This revision petition arises from an order dated 6. 1. 90 passed by Munsiff (1), Hailakandi in Title Execution Case No. 7 of 1989 dismissing the objection filed by the petitioner (judgment debtor). 2. Facts — On 17. 6. 88 Munsiff (1) Hailakandi made an order for passing a decree on compromise between the parties. The last part of the order dated 17. 6. 88 runs in the following words; "Parties appear and file a compromise petition with a prayer for passing a decree as per terms and conditions as contained in the said petition. This petition is marked as 'X'. Heard submission of parties. Prayer allowed. Accordingly this suit is decreed on compromise. The petition marked as 'X' will form the part of the decree.” This order was put into execution as no formal decree was drawn -up. The petitioner resisted the execution of the decree on the ground that the order could not be used as a decree as no formal decree has been drawn up. On 6. 1.90, the Munsiff rejected the objection on the ground that under O 20 Rule 6A (2) (b), CPC, the order could be executed. Hence this petition. 3. Before dealing with the rival contentions of the parties, it may be noted here that it is not disputed that a decree has been drawn up on 8.1.90. A copy of the decree is placed on record. 4. Mr. Senapati, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that the order cannot be executed as it is not a judgment as contemplated under O 20, R 6A, CPC, and that as soon as the decree is drawn up the execution proceeding ipso facto terminates in view of O 20, R 6A. 5. The question which arises for consideration is whether an order under O 23, R 3, CPC, recording compromise and passing a decree is a judgment within the scope, meaning and purport of a jud­gment. Section 2 (9) defines judgment to mean the statement given' by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order. Under O 2J.R 3, terms of compromise are recorded and a decree is passed after giving statement by the judgment of the grounds of the order, namely satisfaction of the Court that the suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise. Under O 2J.R 3, terms of compromise are recorded and a decree is passed after giving statement by the judgment of the grounds of the order, namely satisfaction of the Court that the suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise. Therefore, the order made under O 23, R 3 CPC is within the scope, meaning and purport of a judgment. Therefore j the contention of Mr. Senapati cannot be sustained. 6. Under O 20 R 6A,CPC a decree shall ordinarily be drawn up within 15 days from the date on which judgment is pronounced, however, where the decree is not drawn up within 15 days, so long as decree is not drawn up, the last paragraph of the judgment shall be deemed to be the decree for the purpose of execution. But as soon as a decree is drawn up, that last paragraph shall cease to have the effect of a decree for the purpose of execution or for any purpose. 7. The next question which, therefore, arises for consideration is whether in an execution proceeding which has been already initiated terminates ipso facto, or the execution case is not maintainable, as soon as a decree is drawn up. Mr. Senapati has contended that under Rule 6A as soon as a decree is drawn up, the last paragraph of the judgment shall cease to have the effect of a decree for the purpose of execution or for any other purpose and, therefore, the execution case terminates ipso facto or the execution case is not maintainable. 8. Rule 6A gives a right to a party to execute a decree by using the last paragraph of the judgment as decree before the decree is drawn up. The object of Rule 6A is to ensure that the delay in the preparation of the decree may not affect the right of a party to file an appeal or to execute a decree. The provisions under Rule 6A is enabling provision to effectuate the right to execute a decree. However, a party may execute a decree either before a decree is drawn up by using the last paragraph of the judgment as a decree or after the decree is drawn up. It is at the option of the party. The provisions under Rule 6A is enabling provision to effectuate the right to execute a decree. However, a party may execute a decree either before a decree is drawn up by using the last paragraph of the judgment as a decree or after the decree is drawn up. It is at the option of the party. But, as soon as a decree is drawn up, the right recognised under Rule 6A is extinguished and the party can not take advantage of Rule 6A. The last limb of Rule 6A, namely as soon as a decree is drawn up, the last paragraph of the judgment shall cease to have effect of a decree for the purpose of execution or for any other purpose, is to make clear that the right recognised under Rule 6A is extinguished as soon as the decree is drawn up and the party can not take advantage of Rule 6A. It should not be construed to widen the ambit of the rule. Otherwise if the right vesting at the commence­ment of the original proceeding is taken away as soon as the decree is drawn up it will cause an anomalous position. Therefore, drawing I of a decree after the, institution of the proceeding will not affect | I the proceeding already commenced. In this view of the matter the contention of Mr. Senapati cannot be accepted. 9. The next contention of Mr. Senapati is that the order of recording the compromise and passing the decree is void as it was passed without recording satisfaction of the Court that one or other of the grounds mentioned in the rent law is established. He has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Feroz Lal Jain vs. Man Mai, AIR 1970 SC 794 and Kaushalya Devi vs. K.L. Bansal, AIR 1970 SC 838 , in support of his contention. This point was not raised before the executing Court. However, I am dealing with the question as it relates to validity of the decree. 9A. In Feroz Lal Jain vs. Man Mai (Supra), the Supreme Court has held that a decree for recovery of possession can be passed only if the Court concerned is satisfied that one or other of the grounds mentioned in section 13 of the Delhi statute is established. 10. 9A. In Feroz Lal Jain vs. Man Mai (Supra), the Supreme Court has held that a decree for recovery of possession can be passed only if the Court concerned is satisfied that one or other of the grounds mentioned in section 13 of the Delhi statute is established. 10. In Kaushalaya Devi vs. K.L. Bansal (Supra), the Supreme Court has upheld the finding of the High Court that the decree which was passed solely on -the basis of the compromise without indicating any of the statutory grounds mentioned in section 13 of the Delhi statute. 11. The decisions in the above cited cases show that, if decree or order is passed solely on the basis of compromise without indicating that the Court is satisfied that one or other of the statutory grounds for eviction of the tenant is established, or without indicating the existence of any of the statutory grounds of eviction, that order or decree is void. But the above decisions have not laid down that the existence of the jurisdictional fact, which is pre-requisite for order of eviction, should be clearly indicated by a judicial finding. Therefore, a decree or order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact is shown to have existed when the Court makes order either on its face or in the background of other materials in the case that the tenant expressly or impliedly agrees to surfer the decree for eviction because the landlord, in the circum­stances, is entitled to have such a decree under the Jaw, or, if the fact clearly shows that the tenant had incurred liability to be evicted under the provisions of the rent law and the compromise decree has been passed on tenants impliedly admitting such liability, a decree or order for eviction can be passed as it is possible to postulate that the Court was satisfied about the existence of the grounds for eviction of the tenant under the law (See K.K. Chari vs. R.M. Sheshadri, AIR 1973 SC 1311 , Roshenlal vs. Madanlal, AIR 1975 SC 2130 ; Naglndass vs. Dal Pat ran, AIR 1974 SC 471 ; and Suleman vs. Umarbhai, AIR 1978 SC 952 ). 12. Keeping the above principles in view let me now examine the case on hand. 12. Keeping the above principles in view let me now examine the case on hand. The term of compromise indicates that the plaintiff has not claimed arrears of rent from the defendant and that the tenant has admitted that he has incurred liability to be evicted as he was a defaulter. Default of payment of rent is one of the grounds for eviction under the law. Therefore, jurisdictional fact for eviction of the tenant under the State law existed when the order was made. Therefore the contention of Mr. Senapati is not tenable. 13. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed. Interim order stands vacated. No costs,