Judgment :- The unsuccessful plaintiff before the lower appellate court has preferred this second appeal challenging the judgment and decree passed by the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai, reversing the judgment of the District Munsif, Devakottai. 2. The case of the appellant-plaintiff, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, who filed the suit for declaration and permanent injunction is briefly as follows: One M.A.Meyyappan Ambalam was the common ancestor and he is the grandfather of the plaintiff. The said M.A.Meyyappan Ambalam had got two sons M.A.M.Subbiah Ambalam and M.A.M.Meyyappan Ambalam, the second defendant herein. M.A.M.Subbiah Ambalam has got three sons and the plaintiff is the second son of the said M.A.M.Subbiah Ambalam and he was born on 15. 1943. The second defendant married one Meenakshi as his first wife in 1943 who died in or about 1945 due to small box. When the said Meenakshi got affected with small pox, she wanted the plaintiff to be adopted to herself and the second defendant as he had no issues, and further, she apprehended that she would die soon. The plaintiff’s grandfather M.A.Meyyappan Ambalam desired such adoption so that all the monies and properties should be equally divided between the two families. 3. It is the further case of the plaintiff that his father expressed the view that the plaintiff should be the son of both the families and the contemplated adoption should be as Dwayamushyayana. Accordingly the adoption took place in 1945 in the presence of the family members and with consent of the pangalis by actual giving and taking. Accordingly the plaintiff became the son of both the natural father as well as the adopted father, the second defendant. Some time later, the adoptive mother Meenakshi died and the plaintiff performed her obsequies. 4. About a year or two thereafter, the second defendant married the third defendant. In the meantime the grandfather M.A.M.Meyyappa Ambalam also expired. The natural father of the plaintiff and the adoptive father, the second defendant became divided by means of a registered partition deed dated 24. 1949. In the said partition deed, the plaintiff was shown as the son of the natural father and he was represented by his natural father. It is stated that though the plaintiff is not made a eo nominee party,‘the second defendant is the trustee for the plaintiff’s share also so far as the share allotted to the second defendant. 1949. In the said partition deed, the plaintiff was shown as the son of the natural father and he was represented by his natural father. It is stated that though the plaintiff is not made a eo nominee party,‘the second defendant is the trustee for the plaintiff’s share also so far as the share allotted to the second defendant. The plaintiff and the second defendant have not divided the properties so far. The second defendant has also no issues through his second wife, the third defendant. The second defendant’s eye sight was affected and he was ailing. Taking advantage of the same, the relatives of the third defendant hatched a plan to knock off the properties of the second defendant and with the above object, they arranged to adopt the first defendant who is the son of the third defendant’s sister, the fifth defendant ignoring the adoption of the plaintiff. After coming to know of the same on or about 2. 1984 they have fixed 2. 1984 as the date of adoption, the plaintiff questioned the pangalis who stated that the proposal was true and that they would not participate in the same and that they would support the stand taken by the plaintiff who was already the adopted son the second defendants. The defendants, did not pay heed to the words of the plaintiff and they determined to proceed with the adoption. All the efforts of the plaintiff to prevent the proposed adoption would be of no avail. Hence, filed the suit for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants 2 and 3 from adopting the first defendant and also restraining defendants 4 and 5 from giving in adoption the child on 2. 1984 or any other date declaring the alleged adoption of the first defendant on 2. 1984 as not true and legal. 5. The said suit was resisted by the second defendant and he filed a written statement wherein he admitted the relationship of parties and contended inter alia as follows: The second defendant emphatically denied the case of the plaintiff that he is the adopted son of the second defendant as false. He also denied that his first wife died of small box and she apprehended that she would die of small pox and she wanted the plaintiff to be adopted as his son. He also denied that his first wife died of small box and she apprehended that she would die of small pox and she wanted the plaintiff to be adopted as his son. It is stated that the second defendant himself was only 19 years of age at the time of the alleged adoption and he had full prospect of a long and healthy married life. The age of the first wife who died in 1945 was only 18. To attribute to the couple such apprehension and expectation is not unnatural and it has been invented by the plaintiff for the purpose of this case without due regard to his past conduct in litigation. It is further stated that Dwayamushyayana form of adoption had long ceased to be in vogue. Even in this speculative suit with imaginary allegations, the plaintiff is not able to give the date and month of the alleged adoption which speaks volume against the truth of such incident. Further, the usual adoption murai is not at all referred to by way of narration. But, on the other hand as conceded by the plaintiff himself, by a registered deed of partition dated 24. 1949 the second defendant and his brother divided the properties. The plaintiff is arrayed as the son of his natural father and the second defendant was arrayed on the other side as party No.2 and if really such an adoption in 1945 is true, the partition deed would never have been in the form in which it was written. Significantly, there is no reference at all about the alleged adoption of the plaintiff by the second defendant. The second defendant has also specifically denied that the plaintiff performed the srardh of the first wife of the second defendant and he ever performed her funeral obsequies after her death. Even on 10. 1983 there was a transaction of partition between the second defendant on one hand and the three sons of the second defendant’s elder brother, including the plaintiff, on the other side with regard to the common property which was not divided already, wherein also the plaintiff has described himself as the son of his natural father and not at all the adopted son of the second defendant. It is also stated that in the year 1956, the maternal uncle of the plaintiff and his brothers, namely, C.T.KF.Ar. It is also stated that in the year 1956, the maternal uncle of the plaintiff and his brothers, namely, C.T.KF.Ar. Arunachalam Ambalam of Kottaiyur filed a suit on behalf of the plaintiff and his brothers as their next friend on the file of the Sub Court, Devakottai, against the second defendant’s elder brother. The so-called adoption was not referred to in the said suit. It is further stated that the second defendant’s health is good and the plaintiff need not have any apprehension in that behalf as the second defendant is capable of protecting his own interest without the need of any person much less the plaintiff. 6. It is further stated that the second defendant had a long desire to take the first defendant in adoption he being the son of His wife’s sister and they have brought the boy down to their household and had been fostering him as his beloved son with the consent of his natural parents. On 2. 1984 which happens to be an auspicious day, in accordance with the law and the custom of the Hindu Vallambar community, to which the parties belong, the first defendant was taken by the second defendant and his wife the third defendant as their adopted son, in the presence of his natural parents defendants 3 and 4 and other relations and friends in a large number. The second defendant did not invite the plaintiff and his brothers as they were never kind and considerate towards them. The plaintiff even after knowing fully well when he filed the suit on 2. 1984 that the adoption has taken place on 2. 1984, he has suppressed the same and come forward with false allegations for the purpose of moving for injunction as if a date has been fixed, namely, 2. 1984, for adoption. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of the suit. 7. In the additional written statement filed by the second defendant it is stated that the second defendant and his wife the third defendant received the first defendant from his natural parents on 2. 1984 in gift as their adopted son in accordance with the custom of the Vallambar community which permits adoption of boy above 15 years of age and that the adoption of the first defendant by the second defendant and his wife is true and valid in law. 1984 in gift as their adopted son in accordance with the custom of the Vallambar community which permits adoption of boy above 15 years of age and that the adoption of the first defendant by the second defendant and his wife is true and valid in law. The second defendant also refutes the implied suggestion of the plaintiff that the adoptive boy should belong to the temple and the town of the adoptive father. It is stated that it is nothing but the wishful thinking of the plaintiff. It is stated that the plaintiff has no legal character or status to question the second defendant’s action or his adoption of the first defendant without seeking a declaration of his own alleged status. Hence the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief of declaration or injunction as prayed for. 8. On the pleadings, the trial Court framed four issues. On the side of the plaintiff, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.I and four other witnesses and Exs.Al and A2 were marked. On the side of the defendants, besides the second defendant examining himself as D.W.1, six other witnesses were examined as D.Ws.2 to 7 and Exs.B-1 to B9 were marked. For the reasons assigned in the judgment, the trial court decreed the suit for the relief of declaration that the adoption of the first defendant is not true and contrary to law. Aggrieved by the same, the defendants preferred appeal in A.S.No. 34.of 1986. The Subordinate Judge allowed the appeal and set aside the decree and judgment and dismissed the suit. As against the same, this second appeal was filed and it was admitted on the following substantial question of law: 1.Whether the second adoption of the 3rd respondent in 1984 superseded the earlier lawful adoption of the appellant in 1945 before the adoption laws were codified In 1956? 2. Whether the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act of 1956 could be pressed into effect retrospectively against the appellant? 3. Whether the Dwayamushyayana adoption of the appellant performed according to Hindu religious rites in 1945, valid in law. 9. 2. Whether the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act of 1956 could be pressed into effect retrospectively against the appellant? 3. Whether the Dwayamushyayana adoption of the appellant performed according to Hindu religious rites in 1945, valid in law. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant Mr.G.Subramanyam mainly contended that the lower appellate court while reversing the finding of the trial court has not given any finding as to why the evidence of P. Ws.2 to 5 was rejected and as such, in view of Order 41, Rule 31 Civil Procedure Code the judgment of the lower appellate court is liable to be set aside. The learned counsel also submitted that the trial Court accepted the case of the appellant with regard to Dwayaimishyayana form of adoption and that in spite of the adoption, he continues to have a right in his family where his natural father and other members are there, while the lower court reversed it on the ground that such a custom is obsolete and since the appellant continued to be a member of his family along with his brothers and father, he has not established a valid adoption. The learned counsel would submit that the appellant has admittedly performed the obsequies of the deceased first wife of the second defendant and that as such the finding of the lower appellate Court is not sustainable and that the judgment of the trial Court is to be restored. The learned counsel submitted that the subsequent adoption of the first defendant is not in accordance with the custom of the community and the provisions of the Act. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the lower appellate Court has considered the evidence in detail and discussed as to how the trial Court is wrong. The appellant failed to establish the adoption put forward by him and he has not discharged the onus. He has not established that he is entitled to continue as the son of his natural father and claim right in the said family and also in the family of the second defendant as his adopted son by basing his claim on the Dwayamushyayana form of adoption which custom has long before become obsolete in Madras State and as such the adoption in that form is not valid. He would submit that there is absolutely no evidence to prove the alleged adoption. He would submit that there is absolutely no evidence to prove the alleged adoption. Further, the said adoption is falsified by the documentary evidence adduced in the case and the circumstances and as such, it cannot be said that the finding rendered by the lower appellate Court is not sustainable and liable to be set aside. 10. Let us consider the rival contentions with regard to the adoption on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence. The case of appellant-plaintiff is that the second defendant took him as his adopted son in the year 1945 when the first wife of the second defendant was suffering from small pox. The case of the appellant was emphatically denied by the second defendant who would contend that he had taken only the first defendant, son of defendants 4 and 5, as his adopted son by the adoption deed dated 2. 1984 and the first defendant is none other than the son of the sister of his second wife the third defendant. The appellant was the second son of his father, who has got three sons. The appellant’s father and the second defendant are brothers. The appellant was born on 15. 1943. It is stated that he was taken in adoption in 1945 when he was two years old. Therefore, he cannot speak about the adoption. According to him, his adopted mother Meenakshi Ammal died in 1945. It is not in dispute the within a few months thereafter, the second defendant married the third defendant. The second defendant was aged 20 years at that time and his deceased first wife Meenakshi was 17 years. Two other witnesses spoke about the alleged adoption. P.W.2 who is a pangali of the plaintiff has simply stated that since the second defendant had no issue, he has brought the plaintiff to his house and the plaintiff was staying in his house. Besides that, he has not given any evidence with regard to the giving and taking or with regard to the ceremonies about the adoption. Similarly P. W.3 also is a native of Karaikudi. He has stated that when Meenakshi Ammal was alive, the plaintiff was given as the son of both the families. Beyond that, he did not say anything about the year, month or date in which he was given. He did not speak about any ceremonies. Similarly P. W.3 also is a native of Karaikudi. He has stated that when Meenakshi Ammal was alive, the plaintiff was given as the son of both the families. Beyond that, he did not say anything about the year, month or date in which he was given. He did not speak about any ceremonies. In cross-examination, he admits that no invitation was extended to any of his pangalis and within six months, the second defendant married the second wife and he did not question as to why he married the second wife when he has adopted the plaintiff. P.Ws.4 and 5 did not speak about the adoption; but only speak about the obsequies performed by the plaintiff at the time of death of Meenakshi Ammal. Besides that, he has not stated anything about the adoption. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, the appellant has not adduced any satisfactory evidence to prove the alleged adoption. The learned appellate judge discussed the evidence and circumstances in the case and came to the conclusion that no weight could be given to the case of the appellant in the face of the evidence which is contrary to the documentary evidence and circumstances adduced on the side of the respondents and hence it cannot be accepted. Let us consider the reasons given by the learned appellate judge for rejecting the oral evidence of these witnesses adduced with regard to the adoption which is not supported by any document. It is pertinent to note that the second defendant who is the alleged adoptive father of the plaintiff and the paternal uncle has categorically denied having adopted the plaintiff and the reason given by him for the adopting the plaintiff is also to be noted. He was aged 21 years or 22 years at the time of the death of his first wife Meenakshi Ammal and his first wife was about 20 or 21 years at the time of her death. There was no ceremony to be performed for a person who died to small pox. It is seen from his evidence that his father died after the death of his first wife and thereafter he married the second wife. There was no ceremony to be performed for a person who died to small pox. It is seen from his evidence that his father died after the death of his first wife and thereafter he married the second wife. According to him, he and his brother effected partition under Ex.B3 wherein the appellant was described as the son of his natural father and they were arrayed as one party and second defendant was arrayed as the other party and the properties were allotted accordingly to the second defendant and the appellants branch separately. If really there was any such adoption, they would not have described the appellant as the son of the natural father but would have described him as the adopted son of the second defendant as he is entitled to a share in the properties of the second defendant. Even otherwise, the very adoption of the appellant in 1945 has been falsified by a registered will executed by the father of the second defendant and the grand-father of the appellant which is dated 9-8-1946 where in he has categorically stated that the second defendant has lost his first wife in young age and a second marriage has to be celebrated. It is to be noted that the death of the first wife of the second defendant is also referred to in the said will. If really there was any adoption of the plaintiff by the second defendant during the lifetime of his grandfather in 1945, he would not have failed to mention the adoption and there was no necessity of observing that the second defendant has lost his wife, that a second marriage has to be celebrated for the second defendant, that his elder son i.e., the father of the plaintiff, has to arrange for it and also provide necessary jewel etc. The recitals in the will Ex.Bl executed by the grandfather of the appellant as well as the father of the second defendant also falsifies the case of the appellant that he was adopted by the second defendant. Further, the age of the second defendant and his second marriage immediately after the death of his first wife also falsifies the case of the appellant that such adoption took place since the second defendant lost his first wife and to have a son to inherit his properties. Further, the age of the second defendant and his second marriage immediately after the death of his first wife also falsifies the case of the appellant that such adoption took place since the second defendant lost his first wife and to have a son to inherit his properties. The very documents filed by the appellant clearly establish that the appellant was described only as the son of his natural father and it is nowhere stated that he was the adopted son of the second defendant. Ex.Al is the S.S.L.C. certificate of the appellant and at was issued in the year 1958. It clearly shows that the appellant was the son of the natural father Sub-biah Ambalam. Ex.A2 is the receipt issued by the Periyanayaki Ambal Temple authorities at the time of the marriage of the appellant, wherein he is described as the son of his natural father Sub-biah Ambalam. There is absolutely nothing to indicate that he is the adopted son of the second defendant. It is also seen from the evidence of the second defendant that he and his elder brother were on inimical terms or a very long time, there is absolutely no connection between the two families and that they were not on talking terms. If really the appellant was adopted by the second defendant, he would have exercised some right in the properties of the second defendant. On the other hand, there is absolutely nothing to show that the appellant ever exercised any right in the properties of the second defendant as the adoptee son of the second defendant. In this connection, the learned counsel for the second defendant drew the attention of this Court for the decision in Rahasa Pandiani v. Gokulanania Panda, A.I.R 1987 S.C. 962, wherein their Lordships observed "When the plaintiff relies on oral evidence it support of the claim that he was adopted by th adoptive father in accordance with the Hind rites, and it is not supported by any registere document to establish that such an adoption had really and as a matter of fact taken place, the Court has to act with great deal of caution and circumspection. Be it realised that setting up a spurious adoption is not less frequent than concocting a spurious will, and equally, if not more difficult to unmask. Be it realised that setting up a spurious adoption is not less frequent than concocting a spurious will, and equally, if not more difficult to unmask. And the court has to be extremely alert and vigilant to guard against being enamovied by schemes who indulge in unscrupulous practices out of their lust for property. If there are any suspicious circumstances, just as the propounder of the will is obliged to dispel the cloud of suspicion, the burden is on one who claims to have been adopted to dispel the same beyond reasonable doubt. In the case of adoption which is not supported by a registered document or any other evidence of a clinching nature if there exist suspicious circumstances, the same must be explained to the satisfaction of the conscience of the court by the parly contending that there was such an adoption. Such is the position as an adoption would divert the normal and natural course of succession. Experience of life shows that just as there have been spurious claims about execution of a will, there have been spurious claims about adoption having taken place. And the Court has therefore to be aware of the risk involved in upholding the claim of adoption if there are circumstances which arouse the suspicion of the Court and the conscience of the Court is not satisfied that the evidence preferred to support such an adoption is beyond reproach". It was held in the above case: "There’was also no evidence of change of name of the alleged adopted son nor any evidence of any neighbour that the son was living with the adoptive mother. Hence, it could not said that factum of adoption was established". In Madhusudan Das v. Narayanibai, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 114: (1983)1 S.C.R. 851 : (1983)1 S.C.W.R. 195:1983Mak L.J. 402:1983 M.P.L.J. 313: (1983)9 All.L.R. 146:1983 Jab.L.J. 131: (1983)1 S.C.C. 35 , it has been held: "A person who seeks to displace the natural succession to property by allegingan adoption must discharge the burden that lies upon him by proof of the factum of adoption and its validity. The evidence in proof of the adoption should be free all suspicion of fraud and so consistent and probable as to give no occasion for doubling its truth". The lower appellate Judge relied on the decision reported in Govinda v. Seemabai, A.I.R. 1968 Mys. The evidence in proof of the adoption should be free all suspicion of fraud and so consistent and probable as to give no occasion for doubling its truth". The lower appellate Judge relied on the decision reported in Govinda v. Seemabai, A.I.R. 1968 Mys. 309, wherein it has been held: "The law relating to proof of adoption is thai the person claiming to be an adopted son must prove the factum of his adoption by cogent and reliable evidence and where the adopter denies the adoption, the onus is still heavier on the plaintiff to establish his adoption by a person competent to give and was received by a person competent to take and that this giving and taking was accompanied by ceremonies such as homa. Wherever it is necessary to be performed will not be enough to exclude from consideration the surrounding circumstances either prior to such adoption or subsequent to such adoption and to accept their evidence for sustaining the finding that the plaintiff has established his adoption. This is so because to ascertain the truth or reliability of the testimony given by the witnesses, it must be tested by the surrounding circumstances to enable the Court to judge whether in the circumstances obtaining in the case what the witnesses state canbe accepted as true. If the established circumstances throw doubt on the veracity of the statements made by the witness, than their testimony cannot be accepted as true". "It is open to the Court while assessing the evidence of the witnesses to take into consideration the circumstances, either prior to the adoption or subsequent thereto, or the circumstances attending the adoption." The lower appellate Court applied the ratio in the said case to the facts of this case and came to the conclusion that the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant in this case cannot be accepted in the face of the documentary evidence adduced in this case and the surrounding circumstances prevalent at the relevant time of alleged adoption and subsequent ratio. There is no acceptable evidence to prove the valid adoption in the face of the evidence adduced by D.W.I who is stated to be the adoptive father. It is pertinent to note that he denied specifically the alleged adoption. There is no acceptable evidence to prove the valid adoption in the face of the evidence adduced by D.W.I who is stated to be the adoptive father. It is pertinent to note that he denied specifically the alleged adoption. The second defendant denied that the appellant performed the obsequies of his first wife, since she died of small pox and no ceremonies were done. Even otherwise, since the second defendant had no issue, it cannot be said that the second defendant adopted the appellant for performing the obsequies, in the absence of any cogent, reliable and acceptable evidence for the alleged adoption. 11. Further, it is the case of the appellant that the adoption in question is one of Dwayamushyayana form namely, he continues to be the son of his natural father and the members of his family and also the son of the adopted family. In this connection, two decisions were relied on the side of the respondents to show that such form of adoption has long before become obsolete in Tamil Nadu State. In Dhani Bai v. Neem Kanwar, A.I.R. 1972 Raj. 9:1971 Raj L.W. 103, which is the one relied on by the lower appellate court, it has been pointed out that the “Dwayamushyayana form of adoption had long become obsolute in Madras on the East Coast. Therefore, an adoption in that form is not now valid”. In Narsi Reddi v. Rami Reddi, (1964)1 An.W.R. 261, it has been held: “The Dwayamushyayana form of adoption had long become obsolete in Madras on the East Coast. Therefore, an adoption in that form is not now valid. Several forms and practices in the ancient texts of Hindu Law have been abandoned in latter times. In order words, they have become obsolete. It is idle to seek to revive them now, when we have advanced and developed modern social and ethical standards and out look. The Dwayamushyayana form of adoption was never recognised by Mitakshara. The ancient texts or source books of Hindu Law did not recognise Dwayamushyayana, now recognised in parts of Bombay State and State of Uttar Pradesh. This form of adoption seems to have been a contribution or gloss of commentators who came much after Vijnaneswara. The only Dwayamushyayana (son of two fathers) spoken of in Mitakshara is the Kahetraja, i.e., the son begotten by a person on the wife of another person. This form of adoption seems to have been a contribution or gloss of commentators who came much after Vijnaneswara. The only Dwayamushyayana (son of two fathers) spoken of in Mitakshara is the Kahetraja, i.e., the son begotten by a person on the wife of another person. And this species of son is now obsolete in Hindu Law”. It is clear from the above decisions and texts of Hindu Law that Dwayamushyayana form of adoption was never recognised and in any event this form of adoption has become obsolete in Madras. Further, there is no evidence on the side of the appellant that such a form of adoption is in vogue. On this ground also, the judgment of the lower appellate court has to be upheld. 12. On the other hand, the first respondent/first defendant has established by a acceptable oral and documentary evidence that he was the adopted son of the second defendant by virtue of a registered adoption deed after performing the necessary ceremonies. The said adoption was challenged on the ground that the first defendant was aged more than 15 years and as such the adoption is not valid. The said contention has been rightly negatived by the learned lower appellate judge on the ground that it is proved by documentary and oral evidence that the custom of taking in adoption of boys more than 15 years is prevalent in the community to which the parties belong, namely, val-lambar. It is seen that persons more than 15 years old were being adopted as per the custom prevailing in the said community and it is established by documentary evidence, Exs.B5 to B8. The evidence of D.3 is to the effect that D.W.3 Vellaisami was adopted at the age of 31 years under Ex.B5. Similarly D.W.5 Sivagurunathan, has given evidence to the effect that he was given a adoption to one Arunachalam under Ex.B7 and the was 21 years old at the time of adoption. Exs.B6 and B8 show their respective age. Under Clause (iv) of Sec.10 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, if there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who have completed the age of fifteen years being taken in adoption, there can be adoption. Exs.B6 and B8 show their respective age. Under Clause (iv) of Sec.10 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, if there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who have completed the age of fifteen years being taken in adoption, there can be adoption. In the instant case, it has been established by documentary and oral evidence that such a custom was prevalent in the community to which the parties belong. Hence the said contention was rightly rejected by the learned lower appellate Judge. Next it was contended that there cannot be any two adoptions in a family. The contention has also been negatived by the lower appellate Judge on the ground that the alleged adoption of the appellant has not been established and hence there is no question of two adoption in the same family. Even otherwise, there is no such prohibition either in law or in the community to which the parties belong. Lastly it was contended that the adoption can be done only from a person belonging to the same Karai or temple or only among the pangalis. Such a contention is also not tenable in view of the codified Act of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act of 1956 and there in absolutely no merit in the said contention that only from a person belonging to the temple or same Karai or pangalis adoption can be made. On a careful consideration of the evidence on record, it is seen that the adoption of the first defendant has been established by acceptable oral and documentary evidence. There is absolutely nothing to hold that the said adoption is either invalid or untrue. No argument was advanced as regards substantial questions of law, Nos.l and 2. Even otherwise since the earlier alleged adoption of the appellant in 1945 has not been established by any acceptable evidence, the question of adoption of the third respondent/first defendant in 1984 superseding the earlier adoption does not arise. Hence substantial question of law No.l is answered against the appellant. Even otherwise since the earlier alleged adoption of the appellant in 1945 has not been established by any acceptable evidence, the question of adoption of the third respondent/first defendant in 1984 superseding the earlier adoption does not arise. Hence substantial question of law No.l is answered against the appellant. Similarly with regard to substantial question of law No.2, it has not been shown how the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 is pressed into effect retrospectively against the appellant while deciding the question whether he was adopted in 1945 by the second defendant and therefore that question also does not arise for consideration in this appeal and accordingly it is answered. As regards substantial question of law No.3, the appellant has not adduced any evidence to establish that Dwayamushyayana form of adoption of the appellant was performed according to Hindu religious rites in 1945, As already discussed above, such form of adoption has become obsolete in Madras. The appellant failed to establish that such adoption was ever in vogue in Madras and that ceremonies which were necessary for such adoption were performed. Hence, question of law No.3 is answered against the appellant. 13. For the foregoing discussion and the findings with regard to the substantial questions framed in this appeal, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 14. In the result, thesecond appeal fails and stands dismissed with costs.