JUDGMENT S.K. Dhaon, J. - These petitions have been preferred by the U.P. State Sugar Corporation Limited, Unit Ramkola, District Deoria (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation). They are directed against similar but different Orders passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Gorakhpur (hereinafter referred to as the Deputy Labour Commissioner). In both the petitions the interpretation of clause (LL) of the Standing Orders is involved. In both the petitions the orders of the Deputy Labour Commissioner determining the respective ages of two different workmen are being impugned. The two petitions have been heard together and, therefore, they are being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. These petitions have not been formally admitted as yet. However, affidavit have been exchanged in them. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties they are being disposed of finally. 3. In Writ Petition No. 17969 of 1987 Singasan Kurmi, the Respondent No.2, is the workman; whereas in Writ Petition No. 17973 of 1987 Lochi Gor, the Respondent No.2 is the workman. In both the cases the Corporation gave notices to the workmen to the effect that they would retire from service with effect from a certain date. In accordance with the Standing Orders, the workmen represented their cases to the Deputy Labour Commissioner and upon those representations the impugned orders have been passed. 4. Relying upon the Provident Fund record, the Corporation by separate Notices dated 27/29th September, 1984, informed the two workmen that they would retire from service with effect from Nov. 1, 1984. On the other hand, Singasan Kurmi pleaded that his date of birth was 6th June, 1931 and, therefore, he was to retire from service in June, 1991. Lochi Gor pleaded that his date of birth was 20th October, 1933 and, therefore, his retirement was due some time in October, 1993. 5. Before the Deputy Labour Commissioner the Corporation produced and proved Form No.2 of the Employees Provident Funds Scheme, 1952 (Declaration and Nomination Form) in relation to the two workmen. Photostat copies of the two forms are before me as Annexures to the writ petitions. In the two forms against item No. 10, the date of birth of the two workmen is mentioned as the year 1924. Both the forms are filed is in English. Photostat copies of the two forms are before me as Annexures to the writ petitions. In the two forms against item No. 10, the date of birth of the two workmen is mentioned as the year 1924. Both the forms are filed is in English. Singasan Kurmi has purported to append his signature in broken Hindi; whereas Lochi Gor has appended his left thumb impression in the form relating to him. The workmen produced documentary as well as oral evidence. Singasan Kurmi has purported to append his signature in an extract from the Birth Register maintained at the relevant police station or an extract of the Family Register. These documents were duly proved. The Deputy Labour Commissioner discarded the entry in the Form No.2, accepted the evidence adduced by the two workmen and held that the respective dates of births of the two workmen as given out by them before him were correct. The Corporation also produced an extract from the service record. However, nothing turned upon an entry in relation to the age as the witnesses produced by the Corporation deposed that the year of the birth of the workmen was copied out from the Form No.2. In this Court, the findings of the Deputy Labour Commissioner based on the documentary as well as oral evidence produced by the workmen on the question of the date of their birth cannot be assailed. The submission made is that the Deputy Labour Commissioner acted beyond jurisdiction in travelling outside the contents of clause (LL) of the Standing Orders. Clause (LL) reads : "(LL). Retirement of workmen on reaching the age of superannuation : (1) A workmen may he retired from service on reaching the age of superannuation which shall be 60 years. (2) The Provident Fund record of the factory specifying the workmen's age should, to begin with, be taken as the reliable record of the age of a workman for purposes of retirement. (3) This record of age will stand modified as may be warranted by the following : (a) Date of Birth as given in the School Leaving Certificate or the High School Certificate. (b) Date of Birth as certified by a Municipal Board. A Cantonment Board, a Notified Area or a Town Area Committee. (c) An insurance policy taken before November 1, 1960. (b) Date of Birth as certified by a Municipal Board. A Cantonment Board, a Notified Area or a Town Area Committee. (c) An insurance policy taken before November 1, 1960. (d) Junior High School (VIII class) Certificate (to be applicable in the case of future entrants only). Provided that (i) where the date, month, and the year of birth of a workman are recorded in Provident Fund records, the date of birth as given in the Provident Fund records shall be taken as final: (ii) Where only the month and year of birth are given, the date will be taken as 1St of that month ; and (ii) Where the Provident Fund record of the workmen does not specify the date or month of birth in that case the 1st November of the year shall be deemed to he the date of retirement. (4) The management shall give at least one month's notice to a workman before retirement and during this period the workman shall have the right to represent to the Labour Commissioner, U.P., Kanpur. Such representation shall normally be disposed of within a period of six weeks of the date of receipt of the representation from the workman and the orders passed by the Labour Commissioner, U.P. or if he so directs by the Additional Labour Commissioner, Joint Labour Commissioner, or the Deputy Labour Commissioner (IR) regarding the question of age of the workman shall he final and shall not be questioned by any party before any Court. In case the Labour Commissioner, U.P. or the Additional Labour Commissioner, U.P. or the Joint Labour Commissioner or the Deputy Labour Commissioner (IR), as the case may be allows the representation, the employers shall reinstate the workman immediately on the receipt of the said orders and also pay to him full wages for the period of involuntary unemployment. (5) In the event of a workman retiring during the off season he shall be paid retaining allowance up to the date of retirement. NB: "The factory and the Union (s) concerned are free to settle the question of rectification of age by mutual negotiations." Clause (LL) embodies an important term of service, it confers a right upon a workman to continue in service till he attains the age of 60 years. NB: "The factory and the Union (s) concerned are free to settle the question of rectification of age by mutual negotiations." Clause (LL) embodies an important term of service, it confers a right upon a workman to continue in service till he attains the age of 60 years. Correspondingly, it entitles an employer to severe the relationship of master and servant or employer and employee of a particular workman on his reaching the age of 60 years. Clause (LL) envisages that an entry of the date of birth of a workman in the records pertaining to the Provident Fund Scheme is presumed to be correct. This intent is conveyed by the expression "to begin with". An entry of the date of birth in any of the documents referred to in sub-clauses (a) to (d) of class (LL) (3) will out-weigh the corresponding entry in the Provident Fund papers. To put it differently, the presumption created under clause (LL) (2) will stand rebutted conclusively by an entry in any of the documents referred to in sub-clauses (a) to (.d). It is thus clear that the presumption attached to the correctness of an entry of the date of birth in the Provident Fund papers is rebuttable one. 6. According to Best, the "presumption" is used to designate an inference, affirmative or dis-affirmative, of the existence of some fact, drawn by a judicial Tribunal, by process of probable reasoning, from some matter of fact, either judicially noticed or admitted or established by the legal evidence to the satisfaction of the Tribunal. Thus, a presumption is an inference of fact drawn from other known or proved facts. 7. It is implicit in the scheme of clause (LL) that an entry of date of birth in the Provident Fund papers should be ex facie correct. Such an entry should be based on relevant considerations, should be made bona fide and should be made in the normal course of human affairs. An entry made either capriciously or without due care or mechanically or not in accordance with the prescribed procedure, either express or implied, will not, in the eye of law, be an entry as contemplated in that clause. An entry made either capriciously or without due care or mechanically or not in accordance with the prescribed procedure, either express or implied, will not, in the eye of law, be an entry as contemplated in that clause. Therefore, an attack on the correctness of such an entry cannot be ward off merely by taking the defence that an entry to the contrary in any of the documents referred to in sub-clauses (a) to (d) does not exist. It follows that the authority called upon to adjudicate upon the age of a workman will have jurisdiction to consider and determine the date of birth on any other relevant material or materials. 8. I now revert to the Entry No.10 in Form No.2. It is confined to the date of birth. It has three parts, viz., day, month and year. With respect to both the workmen the entries as against day and month are blank. The entry as against year in English is 1924. The note under Entry No.10 is important and is extracted. "Where exact particulars are not available, approximate age may he indicated in consultation with the Medical Officer of the Factory." It is apparent that the exact particulars of the date of birth of the two workmen were not available to the then employer. It is not the case of the Corporation that the entry against Item No.10 was filled in consultation with the Medical Officer of the factory. In its written statement before the Deputy Labour Commissioner, the Corporation came out with the specific case that the entry as against Item No. 10 was made on the basis of the information given by the workmen and the said entries were made to the knowledge of the workmen. The Corporation produced only two witnesses, one of them was a formal witness who produced the original of Form No.2. The other witness was Sri Banwari Lal Khetan. His deposition was recorded separately in the two cases. True copies of his depositions are before me. The contents of the two depositions are more or less the same. This witness slated that he commenced working in the Ramkola Unit in the year 1963. He also stated that the scribe of the Form No.2 was Sri Janki Govind Rai, who had died. True copies of his depositions are before me. The contents of the two depositions are more or less the same. This witness slated that he commenced working in the Ramkola Unit in the year 1963. He also stated that the scribe of the Form No.2 was Sri Janki Govind Rai, who had died. A perusal of the Form 2 indicates that the same was signed by an Officer of the Unit, who was not Sri Janki Govind Rai. It is to be remembered that the two forms were prepared either in the year 1957 or in the year 1958. Obviously at that time, Sri Banwari Lal Khetan was not on the scene. Thus, the Corporation failed to establish the crucial fact that the entries as against Item No.10 were made on the basis of information given by the two workmen. It also failed to establish that the said entries were made to the knowledge of the workmen. Existence of either of the two aforesaid facts is essential for giving rise to a presumption. As already emphasised, a presumption comes into existence on the basis of a reasoning from some matter of fact. It is an inference from a particular fact. I have, therefore, no option but to take the view that, the Corporation having failed to prove or establish the matter of fact or a particular fact, namely, that the entry was made either on the basis of the information given by the workmen or the same was made to their knowledge, presumption as contemplated in clause (LL) of the Standing Orders cannot be pressed into service by it (the Corporation). Once this is held, the submission that clause (LL) contains a self contained code and an entry of the date of birth in no other document except the Provident Fund record or in the documents mentioned in sub-clauses (a) to (d) can be looked into will have no legs to stand upon. 9. Even otherwise, this Court in the case of M/s. Deoria Sugar Mills, Limited, Deoria v. Deputy Labour Commissioner, Allahabad 1976 F.L.R. page 80 has held that there is a presumption in favour of the age of the workman concerned mentioned in the Provident Fund record; but this presumption is rebuttable. 9. Even otherwise, this Court in the case of M/s. Deoria Sugar Mills, Limited, Deoria v. Deputy Labour Commissioner, Allahabad 1976 F.L.R. page 80 has held that there is a presumption in favour of the age of the workman concerned mentioned in the Provident Fund record; but this presumption is rebuttable. However, if none of the documents mentioned in sub-clauses (a),(b),(c) and (d) of sub-clause (3) of clause (LL) are available then it is permissible for the workman concerned to produce any evidence of his age and in that event it will be for the Labour Commissioner to decide whether the evidence is relevant, whether it relates to the workman concerned and what is its probative value and whether it is sufficient to rebut the initial presumption in favour of the entry in the Provident Fund records. I any in respectful agreement with this decision. 10. It has been strenuously contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the aforesaid Division Bench decision of this Court requires reconsideration. Reliance is placed on the maximum "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Reliance is also placed upon another rule - where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. Having considered the submission, I am of the opinion that neither the aforementioned maximum nor the well known rule in the case of Taylor v. Taylor as reiterated in the case of Nazir Ahmad v. Emperor have any application to the interpretation of Standing Order (LL). 11. Maxwell on Interpretation of Status (Twelfth Edition) at page 295 says: "But the rules, expressio unius may not always provide the answer to problems of construction." It is "said Lopes L.J.," often a valuable servant, but a dangerous master to follow in the construction of status or documents. The exclusion is often the result of in advertance or accident, and the maxim ought not to be applied when its application, having regard to the subject-matter to which it is to be applied, lead to inconsistency or injustice." "More recently, Russel, J refused to apply the rule where to have done so would have produced a wholly irrational situation." The other rule relied upon emphasises the theory of implied prohibition. In my opinion, the maxim and the rule aforesaid are not apposite in the context and setting of clause (LL). The words "to begin with" provide the key to the answer that neither the entry in the Provident Fund records nor the entry in any of the documents catalogued in sub-clauses (a) to (d) are determinative of the question of the date of birth of a workman. Moreover, as emphasised by the learned Judges in Deoria Sugar Mills Limited case a rigid construction of clause (LL) will not only lead to inconsistency and injustice but will also produce an irrational situation. 12. The Supreme Court in M/s. Glaxo Laboratories (India) Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer Labour Court and Ors. 1983 (47) F.L.R. 508 (S.C.). I opined that the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 is a socially beneficial Act, and was enacted for ameliorating the conditions of the weaker partner, conditions of service prescribed thereunder must receive such interpretation as to advance the intendment underlying the Act and defeat the mischief. If two constructions are possible, it is equally well established that the construction which advances the intention of the legislation, remedies the mischief to thwart which it is enacted should be accepted. The reasoning of this court in Deoria Sugar Mills case (supra) is just in line with the aforesaid opinion of the Supreme Court. I have, therefore, no hesitation in repelling the contention that M/s. Deoria Sugar Mills case has been wrongly decided. 13. The decision in M/s. Deoria Sugar Mills case (supra) was rendered on 5th May, 1976. It has held the fort in this State for more than a decade. Thousands of workmen must have been benefited by this decision so far and more, so far illiteracy is not wiped off from the villages will continue to benefit from the same. This should be an additional ground for not reopening this decision. 14. These petitions fail. They are dismissed with costs.