J. N. HORE, J. ( 1 ) OPPOSITE party no. 1, Naba Kumar Adhikari was convicted by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, 1st Court, Hooghly under Section 304, Part-II, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for 4 years and also to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- in default to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for 1 year more. Being aggrieved by the, said order of conviction and sentence opposite party no. 1 Naba Kumar Adhikari preferred an appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 18 of 1988 and the learned Sessions Judge. Hooghly who heard the said appeal allowed it, set aside the order of conviction and sentence and acquitted O. P. No. 1 of the charge under Section 304, part-II, Indian Penal Code. Being aggrieved by the said order of acquittal the petitioner who was the defacto complainant moved this Court in revision and obtained the present Rule. ( 2 ) THE prosecution case was that Bablu Bag (the deceased), brother of the petitioner and some other boys and a girl were playing by the side of the road on 7-6-1980 at about 8. 00/8. 30 A. M. Accused Naba Kumar Adhikari assaulted P. Ws. 5 and 7 and they fled away out of fear. The accused also detained Bablu Bag and assaulted him with fists and blows and a branch of a bamboo and kicked him on the abdomen. Bablu sustained severe injuries and was removed to Goalpota Hospital for medical treatment. Thereafter he was transferred to Howrah General Hospital but he died there on the night of 7-6-1980. The defence case was that the accused had been falsely implicated and that the deceased sustained injuries as a result of beating by his mother and by his playmates due to quarrel. ( 3 ) P. WS. 2 to 5, 7 and 13 are the alleged eye-witnesses to the occurrence Accepting their testimony as true and reliable the learned Assistant Sessions Judge found the accused guilty of an offence punishable under. Section 304, Part-II, Indian Penal Code, convicted him there under and sentenced him in the manner already indicated above. The learned Sessions Judge did not, however, accept the testimony of the alleged eyewitnesses as true and reliable inasmuch as their evidence is full of inconsistencies, contradictions and embellishments. He accordingly passed an order of acquittal setting aside the order of conviction and sentence. The learned Sessions Judge did not, however, accept the testimony of the alleged eyewitnesses as true and reliable inasmuch as their evidence is full of inconsistencies, contradictions and embellishments. He accordingly passed an order of acquittal setting aside the order of conviction and sentence. ( 4 ) IN revision against acquittal by a private complainant the scope of interference by High Court is limited. In K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, the Supreme Court has held that although it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the state may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of Section 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it an the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. Some cases of this kind however may be indicated, which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision these cases may be where the Trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce, or where the appeal court has wrongly had evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be case of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; and in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of Section 439 (4 ). In Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, the Supreme Court has held that in revision against acquittal by a private complainant the High Court cannot reappraise evidence for itself as if it is acting as a Court of appeal and then order a retrial. Normally retrial should not be ordered unless there is some infirmity rendering the trial defective. The reason is that the expression of opinion by the High Court on the evidence before it with respect to the commission of alleged offences though not binding on the Court, holding fresh trial may nevertheless leave an unconscious impression on the Court holding such trial. The same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Bansi Lal and Others v. Laxman Singh. It has been held that it is only glaring cases of injustice resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the Trial Court, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of the acquittal and direct a retrial of the acquitted accused. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. The mere circumstance that a finding of fact recorded by the Trial Court may in the opinion of the High Court be wrong, will not justify the setting aside of the order of acquittal and directing a retrial of the accused. Even in an appeal the Appellate Court would not be justified in interfering with an acquittal merely because it was inclined to differ from the findings of fact reached by the Trial Court on the appreciation of the evidence. The revisional power of the High Court is much more restricted in its scope. The instances mentioned by the Supreme Court in Chinnaswamy case (Supra) as justifying interference with orders of acquittal in the exercise of revisional powers were illustrative and not exhaustive. This has been made clear in Ayodhyo Dube and Others v. Ram Sumer Singh. The revisional power of the High Court is much more restricted in its scope. The instances mentioned by the Supreme Court in Chinnaswamy case (Supra) as justifying interference with orders of acquittal in the exercise of revisional powers were illustrative and not exhaustive. This has been made clear in Ayodhyo Dube and Others v. Ram Sumer Singh. It has been observed that Criminal Justice System does not admit of TPigeon hole Life and the Law do not fall neatly into slots when a court starts laying down rules enumerated (1), (2), (3), (4); or (a), (b), (c), (d ). It is arranging for itself traps and pitfalls. Categories, classifications and compartments which statute does not mention, all tend to make law less flexible, less sensible and less just. In that case the Sessions Judge acquitted the accused by ignoring the probative value of First Information Report and reliable testimony of eye witnesses and without considering material evidence on record and his judgment was full of in consistencies and consisted of faulty reasoning, the order of the High Court in revision directing retrial by setting aside acquittal was held to be justified. ( 5 ) BEARING the above in mind let us consider whether this is a fit case for interference of the High Court with the order of acquittal. On hearing the learned Advocates for both sides arid upon a careful perusal of the judgment and the materials on record, we are of the opinion that there is no glaring defect in the procedure nor there is any manifest error on a point of law and a flagrant miscarriage of justice. The appreciation of evidence made by the lower Appellate Court cannot be said to be perversed. The medical evidence shows that death was due to the head injury viz, one haematoma 2 x 1. 5 on the right occipital parietal region. There was a crack fracture 1. 5 on the right parietal bone and huge amount clotted blood under meningis. According to the doctor, the crack fracture may be caused if a person falls on the ground with force and the haemorr-hage under the brain substance may be caused due to impact of fall on the ground. According to the doctor, the head injury might also be caused by striking the head upon any wall or brick pavement. Now, none of the P. Ws. According to the doctor, the head injury might also be caused by striking the head upon any wall or brick pavement. Now, none of the P. Ws. 1 to 4 who were the alleged eye-witnesses to the occurrence has stated how the deceased received the head injury resulting in his death. These witnesses have stated about assaults with fists, blows, slap, and kicks. Even their evidence with regard to the assault by the accused suffers from inconsistencies as borne out by their earlier statements under Section 161 Criminal Procedure Code as pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge. P. Ws. 5, 7 and 13 have stated that the accused struck the head of the deceased against a brick. P. W. 6 was merely tendered for cross- examination P. Ws. 9,11 and 12 was declared hostile by prosecution as they did not support the prosecution case. It was P. W. 5 who for the first time introduced the story of assault on the head of the deceased with a brick but he did not make any such statement before the Investigating Officer under Section 161, Criminal Procedure Code. This is an omission in a vital matter and, therefore, amounts to contradiction. The learned Sessions Judge did not, therefore, commit any error in discarding this part of the evidence of P. W. 5. P. Ws. 7 and 13 have also been contradicted by their statements under Section 161, Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge-did not consider these serious infirmities in the testimony of the so-called eye-witnesses. The learned Sessions Judge rightly rejected the testimony of P. Ws. 5,7 and 13 as subsequent improvements and embellishments. The appreciation of evidence as made out by the lower Appellate Court cannot be said to be illegal or perverse. On the other hand, the lower Appellate Court has given cogent reasons for discarding the. Testimony of the eye-witnesses. There is, therefore, no scope for interference with the order of acquittal as passed by the lower Appellate Court. ( 6 ) WE, therefore, rejected the revisional application and the Rule is discharged.