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Rajasthan High Court · body

1990 DIGILAW 625 (RAJ)

Kajod Ram v. Smt. Bundhi Devi

1990-10-29

S.N.BHARGAVA

body1990
JUDGMENT 1. - This is defendants first appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Alwar. 2. Plaintiff-respondent filed a suit on 12-12-1977 for recovery of ornaments alleged to have been given to her by her parents, or received as presents, being her Stri Dhan or in the alternative its price which was estimated at Rs. 12,500/-, as compensation. The plaintiff was married to defendant appellant No. 5 Ghanshyam in the year 1965 and the Gona ceremony was performed in March, 1968. It was further mentioned in the plaint that in the month of Kartik 1968. she was beaten by the appellant and was forcibly sent to her father's house in a Rickshaw and all the ornaments etc. were retained by her husband and her in-laws. It has further been pleaded in the plaint that the appellant Ghanshyam filed a suit for divorce u/s 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act and also a petition u/s 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act for judicial separation, which was dismissed by the court. A criminal complaint u/s 500 IPC was filed against the appellants in which conviction was ordered. The husband is not prepared to keep the plaintiff in the house and has not returned the ornaments and other Stri Dhan, and therefore, the present suit was filed for the recovery of ornaments, or in the alternative compensation for the same. The suit has been contested and the allegations mentioned in the plaint have been denied. It has also been pleaded that the suit is barred by time. 3. Learned trial court framed the following four issues:- " 1- vk;k okfnuh dks tsojkr of.kZr ftEeu la0 4 ds yxk;r o okfnuh ds firk ,oa mlds pkpk vkfn us fookg o xkSus esa fn;s\ D;k ;s fHkUu tsojkr of.kZr in okn la0 4 dherh 12]500@& okfnuh ds L=h/ku ds gSa\ 2- vk;k izfroknhx.k us okfnuh dks ekg dkfrZd lu~ 1968 esa ekjihV djds tsojkr of.kZr in okn la0 4 vius ikl j[k fy;s vkSj D;k okfnuh mUgsa izkIr djus dh vf/kdkfj.kh gS\ 3- vk;k nkok olwyh tsojkr of.kZr in okn la0 4 ;k fodYi esa 12]500@& :0 dh izkfIr dk vUnj fe;kn gS\ 4- nknjlh D;k gksxh\ " 4. After recording the evidence led by the parties the trial court has decreed the suit of the plaintiff and awarded a sum of Rs. After recording the evidence led by the parties the trial court has decreed the suit of the plaintiff and awarded a sum of Rs. 12,500/- as compensation or damages for not returning the ornaments and other Stridhan. It is against this judgment of the learned trial court that the present appeal has been filed. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently submitted that the judgment of the learned trial court is not correct. It has not correctly appreciated evidence and findings on all the issues are incorrect. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has supported the judgment of the learned trial court. 6. I have carefully gone through the submissions made at the bar, as also record of the case. Issue Nos. 1 and 2 entirely depends on appreciation of evidence. The learned trial court has elaborately discussed the entire evidence in detail and has come to a firm finding, deciding both the issues in favour of the plaintiff. I have also gone through the evidence led by the parties, and in my opinion, the findings of the learned trial court on both these issues are correct and do not require any interference by this Court. Since I am in agreement with the findings arrived at by the trial court, I do not propose to deal them in detail in this judgment. 7. However, with regard to Issue No. 3, whether the suit is within limitation, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the suit is clearly barred by time because according to the plaintiff herself, the cause of action accrued to her in the year 1968 when she was turned out of the house and was not allowed to take away her articles. If Article 69 or 91 (b) of the Limitation Act are applied, then, the suit is barred by time and even if both these articles are not applicable, and if Article 113 of the Limitation Act is applied then also the suit is barred by time. Learned counsel for the appellants ha submitted that in deciding the point of limitation, the court has to see the allegations made in the plaint and in this connection he has placed reliance on Mohd. Khalil Khan v. Mehboob Ali ( AIR 1949 PC 78 ) which has been followed in (2) AIR 1974 Madras 209. Learned counsel for the appellants ha submitted that in deciding the point of limitation, the court has to see the allegations made in the plaint and in this connection he has placed reliance on Mohd. Khalil Khan v. Mehboob Ali ( AIR 1949 PC 78 ) which has been followed in (2) AIR 1974 Madras 209. He has further relied on Joseph Annamma and another v. Kora Thressiamma & ors. (AIR 1972 Kerala 170) , Akkipeddi Gopalasastry v. Vijayawada Engineering Metal Co. Ltd. ( AIR 1968 AP 41 ) and Brij Mohan v. Bhagwat Singh ( AIR 1971 Raj. 255 ). He has further submitted that the appellant No. 5 did not allow the plaintiff-respondent to take away her properties, which amounted to wrongfully detaining the property and therefore, she should have filed the suit within three years, as provided under Article 91 (b) of the Limitation Act. Since the right to sue according to the plaintiff herself accrued in 1968, she could have filed the suit within three years as provided under Article 91 and therefore also, the suit is barred by time. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has submitted that the marriage between the plaintiff and appellant No. 5 husband is still subsisting. Husband and in-laws of the plaintiff are trustees of the Stri Dhan of the wife and they are bound to return the same a and when demanded by the wife and has placed reliance on Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and another ( AIR 1985 SC 628 ). According to him, the right to sue accrued only on 4-2-1977 when the appellants in their reply in the matrimonial court stated that they did not possess any Stridhan and the same had been taken away by the plaintiff and the suit had been filed within three years from 4-2-1977. 9. I have given my anxious considerations to the submissions and have also gone through the authorities cited at the bar. 10. 9. I have given my anxious considerations to the submissions and have also gone through the authorities cited at the bar. 10. It cannot be denied that the possession of Stri Dhan and property by the husband or the in-laws is in the nature of Trust and as soon as the wife demands the same, they are expected to return to her because she is the sole owner of her Stri Dhan Looking to the allegations and the pleadings of the parties, it is almost admitted that the respondent ported with the company of the defendant appellant No. 5 in the year 1968 and a per the finding of the trial court, she had not taken any property with her at that time and in her statement also in the court, she had stated that when she asked for the properties, she was told that she could take the property when she comes next. So in fact, there was no denial as such. Husband or the in-laws never refused to return the properties and therefore, their retention of the property did not become unlawful or wrongful and hence. Article 91 (b) of the Limitation Act will not apply. Article 69 of the Limitation Act will also not be applicable because admittedly, the property was in possession of the husband and in-laws and it cannot be said to be wrongfully taken nor there is any allegation to that effect. Therefore, there was only Article 113 which prescribes the limitation of three years from the date when the right to sue accrues. In the present case, the appellants did not refuse to part with the Stri Dhan and asked the plaintiff to take the property when she visits next. This will not amount to refusal. It was only on 4.2.1977 when the appellants specifically asserted in reply in the matrimonial court that they were not in possession of the Stri Dhan of the plaintiff that the right to sue accrued to the plaintiff-respondent, to file the present suit and the suit is within three years from 4.2.1977, therefore, in my view issue No. 3 has also been rightly decided in favour of the plaintiff. The judgment of the trial court does not require any interference. 11. In the result, this appeal is dismissed with costs.Appeal dismissed with costs. *******