JUDGMENT : G.B. Pattnaik, J. - The brother of the detenu Bhaba ' Bhabagrahi lenka has assailed the detention made u/s 3(2) of the National Security Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") and the approval and confirmation of the same by the State Government. 2. The District Magistrate, Cuttack, passed the order of detention in exercise of his powers u/s 3(2) of the Act on 6-7-1989 and the detenu was served with the grounds of detention on 9-7-1989. The State Government approve; the said order of detention on 18-7-1989 and the detenu's representation made on 15-8-1980 was rejected by the State Government on 29-8-1989. In the meantime, on the basis of the report of the Advisory Board, the State Government confirmed the order of detention on 24-8-1989 directing that the detenu would continue in detention for a period of 12 months. The detenu's brother has thereafter approached this Court praying for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 3. The grounds of detention that were served on the detenu which have been annexed as Annexure-2 indicate that the detenu's act and conduct on 30th of June, 1989 in respect of which a P.S. Case No. 94 has been registered at Malgodown Police Station and the fact that between 24-8-1984 and 22-12-1988 the detenu was booked in several criminal offences and was released on bail, were sufficient for the satisfaction of the District Magistrate that the normal law of the land has proved ineffective to curb down his anti-social activities and further the District Magistrate was satisfied that the activities of the detenu had adversely affected the even tempo of life of the community and disturbed the public peace and order and, therefore, he passed the order of detention u/s 3(2) of the Act. 4. Mr. R.N. Mohanty, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, raises the following contentions in challenging the legality of the detention of the detenu: (i) The order of detention together with the grounds on which the order has been made have not been reported forthwith to the State Government, as required under Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act and such infraction vitiates the continued detention. (ii) Though the grounds of detention indicate that along with the incident of 30th of June, 1989 the detaining authority also took into account the several criminal cases instituted against the detenu, wherein he was released on bail, but no papers or documents in support of those criminal cases have been furnished to the detenu and thereby there has been an infraction of the constitutional right of the detenu under Article 22(5) of the Constitution and consequently, the detention has become vitiated; (iii) The State Government while confirming the order of detention u/s 12 has not gone through the proceedings of the Advisory Board, but has merely perused the report of the Advisory Board and such non-perusal of the proceedings of the Advisory Board vitiates the order of confirmation and also the consequent continued detention; (iv) The Central Government has failed to exercise its power conferred u/s 14 of the Act, inasmuch as there has been no application of mind by the Central Government after the State Government reported the factum of approval to the Central Government in accordance with Sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Act and such inaction on the part of the Central Government vitiates the order of detention; (v) The grounds on which the detaining authority was satisfied that the detenu's activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order really centre round law and order' in an individual case and, therefore, the detaining authority had no jurisdiction to invoke his powers u/s 3(2) of the Act; and. (vi) The order of detention as well as the grounds of detention indicates that the detaining authority was not satisfied that the detenu would commit such types of activities in future and without such satisfaction, the Act does not authorise the detaining authority to pass an order of detention. All these contentions require a careful examination of the relevant provisions of the Act and the law on the subject. 5. All these contentions require a careful examination of the relevant provisions of the Act and the law on the subject. 5. Coming to the first contention, its correctness depends upon an interpretation of Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act which is quoted below in extenso; (4) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in Sub-section (3), he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars, as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the. making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government: Provided that where u/s 8 the grounds of detention are communicated by the officer making the order after five days but not later than ten days from the date of detention, this Sub-section shall apply subject to the modification that, for the words "twelve days" the words fifteen days' shall be substituted. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision casts an obligation on the detaining authority when such authority is an officer mentioned in Sub-section (3) of Section 3 to forthwith' report the fact to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with the grounds on which the order is made and such other particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the matter. Admittedly, the order of detention in the present case was made on 6th of July, 1989, and the fact of detention was reported to the State Government on the very same day. But the grounds of detention and other particulars were sent to the State Government on 9th of July, 1989. The question that arises for our consideration is whether sending grounds of detention and other particulars on 9th constitutes an infraction of Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act as the same were not sent forthwith' as required under the said sub-section. Mr. Mohanty, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, vehemently contends that under Sub-section (4) the fact of detention as well as the grounds of detention together with particulars having a bearing on the detention must be forwarded to the State Government forthwith' and in any event if there is some delay, the delay must be explained. Mr. Mohanty, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, vehemently contends that under Sub-section (4) the fact of detention as well as the grounds of detention together with particulars having a bearing on the detention must be forwarded to the State Government forthwith' and in any event if there is some delay, the delay must be explained. Since in the counter affidavit, the District Magistrate has not offered any explanation for the delay between 6th and 9th of July, 1989, there has been an infraction of the mandatory requirements of Sub-section (4) of Section 3 and such infraction vitiates the order of detention. In support of the aforesaid contention, the learned Counsel places reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Keshav Nilkanth Joglekar Vs. The Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay Gopal Mondal Vs. State of West Bengal, and a decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Mannsing Babusing Thakore Vs. Commissioner of Police and Others. In Keshav Nilkanth Joglekar Vs. The Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay the Supreme Court construed the expression 'forthwith' used in Section 3(3) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and observed: An act which is to be done forthwith must be held to have been so done, when it is done with all reasonable despatch and without avoidable delay. But when an act is done after an interval of time and there is no explanation forthcoming for the delay, it cannot be held to have been done forthwith'. Hence the word forthwith' means only that the act should be performed with reasonable speed and expedition, and that any delay in the matter should be satisfactorily explained. In Gopal Mondal Vs. State of West Bengal, ; the Supreme Court construed the said expression 'forthwith' in Section 3(3) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, and it was held: The word forthwith' has been interpreted to mean as soon as possible; without any delay'. If there is some delay which is reasonably explained, then there is no violation of the mandatory requirement of the law.... In Mannsing Babusing Thakore Vs. If there is some delay which is reasonably explained, then there is no violation of the mandatory requirement of the law.... In Mannsing Babusing Thakore Vs. Commissioner of Police and Others, a Bench of the Gujarat High Court construed the same expression forthwith' used in Section 3(3) of the Gujuat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 10 of 1985 and their lordships observed: On plain reading of Section 3(3) of the said Act, it is clear that the detaining authority is required to report forthwith the fact of passing the detention order to the State Government, together with the grounds of detention and other materials which have bearing on the impugned order of detention; It is also clear that wherever the legislature is using the word forthwith', it is so advisedly using it and on perusal of the entire scheme, it is very clear that there is a very tight schedule of time. Immediately on getting the report together with the grounds and other materials, the State Government has to consider the same for the purpose of approval and if the approval is not given within the period of 12 days, the said order does not remain in force after 12th day and, therefore, the legislature has advisedly used the word forthwith' meaning of which is now settled by the judgment of the Supreme Court. It means it is to be done with all reasonable despatch and without avoidable delay.... The expression 'forthwith' has been defined in Wharton's law lexicon to mean: When the Defendant is ordered to plead forthwith' he must plead within 24 hours. When a statute or rule of the Court requires an act to be done forthwith it means that the act is to be done within a reasonable time having regard to the object of the provisions and the circumstances of the case. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edition) says the expression 'forthwith' means: When a statute requires that something shall be done forthwith, or immediately' or even instantly', it should probably be under stood as allowing a reasonable time for doing it. The Supreme Court considered this expression occurring in Section 3(3) of the Internal Security Act in the case of S.K. Salim v. The State of West Bengal AIR 1976 S.C. 602. After noticing the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in Keshav Nilkanth Joglekar Vs. The Supreme Court considered this expression occurring in Section 3(3) of the Internal Security Act in the case of S.K. Salim v. The State of West Bengal AIR 1976 S.C. 602. After noticing the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in Keshav Nilkanth Joglekar Vs. The Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay, and in Bidya Deb Barma Etc. Vs. District Magistrate, Tripura, Agartala, their lordships observed: Thus, forthwith' does not connote a precise time and even if the statute under consideration requires that the report shall be made forthwith, its terms shall have been complied with if the report is made without a violable or unreasonable delay. Their lordships quoted an observation of Halman L.J. in Hillingdon london Borough Council v. Cutler (1968) 1 Q.B. 124, which is to the effect: ...While holding that the concept of forthwith' does not exclude the allowance of a reasonable time for doing the act, qualified his formulation by adding the rider provided that no harm is done.... Then applying the ratio to the facts of the case, their lordships observed: The District Magistrate, it must be stated, has not explained in his affidavit why he did not report the fact of detention to the State Government promptly. The order is dated June 13 and if not on the 13th itself, he should have in normal circumstances made his report on the 14th. Such remissness on the part of detaining authorities is not to be encouraged but it ought to be stated that counsel for the State Government had asked for an adjournment to enable the District Magistrate to file a supplementary affidavit for explaining the delay. We did not grant the adjournment as we were inclined to the view that the interval between the date of the order and the date of the report is not so long as to require an explanation on oath. The date on which the order was passed may, even according to the Petitioner's counsel, be left out of the reckoning. That accounts for the 13th. The report was made on the 15th and there is some authority for the proposition that an act may be taken as done at the first moment of the day on which it was performed' (See, Maxwell, 12th Ed. pp. 311-312). That takes care of the 15th. That accounts for the 13th. The report was made on the 15th and there is some authority for the proposition that an act may be taken as done at the first moment of the day on which it was performed' (See, Maxwell, 12th Ed. pp. 311-312). That takes care of the 15th. All that can therefore be said is that there was one day's delay in making the report. We are not inclined to dismiss as untrue the oral explanation offered on behalf of the District Magistrate that he could not make the report on the 14th due to administrative difficulties. As it cannot be said that the District Magistrate had slept over the order or was, lounging supinely' over it and since the explanation of one day's delay may be accepted as reasonable, there is no violation of the requirement that the report to the State Government shall be made forthwith. In our considered opinion, the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court enunciates the legal position in regard to the expression 'forthwith' used in a statute and when we apply the same to the present case, we cannot hold that there has been an infraction of Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act. The order of detention was passed on 6th of July, 1989 and on the very same day, the fact of detention had been reported to the State Government by wireless message 8th of July was a holiday being the second Saturday and on 9th of July which was also a holiday being Sunday, the detaining authority had sent the grounds of detention and all connected papers to the State Government, as has been averred in paragraph-9 of the counter affidavit of the District Magistrate. It is, of course, true that no explanation has been offered as to why the documents were not sent on 7th of July, 1989. But even without the same, we are not in a position to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the District Magistrate had slept over the order or was lounging supinely over it and in our considered opinion, there has been no infraction of Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act. The first contention of Mr. Mohanty is accordingly rejected. 6. So far as the second contention is concerned, Mr. The first contention of Mr. Mohanty is accordingly rejected. 6. So far as the second contention is concerned, Mr. Mohanty for the Petitioner contends that the grounds of detention indicate that the District Magistrate was satisfied about the necessity to detain the detenu because of the incident that happened on 30th of June, 1989 and also because of the fact that there were several other criminal cases against the detenu between the period 1984 and 1987 and detenu's release on bail in those cases made the normal law of the land ineffective to curb down the anti-social activities of the detenu. Though he has relied upon those criminal cases yet none of the documents in support of those criminal cases had been furnished and thus the detenu was prevented from making an effective representation and thereby there has been an infraction of Article 22(5) of the Constitution. The expression 'grounds' means the conclusions drawn by the authority from the facts or particulars which have led the authority to pass the order of detention and Article 22(5) obliges the authority to indicate the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made. Under the second part of Article 22(5) obligation arises to furnish sufficient facts or particulars so as to afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation. Since without getting information sufficient to make a representation against the order of detention it was not possible for the detenu to make a representation at all, non-furnishing sufficient particulars or facts vitiates the order of detention as the only right of a detenu to make an effective representation is infringed. The Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Yousuf Rather Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others, considered this question and held: A detenu has two rights under Article 22(5) of the Constitution : (1) To be informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds on which the order of detention is based, that is, the grounds which led to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority; and (2) to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention, that is, to be furnished with sufficient particulars to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may obtain relief to him.... This being the position of law, an examination of the grounds of detention clearly indicates that the criminal cases referred to in the order of detention were also taken into account to arrive at the subjective satisfaction and yet no particulars in respect of those cases were furnished to the detenu. In our considered opinion, therefore, there has been an infraction of Article 22(5) of the Constitution which vitiated the order of detention and the detenu's continued detention is liable to be quashed on this ground alone. The second contention of Mr. Mohanty is accordingly upheld. 7. So far as the third submission is concerned, it depends upon an interpretation of Section 12 of the Act. It is no doubt true that u/s 12, the appropriate Government is required to consider the report of the Advisory Board when the Advisory Board gives an opinion that there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit. The Supreme Court in the case of Nand Lal Bajaj Vs. State of Punjab and Another, considered a similar question and held that where the Advisory Board did not forward the records of its proceedings to the State Government and merely forwarded a report, then the procedure adopted was not in consonance with the procedure established by law. The State Government while confirming the order of detention u/s 12 of the Act had not only to peruse the report of the Advisory Board but also to apply its mind to the materials on record and if the record itself was not before the State Government, it followed that the order was passed by the State Government u/s 12(5) of the Act without due application of mind and this was a serious infirmity which made the continued detention of the detenu illegal. In the present case, the Petitioner has asserted in paragraph-16 of the writ petition that only the report of the Advisory Board had been considered by the State Government when it confirmed the order of detention in exercise of its power u/s 12 and the proceedings and the materials had not been placed before the State Government and in the counter affidavit, the Statte Government has taken the stand that it was not obligatory on the part of the Advisory Board to forward the proceedings; as well as other materials. Thus it is admitted that the State Government has considered only the report and no other materials. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Nand Lal Bajaj's case, referred to supra, the continued detention of the detenu has become illegal and the same is liable to be quashed. The third contention of Mr. Mohanty must, therefore, be upheld. 8. We also find sufficient force in the fourth submission of Mr. Mohanty, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. Since the allegations made against the Central Government to the effect that the Central Government has failed to exercise its power u/s 14 of the Act as after the State Government reported the factum of approval to the Central Government u/s 3(5), the Central Government has not applied its mind to the facts and materials on record have not been controverted, such inaction on the part of the Central Government vitiates the detention of the detenu. In a recent case of the Gauhati High Court in Namal Chandra Barua v. The State of Assam and Ors. 1985 (2) Crimes 275 the learned Judges considered the provisions of Section 3(5) read with Section 14(1) of the National Security Act and held that the Central Government was duty bound to consider the report and the grounds of detention sent by the State Government but if the Central Government had not discharged its duties and obligations under the Act, then the detention would become vitiated. The allegations made in the present case not having been controverted by the Central Government though the central government is represented by the learned Standing counsel for the Centred Government, the allegation must be taken to have been admitted and, therefore, it must be held that the Central Government failed to perform the duties and obligations cast on it u/s 14 of the Act, and the decision of the Gauhati High Court, referred to supra, will apply with full force. Therefore, the detention of the detenu is vitiated. 9. In view of our conclusions on the second, third and fourth submissions made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, we do not think it necessary to consider the other two contentions. 10. In the net result, therefore, the continued detention of the detenu has been vitiated and accordingly, the order of detention is quashed and the detenu is directed to be set at liberty forthwith. 10. In the net result, therefore, the continued detention of the detenu has been vitiated and accordingly, the order of detention is quashed and the detenu is directed to be set at liberty forthwith. This writ application is accordingly allowed. J.M. Mahapatra, J. 11. I agree. Writ application allowed. Final Result : Allowed