JUDGMENT : G.T. Nanavati, J. Mahendra Prasad, Joint Secretary to the Government 'of India, on being satisfied with respect to Bhupatbhai Popatlai Thadeswar (Soni). husband of the petitioner that with a view to preventing him from abetting the smuggling oi goods, it was necessary to pass an order of detention, passed an order under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act on 4-12-1989. The detenu's wife has challenged that order in this petition. 2. On prior information that the detenu and one Mohanlal Soni were to transport 75 to ICO pieces of foreign marked gold biscuits front Bombay, concealed in car No. NPP-3603 of GJG-7270 of Maruti, car No. 73238 on 3-9-1929, the Central Excise Officers of Ahmedabad, kept a watch near the house of the detenu. After waiting near his house for some time, they raided the same and while the search was going on, the detenu, Mukeshbhai and one Kanubhai arrive that place. Person of the detenu was searched, but nothing was found from him. From Mukeshbhai, 3 pieces of primary gold weighing 8.750 grams valued at Rs. 2,700/- were recovered. Further, inquiry revealed that Mukeshbhai had come from Bombay in a car bearing No MFY-3603. After-obtaining keys of that car from Mukeshbhai it was searched and from that car, 75 foreign marked biscuits were recovered. Fiat car No. GJG-7270 belonging to the detenu was searched, but nothing was found from that car. From the housed the detenu, some documents and a suitcase if longing to Mukeshbhai were found. It is further stated that the detenu's statement was recorded on 4-9-1989, wherein he admitted that he knew Mukeshbhai since about 8 years being his relative. It is further slated that during last 3 months, Mukeshbhai had come to Ahmedabad with foreign marked Lagadies and used to sell the same in Ahmedabad. The detenu is alleged to have been recovering money from the customers to whom Mukeshbhai was selling the same. For collecting the money, the detenu was paid Rs. 5/- per tola as admission charges. These are in short the allegations made against the detenu. 3. What is urged by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the detaining authority in this case has passed the detention order without proper application of mind inasmuch as even though the detenu was not at all concerned with the abetment of smuggling, he has been detained on that ground. 3. What is urged by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the detaining authority in this case has passed the detention order without proper application of mind inasmuch as even though the detenu was not at all concerned with the abetment of smuggling, he has been detained on that ground. As stated earlier, detention order has been passed by the detaining authority with a view to preventing the detenu from abetting the smuggling. If we look at the grounds, therein also it is stated that the detenu was engaged in abetting smuggling of gold. Only act which is alleged to have been committed by the detenu is that he used to recover, since about 3 months, price of the gold sold by his relative Mukeshbhai and for that purpose, he was paid commission at the rate of Rs. 5/- per tola. The grounds do not disclose as to who was concerned with the importation of the gold which Mukeshbhai used to bring from Bombay and sell in Ahmedabad. There was no material before the detaining authority to show that the detenu was a member of an organised gang which was engaged in smuggling gold. There was no material to show there was a part of the whole design of smuggling gold and disposing the same in India, Mukeshbhai had entrusted the work of collecting the money to the detenu. Even though detenu knew Mukeshbhai since about 8 years because he happens to be his relative, it was only since 3 months that he had started collecting money for Mukeshbhai. He was in no way connected with sale of the gold to any of the customers as Mukeshbhai was doing the same on his own. Under the circumstances, if is difficult to appreciate how the detenu can be said to be engaged in the activity of abetting smuggling of gold. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, in support of his submission relied upon the decision of this court in Special Criminal Application No. 622/85 decided on 29-11 -1985. Therein, after considering the facts of the case, this court observed that services of the petitioner therein were requisitioned for the purpose of transporting smuggled goods. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, in support of his submission relied upon the decision of this court in Special Criminal Application No. 622/85 decided on 29-11 -1985. Therein, after considering the facts of the case, this court observed that services of the petitioner therein were requisitioned for the purpose of transporting smuggled goods. It was further observed that there was nothing on the record to show that the detenu was in any manner concerned with the main activity of smuggling or had in any manner assisted or helped other culprits who were responsible for smuggling charas. It was then held that for those reasons, the detenu could not be said to have abetted the smuggling of Charas. Thus, though the detenu in that case was found to be engaged in transporting and concealing the smuggling goods, the order passed on the basis that he was abetting the smuggling of goods was quashed on the ground that there was non-application of mind to this vital act. 5. The ratio laid down in that decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case. In this base, the detenu was not concerned with smuggling of goods nor was instrumental by way of helping, assisting or in any manner in smuggling of gold. He was not concerned with transporting, removing or concealing the smuggled gold. The only act which is alleged against him is that he used to collect the sale proceeds of the goods directly sold by Mukeshbhai to the customers. Even if it is held that he was thus dealing the smuggled goods otherwise then by transporting or removing or concealing, it cannot be said that he was abetting and smuggling of gold. Thus, the order passed by the detaining authority in this case appeals to have been passed with application of mind. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent relying upon two decisions of the Supreme Court submitted that in view of the wide definition of the word 'smuggling', the detenu can be said to have abetted smuggling of gold. He first relied upon the following observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Narendra Purshotam Umrao & Anr. v. B. B. Gujarat & Ors. He first relied upon the following observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Narendra Purshotam Umrao & Anr. v. B. B. Gujarat & Ors. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 420: "There is, no doubt, a distinction between an act of smuggling and abetting the smuggling of goods for purposes of preventive detention under Section 3(1) of the Act Nonetheless, the term 'smuggling' as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act has the same meaning as in Section 2(39) of the Customs Act, 1962, which, when read with S.l 11 of that Act, is wide enough to include and make liable not only the actual smuggler but also persons abetting the smuggling of contraband goods as well as all persons dealing in such goods, etc. Though the provisions of Cls. (i) and (ii) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 3 of the Act may operate on different fields, which may sometimes, as here overlap, still a wider meaning is given to the term 'smuggling' in Section 2(e) of the Act, with a view to broaden the scope of preventive detention. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act provides for the different grounds of detention. Clause (i) relates to smuggling of goods. Clause (ii) relates to abetting the smuggling of goods. Clause (iii) relates to engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. Cl(v) relates to harbouring persons engaged in smuggling of goods. It must, therefore, be assumed that the intention of the legislature was to treat the smuggling of goods and abetting the smuggling of goods as grounds separate and distinct and both are separate grounds for detention, i.e. to take in all such activities which results in accomplishment of smuggling of contraband goods." These observations are required to be read in the context of the contentions raised in that case. The contention which was raised therein was that the order of detention was made with a view to preventing the appellant in that case from smuggling goods, i.e. under sub-section (1) of Section-3 of the Act. In that case it was submitted that his case on the facts revealed in the grounds for detention clearly fell under Clause (ii) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 3 as he could not by any stretch of imagination, be treated to be a smuggler but he was only an abettor. In that case it was submitted that his case on the facts revealed in the grounds for detention clearly fell under Clause (ii) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 3 as he could not by any stretch of imagination, be treated to be a smuggler but he was only an abettor. After considering the facts of that case, the Supreme Court observed that the appellant was the person who was actually engaged in the act of smuggling of the contraband stainless steel rolls into the Indian customs waters. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the appellant was the actual smuggler and not a mere abettor. It was for that reason held in that case that there was due application of mind. In fact, in that decision, it has been held that various clauses of sub-section (i) of Section 1 or the act are independent and distinct grounds of detention. If that is so, the detaining authority while passing the detention order must reach a definite satisfaction as regard the nature of act in which the detenu is alleged to be engaged. This being a matter of subjective satisfaction, the court cannot after considering the material on record say the detenu's act can be said to be covered by some other clause and therefore passing of the order was justified. If detenu has committed an act-A and the order of detention is passed for committing an act-B, then surely it with have to be held that he has exercised the power and passed the order without due application of mind. In our opinion, the decision relied upon by learned Counsellor the respondent can he of no help to him. 7. He next relied upon Sachidananda Banajtt v. Sitaram Agarwal & Ors. AIR 1955 S.C. 955. In that case, the Supreme Court had to consider the meaning of the words 'concerned' and deal' used in Section 157(81) of the Sea Customs Act, 1978. The question which had arisen is that cate was whether attempts to purchase smuggled goods amounted to dealing with the goods as contended by the said clause. The Supreme Court was not concerned with the meaning of the word 'smuggling' and therefore that decision has really no bearing on the question which has been raised in this petition. 8. The question which had arisen is that cate was whether attempts to purchase smuggled goods amounted to dealing with the goods as contended by the said clause. The Supreme Court was not concerned with the meaning of the word 'smuggling' and therefore that decision has really no bearing on the question which has been raised in this petition. 8. Considering the facts of this case, as vealed from the grounds of detention, it will have to be held that the detenu cannot be said to have been engaged in abetting the smuggling of gold. Thus, the order of detention passed on the satisfaction that the petitioner was engaged in such an activity, must be quashed. 9. In the result, this petition is allowed. The impugned order of detention is quashed and set aside. The petitioner is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith unless his presence in jail is required in connection with some other cases. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no orders to costs. Petition allowed.