JUDGMENT Brijesh Kumar, J. - This is a tenant's writ petition filed against the orders passed by opposite parties No. 1 and 2 ordering eviction of the petitioner from the premises in question and accepting the case of opposite party No.3 that the premises in question was in a dilapidated condition. 2. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 3. The opposite party No. 3 landlady moved an application under Section 21(1)(b) of Act 13 of 1972 praying for eviction of the petitioner, who was a tenant in the said premises on the ground that the premises in question was in dilapidated condition and she had to demolish the said house and to reconstruct a building in its place. Her case is that for the above purpose she had got prepared an estimate of expenses likely to be incurred in demolition and reconstruction of the house as well as had got a map sanctioned by the Nagar Palika. She also indicated that she has financial capacity to meet the expenses for demolition and reconstruction. So far the condition of the house is concerned, her case has been that the house in question is 100 years' old and there are cracks in the walls and roofs have fallen down and some had cracked through which water leaks. The tin sheets have also got rotten. On the other hand, the case of the petitioner was that the house was not in dilapidated condition and that the landlady had got the house standing adjacent to the house in question demolished but no new construction was raised so far further his case was that tin sheets were no doubt old but the house was still inhabitable. Both the parties adduced evidence in support of their cases. The Prescribed Authority held that the house was in a dilapidated condition, hence allowed the application of opposite party No. 3. The petitioner went up in appeal which too was dismissed by opposite party No. 1. 4. The main contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the court below erred in not recording any specific finding that the house in question requires demolition, hence the orders passed by them are vitiated. 5. The petitioner went up in appeal which too was dismissed by opposite party No. 1. 4. The main contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the court below erred in not recording any specific finding that the house in question requires demolition, hence the orders passed by them are vitiated. 5. In support of the contention that specific finding was required to be recorded to the effect that the building in question requires demolition and reconstruction, reliance was placed upon a case reported in 1980 ARC 214. Pyare Lal V. IV Additional District Judge, Bijnor and others. In that case distinction was drawn between the provisions of Section 21(1) (b) of Act 13 of 1972 and Rule 17 of the Rules. Under clause (b) of Section 21(1) the provision is that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for the purposes of demolition and new construction, whereas under Rule 17(1) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, it is provided that the building requires demolition. A distinction was drawn between the two expressions used about the demolition of the building. It was observed that dilapidated condition of the building cannot be equated with requires demolition. It has been observed that requires means something more than mere desire and implies an element of need. In reply to this submission, learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties has placed reliance upon a case reported to 1984(2) Lucknow Civil Decisions, 238 Binda Prasad V. III Additional District Judge, Faizabad and others. In this Division Bench's judgment which was given on reference, it has been observed in para 6 that the distinction which was sought to be drawn between the expression requiresdemolition and a building is required for demolition and reconstruction cannot be sustained. 6. Learned counsel for opposite parties has further submitted that no such ground was taken before the appellate court that there was no specific finding that the building was required for demolition and reconstruction. The contention is that in the absence of this point having been taken before the court below, the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise that ground in this Court. It has further been submitted that had this ground been raised, the appellate court would have examined it being court of fact as well and recorded a specific finding in definite words. 7. It has further been submitted that had this ground been raised, the appellate court would have examined it being court of fact as well and recorded a specific finding in definite words. 7. I have considered the matter in view of the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties. I have perused the judgments passed by the courts below. It is true that specific finding in so many words has not been recorded that the house in question required demolition or was required for demolition and reconstruction. However, on going through the judgment passed by the prescribed authority, it cannot be said that this aspect was not considered by it. The judgment while stating the case of the opposite party No. 3 clearly mentions that she had applied for eviction of the petitioner as she required the house for demolition and reconstruction. It also mentions about the conditions which according to the opposite parties were fulfilled as required under Rule 17(i) of the said Rules. The trial court has taken note of the fact that the house is 100 years' old and the evidence on record shows that there were cracks in the walls, some portion of the house was without any roof and in other portions, the roof was cracked through which water used to leak and plaster was peeled off. The trial court has specifically dealt with the evidence of the architect who was produced on behalf of the petitioner and who had opined that the house could be repaired and used. The case of the petitioner also was that the opposite party No. 3 had neglected the repairs of the house and she wanted to take advantage of her own omission. The trial court has specifically dealt with the statement of Iqbalendra Singh architect and has not accepted the same. That is to say, it was not accepted by the trial court that the accommodation could be properly repaired as was the case pleaded on behalf of the petitioner. If a house has gone stage beyond repairs, certainly the consequence would be that it could be demolished, may be that the court after having made the relevant discussion did not specifically said it in so many words. If a house has gone stage beyond repairs, certainly the consequence would be that it could be demolished, may be that the court after having made the relevant discussion did not specifically said it in so many words. The trial court has come to the conclusion that the landlady had proved that the house was 100 years' old and the walls had cracks and Kadis of the roofs were broken. The report of the commissioner also shows that there were no roofs in substantial part of the building; some tin sheds had got completely rotten. So far appellate court is concerned, it is not in dispute that this point was not taken before it. However, at one place, the appellate court has observed that the house is in the state of disrepair and decay. The expression used disrepair in context with the plea raised on behalf of the petitioner that the house may be repaired, indicates that it was found that the house was irreparable. 8. It is true, it would have been much better and more in consonance with the relevant provisions that a specific finding would have been clearly recorded about the fact that the house was required for demolition and reconstruction. However, as indicated above, the whole tenor of the orders passed by the courts below shows that his aspect was given consideration by the trial court. So far as the appellate court is concerned, since this point was not raised before it, it cannot be faulted for not having said specifically about demolition of the house. 9. For the reasons given above, I don't think it would be appropriate to interfere in the matter and upset the orders passed by the courts below. 10. In the result, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. There would, however, be no order as to costs. 11. Sri H. S. Sahai, learned counsel for the petitioner then made a request that the petitioner may be allowed six months time to vacate the premises. Learned counsel appearing for the opposite party No. 3 did not object to the time being granted. However, he objected to the amount of time prayed for and submitted that six months' time would be too much for the purpose. Learned counsel appearing for the opposite party No. 3 did not object to the time being granted. However, he objected to the amount of time prayed for and submitted that six months' time would be too much for the purpose. As agreed upon on behalf of the parties, it is provided that the petitioner shall hand over vacant possession of the accommodation in question to opposite party No.3 within three months from today, subject to the condition that the petitioner furnishes an undertaking on oath within two weeks to the effect that he shall hand over vacant possession to opposite party No. 3 within three months with effect from 17. 1. 1990. In the event of petitioner failing to furnish the undertaking indicated above, it would be open to opposite party No. 3 to proceed in accordance with law for delivery of possession.