extension of that period does not take place. We are fortified in our view with a two Judge decision of this Court in the case of Municipal Board, Bareilly, through its President v. B.K. Mehrotra, 1968 All U 1127. In this case, a Principal of a College was appointed on a probation of one year and he reported for duty on 25th October, 1962. The employer, a Municipal Board, on 31st October, 1963, purported to extend the period of probation of the Principal. This Court emphasised that in terms of Regulation 11 the period of probation could have been extended only before 25th October, 1963, failing which his services stood automatically confirmed with effect from 25th October, 1963. This Court also took the view that the extension of probation on 31st October, 1963, was wholly illegal and ineffective. 10. Learned counsel for the Management has cited two decisions of the Supreme Court which, according to him, run counter to the view taken by this Court in the case of Municipal Board, Bareilly (supra). They are : (1) G. S. Ramaswami v. Inspector General of Police, Mysore, Bangalore, AIR 1966 SC 175 and (2) Dhanjibhai Ramjibhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1985 SC 603 : (1985 Lab IC 744). They are : (1) G. S. Ramaswami v. Inspector General of Police, Mysore, Bangalore, AIR 1966 SC 175 and (2) Dhanjibhai Ramjibhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1985 SC 603 : (1985 Lab IC 744). In the first class the relevant Rule reads : "Promotee Officer will be confirmed at the end of their probationary period if they have given satisfaction." Their Lordships emphasise that the Rule does not contemplate automatic confirmation after the probationary period of two years, for a promotee officer can only be confirmed under the Rule if he has given satisfaction. This condition of giving satisfaction must be fulfilled before a promotee officer can be confirmed under the Rule and this condition obviously means that the authority competent to confirm him must pass an order that the probationer has given the satisfaction and is, therefore, confirmed. The Rule before the Supreme Court was entirely different from the Regulations under consideration in the instant cases. Therefore, this authority is not apposite. (applicable?) 11. In the second case, R.'5 of the Recruitment Rules prescribes the period of probation as two years. The Rule states further that the period of probation may be extended in accordance with the Rules. The order appointing the Government Servant recites that the appointment shall be on probation for a period of two years. The period of two years expires and the appointee continues in service and no order is made confirming his appointment. Later on his services are terminated. Their Lordships opine that the period of two years specified in the Rule is merely initial period for which an Officer may be appointed on probation and not the maximum period of probation. As the terms of-the Rule indicate, the period of probation may be extended. The period of two years does not represent the maximum period of probation. We have already emphasised upon the language used in Regulation 11. This case too is, therefore, distinguishable. 12. Section 16-A' of the U. P. Act 2 of 1921, inter alia, provides that notwithstanding anything in any law, document or a decree or order of the Court or other instrument, there shall be a Scheme of Administration for every institution. The Scheme of Administration shall, amongst other matters, provide for the constitution of a Committee of Management vested with the authority to manage and conduct the affairs of the institution. The Scheme of Administration shall, amongst other matters, provide for the constitution of a Committee of Management vested with the authority to manage and conduct the affairs of the institution. Sub-section (6) of Section 16-A provides that every recognised institution shall be managed in accordance with the Scheme of Administration. It is common ground that on 30th December, 1988 there was a Scheme of Administration in relation to the Institution. Clause 16(iii) of the Scheme of Administration reads :- "At least seven clear days notice shall be given for- an ordinary meeting of the Committee and three clear days notice for an emergent meeting ...............The notice shall contain the agenda and specify the place and time of the meeting." We have already indicated that on 27th December, 1988, a notice convening the meeting of the Committee of Management on 30th December, 1988 was issued. This was an emergent meeting. It is common ground that three days clear notice was not given in accordance with the afore quoted provision of the Scheme of Administration. This is so because for completing a period of three days the date on which notice was issued had to be excluded. 13. The primary question which arises for consideration is whether in the context and setting of clause 16(iii) the requirement of giving three days' clear notice is mandatory. It is now well settled that the use of the word shall is not determinative of such a controversy. The intention of the Legislature or the maker of the Rule or Regulation, as the case may be, has to be ascertained. Here, the crucial words are "at least". These words have been used in a negative sense. It is now recognised that one of the modes of showing the clear intention that the provision enacted is mandatory, is by clothing the command in a negative form. "Negative words are clearly prohibitory and are ordinarily used as a legislative device to make the statute imperative". In Lachmi Narain v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 714 at page 726, the words interpreted are "no less than three months". It is emphasised that the preliminary key to the problem whether a statutory provision is mandatory or directory, is the intention of the law-maker as expressed in the law itself. In Lachmi Narain v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 714 at page 726, the words interpreted are "no less than three months". It is emphasised that the preliminary key to the problem whether a statutory provision is mandatory or directory, is the intention of the law-maker as expressed in the law itself. If the Legislative intent is expressed clearly and strongly in imperative words, such as the use of "must" instead of "shall" that will itself be sufficient to hold the provision mandatory and it will not be necessary to pursue the matter further. If the provision is couched in negative or prohibitive language, it can rarely be directory, the use of pre-emptory language in a negative form is per se indicative of the intent that the provision is to be mandatory. It is held that the aforequoted language is emphatically prohibitory and it.commands the Government in unambiguous negative terms that the period of requisite notice must not be less than three months. The purpose of seven or three clear days' notice is contained in the aforequoted clause of the Scheme of Administration. It is provided that the notice shall contain the agenda and specify the place and time of the meeting. Three clear days' notice has been mandated in order to enable the members of the Committee to study the matters which are to come up for discussion in a particular meeting in accordance with the agenda already circulated. We are, therefore, satisfied that the requirement of three days' clear notice for holding an emergent meeting is mandatory. 14. It is urged on behalf of the Management that the Scheme of Administration does not have a statutory force, that the requirement of three clear days' notice is directory, particularly when the consequence of the non-observance of the terms of the clause in question has not been indicated and that, in any view of the matter, since the requirement of three clear days' notice could be waived by the members, the provision should be treated as directory. 15. We have already referred to the relevant provisions of Section 16-A of the U. P. Act 2 of 1921. The statute mandates that there shall be a Scheme of Administration with regard to every institution. 15. We have already referred to the relevant provisions of Section 16-A of the U. P. Act 2 of 1921. The statute mandates that there shall be a Scheme of Administration with regard to every institution. Regulation 14 of Chapter I of the Regulations framed under U.P. Act 2 of 1921 provides that the Scheme of Administration should conform to no less than 10 rules. In Committee of Management, Janta Uchchtar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Thekma Bijauli Post v. Deputy Director of Education, VIIth Region, Gorakhpur, (1984) 2 LBEC 1150, a two-Judge Bench of this Court presided by Hon'ble Mr. Justice N. D. Ojha (as he then was) has held that the Scheme of Administrations is prepared under the compulsive force and in compliance of the mandatory provisions contained in Section 16A of the U.P. Act 2 of 1921. The Scheme of Administration would be an instrument made under the U.P. Act 2 of 1921. Reliance is placed on behalf of the Management upon a three-Judge decision of this Court in the case of Aley Ahmad Abidi v. District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad, AIR 1977 All 539 . In this case the controversy is slightly different. It is whether a recognised Intermediate College having a Scheme of Administration can be regarded as a statutory body. In paragraph 19 the learned Judges take the view that the Scheme framed by a recognised Intermediate College cannot be regarded as a piece of subordinate legislation like Rules, Regulations, Statutes and Ordinances, which an Act empowers the Government or the statutory bodies under the Act to make or frame. A recognised Intermediate College, which is required by Section 16-A, to have a Scheme of Administration, cannot, by any stretch of imagination be regarded as a statutory body. Once it is held that a Scheme of Administration required to be framed by each recognised Intermediate College under Section 16-A of the Act, is not a piece of subordinate legislation. It follows that the Committee of Management constituted under such a scheme is not a body constituted under such a statute, but is merely governed by the provisions of the Act and the Regulations framed thereunder. In our respectful view there is no conflict between the aforesaid observations made in this judgment and the view expressed in Committee of Management Janta Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Thekma Bijauli Post (supra). In our respectful view there is no conflict between the aforesaid observations made in this judgment and the view expressed in Committee of Management Janta Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Thekma Bijauli Post (supra). On the contrary, this case clearly lays down that the Committee of Management is governed by the provisions of the Scheme of Administration. We have, therefore, no hesitation in repelling the submission made on behalf of the Management that the Scheme of Administration does not have the force of law. 16. The mere fact that a particular statute does not provide the consequence of nullification on failure to comply with a prescribed requirement does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the statutory requirements are not mandatory but are directory : In the ultimate, the acid test is the intention of the law. We have already expressed our opinion on the purpose and the intention of giving three clear days' notice by using negative words. Therefore, we are unable to accept the submission that the requirement of giving three clear days' notice should be interpreted as directory. 17. It is not in dispute that all the members of the Committee of Management did not attend the meeting held on 30th December, 1988. At least two of them were absent. The general rule, that non-compliance of mandatory requirements results in nullification of the act, is subject at least to one exception. If certain requirements or conditions are provided in a statute in the interest of a particular person, the requirements or conditions although mandatory can be waived by him, if no public interests are involved, and, in such a case, the act done will be valid even if the requirement or condition has not been performed. Here the requirement of three days' clear notice is in the interest of all the members of the Committee of Management. The question of waiver of the requisite period of notice could arise only if all the members were present in the meeting held on 30th December, 1988. Waiving a certain requirement or right is a conscious act. It pertains to the intention of a person or a party. The mere fact that all the members were served with the notices of the meeting would not constitute waiver on the part of those members who did not attend the meeting. Waiving a certain requirement or right is a conscious act. It pertains to the intention of a person or a party. The mere fact that all the members were served with the notices of the meeting would not constitute waiver on the part of those members who did not attend the meeting. The absentee members may have felt that their presence in the meeting would not serve any useful purpose as they had not been given sufficient time to prepare themselves for being effective participants. 18. In Kashi Nath Misra v. Chancellor, University of Allahabad, AIR 1967 All 101 , the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor of the Allahabad University is in question. The procedure is that a Committee of three persons submits the names of-person who may be appointed as the Vice-Chancellor by the Chancellor. One member of the Committee is elected by the Executive Council. Section 11(4)(i)(a) of the Allahabad University Act provides that the date of the meeting in which the election of the representative of the Executive Council is to be held must be given sufficiently in advance. Regulation 4 provides that seven days 'notice should be mentioned for the business to be transacted at the meeting or should be accompanied with an agenda specifying the business to be transacted in the meeting. At a meeting of the Executive Council for the election of their representative to the Selection Committee, 16 out of 23 members were present. Local members were served, with four days' notice of the agenda of the meeting but outside members were given only two days' notice. It is held by a two-Judge Bench of this Court that the notice is not sufficient compliance with either S. 11(4)(i)(a) or Regn. 4, and, therefore, the election of the representative at such a meeting suffers from the defect that no proper notice was given to them. The Executive Council was not competent towaive the illegality in the notice. The principle of waiver can only be invoked when all the members are present at the meeting. 19. There is a direct two-Judge decision of this Court in the case of Managing Committee of Jain Pathshala v. Joint Director of Education - Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 1715 of 1976, decided on 21st March, 1977. The judgment was delivered by Hon'ble Mr. Justice H. N. Seth (as he then was). 19. There is a direct two-Judge decision of this Court in the case of Managing Committee of Jain Pathshala v. Joint Director of Education - Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 1715 of 1976, decided on 21st March, 1977. The judgment was delivered by Hon'ble Mr. Justice H. N. Seth (as he then was). In this case, an emergent meeting of the Committee of Management was held on 12th October, 1975. Notice was given of the meeting on 9th October, 1975. Paragraph 9(iii) of the Scheme of Administration provided for at least three clear days' notice. This Court held that three days' notice was not given. This Court observes : "The question that, however, arises for consideration is as to whether such an emergent meeting convened without three clear days' notice would necessarily be vitiated. The notice is required so that the members of the Committee may be able to think over the matter included in the agenda and to participate in the deliberations before any resolution is passed by the Committee. In Harben v. Phillips, (1883) 23 Ch D 14, it was held that an improper notice for a meeting can be cured by the presence and acquiescence of all the directors, i.e., the persons who were entitled to attend and participate in the meeting. Following passage appearing in Shakelton's Law and Practice of Meetings, 5th Edition page 36 is quite instructive and relevant in this regard : "If members are summoned to appear for a particular purpose they cannot proceed to any other matter without the unanimous consent of the whole body, but if they are all present and waive the formality of the notice, a resolution passed at such meeting would be good, even though the meeting was not assembled for that particular purpose (Machell v. Navinson, (1724) 11 East 84). All the members of a Company (five in number) met as directors in board meeting, and afterwards in their capacity as share- holders, passed a resolution to issue debentures without any notice to the share- holders. All the members of a Company (five in number) met as directors in board meeting, and afterwards in their capacity as share- holders, passed a resolution to issue debentures without any notice to the share- holders. Astbury J. commending on the procedure, stated that the requirements of the statute were intended for the protection of share-holders, and if the resolution was in a matter intravires the members of the Company and there was no fraud, the share- holders could waive all formalities as regards notice, and the resolution was just as valid as if there had been requisite notice (RE Express Engineering Works, (1920) 1 Ch 466). Two share-holders, the only members of the Company met and agreed that it was desirable to wind up the Company and a minute to that effect was drawn up by a solicitor was signed of the intention to propose the resolution as an extraordinary resolution has been given. Held that it was competent for the share-holders of the company acting together to waive the formalities required by the Act as to notice and that as all the share- holders had met and passed the resolution was valid as an extraordinary resolution (Re-Oxted Motor Co.. ((1925) 3 KB 32)." It therefore, follows that despite the fact that three clear days' notice for summoning an emergent meeting as contemplated by paragraph 9 of the Scheme of Administration was not given the proceedings at the meeting held on 12-10-1975 and the resolution passed therein will not be vitiated if it is found that all the members entitled to participate at the meeting were present and they waived the formality of three clear days' notice required for the purpose." 20. It was next urged on behalf of the Management that the defect, if any, was cured by the fact of confirmation of the minutes of the meeting at the next meeting of the Committee of Management. The submission is not sound. The confirmation of the minutes .of the meeting only results in the correctness of the record being certified and not in validating the business transacted in the meeting. See Kashi Nath Misra's case, ( AIR 1967 All 101 ) (supra). The submission is not sound. The confirmation of the minutes .of the meeting only results in the correctness of the record being certified and not in validating the business transacted in the meeting. See Kashi Nath Misra's case, ( AIR 1967 All 101 ) (supra). In Marathwada University v. Sheshrao Balwantrao Chavan, (1989) 3 SCC 132 : (1989 Lab IC 1532), it is held that the ratification is generally an act of a principal with regard to a contract or an act done by an agent. The purpose of ratification in the context of law of agency apparently did not have any application with regard to the. exercise of powers conferred under the statutory provisions. The statutory authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred and any action under that power has no legal validity. It is ab initio void and cannot be ratified. 21. In paragraph 10 of the rejoinder affidavit filed by Lakshmi Chand Agarwal, the Manager of the Institution, in Writ Petn. No. 18348 of 1989, it is averred that the Manager had orally discussed the resolution, which came up and was approved in the meeting held on 30th December, 1988 with Sarvasri Chitranjan Swarup and Pravin Kumar Gupta, the absentee members. Both of them expressed their agreement to the proposed resolution. In paragraph 11 it is averred that the resolution dated 30th December, 1988 was circulated amongst the absentee members. Those members did not express any disagreement or pointed out any error in the resolution. The affidavits of Sarvasri Chitranjan Singh, Pravin Kumar Gupta and teacher's representative Sri Shyam Sunder Jain have also been filed as Annexures RA-1, RA-II and RA-III. We have perused these affidavits. Their tenor is that, though they' were not present in the meeting held on 30th December, 1988, the Manager had discussed the proposed resolution regarding the extension of the period of probation of the petitioner Om Prakash. They are satisfied with the decision taken in the meeting held on 30th December, 1988. They are in complete agreement with the said decision. In our opinion, neither the contents of the aforesaid affidavits nor the averments made in paragraphs 10 and 11 referred to above advance the case of the Management. They are satisfied with the decision taken in the meeting held on 30th December, 1988. They are in complete agreement with the said decision. In our opinion, neither the contents of the aforesaid affidavits nor the averments made in paragraphs 10 and 11 referred to above advance the case of the Management. The invalidity attached to the proceedings of 30th December, 1988, on account of the failure to give three days' clear notice could be cured or waived only if all the members including the absentee members were present in the meeting held on 30th December, 1988. 22. In the alternative, it is contended on behalf of the Management that by the resolution dated 7th November, 1988, the Committee of Management merely purported to discharge Om Prakash, the petitioner, from the post of the Principal. In other words, it is submitted that the Committee of Management within a period of one year exercised its right of not extending the period of probation of the petitioner. It is further contended that the order dated 23rd December, 1988, of the Commission, whereby it disapproved the resolution of 7th November, 1988 of the Committee of Management was illegal. In any view of the matter, the approval of the Commission was not required to be taken when the only decision taken by the Committee of Management was that the probationary period of the petitioner was not extended. We may straightway repel the contention that the order of the Commission dated 23rd December, 1988, was illegal on the short ground that the legality of the said order was not challenged in any forum and the Management acquiesced into the same. Even in Writ Petn. No. 18348 of 1989 preferred by the Management no such prayer has been made. 23. Section 16-G(3)(a) of the U.P. Act 2 of 1921, inter alia, provides that no Principal, Headmaster or teacher may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank of subjected to any diminution in emoluments or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector. 23. Section 16-G(3)(a) of the U.P. Act 2 of 1921, inter alia, provides that no Principal, Headmaster or teacher may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank of subjected to any diminution in emoluments or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector. Sub- section (1) of Section 21 of the Act reads : "No teacher specified in the Schedule shall be dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank and neither his emoluments may be reduced nor he may be given notice of removal from service by the management unless prior approval of the Commission has been obtained." We have already referred to Section 32 of the Act. In view of the provisions contained in that Section, Section 21 of the Act will operate and Section 16(3)(a) of the U.P. Act 2 of 1921 will become dormant. The contention is that the expression "discharged" as expressly used in Section 16-G(3)(a) of the U.P. Act No. 2 of 1921 is conspicuously absent in Section 21 of the Act. This omission, according to the learned counsel, is deliberate. Therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that prior approval of the Commission is not required in the case of a discharge of a probationer from service. 24. Section 21 as interpreted by the learned counsel for the Management expressly excludes the discharge of a probationer. We have already seen that Section 16-G(3)(a) gave a statutory protection even to a probationer who was sought to be discharged from service. Section 32 preserves the protection given to the teachers etc. by the provisions of Act 2 of 1921 and the Regulations framed thereunder in the matters of selection, appointment, promotion, dismissal, removal, termination or reduction in rank provided those provisions are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Since Section 21 is silent with respect to the discharge of a probationer, the provisions of Section 16-G(3)(a) would not be inconsistent so far as the discharge of a probationer is concerned. However, in Section 32 too "discharge" is conspicuously absent. Since Section 21 is silent with respect to the discharge of a probationer, the provisions of Section 16-G(3)(a) would not be inconsistent so far as the discharge of a probationer is concerned. However, in Section 32 too "discharge" is conspicuously absent. If a literal interpretation is given, there can be no escape from the conclusion that after the enforcement of the Act the decision of the Managing Committee to discharge a probationer from service would not require the prior approval of the Inspector or the Commission and such a decision would be executable straightway. This will result in worsening the position of a probationer. The Legislature did not intend to do so by enacting the Act. In our opinion, in Section 21 and in Section 32 the expression "removal" was used in a comprehensive sense to include the discharge of a probationer from service. Otherwise, the Legislature would not have used the words "nor he may be given notice of the removal from service by the Management" in the latter part of Section 21. Designedly, the Lagislature has confined the notice to removal from service; but no notice of dismissal from service or no notice of reduction in rank or no notice of reduction in the emoluments has been envisaged. The notice of removal referred to is really used in the sense of notice of discharge from service. We, therefore, conclude that the protection of Section 21 of the Act is available to a probationer who is being discharged from service. It follows that the decision of the Committee of Management concerned not to extend the period of probation would also require the prior approval of the Commission. 25. We have taken the view that the meeting of the Committee of Management held on 30th December, 1988 was an invalid one. Therefore, the decision taken in that meeting extending the probationary period of the petitioner, Om Prakash, must fall through. The consequence is that on 30th December, 1988, the probationary period of Om Prakash was not extended. If this did not happen, Sri Om Prakash stood automatically confirmed in service upon the expiry of the period of one year from the date on which he was put on probation. We have already held that the theory of automatic confirmation will apply on the force of the interpretation given by us to Regulations 10, 11 and 12. If this did not happen, Sri Om Prakash stood automatically confirmed in service upon the expiry of the period of one year from the date on which he was put on probation. We have already held that the theory of automatic confirmation will apply on the force of the interpretation given by us to Regulations 10, 11 and 12. It follows that the Committee of Management on 13th May, 1989, proceeded on the wrong assumption that the petitioner was a probationer. The termination of the services of the petitioner on the basis of such a resolution was void as the Committee of Management failed to give the benefit of the relevant regulations to the petitioner which are to be given to a Principal whose service stands confirmed and who is sought to be either dismissed or removed from service. The decision of the Commission approving the resolution of the Committee of Management discharging the petitioner from service by not extending his term of probation too is liable to be struck down as void and illegal. It is not necessary for us to examine the contention raised on behalf of the Management that the District Inspector of Schools had no jurisdiction to cancel the resolution of the Committee of Management dated 30th December, 1988, which he did by means of the order dated 6th May, 1989. As we have already taken the view that the resolution of 30th December, 1988, was void, the ultimate decision taken by the District Inspector of Schools cannot be touched. It is well settled that a decision of an authority, even though without jurisdiction, may not be quashed in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution if by the decision substantial justice is done between the parties. This is a fit case where this practice should be enforced. Even otherwise, no useful purpose will be served in quashing the order dated 6th May, 1989, of the District Inspector of Schools. Likewise, we need not examine the other contentions advanced on behalf of the Principal, Sri Om Prakash. 26. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The resolution of the Committee of Management dated 13th May, 1989, terminating the services of the petitioner (Annexure 8 to the writ petition) is quashed. Likewise, we need not examine the other contentions advanced on behalf of the Principal, Sri Om Prakash. 26. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The resolution of the Committee of Management dated 13th May, 1989, terminating the services of the petitioner (Annexure 8 to the writ petition) is quashed. The order dated 28th June, 1989, passed by the U.P. Education Services Commission, Allahabad and as issued vide letter dated 29th June, 1989, is also quashed. The respondents, and the Committee of Management in particular, are commanded to treat the petitioner as a confirmed Principal of the Sanatan Dharam Inter College, Muzaffarnagar. They are also directed not to interfere with the functioning of the petitioner as the Principal of the said Institution on the basis of the aforesaid Resolution of the Committee of Management and the aforesaid order of the Commission. 27. Writ Petition No. 18438 of 1989 is dismissed. 28. In both the writ petitions Sri Om Prakash, the petitioner, shall be entitled to his cost.