JUDGMENT Bhawani Singh, J.—The petitioner has assailed the judgment of Sessions Judge, Mandi in Criminal Revision No. 23 of 1986, whereby the complaint moved by the petitioner for the prosecution of the respondents for offences like Ss. 141, 427, 109/34 of the Indian Penal Code was quashed on the ground that of want of sanction under section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter shortly ‘the Code). 2. Briefly, the facts are that the petitioner preferred a complaint for the prosecution of the respondents for the offences mentioned hereinabove, on the allegations that on 17-4-1985, the respondents came to the place of occurrence where the truck HIM-I925 owned by the petitioner/ was parked for the purpose of repairs. The place was notified parking place and board was duly displayed for the purpose. This place was in front of Happy Automobile Works owned by the son of the petitioner-Kirpal Singh. The first respondent enquired about the ownership of the truck and he was told that the truck was owned by the petitioner. It was also stated that it was at the parking place and would be removed very soon. The first respondent threatened Kirpal Singh that he would be arrested and instead of permitting him some time to remove the truck, the first respondent asked the other respondents to throw the truck in sketi Khud’ (river) Accordingly, the truck was thrown into the Sketi Khud. According to the petitioner, the Police and the Tehsildar who had also come on the spot, did not do anything in the commission of the crime. The accused has common intention to come to the spot and throw the vehicle into the river. By this act, the respondents made themselves liable for the offences already reproduced above, and also caused damage to the vehicle to the extent of Rs. 30,000. 3. In order to support the complaint, the petitioner examined himself, (Surjeet Singh) Avtar Singh, Kirpal Singh and Shashi Bhushan. After examining the complaint and the evidence, the trial Judge directed the respondents to appear in his Court on 4-6-1986. This order was assailed by the respondents before the Sessions Judge, Mandi, who by the impugned judgment, quashed the proceedings. This is how, the matter has been agitated in this Court by way of this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition. 4. After examining the complaint and the evidence, the trial Judge directed the respondents to appear in his Court on 4-6-1986. This order was assailed by the respondents before the Sessions Judge, Mandi, who by the impugned judgment, quashed the proceedings. This is how, the matter has been agitated in this Court by way of this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition. 4. The short question for determination is whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, it can be said that in throwing the truck HiM-1925 into the river was done while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty, thereby attracting the provisions of section 197 of the Code and necessitating the previous sanction of the State Government before the Court taking cognizance of the offences alleged to have been committed by the respondents, 5. Shri B K. Malhotra, learned Counsel for the petitioner, contends that there is no law authorizing the respondents to throw away the vehicle into the Khud, more particularly, when it was parked for the purpose of repairs at a parking place in front of a motor workshop. This kind of act cannot be brought within the tenor and spirit of section 197 of the Code and the defence raised by the respondents has been wrongly accepted by the Sessions Judge. 6. On the other hand, Shri M. L. Sharma, learned Counsel for the respondents, made submissions in support of the impugned judgment and his contention was also that the act was intimately connected with tbe part of the official duty of the respondents and in the absence of bias, it cannot be said that the provisions of section 197 of the Code are not attracted ia this case. 7. In order to support his submissions, Shri B. K. Malhotra placed reliance on number of decided cases In AIR (35) 1948 Privy Council 128, H. H. B. Gill and another v. The King, wherein the Court said i (para 30, P. 133) "......A public servant can only be said to act or purport to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duty... ..The test, may well be where the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that, what he does, he does in virtue of his office.” 8. ..The test, may well be where the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that, what he does, he does in virtue of his office.” 8. In AIR 1966 Supreme Court MM, State of Maharashtra v. Atma Ram and others, the Supreme Court followed its earlier judgment reported in AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1783, State of Maharashtra v. Narhar Rao, and said i (Para 3, p. 1787) “......The provisions of sections J6i and 163 of the Criminal Procedure Code emphasize the fact that a police officer is prohibited from beating or confining persons with a view to induce them to make statements. In view of the statutory prohibition it cannot, possibly, be said that the act complained of, in this case, are acts done by the respondents under the colour of their duty or authority. la our opinion, there is no connection in this case between the acts complained of and the office of the respondents and the duties and obligations imposed on them by law. On the other hand, the alleged acts fall completely outside the scope of the duties of the respondents and they are not entitled, therefore, to the mantle of protection covered by section 161 ({) of the Bombay Police Act......" 9. In AIR 1969 Supreme Court 686, Prabhakar v Sinari V. Shander Anant Verlekar, the facts were that certain hawkers threatened to eacroach upon the complainants land. The complainant moved the police and the Deputy Superintendent of Police visited the spot in civilian dress and threatened the complainant that he would arrest him if he interfered with the hawkers who were asked by him to enter upon the land. The complainant moved the police and the Deputy Superintendent of Police visited the spot in civilian dress and threatened the complainant that he would arrest him if he interfered with the hawkers who were asked by him to enter upon the land. The complainant was also threatened that he would be slapped, Prosecution or the Deputy Superintendent of Police on various charges was launched and section 197 of the Code came for consideration before the Apex Court In para 5 of the judgment, the Court said : "..............The language of section 197, C P. C clearly is that no Court can take cognizance of an offence alleged to have been committed by any person belonging to the categories mentioned in the section which would include the appellant when he is accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting act in the discharge of his official duty." While interpreting this provision, the Court referred to the following principle laid down by the same Court in AIR 1956 Supreme Court 44 at page 49, Matajog Dubey v. H. C. Bhari: “......There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty ; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty." Then in para 7, the Court said: ".....Normally it would be the officer-in-qharge of the police station who would go to the spot to prevent any breach of peace or apprehended breach of peace. Even if the appellant who was a superior officer could come to prevent any ugly situation arising between the complainant and the hawkers, it is not established that the appellant came in the capacity as a police officer. On the contrary the necessary implication in the statement of the complainant is that the appellant came in civil dress, wanted the hawkers to be put in possession of the disputed plot and actually directed them to enter the plot and warned the complainant that if he resisted he would be slapped in his face. On the contrary the necessary implication in the statement of the complainant is that the appellant came in civil dress, wanted the hawkers to be put in possession of the disputed plot and actually directed them to enter the plot and warned the complainant that if he resisted he would be slapped in his face. Until some more material is placed on the record it cannot be held that it was any part of the duty of the appellant to ensure that the hawkers were put in possession of the disputed land. H may be that the appellant was entitled to interfere and take proper steps if he apprehended any breach of peace but there is nothing whatsoever in the complainants statement which would show that any such situation existed which could justify interference by the appellant. Ordinarily if a person is in possession of some property and other persons are threatening to dispossess him it is no part * of the duty of a police officer to take sides and decide the dispute in favour of one party or the other or to force one party to give up possession to the other, even if he was satisfied that the party seeking to take possession was lawfully entitled to do so. This the police officer could only do if there had been any direction by a competent court for rendering help in the matter of delivery of possession. Whatever way the matter is looked at we are unable to hold on the basis of the allegations contained in the statement of the complainant that the acts alleged against the complainant that the acts alleged against the appellant were such as could be regarded to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. It will be open to the appellant to establish during the course of further proceedings that the requisite sanction under section 197 must be obtained ; but at this stage we concur in the view of the learned Judicial Commissioner that no such sanction was necessary.* 10. In AIR 1983 Supreme Court 64, B. S. Sambhu v. /. S. Krishna-swamy, the facts were that a Munsiff Magistrate in his communication to the District Judge in a transfer application called the respondent "rowdy, "a big gambler", "a mischievous element". In AIR 1983 Supreme Court 64, B. S. Sambhu v. /. S. Krishna-swamy, the facts were that a Munsiff Magistrate in his communication to the District Judge in a transfer application called the respondent "rowdy, "a big gambler", "a mischievous element". A criminal complaint was filed without obtaining sanction under section 197 of the Code. It was contended that no sanction was necessary, since the act complained of had no connection with the discharge of official duty by the appellant and section 197 of the Code was not in any way attracted The Court while deciding this case, not only approved the principle laid down in Matajog Dubey case (supra\ but also latter case reported in AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2591, Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan and another. 11. In AIR 1979 SC 1841, S. B. Saha and others v. M. S. Kochar, the accused came in possession of the property in discharge of their official duty. They were trustee of the property till the same was disposed of in accordance with law. However, they criminally misappropriated the same. The question arose whether the offence under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code was committed in the course of official duty or under colour of office. The Court considered the matter and came to the conclusion that the official capacity could be stated to be upto the stage the goods came in their possession. Thereafter, they were to keep the same in trust, but the act of criminally misappropriating the same could not be said in discharge of the official duty nor under the colour of office, since it could not be said that misappropriation of the same was part of their official duty. In such a situation, there was no requirement for obtaining the sanction under section 197 of the Code; the Court held 12. On the other hand, Shri M. L. Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents, placed reliance on AIR 1955 Supreme Court 309, Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu, arid contended that the act of the respondents is so integrally connected with the duties attaching to the office of the respondents that they cannot be separated from the same,- hence sanction under section 197 of the Cede would be necessary. A perusal of the judgment, as a matter of fact, indicates that in order to apply the principle, the facts of the case have necessarily to be taken into consideration, besides, the nature of the act complained of. On facts, this case is inapplicable to this case 13. Then Shri M. L Sharma, Advocate, referred to the provisions of sections 151 and 156 of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act, 1966 and submitted that throwing away of the truck fell within the functions of the respondents and they could not be prosecuted without legal sanction. It is relevant at this stage to quote these provisions: "151 The committee may fix places within or with the approval of the District Magistrate, beyond the limits of the municipality for the deposit of refuse, rubbish or offensive matter of any kind or for the disposal of the dead bodies of animals, and may by public notice, give directions as to the time, manner and conditions at, in and under which such refuse, rubbish or offensive matter or dead bodies of animals may be removed along any street and deposited at such places." "156. Whoever, being the owner or occupier of any building or land, keeps or knowingly or negligently allows to be kept for more than twenty-four hours, or otherwise than in some proper receptacle or pit, any dirt, dung, bones, ashes, night-soil or filth or any noxious or offensive matter in or upon such building or land, or suffers any such receptacle or pit to be in a filthy or noxious state, or neglects to employ proper means to cleanse and purify the same, shall be punishable with fine which may extend to fifty rupees." 14. It is very difficult to agree with the submissions of the learned Counsel for the respondents for the simple reason that the vehicle of the petitioner does not fall within the province of these sections. Further, "removal* does not mean removing the property of any one by way of throwing the same into the "khud", thereby causing immense loss to the owner thereof, as a matter of fact, the petitioner had parked the vehicle, at a spot meant for the parking of the vehicles He had also requested the respondents to allow him some time to remove the same to some other place. But, the act of the respondents in throwing the same into the *Khud is clearly outside these statutory provisions. Even, violation of section 156 of Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act, 1968 prescribes penalty which could be imposed. The offence appears to be quite petty in view of the maximum penalty of Rs. 50. 15. The evidence that has come on the record of this case upto this stage, clearly demonstrates that there is no intimate connection between the official duty of the respondents and the act complained of. They are clearly separable and it can be said without any iota of doubt that the provisions of section 197 of the Code are not at all attracted in this case, and the case can proceed without requirement of sanction. The learned Sessions Judge failed to notice the correct legal position before allowing the revision application of the respondents. 16. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that there is merit in this petition and the same is allowed. Judgment of the Sessions Judge, Mandi, challenged by the petitioner, is set-aside. The trial Court is directed to take up the complaint of the petitioner at its original number and proceed with the same in accordance with law. 17. Before parting with the case, it is made clear that the trial Court will not be influenced in any manner by any of the observations made in this judgment. It will cjecide the matter strictly in accordance with evidence, the parties may adduce before the Court. Petition allowed.