VENKATAPATHY v. B. K. NAGARAJ — 1990 DIGILAW 653 (KAR)

SWAMI, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is preferred against the Judgment and decree dated 17-12-1981 passed in O. S. No. 2576/1980 by the learned III Addl. City Civil judge, Bangalore City. The suit was originally filed in the Court of the Principal Civil Judge, bangalore City. On the establishment of the City civil Court, the suit came to be statutorily transferred to the Court of the City Civil Court, Bangalore City and was re-numbered as O. S. No. 2576/1980. The suit was filed on 30-3-1978 for declaration of title that the plaintiffs are the owners of the suit Schedules 'a' and 'b' properties and for possession and mesne profits. ( 2 ) THE case of the plaintiffs was that the suit Schedule 'a' property was purchased by Chikka bandappa, grand-father of the plaintiffs under a registered sale deed dated 22-5-1922 and schedule 'b' property was granted to their uncle b. Ramaiah under a grant certificate dated 21-11-1964; that one Jyothinagarada Ramaiah was the tenant of the suit schedule premises described in Schedules 'a' and 'b' on a monthly rent of Rs. 25/-; that the defendants are the legal representatives of the said Jyothinagarada ramaiah; that the defendants have denied title of the plaintiffs by filing a suit O. S. No. 1045/1974 on 7-5-1974 and from that date they have lost their character of tenants and their position has become that of trespassers and as such they are liable to be evicted and are liable to pay past and future mesne profits. ( 3 ) THE 1st defendant resisted the suit by filinga written statement. The remaining defendants adopted the written statement of the 1st defendant. In the written statement filed by the 1st defendant, it was contended that neither the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiffs was the owner of the suit properties nor the suit properties were joint family properties of the plaintiffs and the 1st defendant. The plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-title were not in possession of the same. In the written statement filed by the 1st defendant, it was contended that neither the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiffs was the owner of the suit properties nor the suit properties were joint family properties of the plaintiffs and the 1st defendant. The plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-title were not in possession of the same. Jyothinagarada Ramaiah was in possession of the suit properties in his own right and he constructed a tiled house comprised in suit 'a' schedule property, that they the defendants have been in possession of the suit properties; that the suit properties were not purchased by the plaintiffs' grand-father Chikkabandappa under a registered sale deed dated 22-5-1922; that the suit properties are in continuous and undistmbed possession and enjoyment of the defendants and their deceased father for over 45 yers; that the suit properties were not obtained on lease by the father of defendants from the plaintiffs' father on a monthly rental of Rs. 25/- about 15 years back; that the defendants' father filed O. S. No. 1045/1974 when plaintiffs' father attempted to interfere with his possession and the said suit was decreed; that the plaintiffs are not entitled to mesne profits, either past or future. It was also alternatively contended that even if it were to be assumed that the plaintiffs had title to the suit schedule property by the sale deed, they were not in possession since the defendants and their father had been in possession for over 45 years; therefore, they have perfected their title to the suit property by adverse possession. ( 4 ) ON the basis of the pleadings of the parties,the trial Court framed the following issues:1. Whether the plaintiffs prove that they are the absolute owners of the plaint schedule properties? 2. Are they further entitled to the relief of declaration and possession sought for? 3. Are the plaintiffs entitled to past and future mesne profits? 4. Do the defendants prove that they have perfected their title to the plaint schedule properties by the adverse possession? 5. Is the suit barred by limitation? 6. Is the valuation for the purpose of Court-fee correct? ( 5 ) WHAT order or decree?5. In support of their case, the plaintiffs have examined three witnesses on their behalf and produced as many as 21 documents marked as exhibits P-1 to P-21. 5. Is the suit barred by limitation? 6. Is the valuation for the purpose of Court-fee correct? ( 5 ) WHAT order or decree?5. In support of their case, the plaintiffs have examined three witnesses on their behalf and produced as many as 21 documents marked as exhibits P-1 to P-21. The defendants on their behalf have examined three witnesses and produced D-14 documents marked as Exhibits d-l to D-14. Here itself it may be pointed out that P. W. 1 is plaintiff-2; P. Ws. 2 and 3 are the uncles of the plaintiffs. D. Ws. 1 and 2 are the witnesses and D. W. 3 is the 1st defendant. ( 6 ) ON the basis of the evidence on record, the trial Court has answered issue No. 1 in the affirmative; on issue No. 2, it is held that the plaintiffs are the owners of the suit-schedule properties and has declared them to be owners. However, on the other portion of this issues, it has been held that the plaintiffs are not entitled to possession since it is their case that the defendants are the tenants, therefore, the trial Court has held that the plaintiffs can seek possession only under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control act. Issues 3,4 and 5 have been answered in the negative. As far as issue No. 6 is concerned, it related to valuation for the purpose of Court-fee. It was not pressed at the time of trial. Consequently, the trial Court has decreed the suit in the following terms:"in the result, the suit is decreed in the following terms: plaintiffs are declared to be the absolute owners of the suit properties. Since according to the plaintiffs, the defendants are in possession as tenants, they are entitled to seek possession of the suit properties under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control act. They are also at liberty to recover arrears of rent in accordance with law. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, it is ordered that the plaintiffs are entitled to the costs of the suit. " ( 7 ) CHALLENGING the aforesaid Judgment and decree, the defendants have filed the above appeal and the plaintiffs have filed the cross-objections. ( 8 ) IN this Judgment, the parties will bereferred to as 'plaintiffs' and 'defendants' as they were arrayed before the trial Court. " ( 7 ) CHALLENGING the aforesaid Judgment and decree, the defendants have filed the above appeal and the plaintiffs have filed the cross-objections. ( 8 ) IN this Judgment, the parties will bereferred to as 'plaintiffs' and 'defendants' as they were arrayed before the trial Court. ( 9 ) THIS appeal has come up before a Division Bench pursuant to an order dated 21-3-1989 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court referring the appeal to a Division Bench. In the order of reference, the learned Single Judge has observed that the decisions in (1) Mangalamba v sulochana Bai, ILR 1988 Kar. 3374; (2) Govindaraja Mudaliar v University of "mysore, ILR 1987 kar. 3415 require to be reconsidered in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Sultan and Others v Ganesh and Others, AIR 1988 SC 716 . ( 10 ) IN the light of the contentions urged on both sides, the following points arise for consideration:1) Whether the trial Court is justified in holding that the plaintiffs have proved their title to the suit schedule properties? 2) Whether the trial Court is justified m holding that the defendants have failed to prove that they have perfected their title by adverse possession? 3) Whether the trial Court is justlfied in law in refusing to grant a decree for possession? point No. 1 ( 11 ) AS already pointed out, the plaintiffs have examined three witnesses on their, behalf. The title claimed by the plaintiffs to the suit schedule properties does not depend only on the oral evidence. It is based on the documentary evidence also. Ex. P-1 is the sale deed dated 22-5-1982 executed in favour of Chikka Bandappa, the grand-father of the plaintiffs-1 to 8. This is spoken to by P. W. 1 and also the other two witnesses p. Ws. 2 and 3. It was contended before the trial Court that Ex. P-l did not relate to suit schedule 'a' Property. The trial Court, on consideration of the recitals contained in Ex. P-1, has held that it relates to suit Schedule 'a' property. We have also been taken through this document (Ex. P-1 ). The recitals relating to Item No. 2 is referable to suit Schedule 'a' property. The contention that all the boundaries mentioned in Ex. The trial Court, on consideration of the recitals contained in Ex. P-1, has held that it relates to suit Schedule 'a' property. We have also been taken through this document (Ex. P-1 ). The recitals relating to Item No. 2 is referable to suit Schedule 'a' property. The contention that all the boundaries mentioned in Ex. P-l do not tally has no substance because all the three boundaries from all the three sides tally except the eastern boundary which, as described in the plaint schedule is the plaintiffs' other property. When all the three boundaries tally and the document is of the year 1922 and at no point of time it has been challenged as not relating to the property in question and it has been produced from the proper custody, it is not possible to hold that the document (Ex. P-1) does not relate to the suit Schedule 'a' properly. In addition to this, there are other documents produced by the plaintiffs. Exhibits P-3 to P-11 are the kandayam receipts for having paid the tax in respect of suit schedules 'a' and 'b' properties for the years 1966 to 1972. Ex. P-12, dated 1-6-1965 is the assessment notice issued by the Corporation of the city of Bangalore informing B. Krishnamurthy, the father of plaintiffs-1 to 8 the present assessment of the suit schedule properties. Ex. P-13, dated 21-12-1965 is the order of assessment assessing tax in respect of suit Schedules 'a' and 'b' properties. Ex. P-2, dated 21-11-1964 is a grant certificate relating to suit Schedule 'b' property made in favour or P. W. 3, the uncle of P. Ws. 1 to 8. It also further reveals that the grant was made on 21-11-1964 under G. O. No. GAD 30, dated 28-12-1961. The boundaries mentioned in this document and the boundaries stated in the plaint *b' Schedule to tally. The measurement also tallies. Ex. P-14 is the demand made for payment of the amount towards grant made under Ex. P-2. Ex. P-15 is the receipt for having paid Rs. 2,200/- towards the amount demanded for grant. These three documents put together go to prove that plaint Schedule 'b' property was granted in favour of P. W. 3, the uncle of plaintiffs-1 to 8. Exs. P-16 and P-17 are the notices issued by the corporation in respect of suit Schedules 'a' and 'b' properties. Ex. 2,200/- towards the amount demanded for grant. These three documents put together go to prove that plaint Schedule 'b' property was granted in favour of P. W. 3, the uncle of plaintiffs-1 to 8. Exs. P-16 and P-17 are the notices issued by the corporation in respect of suit Schedules 'a' and 'b' properties. Ex. P-18 is the city survey sketch showing the suit properties. The learned trial judge after considering all these documentary evidence and also the oral evidence has held that the plaintiffs have proved that they are the owners of the suit schedules 'a' and 'b' properties. 11. 1 Here itself it may be pointed out that the case of the plaintiffs is that the suit Schedules 'a' and 'b' properties, in the partition between B. Krishnamurthy and his brother, fell to the share of B. Krishnamurthy. The partition was an oral partition. This case of the plaintiffs is spoken to by P. Ws. 2 and 3 in addition to P. W. 1. The evidence of P. W. 3 is relevant because, he has deposed that suit Schedule 'b' property was granted in his name and subsequent to the grant, there was a partition between himself and his brother and in that partition the suit Schedule 'a' and 'b' properties fell to the share of B. Krishnamurthy, father of plaintiffs-1 to 8. It may be pointed out here itself that the defendants have tried to establish their title by producing Ex. D-1. Ex. D-l is dated 20th March, 1949 under which jyothinagarada Ramaiah, father of defendants-1 to 4 purchased 'gana' and a wooden plank. Thus this document does not relate to the title of the suit schedule properties. Ex. D-3 to 7 are the receipts for having paid the tax in respect of the suit schedule properties for the years 1975 to 1978. It may be pointed out that Jyothinagarada ramaiah, father of defendants-1 to 4 had filed o. S. No. 1045/1974 against the father of plaintiffs- 1 to 8 for a permanent injunction on the ground that he was in possession as owner thereof and had perfected title to the suit schedule properties. That suit was decreed on 2-1-1978. After that suit was filed, tax receipts have been obtained by the defendants as per Exs. D-3 to D-7 by paying the tax in respect of the suit schedule properties in the name of the khatedar. Ex. That suit was decreed on 2-1-1978. After that suit was filed, tax receipts have been obtained by the defendants as per Exs. D-3 to D-7 by paying the tax in respect of the suit schedule properties in the name of the khatedar. Ex. D-8, dated 1-11-1964 is a demand notice issued by the town Panchayat, Yeshwanthpur, Bangalore. It may also be pointed out that these documents cannot be held to prove the title of the defendants. After the suit O. S. No. 1045/1974 was decreed, the katha in respect of the suit schedule properties was changed as per Ex D-12 in the name of the 1st defendant. Thereafter the defendants have paid the house tax. The suit schedule properties stood in the name of B. Krishnamurthy until they were changed in the name of the 1st defendant under Ex. D-12. Therefore, taking into consideration all the evidence on record having a bearing on the issue of title and also the reasons given by the trial Court, we are satisfied that the trial Court is justified in holding that the plaintiffs have proved their title to the suit schedule properties. Point No. 1 is accordingly answered m the affirmative. Point No. 2 ( 12 ) THE trial Court has held that the defendants have failed to prove the plea of adversepossession. It is relevant to notice that if really jyothinagarada Ramaiah, the predecessor of defendants was in adverse possession of the suitschedule property for the last 40 years as contended by the defendants, there would have been an indication in the records pertaining to the suit schedule property. In the Corporation records, the suit schedule properties are continued in the name of the father of plaintiffs-1 to 8. It came to be changed in the name of the 1st defendant only pursuant to the Judgment in O. S. No. 1045/1974 under Ex. D-12, dated 6-3-1978. The defendants have tried to prove their adverse possession placing reliance on Exs. D-1 to D-14. We have already held that Ex. D-1 does not relate to the suit schedule property though it refers to Mirja tree grown on the suit Schedule 'b' property. The other documents are either tax receipts or provisional tax receipts and the ration card. Exs. The defendants have tried to prove their adverse possession placing reliance on Exs. D-1 to D-14. We have already held that Ex. D-1 does not relate to the suit schedule property though it refers to Mirja tree grown on the suit Schedule 'b' property. The other documents are either tax receipts or provisional tax receipts and the ration card. Exs. D-9 and D-10 are the certified copies of the judgment in O. S. No. 1045/1974 on the file of the i Additional Munsiff, Bangalore, and the written statement filed by B. Krishnamurthy in that suit. Therefore, from these documents it is not possible to hold that there was any adverse possession. According to the case of the plaintiffs, the possession of Jyothinagarada Ramaiah was that of a tenant and it continued to be so until he filed o. S. No. 1045/1974. In the plaint, the plaintiffs have specifically pleaded that Jyothinagarada ramaiah was the tenant of the suit schedule property until 6-5-1974 on a monthly rental of Rs. 25/ -. It has also been specifically pleaded that from the date of filing of O. S. No. 1045/1974 tenancy of the defendants of the suit properties stood forfeited as they denied the title of the plaintiffs and set up title in themselves. ( 13 ) IN his deposition, P. W. 1 has stated thus:"my father had leased out the suit schedule property to one Ramaiah, father of the 1st defendant, about 15 years back on a rent of Rs. 25/- per month. " no doubt he has stated that there is no document to evidence the fact that the suit schedule property was leased to Jyothinagarada Ramaiah. The suggestion made in the cross-examination that Jyothinagarada Ramaiah was not a tenant of the suit schedule property has been denied. P. Ws. 2 and 3, had not deposed that the suit schedule property was leased to Jyothinagarada ramaiah. Defendant-1 who is examined as D. W. 3 has deposed thus:"we have never paid rent to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have never issued any notice calling upon us to pay rent or vacate the suit property. "no doubt he has not stated in his examinalion-in-chief that Jyothinagarada Ramaiah was not the tenant of the suit schedule properties; but in the cross-examination, a suggestion made to that effect has been denied. The case of the defendants, as already pointed out is one of adverse possession. "no doubt he has not stated in his examinalion-in-chief that Jyothinagarada Ramaiah was not the tenant of the suit schedule properties; but in the cross-examination, a suggestion made to that effect has been denied. The case of the defendants, as already pointed out is one of adverse possession. As we have already pointed out that, if Jyothinagarada Ramaiah, predecessor of the defendants and the defendants were in adverse possession for over a period of 30 years as claimed by them, the khata of the property,would not have been allowed to stand in die name of plaintiffs-1 to 8. Further, if Jyothinagarada ramaiah was not the tenant of suit Schedules 'a' and 'b' properties, the father of plaintiffs-1 to 8 and the plaintiffs would not have allowed him to continue in possession inasmuch as immediately on the denial of title by Jyothinagarada Ramaiah by filing O. S. No. 1045/1974, the plaintiffs have filed the suit for a declaration of title and possession. This conduct of the plaintiffs would show that if only Jyothinagarada Ramaiah had asserted his right before filing his suit, that he was not the tenant of the suit properties, the plaintiffs being the owners of the suit properties would not have kept quite. ( 14 ) MERE possession is not adverse however long it may be. In order that a possession of a party should be adverse to the real owner of the property. Therefore, the possession of the defendants, as asserted by them, had never been adverse to the plaintiffs. On the contrary, they have allowed the khata of the suit schedule prc perties to stand in the name of the plaintiffs only, in the corporation records. They nave paid the house tax in the name of the khatedar. They have not made any attempt at any time in the past 30 to 40 years to have the khata changed in their name. There was no overt-act on the part of the defendants until O. S. No. 1045/1974 was filed to deny the title of the plaintiffs and claim title in themselves by adverse possession. There must be animus et factus to hold possession of the property adverse to the real owner. Under these circumstances, taking into consideration the evidence on record, we are of the view that the trial Court is justified in holding that the defendants have failed to prove adverse possession pleaded by them. There must be animus et factus to hold possession of the property adverse to the real owner. Under these circumstances, taking into consideration the evidence on record, we are of the view that the trial Court is justified in holding that the defendants have failed to prove adverse possession pleaded by them. Point No. 2 is answered, accordingly, in the affirmative. Point No. 3 ( 15 ) IT is contended by Sri Ramakrishna,learned counsel for the plaintiffs-cross-objectors that the trial Court has failed to see that the plaintiffs have filed a suit for a declaration of title and possession on the ground that the defendants are the trespassers even though in the beginning they were the tenants; but as the defendants have not accepted the plea of tenancy set up by the plaintiffs and the suit is one for ejectment on the termination of tenancy, in the light of a decision of the Supreme Court in Sultan v ganesh, AIR 1988 SC 716 , the defendants who have not sought for the protection under the Karnataka rent Control Act, they are not entitled to any such protection and the Court is not justified in refusing a decree for possession on the ground that the plaintiffs have pleaded that the predecessor of the defendants was a tenant of the suit schedule properties. ( 16 ) IT is relevant to notice that the plaintiffs'themselves have sought for a declaration of title and for possession on the ground that they are the owners of the suit schedule properties and the predecessor of the defendants was a tenant upto 6-5-1974 and thereafter on filing O. S. No. 1045/1974 claiming title in himself and denying title of the father of plaintiffs 1 to 8, he ceased to be a tenant and had become a trespasser. ' When the plaintiffs themselves have come forward with the plea that the defendants are the tenants and have claimed the relief of possession on the ground that they the defendants have ceased to be tenants and have become trespassers on renouncing their character or status as tenants and by denying the title of the plaintiffs, and claiming title in themselves, in our view, it should not make any difference whether it is a suit for ejectment of a tenant or a suit for a mere possession. The only effect of both the suits is to dispossess the tenant. The only effect of both the suits is to dispossess the tenant. Clever drafting of the prayer in such a manner should not make any difference as far as the actual effect of the decree is concerned. Even in the case of denial of title by the tenant what happens is that the lessor would be entitled to put an end to the lease by issuing a notice under Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property act. Mere denial of title by the tenant does not ipso facto put an end to the tenancy unless the landlord or the lessor chooses to use that circumstance to issue notice terminating the tenancy on the basis that the tenant had renounced his character as a tenant, and denied title of the landlord and set up title in himself. Therefore, the mere plea of Ihe plaintiffs that the defendants have denied title of the plaintiffs and therefore, the tenancy has come to an end cannot be accepted as correct either on fact or in law. ( 17 ) THE decision of the Supreme Court in Sultan's case, AIR 1988 SC p. 716 was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Govindamma v Mwvgesh Mudalilar, ILR 1990 Kar. 2639. That was also a case in which the plaintiff had pleaded that the defendants were the tenants but they ceased to be tenants because of the fact that they had denied title of the plaintiffs and had set up title in themselves. The premises concerned therein was governed by the provisions of the karnataka Rent Control Act. In the case on hand also, it is not in dispute that the premises is situated in the area to which Parts IV and V of the Karnataka Rent Control Act are applicable. In Govindamma's case, the trial Court had passed a decree for possession on the ground that the defendants had denied title of the plaintiff even though he was a tenant of the premises; therefore the tenancy stood terminated on the denial of title of the landlord. In Govindamma's case, the trial Court had passed a decree for possession on the ground that the defendants had denied title of the plaintiff even though he was a tenant of the premises; therefore the tenancy stood terminated on the denial of title of the landlord. This Court on considering the decision of the Supreme Court in sultan's case, AIR 1988 SC 716 and also the effect of the definition of the expression 'tenant' occurring in Section 3 (r) of the Act and on taking into consideration another decision of the supreme Court in Majati Subbarao v Krishna rao, 1989 (4) SCC 732 , held as follows: "thus it is clear that in Sultan's case, it was not held that the civil Court was entitled to pass a decree for possession against the tenant in possession of the premises governed by the Rent Act if such a plea were to be raised by the defendant. That being so, we are of the view that in Mangalamba's case, ILR 1988 Kar. 3374 AIR: 1988 Kar. 174, the scope of Sultan's case has not been correctly appreciated. In addition to this, it is also relevant to notice that Sultan's case, AIR 1988 SC 716 did not consider the case wherein Rent Act provided that the tenant in occupation of the premises after the termination of tenancy would-continue to be a tenant until he is evicted in accordance with the provisions of the Rent Act. Such a provision is contained in the Karnataka Rent Control Act. As already pointed out and it is that provision which makes all the difference between Sultan's case, and also the case governed by the Transfer of Property Act and the Rent Control Act. Therefore, it is not possible to agree with the view expressed by this Court in mangalamba's case, that in spite of the provisions contained in the Act, the Civil court will have jurisdiction to pass a decree for possession against a tenant in possession of the premises governed by Parts IV and V of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. We may also point out here that in Mangalamba's case, the definition of the word 'tenant' and the effect of it are not considered. We may also point out here that in Mangalamba's case, the definition of the word 'tenant' and the effect of it are not considered. Therefore, we are of the view that the decision in mangalamba's case, cannot be held to lay down the law correct as it is opposed to the decision of the Supreme Court in Majati subba Rao's case, 1989 (4) SCC 732 and the definition of the word 'tenant1 contained in secion 3 (r) of 'the Act read with the provisions contained in Section 21 (1) of the act. Accordingly we are of the view that the decision in Mangalamba's case, has to be overruled. " ( 18 ) SRI Ramakrishna, learned counsel for the plaintiffs-cross-objectors laid stress on the following observation contained in Govindatnma's case, ILR 1990 Kar. 2639;"thus it is clear that in Sultan's case, it was not held that the Civil Court was entitled to pass a decree for possession against the tenant in possession of the premises governed by the Rent Act if such a plea were to be raised by the defendant. That being so, we are of the view that in Mangalamba's case, the scope of Sultan's case has not been correctly appreciated. "it is not possible to appreciate how the said observation will help the plaintiffs-respondents. Therefore, we are of the view that the decision in sultan's case, AIR 1988 SC 716 , cannot be of any help to support the contention of the plaintiffsrespondents. The contention of the defendants that once adverse possession pleaded by them has been negatived, the plea raised by the plaintiffs that the predecessor of the defendants was a tenant holds the field, deserves to be accepted. Therefore, we hold that the predecessor of the defendants was a tenant of the Schedules 'a' and 'b' properties and the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the plaintiffs and the respondents. Therefore, we hold that the predecessor of the defendants was a tenant of the Schedules 'a' and 'b' properties and the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the plaintiffs and the respondents. A mere fact that the predecessor of the defendants denied title of the plaintiffs by filing O. S. No. 1045/1974 did not ipso facto, put an end to the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendants because, (1) there was no forfeiture of tenancy by issuing a notice as required by Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act and, (2) even if there was any such notice, the relationship would not have come to an end until the predecessor of the defendants was actually evicted from the schedule premises having regard to the definition of the word 'tenant' occuring in Section 3 (r) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act as held by a division Bench of this Court in Govindamma's case, ILR 1990 Kar. 2639 and also in The West coast Paper Mills Ltd, v Mrs. Indira Rao, RFA no. 246/1979, DD: 30-8-1990. In Govindamma's case the decision in Mangalamba v sulochanabai, ILR 1988 Karnataka p. 3374 has been overruled and the decision in Govindaraja mudaliar v University of Mysore, ILR 1987 Kar. p. 3415 has been affirmed. Therefore, the point raised in the referring order has already been answered in Govindamma's case. Accordingly, we hold that as the predecessor of the defendants was a tenant of the premises and that status of the predecessor of the defendants continued even after his death, the plaintiffs were not entitled to a decree for possession from the Civil Court as such a decree/order for eviction can only be obtained in accordance with the provisions contained in the Karnataka Rent Control Act from the Court defined in the Act. The present defendants are no other than the legal representatives of deceased Jyothinagarada Ramaiah. They have stepped into the shoes of Jyothinagarada ramaiah. Therefore, the defendants are the tenants of the suit schedule premises. Thus the relationship of the plaintiffs and defendants is that of landlord and tenant of the premises which is governed by the provisions of the Karnataka rent Control Act. Therefore, the trial Court is justified in refusing to pass a decree for possession. Point No. 3 is answered accordingly. Therefore, the defendants are the tenants of the suit schedule premises. Thus the relationship of the plaintiffs and defendants is that of landlord and tenant of the premises which is governed by the provisions of the Karnataka rent Control Act. Therefore, the trial Court is justified in refusing to pass a decree for possession. Point No. 3 is answered accordingly. ( 19 ) FOR the reasons stated above, the appealand the cross-objections are dismissed. The decree of the trial Court is affirmed. Liberty is reserved to the plaintiffs to seek possession of the suit Schedules 'a' and 'b' properties in accordance with the provisions of the Karnataka Rent control Act, and also to recover arrears of rent, if any. ( 20 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case,there will be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .