JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner had challenged the orders passed by the Government on 31.7.1978, by which his representation against the order of retirement dated 12.11.1976 passed by the Superintendent of Police Jhalawar, was rejected, as also the order of the Superintendent of Police regarding his retirement under Rule 244(2) of the Rajasthan Service Rules by filing appeal before the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal, which was registered as Appeal No. 590/78. The appeal of the petitioner has been dismissed by the Tribunal vide its order dated 23.3.1979. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the orders passed by the Superintendent of Police, Jhalawar, the order passed by the Government as well as the order dated 23.3.1979 of the Tribunal. 2. Head Constable, Civil Police. He was promoted Assistant Sub Inspector by order of the Dy. Inspector General of Police issued on 11.10.74. He was further promoted as Sub Inspector on ad hoc basis on 14.1.76. He was reverted back to the post of Assistant Sub Inspector by another order dated 25.3.1976. The Superintendent of Police passed an order on 12.11.1976 under Rule 244(2) of the Rajasthan Service Rules, by which the petitioner was retired from service on completing 20 years qualifying service. The Government had sent a letter dated October 30, 1976 to the Dy. Inspector General of Police, Kota Range, Kota regarding retirement of the petitioner. The petitioner made a representation before the Government against the order of retirement and this representation was rejected by the Government and the petitioner was conveyed with the rejection vide letter dated 31.7.78. 3. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Tribunal and as mentioned hereinabove, the same has been dismissed by order dated 23.3.1979. While dismissing the appeal, the Tribunal had looked into the proceedings of the Screening Committee and the service record of the petitioner and noted that a number of punishment had been inflicted upon the petitioner between the years 1968 to 1976 and even prior to that. He had also remained under suspension. He was given promotion when many of the adverse enteries had not been communicated to him. He was reverted back to the post of Assistant Sub Inspector on account of complaints and even in the year 1976, punishment of stoppage of grade increments was imposed on him. He had also remained under suspension. He was given promotion when many of the adverse enteries had not been communicated to him. He was reverted back to the post of Assistant Sub Inspector on account of complaints and even in the year 1976, punishment of stoppage of grade increments was imposed on him. The Tribunal expressed the view that having an over all view of the record of the petitioner, it could not be said that the recommendations made by the Screening Committee was erroneous and the order of retirement was contrary to law. 4. The respondents have filed reply to the writ petition, in which it has been stated that the petitioner had initially been appointed as Constable on 21.7.1948 and he was then promoted as Head Constable on 21.9.1963. The facts regarding his promotion as Assistant Sub Inspector and Sub Inspector of Police have been admitted. Along with the reply, the respondents have produced statement showing that 12 minor punishments had been imposed on the petitioner and then: were adverse remarks in his ACRs for the years 1964, 1968 and 1974 and his integrity certificate was with held in the year 1975. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the r.'cord of the case. 6. The first contention urged by Shri Prem Asopa, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner's order of retirement could not have been passed by the Superintendent of Police, Jhalawar. He was promoted as Assistant Sub Inspector by the Dy. Inspector General of Police and therefore, the Dy. Inspector General of Police could be treated as the authority, which appointed him. According to Shri Asopa, as per the provisions of Article 311 (1) of the Constitution, the petitioner could not have retired by the Superintendent of Police. Shri Asopa has placed reliance on the decision in Ram Karan v. Union of India and Others (1975 (2) S.L.R. 683) and Om Prakash Gupta v. Union of India (1975 (2) SLR 226) in support of his contention. 7. Shri Paker Farooq, learned Deputy Government Advocate has referred to Rule 2(A) of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1974, which contains definition of the term 'Appointing Authority'. According to him, as per this definition, the Superintendent of Police is the appointing authority in respect of Assistant Sub Inspector and the mere fact that the Dy. 7. Shri Paker Farooq, learned Deputy Government Advocate has referred to Rule 2(A) of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1974, which contains definition of the term 'Appointing Authority'. According to him, as per this definition, the Superintendent of Police is the appointing authority in respect of Assistant Sub Inspector and the mere fact that the Dy. Inspector General of Police had issued the order of promotion in the year 1974, does not entitle the petitioner to claim that he could not be retired by the Superintendent of Police. Learned Deputy Government Advocate has also referred to the provisions of Rule 244(2) of the Rajasthan Service Rules and has submitted that right has been conferred under this rule on the appointing authority to retire a Government servant in public interest. 8. The definition of the term 'appointing authority' means, the Inspector General of Police in respect of Inspector/Company Commanders; Dy. Inspector General of Police in respect of Sub Inspector/Platoon Commanders; Director, State Police Wireless in respect of Sub Inspector Supervisors, Sub Inspectors, Assistant Sub Inspectors, Head Constable and Constables of the Police, Wireless Organisation and, Superintendent of Police/Commandent in respect of Assistant Sub Inspectors, Head Constables and Constables. 9. Rule 244(1) of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 says that "the appointing authority shall have an absolute right to retire 10. Article 311 (1) of the Constitution of India lays down that no person who is a member of the civil service of the State or hold such civil post under the State shall be dismissed or removed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. 11. A perusal of these . provisions show that there is a marked distinction between the language employed in Article 311 (1) of the Constitution on the one hand and Rule 244(2) of the Rajasthan Service Rules on the other. The term, by which he was appointed refers to some events, which had happened in the past, were as the term 'appointing authority refers to the position in presentie. The argument of Shri Asopa, which is based on Article 311(1) of the Constitution cannot be accepted for two reasons. In the first place Article 311(1) has no application to the cases of compulsory retirement. The compulsory retirement has not been treated to be punishment like dismissal or removal from service. The argument of Shri Asopa, which is based on Article 311(1) of the Constitution cannot be accepted for two reasons. In the first place Article 311(1) has no application to the cases of compulsory retirement. The compulsory retirement has not been treated to be punishment like dismissal or removal from service. Only in cases where retirement has been brought about as a result of disciplinary action or retirement, which is primarily founded on disciplinary inquiry, the order of retirement has been treated as punishment and order of retirement simpliciter has always been distinguished from an order of punishment. This is the consistent view of the Supreme Court of India from Shyum Lal v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1954 SC 369 ) and Union of India v. M.A., Reddy ( AIR 1980 SC 563 ) . This is also the view taken by the Division Bench of this court in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1720/86, M.P. Mittal v. Rajasthan High Court and others decided on 26.2.1990 . Ram Karan's case as well as Om Prakash Gupta's case were decided in entirely different facts situation. The phrase 'appointing authority' which has been used in Om Prakash Gupta's case because to rule was available containing the definition of term 'appointing authority'. In State Bank of India v. Vijay Kumar (1990) 3 SCC 308 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had considered the phrase 'appointing authority' used in Regulation 55(2) of the State Bank of India General Regulations, 1955. After taking note of the provisions of Article 311 (1) of the Constitution, the Supreme.Court proceeded to hold as under "Now .So far as the right which has been conferred on the employees of the State Bank contained in Regulation 55(2) (a) is that such officers or employees shall not be dismissed from service of the State Bank by an authority lower than the appointing authority. Thus a comparison of the provisions contained in Article 311(1) of the Constitution and the right guaranteed to the employees of the State Bank under Regulation 55(2) (a) shows that there is a material difference between the language used in the two provisions. Thus a comparison of the provisions contained in Article 311(1) of the Constitution and the right guaranteed to the employees of the State Bank under Regulation 55(2) (a) shows that there is a material difference between the language used in the two provisions. Under Article 311(1) the words used are "by which he was appointed." In Regulation 55(2)(a) there are no such words "By which he was appointed" and in its place the only right guaranteed is that the .employee shall not be dismissed by an authority lower than the appointing authority. Thus the right guaranteed in case of the officers or employees of the State Bank is that the order of dismissal cannot be passed by an authority lower than the appointing authority. A perusal of the relevant Regulations and Rules mentioned above clearly go to show that the Chief General Manager had become the appointing authority of the employees in question under Regulation 55(2) (a) w.e.f. 1.7.74." The Supreme Court proceeded to hold that the Chief General Manager who had become the appointing authority at the time of passing of order of dismissal was competent to pass the order of punishment. 12. The above principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court of India is fully applicable to instant case, where the appointing authority has issued the order of retirement. The Superintendent of Police is the appointing authority as per Rule 2(A) Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1974 in respect of the employees holding the posts in the cadre of Assistant Sub Inspector. 13. The second contention raised by Shri Ashopa is that after his promotion in the year 1974, the previous adverse record of the petitioner stood washed of and the same could not be taken into consideration for the purpose of formation of the opinion as to whether retention of the petitioner in service was in public interest or not, Shri Asopa has placed reliance on State of Rajasthan v. Narendramal (1981 W.L.N. (UC) 467) , Brij Mohan v. State of Punjab (1986 (2) S.L.R. 54 and Bahadur Singh v. State ( 1981 (2) S.L.R. 582 ) . 14. As we have already noticed, the respondents had clearly asserted before the Tribunal that the petitioner had been promoted when some adverse enteritis had not been communicated to him. It has also been noticed that the petitioner had been punished even after his promotion. 14. As we have already noticed, the respondents had clearly asserted before the Tribunal that the petitioner had been promoted when some adverse enteritis had not been communicated to him. It has also been noticed that the petitioner had been punished even after his promotion. Without much repeatation, we would straight-way say that this point raised by Shri Ashopa is clearly covered by the decision in M.P. Mittars case (supra). After discussing the entire case law on the subject, the Division Bench proceeded to observe as under "As a result of the review of the above case law, we are of the opinion that though the entire record of the Government servant had to he taken into consideration and the over all picture of the officer during long years of service, which he has put in has to be considered, but old and stale entries should not be given much weightage and if the officer has been promoted then the adverse entries, if any prior to his promotion shall be deemed to be washed off or wiped out, but if after promotion, if any such officer has earned adverse entries then while considering the case of that officer for premature retirement under the relevant rules, like or similar entries, prior to his promotion, will have to be considered, we are of the opinion that while considering the case of an officer for compulsory or premature retirement under the relevant rules, the entire service record of the officer can be looked into, but more weightage should be given to the service record and other material of about 10 years immediately preceding to the date when the case is examined by the competent authority." 15. In view of the above decision, we are of the considered opinion that consideration of the punishment imposed upon the petitioner prior to 1974 and particularly, those imposed in 1968 and 1974 was perfectly justified. Even otherwise, a perusal of the service record of the petitioner shows that he has earned adverse remarks and punishment. Even his integrity certificate was with held in the year 1975 on the basis of complaint of having taken bribe. He has received four punishments of stoppage of grade increments between 1968 to 1976. He has received punishment of censor in the year 1968 on 3 occasions and in 1975 on one occasion. Even his integrity certificate was with held in the year 1975 on the basis of complaint of having taken bribe. He has received four punishments of stoppage of grade increments between 1968 to 1976. He has received punishment of censor in the year 1968 on 3 occasions and in 1975 on one occasion. Thus over all consideration of record of the petitioner shows that the decision to retire the petitioner was taken on relevant material. 16. The third contention urged by Shri Ashopa is that the competent authority had not applied its mind while passing the order of retirement and the order had been issued because of the Government's direction. He has referred to the decision of Sitaram v. State of Rajasthan (1970 R.L.W. 256) As against this, the learned Deputy Government Advocate submitted that the entire record of the petitioner had been considered by the Screening Committee and after due consideration, the Government had taken the decision that the petitioner deserves to be retired compulsorily. Thus the consideration was in fact made by the Government and the appointing authority was fully justified in acting upon the recommendations of the Screening Committee. He has invited our attention to Murari Lal v. State of Rajasthan (1978 W.L.N. 370) . 17. Having. considered this argument of the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that Sita Ram's case (Supra) stands fully explained in Murarilal's case (supra). We are also of the view that under Rule 244(1), power has been vested with the appointing authority and the appointing authority is certainly entitled to take into consideration the recommendations of the Screening Committee. The appointing authority was also justified in considering the directions given by the Government in this record. The consideration in this case cannot be said to have been vitiated by malafides or arbitrariness. Thus, none of the submissions made by Shri Ashopa merit acceptance. 18. In the result , we do not find any substance in this writ petition. It is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******