K. J. VAIDYA, S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) TWO important questions of law arising for our consideration in this petition are as under : (I) Whether Rule 233 of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 is ultra vires Sec. 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 ? (ii) Whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act (of 1939 or 1988 of the case may be) has got powers under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for enforcement and execution of its award i. e. whether which Claims Tribunal can be called or equated with Court and can execute an award like a decree ?. . . . . . . . . ( 2 ) NOW in order to answer the aforesaid two question it is necessary first of all to have a look at the facts of the case and then to closely examine and scan the relevant scheme and provisions of the raid Motor Vehicles Act and Rules made thereunder2. 1 Facts One Bhartiben Dilipbhai Kothari (for short respondent- claimant) had submitted an application for compensation under Sec. 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 same being M. A. C. Petition No. 283 of 1988 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-IV (Main) Ahmedabad against three opponents (i) Kalpesh Khodidas Patel (respondent No 4 herein); (ii) Haribhai Nagjibhai Desai (petitioner- judgment-debtor); and (iii) The National Insurance Co Ltd. Ahmedabad (respondent No 3 herein) praying for a compensation to the tune of Rs. 50 0 for her alleged leg injury in a vehicular accident According to the respondent-claimant on 3/10/1953 at about 15-30 hours when she was returning home the respondent No 4 came from Usmanpura wide rashly and negligently driving the motor-cycle bearing No GRL 8687 belonging to the petitioner herein and dashed against her causing a fracture on her left side. There proceedings terminated ultimately into a judgment and award dated 26/06/1989 in her favour. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. 2 Thereafter it appears that since the judgment-debtor tiled to comply with the said award the respondent-claimant was constrained to file Execution Applications Darkhast No. 25 of 1916 on 23/12/1916 before the Tribunal for the enforcement of the same. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. 2 Thereafter it appears that since the judgment-debtor tiled to comply with the said award the respondent-claimant was constrained to file Execution Applications Darkhast No. 25 of 1916 on 23/12/1916 before the Tribunal for the enforcement of the same. Ultimately the Tribunal was pleased to pass the following order; further ORDER notice under Order 21 Rule 14 is served Notice under Order 21 Rule 66 is also served No objection has been filed by other side. Hence attached property to be sold and Darkhast ordered to be sent to C. T. A. for further proceedings according to law. 4 Sd/- R. P. Dholakia m. A. C. T (IV) (A ). ( 3 ) FOOLING aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned judgment and order the petitioner who happens to be one of the two judgment- debtors has filed the present petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 4 ) MR. Ashok Padiya the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner while challenging the impugned order has raised two contentions referred to in the first paragraph of this judgment. In order to make good his submissions Mr. Padiya first of all took us to the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and Rules made thereunder as far as they are relevant to decide the controversy in the present case. Incidentally it may be mentioned that of late in the year 1988 the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 has been replaced by the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 and relevant Rules made thereunder namely The Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules 1959 have been replaced by the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Rule. 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Act 1939 or Act 1988 and Rules 1959 or Rules 1989 as the case may be ). Briefly it is to be noticed that Secs. 110e 110 and 111a of the Act 1939 correspond to Secs. 174. 175 and 176 of the Act 1988 Thus Sec 110e of the Act 1939 which corresponds to Sec. 174 of the Act 1988 pertains to the recovery of money from insurer as arrears of land revenue. Briefly it is to be noticed that Secs. 110e 110 and 111a of the Act 1939 correspond to Secs. 174. 175 and 176 of the Act 1988 Thus Sec 110e of the Act 1939 which corresponds to Sec. 174 of the Act 1988 pertains to the recovery of money from insurer as arrears of land revenue. Section 110f of the Act 1939 which corresponds to Sec 175 of the Act 1988 pertains to bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts Section 111a of the Act 1939 which corresponds to Sec. 176 of the Act 1988 pertains to power of the State Government to make rules. Further still in order to resolve the controversy raised it is important to notice and bear in mind the relevant Sec. 217 of the Act 1988 which is reproduced as under:sec. 217: Repeal and savings: (1) The Motor Vehicles Act 1939 and any law corresponding to tit Act to force in any State immediately before the commencement of this Act in that State (hereafter in this section referred to as the repealed enactments) are hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding the repeal by sub-sec (1) of the repealed enactments (a ). . or any other action taken under the repeal enactments and in force immediately before such commencement shall so far as it is not in consistent with the provisions of this Act be deemed to have been issued made granted done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act. 4. 1 Similarly regarding Rules also it is to be noticed that Rules 294 and 310 of the Rules 1939 correspond to Rules 213 and 229 of the Rules 1989 Thus Rule 294 of the Rules 1939 which corresponds Rule 213 of the Rules 1989 pertains to the exercise of powers by Claims Tribunal. Rule 310 of Rules 1939 which corresponds to Rule 229 of Rules 1989 pertains to the application of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in certain cases. In Rules 1989 a specific headway is noticed in as much as a special provision as contained in Rule 233 provides for enforcement of an award of the Claims Tribunal. It appears that such corresponding rule does not exist in Rule 1959 Rule 242 of the Rules. 1989 is reproduced as under: Sec. 242. Repeal and saving: (1) The Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules 1959 are hereby repealed. It appears that such corresponding rule does not exist in Rule 1959 Rule 242 of the Rules. 1989 is reproduced as under: Sec. 242. Repeal and saving: (1) The Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules 1959 are hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding the said repealed anything done or any action taken under any of the Provisions of the rules so repealed shall in so far as it is not Inconsistent with the provisions of these rules be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of these rules. ( 5 ) NOW turning back to the points and elaborating the first contention Mr. Padiya submitted that Rule 233 of the Rules 1989 clearly transgresses the provision contained in Sec. 174 of the Act 1988 The relevant Rule 233 of the Rules 1989 and Sec. 174 of the `act 1988 read as under:rule 233: Enforcement of any award of Claims Tribunals: subject to the provisions of sec. 174 the Claims Tribunal shall for the purpose of enforcement of its award have all the powers of a Civil Court to the execution of a decree under C. P. C. 1908 as if the award were a decree for the payment of decree passed by such court in a civil suit. SEC. 174: Recovery of money from insurer as arrears of land revenue: where any amount is due from any person under an award the claims Tribunal may on an application made to it by the person entitled to the amount issue a certificate for the amount to the Collector and the Collector shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrears of land revenue. According to Mr. Padiya Sec. 174 of the Act 1988 expressly provides for a special mode of recovery of amount by the Collector who should proceed to recover the same as arrears of the land revenue. Now in this context Rule 233 of the Rules 1989 is in clear conflict and overrides express provision contained in Sec. 174 of the Act 1988 as the said Rule expressly spells out that for the purposes of enforcement of its award. the Tribunal shall have all the powers of Civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 as if the award were a decree for the payment of decree passed by such Court in a civil suit. According to Mr. the Tribunal shall have all the powers of Civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 as if the award were a decree for the payment of decree passed by such Court in a civil suit. According to Mr. Padiya Rule 233 is ultimately merely a rule a creature of the Statute and therefore it cannot be permitted to over-ride the statute itself in this view of the matter according to Ms Padiya since the State Government while framing Rule 233 clearly exceeded its powers circumscribed by the main provisions contained in Sec. 174 of the Act 1988 the same should be declared ultra vires. 5. 2 While referring to the second contention Mr. Padiya further submitted that the Motor Vehicles Act is a special and self-contained statute and accordingly contains in its fold various provisions right from the beginning to the end relating to the constitution and establishment of Claims Tribunal presentation of claims petition examination of witnesses and ultimately passing of an award Thus it is complete and exhaustive code by itself Mr. Padiya further submitted that Sec. 174 specifically provides for a special mode and machinery in the matter of recovery of money due under the award and therefore any execution of award under Order 21 Rule 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure is out of question Not only that Sec. 175 of the Act 1988 clearly bars the jurisdiction of the Court in such matters and in that view of the matter the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain Darkhast under Order 21 Rule 54 According to Mr. Padiya an award passed by Claims Tribunal which was not a Court cannot lea executed as a decree under the C. P. C. ( 6 ) AS against the above Mr. Sandip Shah the learned Advocate for the caveator (respondent-claimant) submitted that neither of the two contentions raised by Mr. Padiya has any substance as they are duly covered by a catena of decisions of various High Courts including this High Court as well as that of Supreme Court Dealing with the first contention Mr. Shah straightway invited our attention to the following two judgments of Andhra Pradesh High Court (i) AIR 1979 AP 68 - R. Jagadeshwara Rao v. Premier Insurance Co. Kakinada and Anr. and (ii) AIR 1980 AP 34 (D. B.) Premier Insurance Co. v. Jagadeshwara Rao. Shah straightway invited our attention to the following two judgments of Andhra Pradesh High Court (i) AIR 1979 AP 68 - R. Jagadeshwara Rao v. Premier Insurance Co. Kakinada and Anr. and (ii) AIR 1980 AP 34 (D. B.) Premier Insurance Co. v. Jagadeshwara Rao. Again while dealing with the second contention Mr. Shah has invited our attention to (i) an unreported decision in Special Civil Application No 1599 and 1600 of 1969 decided by this Court (Coram: J B Mehta J ) on 23/07/1970 in the case of Minor Ramba Ishwarji v. Ahmedabad Municipal corporation: (ii) AIR 1971 Gujarat 151 ( 1971 GLR 97 ) - Shardaben v. M. I. Pandya; (iii) 1975 ACJ 433 - Kishanchand v. K M. Satwani and (iv) (1972) 13 GLR 744 - Mohan Ganda v. Driver Garasiya Keshubhai Shibubhai and Anr. ( 7 ) NOW it is true that a superficial reading of the wordings of Sec 174 of Act 1988 does give an impression that where any amount is due form any person under an award the Claims Tribunal may on application made to it by 8 person entitled to the amount issue a certificate for the amount to the Collector and the Collector shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrears of land revenue and by no other way an award can be enforced but this indeed in at first blush but it cannot stand any close scrutiny. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the word used in this Section is may i. e. to say it merely provides an alternative or an option available to the claimants to ask for issuance of the certificate for enforcement by the Collector who in his turn then proceeds to recover the same in the same manner as an arrears of land revenue. This Section does not for a moment prevent the Tribunal from exercising its power as a Civil Court in treating the award as a decree and in passing necessary order under Order 21 Rule 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As a matter of fact there is no doubt in our mind that the Claims Tribunal has ample jurisdiction to execute an award in the same manner as decree is executed by the Civil Court. As a matter of fact there is no doubt in our mind that the Claims Tribunal has ample jurisdiction to execute an award in the same manner as decree is executed by the Civil Court. Further our subsequent discussion in this judgment will also show that the Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act by now is well settled to be a Court for all its intents and purposes including enforcement of an award and therefore can exercise same powers under the Code of Civil Procedure as that of the Courts. ( 8 ) THIS view of ours is squarely supported by a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of R. Jagadeshwara Rao v. Premier Insurance Co. Kankinada and Anr. AIR 1979 AP 68 . Therein also the Andhra Pradesh High Court was called upon to interpret identical provisions under the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules thereunder. In this connection the Andhra Pradesh High Court in paras 4 5 and 6 of its judgment has observed as under:4 On the other hand it is the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the word used in Sec. 110-E may and not shall and therefore it is open to the person concerned to choose either to execute the award through the media of the Collector or the Claims Tribunal Itself under Rule 530-A. In the ordinary usage the word may is permissive and must is imperative and in accordance with such usage the word may in a statute will not generally be held to be mandatory. No doubt in some cases it has been held that the word may has been given a mandatory meeting by judicial exposition. Craies Statutes Law Seventh Edition at page-229 contains the following passage- may does not mean must may always means may. May is a pepermissive or enabling expression but there are cases in which for various reasons as soon as the person who is within the statute is entrusted with the power it becomes his duty to exercise it. So may sometimes is equivalent to shall. A look at the language employed in in Sec. 110-E makes the intention of the Legislature quite clear. So may sometimes is equivalent to shall. A look at the language employed in in Sec. 110-E makes the intention of the Legislature quite clear. The section after the amendment of 1969 reads: 110 Recovery of money from insurer as arrears of land revenue:where any money is due from any person under an award the Claims Tribunal may on an application made to it by the person entitled to the money issue a certificate for the amount to the Collector and the Collector shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as arrests of land revenue. 5 The section merely deals with the procedure to be adopted when an application is filed by the claimant for a certificate. The section does not take away the right conferred on the claimant to approach the Claims Tribunal itself under Rule 530-A The and may an on application made to it by the person entitled to the money issue a certificate. do not preclude a person from filing an application under Rule 530-A for execution. Therefore the claimant bag choice either to seek a certificate under Sec. 110-E or file an application for execution under Rule 530-A it is in no way in conflict with Sec. 110-E and the application is maintainable The learned District Judge was in error in holding that Rule 530-A is in conflict with Sec. 110-E and therefore is ultra vires. 6 The learned Council for the respondents however invited my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in B R. C. S. Balakrishna Chetty and Sons and Co. v. State of Madras AIR 1961 SC 1152 . and submitted that the opening words subject to the provisions of Sec. 110-E in Rule 530-A exclude any choice to the claimant to approach the Claims Tribunal to file an application for execution and he has to seek only the certificate under Sec. 110-E of the Act. I am unable to accede to this contention. If the claimant had already Invoked the provisions of Sec. 110-B and filed an application for the certificate then no doubt he would be barred from filing any application for execution under Rule 530-A. But If the claimant chooses to file an application for execution under Rule :30 instead of seeking a certificate under Sec. 110-E the application cannot be thrown out as not maintainable. 8. 8. 1 The above decision of the learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court when challenged by way of L. P. A. was approved by the Division Bench of that High Court. It is reported in (Premier Insurance Co. v. Jagadeshwara Rao) AIR 1980 AP 34 . In para-12 of the said judgment it has been held as under; the Intention of the legislature in enacting Sec. 111-A is clearly to empower the State Govt. to frame rules which would supplant the powers of execution enforced on the Collector under Sec. 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act. The purpose underlying Sec 110-E of the Motor Vehicles Act is to facilitate recovery of the money. Under Sec. 111-D the State Government is empowered to make Rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Sec. 110-E. It is therefore competent for the State Government to frame Rule 530-A in the form in which it has been framed. In as much as the State itself contemplates the making of and authorities the framing of supplementary provisions in the form of rules facilitating the fruition of the purpose underlying Sec. 110-E any supplementary Rule like Rule 530-A cannot be held to be Inconsistent with Sec. 110-E of the Act. In other words it must be understood that it is never the Intention of Parliament to exhaustively provide for the method and manner of execution by enacting Sec. 110-E. The clear intention of the Parliament as evidenced by Sec. 111-A is that the procedure provided for by Sec. 110-E can be added to and supplemented by the rules that might be made by the State Government out of felt necessities of the local situation. It is to be noticed that Rule 233 of the Rules 1989 is pari materia with Rule 530-A (framed by State of Andhra Pradesh under Sec. 111a of the Act 1939 The same reads as under:530 Enforcement of an award of Claims Tribunal : subject to the provisions of Sec. 110-E the Claims Tribunal shall for the purpose of enforcement of its award have all the powers. of a Civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 as If the award were a decree for the payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit. 8. of a Civil Court in the execution of a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 as If the award were a decree for the payment of money passed by such Court in a civil suit. 8. 2 We are in respectful agreement with the ratio of the aforesaid two decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. We accordingly hold that Rule 233 of Rules 1989 being supplementary to the main provisions of Sec. 174 of the Act 1988 is not ultra vires the said provision. ( 9 ) THIS takes us to the second contention raised by Mr. Padiya as to whether the Claims Tribunal like Court can exercise powers under the Code more particularly when the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is expressly barred under Sec. 175 of the `act 1988 In this regard also Mr. Sandip Shah learned Advocate for the respondent- claimant has brought to our notice judgments of various High Courts including this Court as referred to in earlier para of this judgment. All these judgments have consistently held that the `claims Tribunal is a Court for all intents and purposes and accordingly has ample jurisdiction to exercise powers under the Code. 9. 1 The first of such decision relied upon by Mr. Shah is an unreported decision of this Court (Coram: J. B. Mehta J.) in the case of Minor Ramba Ishwarji v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and Anr. (Special Civil Application Nos. 1599 and 1600 of 1969) decided on 23/07/1970 The facts of the said case briefly stated were that an injured minor having received injury in motor accident filed a claims petition before the Claims Tribunal through his father as his guardian. He was injured in an accident which took place on 5-11-1964. An application for compensation on behalf of the said minor was filed by his father before the Claims Tribunal on 3-5-1967. Now as per Sec. 110a (3) of the Act 1939 application for compensation has to be made within 60 days (as per the then relevant provision) from the date of the accident. however in this case the claim application was clearly filed beyond 60 days. Accordingly an application praying for the condonation of delay on certain grounds was also submitted. Now as per Sec. 110a (3) of the Act 1939 application for compensation has to be made within 60 days (as per the then relevant provision) from the date of the accident. however in this case the claim application was clearly filed beyond 60 days. Accordingly an application praying for the condonation of delay on certain grounds was also submitted. This was rejected by the said Tribunal holding that Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act could not apply in the facts and circumstances of the case as the claim application was not and cannot be equated with the suit. The Tribunal also held that Claims Tribunal cannot be considered to be a Court and in that view of the matter relying upon Sec. 110a (3) of the Act 1939 Tribunal refused to condone the delay. This order of the Tribunal came to be challenged before this Court raising two contentions namely - (i) whether the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal was a Court ? and (ii) whether the application for compensation can be considered to he a suit - as to what ought to be the test to be adopted in order to distinguish the Court from mere - Tribunal and what is the meaning of the suit. This Court after carefully examining the scheme and relevant provisions of the Act 1939 and Rules framed thereunder and after relying upon (i) AIR 1967 SC 1494 - Jugalkishore Sinha v. The Sitamarhi Central Co-op. Bank Ltd. and Anr. (ii) AIR 1956 SC 153 - Virendrakumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab held that the relevant test which has been laiddown in Jugalkishore case (supra) for determination whether such body as Claims Tribunal possess all attributes of a Court was clearly satisfied. Bank Ltd. and Anr. (ii) AIR 1956 SC 153 - Virendrakumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab held that the relevant test which has been laiddown in Jugalkishore case (supra) for determination whether such body as Claims Tribunal possess all attributes of a Court was clearly satisfied. By way of a brief reference it may be pointed out that Supreme Court in Jugalkishores case (supra) in para 11 of its judgment held as under : a Registrar exercising powers under Sec. 48 must be held to discharge the duties which would otherwise have fallen on the ordinary Civil and Revenue Courts of the land The Registrar has not merely the trappings of a Court but in many respects he is given the same powers as are given to ordinary Civil Courts of the land by the Code of Civil Procedure including the power to summon and examine witness on oath the power to order inspection of documents to hear the parties after framing issues to review his own order and even exercise the inherent jurisdiction of Courts mentioned in Sec 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in adjudicating upon a dispute referred under Sec 48 of the Act the Registrar is to all intents and purposes a Court discharging the same functions and duties in the same manner as a Court of law is expected to do Therefore an Assistant Registrar discharging the function of Registrar under Sec. 48 read with Sec. 6 (2) of Bihar and Orissa Co-op Societies Act is a Court. Referring to a decision reported in AIR 1956 SC 153 in the case of Virendrakumar Satyavadi v. State of Punjab in para 15 of judgment Supreme Court further observed: it may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a Court from quasi-judicial Tribunal in that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a designative judgment in decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law When a question therefor arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasi judicial Tribunal what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court. 9. 2 It appears that aforesaid judgment and order in Special Civil Application Nos. 1599 and 1600 of 1969 (Minor Ramba Ishwarji v. A. M. C) were challenged by way of Civil Appeals Nos. 198 and 199 of 1971 by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court while confirming the judgment and order of this Court vide their decision dated 16/07/1985 held as under: we are satisfied that the High Court was right in holding that the application filed by the respondent under Sec. 110 of the by Act 1939 was not barred by limitation as the proceedings before it involving a claim for compensation for personal Injury were in the nature of a suit and therefore she was entitled to the benefit of Sec 6 of the Limitation Act 1963 That being so the judgment of the High Court does not warrant any interference9. 3 The above decision has been referred to and relied upon by this High Court in the case of Kishanchand v. K. M. Satwani reported in 1975 ACJ 433. 3 The above decision has been referred to and relied upon by this High Court in the case of Kishanchand v. K. M. Satwani reported in 1975 ACJ 433. In para 2 of the said judgment it has been held as under: in a series of decisions of this Court the Claims Tribunal when it deals with such compensation matters has been held to be a Court because the claims Tribunal is constituted in supersession of the ordinary Courts of the land for this purpose with all the powers of the Court and it has to pronounce a definitive judgment in accordance with law after proper evidence is led for fastening the liability on the basis of fault After considering the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act as a single Judge. I had decided this question settled principles In Special Civil Application No. 1599 of 1969 decided on 23/07/1970 and for view was approved in the decision of the division Bench where Patel J. spoke for the Division Bench for both of us in F. A. No. 280 of 1968 decided on 15/11/1971 Even the relevant Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules 1959 hereinafter referred to as the Rules make a clear provision in Rule 306 for a judgment of the Claims Tribunal by enacting that the Claims Tribunal in passing order shall record concisely in a judgment the finding on each of the issued framed and its reasons for such finding. therefore it is obvious that in such Motor Accidents Claims proceedings which result in an award of compensation under Sec. 110-D the Claims Tribunal has to pass a formal judgment in accordance with which a formal award or decree has to be drawn up as required by the provisions of the Code. The Claims Tribunal being a Court would be governed by the provisions of the Code in that respect. That is why Rule 310 oven enacts that in so far as these rules make no provision or make insufficient provisions the Claims Tribunal shall follow the procedure laid down in the Cede of Civil Procedure 1918 for the trial of suits. It is against such an award of the Claims Tribunal under Sec 110b that an appeal is provided to this Court under Sec. 110d. It is against such an award of the Claims Tribunal under Sec 110b that an appeal is provided to this Court under Sec. 110d. Rule 312 (3) provides that the provisions of Order 41 and Order 21 in the Code shall mutatis mutandis apply to appeals preferred to the High Courts under sec. 110d. Therefore there is not only a judgment and formally drawn up award against which an appeal had to be filed but the original decree or the decree in appeal could be executed by invoking the provisions under Order 21 of the Code. Therefore on both the grounds that the claims Tribunal is a Court and because of these specific provisions it is obvious that the Claims Tribunals judgment has to be formally embodied in the award like a Civil Courts decree and therefore the award has got to be drawn up and to that extent the Tribunal was right in its view. 9. 4 This view is further reiterated and re-emphasised in the case of Shardaben v. M. I. Pandya reported in AIR 1971 Guj. 151 : ( 1971 GLR 97 ). Relevant discussion is found in paras 3 and 4 which are reproduced as under: 3 From this Act and the scheme of the Act and the Rules it is clear that the Claims Tribunal is constituted under sec. 110 for a particular area specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents Involving the death of bodily injury to persons arising not of the use of motor vehicles. The institution of the proceeding is by an application for compensation as stated in Sec. 110 in the form prescribed. Limitation for such application is provided in Sec. 110 (3) of only sixty days from the date of the occurrence of the accident. But the Claims Tribunal can entertain the application even after the expire of sixty days if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. Under Sec. 110b the Claims Tribunal disposes of this application after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and holding an inquiry into the claim. But the Claims Tribunal can entertain the application even after the expire of sixty days if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. Under Sec. 110b the Claims Tribunal disposes of this application after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and holding an inquiry into the claim. and it has to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just specifying the person or persons to whom compensation is to be paid and the amount which is to be paid by the insurer. Under Sec. 110-C (2) the Claims Tribunal is given all the powers of a Civil Judge for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents. Rule 294 also confers all the powers of a Civil Court on the Claims Tribunal in so far as the same are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and the Roles made thereunder. Therefore all the powers of a Civil Court are conferred on the Claims Tribunal. Right of appeal is also provided under Sec. 110d of the Act to the High Court. material provision in Sec. 110f of the Act outs the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The said section provides that where any claims Tribunal is constituted. for any area no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area. Therefore it is obvious on a bare perusal of the scheme of the Act that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is ousted and the Claims Tribunal is constituted under the Act to discharge duties which would have otherwise fallen on in Ordinary Civil Court of the land. The relevant provision under See. 110c of the Act as regards procedure and powers of a Claim Tribunal provides that the Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the discovery and prosecution of documents and material objects and even a local Inspection and under Rule 294. It has all the powers of a Civil Court. It has all the powers of a Civil Court. Having regard to the other provisions already referred to the tribunal possesses all she attitudes of a Court and it has to decide the claim on the basis of legal evidence in accordance with law by a definitive final judgment. The tribunal is for all intents and purposes a Civil Court discharging the same functions and duties in the same manner as a Civil Court is expected to do Therefore following the decision of Their Lordships in Jugalkishore v. Sitamarhi Central Co-op Bank Ltd. AIR 1967 SC 1494 at page 1499 wherein similar circumstances the Registrar under the Co-op Societies Act was held to be a Court even such a claims tribunal must be held to be a Court of law to which the Civil Procedure Code would clearly apply. This being the original civil proceeding also could be permitted to be instituted as a pauper by taking into consideration the provisions of Order 33 of the Code. 4 Even otherwise Rule 294 itself makes it clear that all the powers of Civil Court are conferred on the claims tribunal. In the powers would necessarily Include the power to permit a litigant to institute the proceedings as pauper which is vested tn the Civil Court under 33 of the Code and it would also vest in the claims tribunal by specific provision of Rule 29. Mr. Pathak was unable to point out any inconsistency in the language of any of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act itself or the Rules framed there under which would negative the application of the sal any provision for the protection of an impecunious litigant the poverty of a litigant would be no ground which should deprive him of his right of which an equitable and just compensation from the tribunal. The present applicant widow has claimed a compensation of Rs. 25000 and merely because she is not in position to pay half of the amount of ad valorem Court fees thereon tee claims tribunal has refused to entertain this claim. The claims tribunal was obviously in error in presenting that there was no no provision which would make the civil Procedure Code and in particular Order 33 of the Code applicable to such an application for compensation under Sec. 110a of the Act. The claims tribunal was obviously in error in presenting that there was no no provision which would make the civil Procedure Code and in particular Order 33 of the Code applicable to such an application for compensation under Sec. 110a of the Act. The claims tribunal can be treated as a court possessing all posers of Civil Court and even the wide ambit of Rule 94 confers such a power and even if there be any doubt the same is further clarified by provision contained in Rule 310 which provides that in so far as the rules make no provision or make insufficient provisions the claims tribunal shall follow the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned claims tribunal has however held that Rule 310 could not help the petitioner as it would being in those provisions of the Code which apply at the stage of trial and trial would mean only hearing of the suit. The trial of a suit involves a much wider concept than only the hearing of the suit. All the procedural stages right from the stage of institution of a suit till the suit ends in a decree would be included in the broader concept of the term trial Mr. Chokhawala. In this connection relied upon a decision of Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay consisting of Chagla C J and Dixit J. In Sitaram Hirachand Birla v. Yograjsing Shankarsing Parihar AIR 1953 Bom. 293 wherein the Division Bench construed Sec. 90 (2) of the Representation of the People Act 1951 which provided that every election petition shall be tried by the tribunal as early as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure in the trial of suits. The suits did not mean the same thing as the hearing of a suit, which was referred to, in Order 18 of the C. P. C. and subsequent Order. A Court is concerned with the trial of suit form the time when it is instituted and the hearing of a suit is only a part of the trial of the suit. But a great many things go on after a suit is instituted which are all concerned with the trial of a suit and Sec. 90 (2) could not be restricted only to the stage of hearing of suit. But a great many things go on after a suit is instituted which are all concerned with the trial of a suit and Sec. 90 (2) could not be restricted only to the stage of hearing of suit. Therefore it was held that the power of amending a petition could be exercised under Sec. 90 of that Act. This decision is in terms approved by the Supreme Court in Harishchandra v. Triloksingh AIR 1957 SC 444 at pages 454-455 which now settles this wider meaning of term trial as connoting the entire proceedings before the tribunal and that powers and procedure are interchangeable terms. Mr. Pathak sought to distinguish this decision on the ground that even that decision only held that after the suit is instituted the provisions regarding the trial would have to be applied as per the Code. In the present case however no application for compensation could be entertained by the claims tribunal in view of Rule 292 unless the application for compensation was accompanied with half the ad valorem Court fees at least in the first instance. Mr. Pathak ignore the fact Rules 291 to 312 have been enacted by the State Government under the powers conferred under Sec. 311a to carry into effect the provisions of Secs. 110 to 110b and particularly of lay down the procedure to followed by the claims tribunal in holding an inquiry under the chapter and to proscribe the powers of payable on such applications. Therefore it is obvious form the rule making power itself which conferred under Rule 111a that provisions of Court fee itself is a procedural provisions and while making this procedure for Court fee the rule making authority specifically provides Rule 294 and 310 to make the position clear that the claims tribunal shall exercise all the powers of a Civil Court without any restriction and even where there wan any in sufficient provision or as laid down in C. P. C. Therefore the claims tribunal was obviously under an error in presuming that there was no provision in the Rules or the Act to permit an application under Sec. 111a of the Act to be filed by the petitioner as a pauper and that Order 33 of the Code was not applicable to this case and by committing his patent error of law the tribunal has refused to exercise further jurisdiction in the matter. Therefore the order of the claims tribunal must be quashed. 9. 5 In the case of Mohan Ganda v. Driver Garasiya Keshubhai Shivubha and Ors. reported in 1972 (13) GLR 744 this Court (Coram : B. J. Diwan J. as he then was) at page 747 has held as under : under Sec. 111a of the Act power has been conferred on the State Government to make rules of the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Secs. 110 to 110e and in particular said the rules may provide inter alia for the form of application for claims for compensation particulars of the claim fees if any to be paid in respect of such applications. The Rules may also provide for the procedure to be followed by the claims tribunal and the powers in a Civil Court which may be exercises byes by a claims tribunal. Acting under Sec. 111a the Bombay Government has framed the M. V. Rules 1959 and in their applicability to the State of Gujarat it has been provided by Rules 294 that the claims tribunal may exercise all the powers of a Civil Court save in so far as they ar not inconsistent with the provisions of the M. V. Act 1939 and the Rules made thereunder. Therefore though it is called a tribunal a claims tribunal has on view of Sec. 111 read with Rule 294 all the powers of Civil Court and can exercise all the powers of a Civil Court. Therefore when Sec. 43 of the Bombay Court Fees Act enables the Civil Court to direct a refund of the Court fee paid by the plaintiff on plaint the claims tribunal exercising the powers of Civil Court can also direct refund of the Court fee paid on the application in accordance with Rule 292. To my mind reading Sec. 111a under the State Government is empowered to make rules and Rules 292 and 294 It is clear that the claims tribunal under M. V. Act exercises all the powers of a Civil Court which would also include power of refund of the Court fee and that Court fees paid on an application under Role 292 stand on the same footing as the Court fees paid on a plaint under Art. 1 of Schedule I of the Bombay Court Fees Act. ( 10 ) MR. ( 10 ) MR. Pandya the learned Advocate for the petitioner as a last resort finally submitted that in view of the fact that Sec. 175 of the Act 1988 clearly bars jurisdiction of the Civil Court and in that view of the matter the Tribunal was not justified in assuming and exercising powers of the Civil Court by resorting to and applying provisions under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 Now this is a total misconception of law. On going through the scheme and object of the Act 1988 and Rules made thereunder vie. Rules 1989 it is difficult to conceive as to how Sec. 175 of the Act. 1988 which pertains to the bar of the Civil Court can forbid the Tribunal in resorting to and adopting and applying the procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 The bar of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is one thing and the application of the Cede of Civil Procedure is entirely 8 different thing. Both stand on different footings. It has to be appreciated that the bar of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been created only and simply because the Act 1988 has created a special forum viz. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. vesting it with a special and exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the cases of motor accident claims arising out of the vehicular accidents. Obviously no such claims proceedings for which the Special Motor Accident Claims Tribunals are constituted can lie before the Civil Court. Under the circumstances Sec. 175 of the Act 1988 which speaks about bar of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has nothing to do with the application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal As a matter of fact Mr. Padiya forgets that Rule 229 of the Rules 1989 in terms permits the application of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 tn the Tribunal proceedings. So far as the enforcement of as award of the Tribunal is concerned. Rule 233 of the Rules 1989 is so patently clear regarding application of Code of Civil Procedure that it needs no further comments on our part. ( 11 ) IN view of the above discussion both the contentions raised by Mr. Padiya having no substance have to be rejected. Rule 233 of the Rules 1989 is so patently clear regarding application of Code of Civil Procedure that it needs no further comments on our part. ( 11 ) IN view of the above discussion both the contentions raised by Mr. Padiya having no substance have to be rejected. We accordingly hold that (i) Rule 233 of Rules 1989 is intra vires Sec. 174 of Act 1988 and (ii) that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under the provisions of Act 1988 is a Court for all intents and purposes including enforcement of its award and therefore can exercise powers under Sec. 47 and Order at Civil Procedure Code 1908 and that what is barred by Sec. 175 of Act 1988 is the jurisdiction of Civil Court and not the procedure to be applied under Civil Procedure Code. (KMV) Rule discharged .