ORDER K.L. Shrivastava, J. 1. This application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the 'Code') is for quashing the proceedings in Special Case No. 1 of 1989 in the Court of Special Judge, Jhabua. 2. Circumstances giving rise to the application are these holding that the petitioner had accepted bribe from R. S. Mishra, by judgment dated 11-8-1982, the Special Judge, Jhabua convicted him of the offence under section 161, Indian Penal Code and under section 5(1)(a) read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short the 'Act') and had sentenced him to R. I. for 3 months on each count, sentences to run concurrently. Against that judgment the appellant preferred appeal in this Court [ vide Appeal No. 471/82]. By its judgment dated 29-4-1987, this Court holding that there was no valid sanction allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and the sentence. 3. By the said judgment the proceedings were quashed and the appellant was discharged. In this connection paragraph 36 of the judgment may usefully be reproduced: "In the decision in Baikunthnath's case, 1985 (1) Cr.LJ. 563 which has been referred to in the decision in Vijay Kumar's case, 1987 MPLJ 109 it has been pointed out that where in absence of previous sanction by the competent authority, the prosecution is void ab initio the proper order to be passed is one of discharge and not of acquittal. In such a situation the proceedings must be quashed as pointed out in paragraph 18 of the decision in Vijay Kumar's case (supra). In the decision in Baijnath Prasad's case (supra) it has been held that a fresh trial after requisite sanction would be possible." 4. The State by Special Case No. 1/89 has launched fresh prosecution against the petitioner after obtaining requisite sanction for the same under section 6 of the 'Act'. 5. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that a combined reading of paragraphs 11, 20, 27 and 28 of the aforesaid judgment in Cr. A. No. 471/82 makes it abundantly clear that this Court had recorded a finding that the petitioner succeeds on both of his contentions. 5. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that a combined reading of paragraphs 11, 20, 27 and 28 of the aforesaid judgment in Cr. A. No. 471/82 makes it abundantly clear that this Court had recorded a finding that the petitioner succeeds on both of his contentions. He urges that in the context, though in the operative part of the judgment this Court has discharged the petitioner, in substance and in effect it has been held that on the material, it cannot be said that the prosecution has made out its case against the petitioner. According to the learned counsel this finding, in the absence of any challenge before the Apex Court, have attained finality and in the premises aforesaid the fresh proceedings deserve to be dropped under inherent powers under section 482 of the 'Code'. In support of his contention he placed reliance on the decision in Aratlal Rathilal's case, AIR 1980 SC 307; Hari Prasad's case, AIR 1974 SC 28 and Ravinder's case, AIR 1975 SC 856 . 6. The contention of the learned counsel for the State is that the proceedings were void and on the material therein collected, no finding on the controversies involved could properly be recorded and further that in view of the operative part of the judgment to the effect that the petitioner is discharged, it cannot successfully be urged that the finding is one of acquittal and that no subsequent prosecution is, therefore, permissible in law. 7. The point for consideration is whether the petition deserves to be allowed. 8. Paragraphs 11, 20, 27 and 28 of this Court's judgment in Cr. A. No. 471/82 referred to in paragraph 5 above may usefully be reproduced. They run thus: - "11 - In addition to the contentions that there has been no proper sanction for the prosecution and that the sanction is not by a competent authority, the defence of the appellant at the trial was that Ram Sewak Mishra (PW 1) was in arrears in relation to the bills for supply of electrical energy in the quarter and supply of electrical energy was disconnected. When later he occupied the quarter, he had to pay the arrears before getting the supply of electrical energy restored. When later he occupied the quarter, he had to pay the arrears before getting the supply of electrical energy restored. R. S. Mishra (P.W.I) had given the money to him towards arrears in connection with the supply of electrical energy and water charges." "20 - From what has been narrated above, it is clear that by the proposal for the suspension of R. S. Mishra (PW1) the appellant had earned strong displeasure of K. L. Mishra, S.D.O. (Police). In the circumstances the story of demand of bribe by the appellant is far from being plausible." "27 - In the circumstances, R. S. Mishra (PW1) had the motive as well as the opportunity to get the appellant trapped by paying him money towards arrears. It is too much to expect that the appellant ought to have actually counted the money paid to him by the A.S.I. Mishra. It is not infrequently that counting of money in the very presence of the person paying it is, at times, viewed as bad manners."and "28 - On a careful consideration, I find that the material on record supports the defence contention that it was due to the grudge over his proposal for the suspension of R. S. Mishra (PW1) that with a view to teach him a lesson, the trap was got arranged and the notes were given to him by the latter stating that the payment was towards outstanding dues. At any rate, the reasonable probability of the defence be true cannot be ruled out." 9. At this stage reference to the observations in paragraphs 18 and 20 of the decision in Ravinder's case (supra) are apposite. They run thus: - "There is an issue estoppel, if it appears by record of itself or as explained by proper evidence, that the point was determined in favour of a prisoner in a previous criminal trial which is brought in issue on a second criminal trial of the same prisoner. They run thus: - "There is an issue estoppel, if it appears by record of itself or as explained by proper evidence, that the point was determined in favour of a prisoner in a previous criminal trial which is brought in issue on a second criminal trial of the same prisoner. There must be a prior proceeding determined against the State necessarily involving an issue which again arises in a subsequent proceeding by the State against the same prisoner." (18) "Issue estoppel does not prevent the trial of an offence as does autrefois acquit but only precludes evidence being led to prove a fact in issue as regards which evidence has already been led and a specific finding recorded at an earlier criminal trial before a Court of competent jurisdiction." (20) 10. In note No. 2 on section 300 of the 'Code' by Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, 13th Edition, it has been pointed out that a trial by a Court not having jurisdiction is void ab initio and the accused, if acquitted, is liable to be retried. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision in Baij Nath Prasad's case, AIR 1957 SC 494 . 11. Where there is no requisite sanction for prosecution, the Court trying the case cannot be said to have jurisdiction and, therefore, the proceedings are void. 12. From a perusal of this Court's judgment passed in appeal by the petitioner, it is clear that the same cannot be construed as one of acquittal. It does, however, record certain findings in favour of the petitioner. 13. It has to be conceded that the proceedings in the earlier special case, for want of a valid sanction were without jurisdiction and void. Therefore, the appeal ought to have been disposed of by discharging the petitioner without other findings on the points in controversy. 14. As the proceedings connected with the previous prosecution were void ab initio and consequently there was want of jurisdiction in the Courts in dealing with the matter, the findings on the evidence in the same recorded by this Court in disposing of the appeal, though they were not challenged before the Apex Court, cannot be said to be legally binding. The decision in Baij Nath Prasad's case (supra) may usefully be perused. 15. The decision in Baij Nath Prasad's case (supra) may usefully be perused. 15. This brings us to the petitioner's contention that in the circumstances of the case, fresh prosecution deserves to be dropped in exercise of inherent powers of this Court under section 482 of the 'Code'. The provision is in words of wide amplitude and reads thus: "482. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." 16. The position of a litigant entitled to invoke the appellate powers of a Court is much stronger than that of a litigant who seeks interference by it in exercise of its revisional powers. The inherent powers under section 482 of the 'Code' stand on quite a different footing. 17. It is well settled that the provision in section 482 of the 'Code' is not to be exercised as appellate or revisional powers for correction of errors and is to be invoked only to meet the three situations therein catalogued. Inherent powers are not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code and they are not to be exercised against express bar of law (vide Madhu Limaye's case, AIR 1978 SC 47 ). However where on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, any of the three situations is shown to exist, as is clear from the words employed in the provision 'nothing in the Code' can be urged as creating a hurdle in the way of the exercise of inherent powers. It is the function of the Courts below to try and determine factual controversies between the contending parties. However this Court's inherent powers should certainly be used when there is reason to believe that process of law is being misused to harass a citizen. But at the same time care has to be taken to ensure that any attempt to bypass the procedure prescribed by law on the subject does not succeed and there is no pre-judging of issues. The following observation made in the decision in Porinchu's case, 1987 Cri.LJ. But at the same time care has to be taken to ensure that any attempt to bypass the procedure prescribed by law on the subject does not succeed and there is no pre-judging of issues. The following observation made in the decision in Porinchu's case, 1987 Cri.LJ. 1989 touching the provision may profitably be reproduced: "Legislature in its wisdom thought of giving finality to the order passed in revision by the Sessions Judge as against the person who invoked the revisional powers. In such a situation this Court may be reluctant to interfere with the orders even though the inherent powers are wide and self-restraint is the only limit having regard to the facts that nothing prevents action if it is found necessary to prevent abuse of the process of law and secure the ends of justice. Inherent powers are not intended to interfere with the pronouncements of competent tribunals unless this Court is satisfied that action is necessary to prevent an illegality and the consequent injustice for which no remedy is provided." 18. Courts exist for doing justice and where discretion permits, technicalities must be eschewed and the ends of justice which are higher than the ends of law, must be made to prevail. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision in S. N. Bonse's case, 1974 Cri. L.J. 569 wherein the finding of guilt was upheld but conviction was set aside on the ground of invalidity of sanction to prosecute, and it was further held that re-trial after obtaining necessary sanction ought not to be held in the interest of justice though it was not barred under section 403 of the repealed 'Code' corresponding to section 300 of the current 'Code'. 19. In the instant case, the prosecution's case is that on 18-9-1981, the petitioner had accepted a bribe of Rs. 100/-. His earlier prosecution has proved abortive due to want of a valid sanction under section 6 of the Act. Though, in law he is liable to be subjected to fresh trial, after requisite sanction, the question is whether the second prosecution, in the circumstances of the case, is liable to be quashed under section 482 of the 'Code'. I am of the view that the answer has to be in the affirmative. Though, in law he is liable to be subjected to fresh trial, after requisite sanction, the question is whether the second prosecution, in the circumstances of the case, is liable to be quashed under section 482 of the 'Code'. I am of the view that the answer has to be in the affirmative. As is clear from a perusal of paragraph 8 above, the petitioner had earned the displeasure of his superior and was, therefore, trapped and that his defence that the payment was towards dues is reasonably probable. Therefore, there is little chance of his conviction. All considered it is not in the interest of justice that he should be subjected to this fresh prosecution. In this connection the decisions in Rakesh Saxena's case, AIR 1987 SC (Weekly) 740 and Madhav Rao Jiwaji Rao Scindia's case, AIR 1988 SC 709 may usefully be perused. 20. In the result, the application under section 482 of the 'Code' succeeds and is allowed. The connected proceedings in the Special Criminal Case No. 1 of 1939 pending in the Court of the Special Judge, Jhabua are quashed.