JUDGMENT Nathoo Lal, Member - This is a reference made by the Additional Commissioner, Bareilly Division, Bareily in two revisions no. 41/165 and 152/161 of 1986 Ghanshyam v. Gaon Sabha and another and Purtuaml v. Gaon Sabha and another respectively with a common Judgement and recommendations dated 29-8-86 and the revision were preferred against the order dated 7-3-86 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer Pilibhit in suit no. 34 and 35 of 1985-86 of district pilibhit under section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and land Reforms Act, to be called the "Act" hereinafter since the reference has been made with a common Judgement and order of this court also applicable to both the revisions. 2. Briefly speaking the facts of the case are that two separate suits under Section 229-B of the Act were brought by Ghanshyam Dass and Partumal, the revisionists against the Gaon Sabha Bakhshpore, Pargana, tehsil and district described at the foot of the plaints, of village Bakhshpore referred to above with the allegations that the land in suit is situated in the middle of the old grove lands belonging to the plaintiffs and had been in the cultivatory possession for a petty long time beyond the prescribed limit of 12 years and the defendant Gaon Sabha attempted to dispossess the plaintiff from the land but the plaintiff continued their adverse possession uninterrupted and in the hostile manner and that there exist, a number of mango and guava trees over the land in suit planted by the plaintiff and the land in suit has been under the cultivatory possession of the plaintiff on account of Section 210 of the Act against the Gaon Sabha. The suit was contested by the state only while the plaint case was admitted in the written statement filed on behalf of the Gaon Sabha After completing the trial the suits were decreed accordingly under the Judgement and decree dated 3-11-1971 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer/Assistant Collector First Class Pilibhit. A restoration application was moved on behalf of the Gaon Sabha under the signatures of Sri Laxman Prasad Pradhan on 22-5-85 which was vehemently opposed by the plaintiff but ultimately the restoration was allowed setting aside the decree dated 3-11-1971 and the trial of the suit was reopened. Feeling aggrieved the plaintiff have filed two separate revisions described above. A restoration application was moved on behalf of the Gaon Sabha under the signatures of Sri Laxman Prasad Pradhan on 22-5-85 which was vehemently opposed by the plaintiff but ultimately the restoration was allowed setting aside the decree dated 3-11-1971 and the trial of the suit was reopened. Feeling aggrieved the plaintiff have filed two separate revisions described above. The present reference has been made by the learned Additional Commissioner with the recommendations for setting aside the impugned order dated 7-3-86 and for rejecting the restoration application of the defendants opposite parties being heavily time barred. 3. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have perused the record. 4. The learned counsel for the revisionist during the course of his arguments has laid great stress on the point that the restoration application is heavily time barred having been filed after the lapse of about 14 years and there can be no reasons by any stretch of imagination that the Gaon Sabha or the State could not have knowledge about the trial of the suit and about the decree passed by the learned trial court. The learned counsel for the revisionist has further argued that the learned trial court has acted wrongly in exercise of its jurisdiction in restoring the suit for which under the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned trial court did not have actually any jurisdiction and the Judgement of the learned trial court itself goes to show that no explanation and reasons have been furnished to justify the restoration either by the defendants seeking the restoration or by the learned trial court in allowing the restoration and the only reason appears to be that since the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha as well as the D. G. C. (R) Pilibhit have been changed and therefore they have moved for the restoration dishonouring the actions of their predecessors particularly when the Gaon Sabha had filed a written statement wherein the claim of plaintiffs relating to rights and title over the land in suit were clearly admitted and although in the written statement filed on behalf of the State, formal denial of the claims of the plaintiffs were made by the then D.G.C. (R) but after filing the written statement he never appeared to oppose the suits. 5. 5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Gaon Sabha and the State could not deny that the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha had admitted the plaint case and State also put in appearance but disappeared after awards and accordingly the learned counsel has laid much stress on the point to convince that the restoration application has been treated and justified by the learned trial court to be an application under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code and the restoration was allowed in the interest of justice. The learned counsel for the opposite parties referring to 1956 A.L.J. page 367 (H.C.) has contended that the restoration is justified if it is proved that perverse view has been taken in the matter and the learned counsel has also admitted that provisions of Order 9 Rule 13 of the C.P.C. are not applicable to the present restoration application and the case can only be covered under Section 151 of the C. P. C. and in that view of the matter there is no question of limitation for allowing the restoration as has been held in 1973 Kerala page 226. Further the learned counsel for the opposite parties has contended that consolidation of holdings proceedings had taken place in 1966 but the appellant-revisionist failed to agitate the matters regarding their rights and title before the Consolidation authorities. The learned counsel for the opposite parties has also disclosed that prior to October 14, 1971 the limitation prescribed for perfection of rights by adverse possession over the Gaon Sabha land was six years and it was made 12 years by an amendment and was further extended to 30 years after awards and the question of limitation came to an end when by amendment of 1976, acquisition of sirdari or bhumidhari rights by adverse possession over the Gaon Sabha land was totally prohibited under the Act irrespective of the period of adverse possession and now no sirdari or bhumidhari can accrue to a trespasser of the Gaon Sabha land under Section 210 of the C.P.C. as has also been held in 1979 R.D. page 226. Commenting on the observations of the learned Additional Commissioner that it is the jurisdiction of the civil court to set aside the decree if the fraud is alleged to have been played in obtaining the decree, the learned counsel for the opposite parties has vehemently argued that the observations are correct only in case of decrees which are void and not in the case of voidable orders which are to be set right by the same court. The learned counsel for the opposite party has also pointed out that although the learned trial court has admitted that no fraud has been played in the matter but has observed about the collusive nature of the decree but the learned Additional Commissioner has said nothing on this point and if the decree is void, the revenue court has got jurisdiction to set the matter right and the learned counsel has cited 1990 (S.C.) page 540 in support of his contentions. 6. I have given a thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. The main disputed point in the present case under consideration is whether the decree passed by the learned trial court on 3-11-71 was ex-parte against the Gaon Sabha and against the State or not and if it is found that the decree was ex-parte again,t the Gaon Sabha and against the State as has been held by the learned trial court itself for justifying his findings and orders, relating to restoration of the decree, then only the question of limitation will arise and Order 9 Rule 13 will come to play its role in tire matter but if it is found that it is not ex-parte decree against the Gaon Sabha or against the State then there is no question of treating the case to bean ex-parte. From the perusal of record, it is clearly proved that summon was served on the then Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha Sri Dinanath and in pursuance of that summon Sri Dinanath Pradhan appeared before the court and filed a written statement. It is further proved from the record that summon was also served on the State and the D. G. C. (R) Pilibhit also appeared and filed a written statement. It is further proved from the record that summon was also served on the State and the D. G. C. (R) Pilibhit also appeared and filed a written statement. In the restoration application filed by the present Pradhan it has been alleged that actually no summon was served on the then Pradhan Dinanath and his signatures have been forged on the summon.to show service on him and similarly under the forged signatures of the then Pradhan Dina nath a written statement was also filed while as a matter of fact the then Pradhan Dinanath did not have any knowledge of the trial of the suit. At the same time it is also alleged that Dinanath Pradhan did not have any instructions by the L.M.C. to file the said written statement for admitting the claim of the plaintiffs over the land and therefore the presence of Pradhan and of the D.G.C. (R) in the court cannot be considered to be the presence of the Gaon Sabha and the decree passed is therefore ex parte against the Gaon Sabha. The restoration application carry the facts which are self-contradictory and create much doubt in the honesty of the Present Pradhan himself because on one hand he denies the service of summon on his predecessor Pradhan Dinanath but on the other hand he says that the presence of Pradhan and filing of a written statement on behalf of the Gaon Sabha were unauthorised as there was no instructions to this effect by the L.M.C. I therefore find that no reliance can be placed in the contents of this restoration application and the affidavit filed by the Pradhan to support these contents appear to be absolutely false. Had there been the least truth in the version of the restoration application the then Pradhan Dina nath ought to have been brought before the court to deny the service of summon oil him and also to deny the filing of written statement on behalf of the Gaon Sabha but no reason or explanation has been furnished for not doing so and the only inference which can be drawn is that there is not the least truth in the versions of the restoration application which has been sought on false and frivolous allegations. 7. 7. Coming to the findings of the learned trial court it appears that the learned trial court has been in utter confusion in appreciating the facts and circumstances of the case and recorded his findings on baseless and flimsy grounds making his findings to be absolutely perverse because the learned trial court on the one hand admits that from the evidence available on record the fact that any fraud has been played upon the court is not established but at the same time he forms a different view and opinion that a possibility cannot be ruled out that a fraud was committed and his observations are totally contradictory and cannot be upheld. His observations on the merits of the case with regard to the availability of evidence etc are totally uncalled for and irrelevant because when the pleadings put forward by the plaintiffs in the plaint are admitted by the Gaon Sabha defendant and are not opposed by any evidence by defendant State any amount of evidence for the formal proof of the facts of the case is sufficient to justify the decree passed because admission by defendant is the best piece of evidence to justify the decree. Further the findings of the learned trial court that the Judgement and decree are ex parte against the State also are again totally misconceived as the learned trial court has said that after filing of the written statement no evidence has been adduced on behalf State nor there are any signatures of the D G. C. (R) on the order-sheet after 6-10-1971 which all go to prove that the decree is ex parte against the State too. It is totally an immatured view and rather childish to say that because no evidence was produced by the State after filing a written statement and also because the counsel for the State could not take trouble to appear after 6-10-1971, the decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs is ex parte against the State. It is totally an immatured view and rather childish to say that because no evidence was produced by the State after filing a written statement and also because the counsel for the State could not take trouble to appear after 6-10-1971, the decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs is ex parte against the State. How can -t be justified because it is the duty and liability of the State itself through D. G. C (R) to do pairvi and to adduce evidence in support of its pleadings and if the State has failed m discharging its liability, it is the State only which is responsible for it and similarly if the counsel for the State appears on 6-10-971 and never appears after wards for a period of about 14 years, then the fault lies on the part of D. G. C. (R) only and his party the State has to suffer for it and nobody else is to be blamed Thus the findings of the learned trial court are totally unfounded and must be set aside. It is therefore clear that the suit never proceeded ex parte against the State but as a matter of fact the State after filing the written statement did not put in appearance to oppose the suit and it is no duty of the court or of the plaintiff to call for the D.G.C. (R) to contest the suit, the other observations made by the learned trial court about the collusion of the then Pradhan and the plaintiffs are also based on baseless grounds because the reasons given for such a conclusion by the learned trial court are that there was no resolution of the L.M.C. and the service of summon of the Pradhan was witnessed by the plaintiff Ghanshyam himself. Both these grounds are not the least acceptable because there is nothing on record to show that the written statement filed by the Pradhan was not based on the resolution to the Gaon Sabha or of the L.M.C. and mere allegations made in the restoration application cannot be believed and the defendant could have brought the record of the Gaon Sabha before the court or the then Pradhan Dinanath ought to have been summoned to appear before the court in order to clarify the position and in absence of any thing to the contrary it shall be presumed that the written statement filed on behalf of the Gaon Sabha by the then Pradhan Dmanath was fully authorised based on the consent of the Gaon Sabha and of the L.M C Moreover a copy of the resolution of the Gaon Sabha dated 19-8-70 has been filed by the revisionist in the court of the Additional Commissioner. It is no ground that since the service of summon on the Pradhan was witnessed by the plaintiff Ghanshyam the suit shall be presumed to have been collusive unless it is proved "that the suit was actually collusive. The suit was not collusive is a fact which is also proved from the evidence on record. A certified copy of the compromise dated 6-9-63 in case no. 100/63 under Section 107/1 17 Cr. The suit was not collusive is a fact which is also proved from the evidence on record. A certified copy of the compromise dated 6-9-63 in case no. 100/63 under Section 107/1 17 Cr. PC of Police Station Kotwali Pilibhit State v. Dulli and others decided by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Pilibhit on 10-10-63 has been filed by the revisionist m the trial court which goes to show that not only the then Pradhan Dinanath but 20 other people of the village who were members of the Gaon Sabha had fought a criminal case face to face with the plaintiffs to take over possession of the alleged land in dispute which had been in the occupation of the plaintiffs but ultimately good sense prevailed and the parties came to terms and filed compromise before the court wherein the rights, title and possession of the plaintiffs Partumal over the land in dispute was admitted on behalf of the residents of the village and the Gaon Sabha and the strained relations between the parties come to an end it is further proved from the copy of the resolution passed by the I MC in its meeting dated 16-8-70 that the Gaon Sabha had admitted the claims of the plaintiffs with regard to rights and title over the land in suit and it was resolved that since the plaintiffs Ghanshyam and Partumal had been in the actual cultivation and actual possession over the land in suit for a continuously Iona time and their possession had crossed the prescribed period 12 years, patta for sirdari rights over the land in dispute should be executed in their favour by the L M C in view of such a resolution, no further resolution was actually necessary for the then Pradhan Dinanath in whose leadership the resolution was passed tor filing the written statement in the suit and admitting the case of the plaintiffs and thus by no evidence or by no stretch of imagination it can be believed that the decree passed by the learned trial court in favour of plaintiffs was ex parte against the Gaon Sabha. Since the D. G. C. (R) also appeared and filed written statement but disappeared after wards and remained sleeping over the matter for a long time of 14 years the fact is enough to prove that the decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs cannot be considered to be ex parte against the State too. 8. I cannot agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the opposite-parties that the learned trial court has passed the impugned order setting aside the ex parte decree in exercise of its powers under Section 151 of the C. P. C. because there is no such evidence to show that the application was moved under Section 151 of the C.P.C. on behalf the Gaon Sabha because the plea taken was that ex parte decree was passed against the Gaon Sabha and no such plea was taken by the D.G.C. (R) in his restoration application because he also pleaded that the decree is ex parte against the state. The contentions of the D.G.C.(R) in the restoration application are totally baseless and cannot be accepted because according to him the D.G.C (R) ought to have been called for cross-examination of the witnesses and for the hearing of the case before passing the decree and this contention is totally baseless because it is no duty cast upon the court to call for a counsel of one of the parties to the contest had appeared on the previous date and had full knowledge of the next date fixed. 9. The learned trial court has also passed the impugned order treating the Judgement and decree to be ex parte against the Gaon Sabha and the State thus there is no question of bringing the matter under the purview of Section 151 of the C.P.C and it is a simple matter under order 9 Rule 13 C P C for which neither any application for condonation of delay has been moved nor any explanation has been furnished for not seeking restoration for a long time of 14 years although even restoration under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC is misconceived because the decree passed is clearly proved to have not been passed ex parte either against the Gaon Sabha or against the State and it cannot be set aside on the grounds of ex parte decree. The other contentions of the learned counsel for the opposite party made during the course of arguments are absolutely irrelevant and need no comments. A brief mention of the act that before the amendment of Section 210 of the Act by the U.P. land Laws Amendment of 1976 sirdar, rights could definitely accrue in favour of a trespasser for Gaon Sabha land by advert possession, and if not ejected within the limitation prescribed could acquire tenancy rights and in the present case under consideration the decree passed by the learned trial court is totally in accordance with law as it stood at the relevant period of time. So far as the consolidation s concerned, the contentions of the learned counsel for the opposite party are also against the facts on record because the plaintiffs had agitated the matter before the consolidation authorities and the matter was adjudicated upon in case no 151 under Section 9-A of the U.P.C.H. Act Partumal v. Gaon Sabha decided on 9-5-66 by the Consolidation Officer 15 Pilibhit, a copy of which is on file wherein he learned Consolidation Officer had admitted that from the documentary evidence brought on record it was proved that the plaintiffs had been in adverse possession over the land in dispute for the last eight years aid view all the matter they could be recorded as Asamis of Gaon Sabha. 10. In view of the observations made above, the reference and the recommendations are accepted and the revisions are allowed. The impugned order dated 7-3-1986 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Pilibhit setting aside the ex parte decree is set aside and the restoration applications filed on behalf of the Gaon Sabha and on behalf of the state are dismissed.