JUDGMENT A.N.Verma, J. 1. There is a Railway Cinema Club at Mughalsarai. It has an auditorium fitted with a projector and other equipment used for the exhibition of films for the entertainment of the Railway Officers and employees. This cinema building is owned by the Central Government under the Ministry of Railway. The management of the Club building including the auditorium, etc. has been entrusted by the Eastern Railway Administration to the Railway Cinema Club, Mughalsarai for the benefit of us members- In the year 1982, the auditorium of the Railway Cinema was hired to the petitioner for the period of five years for screening feature films. On the expiry of this period the Estate Officer, Eastern Railway acting under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (the Act' hereafter) initiated proceedings for the eviction of the petitioner on the ground that after the expiry of the period of the contract, he had become an unauthorised occupant. 2. By means of this petition, the petitioner has assailed the legality of the order passed by the Estate Officer directing the eviction of the petitioner from the said premises under section 5 of the Act as well as the order passed in appeal by the learned VIth Additional District Judge, Varanasi, affirming the order passed by the Prescribed Authority. The impugned orders have been attacked by the petitioner on diverse grounds. But the main challenge urged in support of the petition at the Bar by Sri Ashok Khare was that the provision of the aforesaid Act were not available to the respondent in the present case inasmuch as the petitioner did not hold the premises directly from the Railway Administration. The submission was that as between the Railway Cinema Club and the petitioner the premises in question did not bear the character of 'public premises' within the meaning of the said Act, the premises not belonging to the Club itself. The learned counsel contended that as between the Railway Administration and the Railway Cinema Club, the premises may be regarded as 'public premises'. But where the premises are leased or hired to the occupant by an entity (the Club here) other than the Central Government, the premises could not be regarded as 'public premises' within the meaning of section 2 (e) of the aforesaid Act. 3. But where the premises are leased or hired to the occupant by an entity (the Club here) other than the Central Government, the premises could not be regarded as 'public premises' within the meaning of section 2 (e) of the aforesaid Act. 3. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and given the matter an anxious consideration, I find no merit in this submission. The relevant provisions, viz., section 2 (e) (I) of the Act may be extracted here for appreciating the controversy. It reads : " (e) " public premises " means- (1) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Central Government, and includes any such premises which have been placed by that Government, whether before or after the commencement of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Act, 1980, under the control of the Secretariat of either House of Parliament for providing residential accommodation to any member of the staff of that Secretariate." 4. For invoking the aid of these provisions the main requirement is that the premises must belong to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Central Government. If, therefore, any of these three elements is present, the premises would undoubtedly assume the status of 'public premises'. Undisputedly, the premises are owned by the Central Govt. This fact was not challenged before the courts below nor even in the petition or in the course of arguments before me As the premises are owned by the Railway Administration, it must follow in the absence of any compelling reason that the same 'belong to? the Railway Administration. Upon the plain terms of section 2 (e), therefore, the conclusion is inescapable that the disputed premises fall within the ambit and scope of section 2 (e). Referring to the definition of 'public premises', however, the learned counsel submitted that the term 'belonging to' occurring in section 2 (e) should not be equated with the concept of ownership but should be understood to mean that the Central Government has some control or dominion over the premises Where, therefore, the Central Government leases the premises to another entity which, in its turn, sublets it to some outside agency, it was argued, the Central Government cannot be said to have that control or dominion over the premises so as to attract the application of the Act. The submission was entirely founded on a decision of the Punjab High Court in the case of Nirmal Singh v. State of Punjab, 1965 (1) ILR Punjab 19. 5. The submission, though attractive on its face, cannot be accepted. As mentioned above, it is founded wholly on the decision of the Punjab High Court quoted above. The decision may, on a superficial reading, seem to support the petitioner's contention but a closer scrutiny of the facts in the context of which the observations were made by the learned Judge of that court it would be plain that it lends no support to the petitioner. The position in that case was that a plot of land belonging to the State Govt. had been given on lease to the District Sailors Soldiers and Airmen Board for a period of 99 years. The Board, in its turn, let out parts of the demised land to different persons. In pursuance of the sub-lease, the plaintiff's had built khokhas (wooden stalls) over the respective plots demised to the sub-lessees. The Board subsequently sent notices to the sub lessees to vacate the premises and, on the failure of the latter to comply with the same, the Collector purporting to act under section 4 of the Punjab Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1989, initiated proceedings for the Eviction of the sub-lessees. In the context of these facts the learned Judge observed at page 23 of the report : " I am definitely of the view that the provisions of the Act are not meant for the assistance of the lessees from the Government to get their tenants evicted and 1 am inclined to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the words 'belonging to' have to be understood not necessarily to mean 'owned by' but as indicative of complete control and dominion over the property in dispute. So far as the State Government is concerned, after the grant of lease for 99 years, they have been left with no control or dominion over the land excepting a right of reversion at the expiry of the lease or on the breach of any terms, if so provided in the lease and meanwhile the State Government is entitled only to recover the rent fixed, the real dominion over the land is that of the Board subject of course, to the terms of the lease. " 6. It will thus be seen that on the facts peculiar to the case, the learned Judge arrived at the conclusion that the State Govt. had been left with no control or dominion over the land after having leased it to the Board for a period of 99 years with the stipulation that the Board may, in its turn, sublet the whole or part of the demised land to other individuals. The State Government had virtually parted with all dominion or control over the land for a period of 99 years in favour of the Board. IT was in this factual background that the court was persuaded to hold that the demised land did not 'belong to' the State Government. It is difficult to see how the above decision can lend any assistance to the submission advanced at the Bar by the learned counsel. In the present case, the situation is wholly different. The premises in question were merely entrusted to the management of the Club. No right or interest in the property was created in favour of the Club. Indeed the premises were made available to the Club by the Railway Administration in the discharge of its statutory obligations envisaged under the various circulars issued by the Railway Administration. Indeed the Railway Board has always treated these Clubs as an integral part of the Railways. These Clubs not only receive grant-in-aid but also other facilities from the Government. Section B of Chapter XXVIII of the Railway Establishment Mannual makes a special-provision for the Railway Institutes and Clubs. Paragraph 288 of this Mannual states that Railway Institute should be treated as a Club provided by the Railway rent-free for the benefit of its employees. The Railwav Administration constructs the buildings and playgrounds, etc. for these institutes and Clubs at its own cost and also furnishes the same at its expense. Paragraph 288 of this Mannual states that Railway Institute should be treated as a Club provided by the Railway rent-free for the benefit of its employees. The Railwav Administration constructs the buildings and playgrounds, etc. for these institutes and Clubs at its own cost and also furnishes the same at its expense. All this is part of welfare scheme designed to provide recreational facilities to the railway employees. 7. Thus the position is that the Club building including the auditorium admittedly belongs to the Central Government under the Ministry of Railways but its management has been entrusted to the Railway Cinema Club, Mughal sarai for the beneficial enjoyment of the Railway employees. The Club was neither the lessee of the Central Government nor was it entitled to exercise any ownership rights in respect thereto. By the entrustment of the building to the Club, the Railway administration did not lose control over the same as its owner. The decision cited by the learned counsel is hence clearly distinguishable on facts. 8. Even otherwise as a matter of pure construction of the relevant provisions of the statute, I have not (sic) was five years and the lease was not registered the petitioner became a month-to-month tenant in view of the provisions of Sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. I regret the contention cannot be accepted. Both the courts below have found on an exhaustive consideration of the evidence on the record that the petitioner was not a lessee They have further found that under the contract he had merely been allowed to run the Cinema shows on hire as per terms and conditions laid down in the tender notice issued by the Railway Cinema Club. The contract to run the Cinema shows was initially for 5 years beginning from 8-1-1982, the date on which the possession of the auditorium was delivered to the petitioner According to the respondent the amount of hire charges settled between the parties was linked to the sale proceeds of the tickets of the Cinema business and it was stipulated that the petitioner shall pay Rs. 1250/- per month up to the business of Rs. 20,000/- per month and beyond that up to Rs. 2,000/- at the rate of Rs. 1,500/- per month, and, if the turnover of the business exceeded Rs. 30,000/- the hire charges would be Rs. 2,000/.- per month. 1250/- per month up to the business of Rs. 20,000/- per month and beyond that up to Rs. 2,000/- at the rate of Rs. 1,500/- per month, and, if the turnover of the business exceeded Rs. 30,000/- the hire charges would be Rs. 2,000/.- per month. The auditorium belonged to the Central Government and according to the terms of the contract vide tender notice, the entire equipment including the projectors and other machinery and sound system, etc. was to be provided by the Club itself. The tender notice further stipulates that the contract was liable to be terminated at any time. 9. The terms and conditions mentioned in the tender notice clearly suggest that no interest in the property in question was intended to be created in favour of the person to whom the contract was decided to be assigned. It was a plain and simple business contract for running Cinema shows in the auditorium on hire linked to the business turnover without the last hesitation in holding that if the premises in question are owned by the Central Government they will fall within the definition of 'Public Premises' under section 2 (e) (1). In my humble view, the term 'belonging to' will upon a plain grammatical construction include the concept of ownership. And 1 see no compelling reason to give this term a restricted meaning as suggested by the learned counsel or, as seems to have been held in the case cited above I cannot see any good ground for reading into section 2 (e) (1) the further requirement that in order to fall within the purview of that provision the unauthorised occupant should be holding directly from the Central Government and not through the agency designated by the Central Government to manage the premises on its behalf. I do think that in order to attract the application of the Act it would be sufficient to prove firstly that the premises in question belong to the Central Government which term would include the concept of ownership and secondly the person sought to be evicted under the Act should be if unauthorised occupation as defined by clause (g) of Sec. 2 of the Act. If these two elements are present, the procedure laid down for the eviction of such unauthorised occupants would be clearly available to the Central Government irrespective of whether the person in unauthorised occupation holds directly from the Central Government or through someone managing the premises on behalf of the Central Government. 10. That takes me to the second submission. The contention was that the petitioner was a lessee of the disputed premises and inasmuch as the term of the lease assigning or creating any interest in the property in favour of the contractor. The courts below have, in my opinion, rightly held that no lease was created in favour of the petitioner. They have given good and proper reasons for rejecting the plea of the petitioner that any lease deed was executed between the parties- I have perused the finding of the learned Additional District Judge on this issue of fact and find no ground for taking a different view. We are thus left only with the terms and conditions stipulated in the tender notice according to which the status of the petitioner in relation to the premises was at best that of a licencee. As the contract was given only for five years, the petitioner became liable to be evicted at the end of that term. The next contention of the learned counsel was that Sri P. N. Rai, the Divisional Engineer who has passed the impugned, order as the Prescribed Authority was himself a member of the Executive Committee of the Club which had passed the resolution for initiating necessary action for the eviction of the petitioner after the expiry of the period of the contract. He had thus disqualified himself from acting as the Prescribed Authority on grounds of bias. 11. The submission is devoid of any merit. There is no allegation of any malice against Sri P. N. Rai nor has it been alleged at any stage that he had any personal interest in the litigation. In paragraph 16 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Railway Cinema Club it has been asserted that Sri P. N. Rai had resigned from the membership of the Club when he was appointed Estate Officer. Sri Rai had been appointed Estate Officer by the Railway Board under section 3 of the Act. In paragraph 16 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Railway Cinema Club it has been asserted that Sri P. N. Rai had resigned from the membership of the Club when he was appointed Estate Officer. Sri Rai had been appointed Estate Officer by the Railway Board under section 3 of the Act. In the absence of any allegation of malice or that Sri Rai had any personal interest in the matter, the fact that he was a member of the Executive Committee does not per se render him unfit for bringing to bear on the proceedings the degree of objectivity necessary for removing any possible misgiving about his impartiality. A somewhat identical submission was advanced before the Supreme Court in the case reported in Accountant and Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1708 . The submission was that an officer of the concerned Bank at whose instance the proceedings for eviction were initiated and which were under challenge before the Supreme Court was himself designated as the Estate Officer under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and consequently the provision enabling such an officer of the Bank to Act as the Estate Officer must be struck down as violative of Art. 14 on the ground of personal bias. The submission was repelled by their Lordships with the following observations : "Dr. Chitale, while initially formulating his contentions, outlined an argument that the provision in the 1971 Act appointing one of the officers of the respondent bank as the Estate Officer is violative of Art. 14. We do not see any substance in this contention. In the very nature of things, only an officer or appointee of the Government, statutory authority or Corporation can be thought of for implementing the provisions of the Act That apart, personal bias cannot necessarily be attributed to such officer either in favour of the bank or against any occupant who is being proceeded against, merely because he happens to be such officer. Moreover, as pointed out earlier, the Act provides for an appeal to independent judicial officer against order passed by the Estate Officer. THEse provisions do not, therefore, suffer from any infirmity. In fact, Dr. Chitale did not pursue this objection seriously. " 12. Moreover, as pointed out earlier, the Act provides for an appeal to independent judicial officer against order passed by the Estate Officer. THEse provisions do not, therefore, suffer from any infirmity. In fact, Dr. Chitale did not pursue this objection seriously. " 12. A case more directly on the point is reported in M. L. Joshi v. Director of Estate Government of India, New Delhi, AIR 1967 Delhi 86. There the validity of the provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act were challenged on the ground that as an Estate Officer himself issues a notice under section 4 (1) he becomes disqualified on grounds of bias from conducting the proceedings himself. Justice Dua (as he then was) speaking for the court repelled the contention with the following observations : " I have not been impressed by the argument that the show cause notice is wholly without jurisdiction. Section 2 (e) of the Act defines an 'estate officer' to mean an officer appointed as such by the Central Government under section. 3. In the case in hand, it is sworn in the return that the Deputy Director of Estates (Litigation) is the Estate Officer under the Act and is entitled to start proceedings thereunder. The show cause notice under Sec. 4, would therefore, be fully authorised and lawful. There being no jurisdictional or other similar serious legal infirmity, it would clearly be for the petitioner to show cause on the merits against bis proposed eviction in accordance with the statutory provision. The contention urged on behalf of the petitioner that the Estate Officer would be both the prosecutor and the Judge which is hit by the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in Gullappalli Nageswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1959 SC 1376 , is unconvincing and of no avail to the petitioner in the present case because the Estate Officer does not appear to me to be acting as a Judge in his own cause when he is disposing of the proceedings initiated by the show cause notice under Sec. 4 of the Act. To say that no one shall be a Judge in his own cause means that the Judge must not have anything like a personal interest in the cause he is to adjudicate upon and not that an officer discharging his official functions must not start proceedings in a matter which he is under the law, competent to adjudicate upon. The petitioner's argument is obviously misconceived in the instant case and the decision of the Supreme Court does not seem to land support to the petitioner's submission on the existing facts before me. " With respect I entirely agree with the statement of law, namely, that the maxim that no one shall be a Judge in his own cause only means that he should not have any personal interest in the cause he is called upon to adjudicate. The maxim has no application where an officer is discharging his official functions in a matter in which he is competent under the law to adjudicate. 13. Reliance was, however, placed by the learned counsel on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Baidyanath Mahapatra v. State of Orissa, 1989 (4) SCC 664 . The decision is clearly distinguishable on basic facts. There an order of compulsory retirement was under challenge. The order was attacked, inter alia, on the ground that the member of the Review Committee which had recommended compulsory retirement had himself adjudicated the correctness of the same as Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal./ It was in this peculiar factual background that their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that this was sufficient to vitiate the decision of the Tribunal even if there was no allegation of personal bias against that member. Their Lordships ruled that in view of the fact that the gentleman himself had made the recommendation as a member of the Review Committee for the pre mature retirement of the employee, he should have abstained or withdrawn from the Tribunal which heard the matter. The above was a clear instance of appeal from Ceasor to Ceasor. The Chairman of the Tribunal had himself recommended the compulsory retirement of the petitioner whereupon the petitioner was prematurely retired. Subsequently as Chairman of the Tribunal he adjudicated the correctness of his own recommendation. There could hardly be any doubt in these circumstances that the principles of natural justice stood completely and demonstrably violated. The Chairman of the Tribunal had himself recommended the compulsory retirement of the petitioner whereupon the petitioner was prematurely retired. Subsequently as Chairman of the Tribunal he adjudicated the correctness of his own recommendation. There could hardly be any doubt in these circumstances that the principles of natural justice stood completely and demonstrably violated. This case has no correspondence with the present situation. The Executive Committee of the Club had passed a resolution for initiating proceedings for the eviction of the petitioner on the simple ground that the terms of his contract had lapsed and he was overstaying in the premises. After this resolution Sri Rai had resigned. Incidentally Sri Rai was also designated as an Estate Officer under the aforesaid Act by the Central Government. It was in the exercise of his powers and duties as an Estate Officer that he issued the notice calling upon the petitioner to show cause why an order of eviction should not be passed against him. The decision of Sri Rai was later affirmed by the learned Additional District Judge in appeal against whom no bias was alleged. This coupled with the fact that no malice or ill-will is alleged against Sri RBi and with the further fact that Sri Rai did not have any personal interest in the subject-matter in dispute completely discounts the possibility of any breach or violation of the principles of natural justice. In International Airports Authority v. K. D. Bali, AIR 1988 SC 1099 , their Lordships ruled that to constitute bias there must be reasonableness of the apprehension of bias in the mind of the party and that it is not every suspicion expressed by the party which may lead to the conclusion that the authority hearing the proceedings is biased. The apprehension, their Lordships observed, must be judged from a healthy, reasonable and average point of view and not on mere apprehension of any whimsical person. It is the reasonableness and the apprehension of an average honest man that must be taken note of. 14. Applying these standards, I have not the least manner of doubt that there was no reasonable ground for apprehending that the Estate Officer was biased against the petitioner or that there has been any infraction of the principles of natural justice. This finally takes me to the last submission advanced by the learned counsel in support of the petition. 14. Applying these standards, I have not the least manner of doubt that there was no reasonable ground for apprehending that the Estate Officer was biased against the petitioner or that there has been any infraction of the principles of natural justice. This finally takes me to the last submission advanced by the learned counsel in support of the petition. It was urged that the petitioner was not afforded reasonable opportunity of substantiating his objection before the Estate Officer. He had made applications for summoning various records, both from the custody of the respondents as well as from a civil court where a suit filed by the petitioner against the respondents in regard to the same property was pending. I have carefully examined this grievance of the petitioner and I find myself in complete agreement with the learned Additional District Judge when he says that the petitioner had been afforded full and repeated opportunities to adduce evidence in support of his case. However, the learned Additional District Judge has observed that a perusal of the record of the proceedings of the case before the Estate Officer clearly demonstrate that these applications were attempts merely to delay the proceedings and that every conceivable opportunity had been afforded to him. The learned Additional District Judge has also noted that the grievance aired by the petitioner on this score was not genuine. Had it been so, the petitioner would have filed an application before the appellate court also for the same purpose but this was not done. I have also pursued the various application filed by the petitioner along with a supplementary affidavit as also the objections filed by the respondent Club against the same. On a perusal of these applications and objections, I am convinced that there has not been any failure of justice in the case. 15. The above discussion disposes of all the points urged at the Bar in support of the petition. 16. In the premise, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.