H. G. BALAKRISHNA, J. ( 1 ) THE essential facts of the case briefly stated are as follows: the petitioner who is an agriculturist was the owner of 6. 38 acres of land in survey No. 54, 8. 38 acres in survey No. 60 and 1. 25 acres in survey No. 61 of melina sampally village, hosanagar taluk, shimoga district. With the introduction of sharavathi hydro electric project these lands came to be submerged the petitioner underwent a transformation in status and became a displaced agriculturist having lost all his lands. ( 2 ) THE Mysore land revenue (Amendment) rules, 1960 came to the rescue of the petitioner since the rules provide for grant of lands to the displaced holders as well as tenants, holding out statutory assurance of rehabilitation by grant of land to the displaced holders. The only limitation is that the rehabilitation will be limited to the grant of 20 acres of land as the ceiling limit. According to Rule 43 (e) (g) notwithstanding anything contained regarding grant of lands to other persons, a displaced holder is entitled to the priority even over persons who belong to scheduled caste. The statutory priority is of such a special nature that it confers priority even over the weaker sections. However, it must be stated that the petitioner himself belongs to bhovi community which is a part of scheduled caste under the Constitution (scheduled caste) Order, 1950. ( 3 ) SURVEY No. 1 of hadalagatta village, bbadravathi taluk, measures 222 acres in area and it was reserved for the purposes of grant exclusively to displaced holders by virtue of government order dated 4-12-1961. As required by the then prevailing rules of procedure, the petitioner applied to the special land acquisition officer, hosanagar, for grant of 10 acres in hadalagatta village. The petitioner was permitted to cultivate 9. 39 acres in blockno. Ii of the said land. This is the very land in respect of which records were built up by the revenue inspector on 11-1-1961 for the rehabilitation of the petitioner to the extent of 9. 39 acres. It is asserted by the petitioner that the land earmarked for the grant to the petitioner was indicated in blue colour in a sketch prepared by the revenue inspector and it was also shown to the petitioner. 39 acres. It is asserted by the petitioner that the land earmarked for the grant to the petitioner was indicated in blue colour in a sketch prepared by the revenue inspector and it was also shown to the petitioner. Proposal of the revenue inspector was accepted by the tahsildar, hosanagar and it ultimately reached the special officer for rehabilitation, shimoga, for final approval. The grievance of the petitioner is notwithstanding the recommendation made by the special officer restricted the grant only to the extent of 5. 39 acres at an upset prices and a saguvali chit was issued to the petitioner on 7-10-1965, under order of the special tahsildar dated 16-11-1961. When the petitioner came to know that instead of 9. 39 acres only 5. 39 acres were granted to him, he claimed the balance extent of land. At this juncture the revenue authorities were initiated action for eviction of persons who had occupied lands in excess of what had been granted to them. However, the government issued orders through the revenue secretary that if expropriated ryots had occupied lands in accordance with the directions given by the special land acquisition officer, their possession should not be disturbed. When an eviction notice was served on the petitioner the petitioner promptly gave a reply. The record of rights indicate that the petitioner continues to be in possession of 4 acres of land besides 5. 39 acres granted to him. ( 4 ) THE case of the petitioner is that the grant of land to the displaced holders is governed by the Provisions of the Mysore land revenue (Amendment) rules, 1960 and that the petitioner has a right to be granted 4 acres of land besides 5. 39 acres already granted to him. It is contended, having due regard to the purpose and object of the rules, though grant of land is discretionary the authorities are bound to grant the lands if the conditions stipulated for such a grant are satisfied, and it is further contended that when the authority is invested with the powers to make orders granting relief to displaced holders of land though the exercised of power is discretionary nevertheless the power is intended to be exercised to adequately rehabilitate displaced holders among others. It is further contended that the authorities have continued to levy t. t. fine and are recovering fine from the occupants duly recognising their occupation. It is further contended that the authorities have continued to levy t. t. fine and are recovering fine from the occupants duly recognising their occupation. Hence it is submitted that the petitioner cannot be classified as an unauthorised occupant. The petitioner strongly relies upon the application made by him in the year 1967 under Annexure-E claiming relief to the extent of 10 acres of nala wet land as a result of expropriation caused by submersion of his land due to the introduction of sharavathi hydro electric project it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the circumstances of the case a mandamus ought to be issued to the respondents to consider the application of the petitioner for grant of 4 acres of land in survey No. 1 of hadalagatta village, bhadravathi taluk, shimoga district, in accordance with the Mysore land revenue (Amendment) rules, 1960. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also sought for quashing the eviction notice dated 28-8-1982 under Annexure-F issued by the tahsildar, bhadravathi taluk. ( 5 ) THE learned government pleader raised the preliminary objection, the objection being that the petitioner cannot have recourse to a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution since remedy by way of statutory appeal is provided under the act. In short the submission made by the learned government pleader is that existence of alternative remedy bars writ jurisdiction. ( 6 ) AS regards the facts narrated by the petitioner, they are not disputed. Hence the point for consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled to a favourable consideration of his application for grant of 4 acres of land, under the Mysore land revenue (Amendment) rules, 1960 in survey No. 1 of hadalaghatta village, bhadravathi taluk, shimoga district as an expropriated holder of land? ( 7 ) EXPROPRIATION is an act of the state brought about by the implementation of a power project called sharavathi hydro electric project to subserve common good and to promote public interest. It is no doubt true that in giving effect to such projects which bring about public good, the interests of the individuals have to be subordinated to the general good of the community. It is no doubt true that in giving effect to such projects which bring about public good, the interests of the individuals have to be subordinated to the general good of the community. At the same time in a welfare state in which the underlying philosophy seeks to introduce an egalitarian order assuring socio-economic Justice commending the implementation of the directive principles of state policy, the interests of the ordinary citizen such as the petitioner cannot be disregarded. The petitioner has a right to live with human dignity and enjoy his property and engage in the pursuit of happiness unless his property is to be taken away by a process which is legally recognised. In the instant case, though there is statutory power to introduce a hydro electric project the consequence of which would be the submersion of huge areas of land belonging to a number of citizens in the rural area, action has been taken by the legislature in providing for necessary relief especially for the rehabilitation of the expropriated ryots. These Provisions have been found in the Mysore land revenue (Amendment) rules, 1960 which cater to the needs of the displaced holders by grant of land impliedly commensurate with the extent to which such persons have been expropriated. This is a Rule of fairness as well as a Rule intended to subserve socio-economic Justice to the displaced holders. ( 8 ) A special officer for the purpose of rehabilitation of such expropriated ryots has come into the scene to dispense Justice to such displaced persons. He is the special officer for rehabilitation, shimoga. When a claim is registered by the petitioner for grant of 9. 39 acres of land which he had occupied with the permission of the special land acquisition officer and had been cultivating the same in block No. Ii of survey No. 1 after the revenue inspector for rehabilitation had built up the records, and when the proposal for grant of 9. 39 acres for petitioner was accepted by the tahsildar, hosanagar, and ultimately the recommendation was forwarded to special officer, shimoga, for his final approval, the reasonable expectation was an order granting the entire extent of 9. 39 acres but what was actually granted being 5. 39 acres under a saguvali chit dated 7-10-1965. 39 acres for petitioner was accepted by the tahsildar, hosanagar, and ultimately the recommendation was forwarded to special officer, shimoga, for his final approval, the reasonable expectation was an order granting the entire extent of 9. 39 acres but what was actually granted being 5. 39 acres under a saguvali chit dated 7-10-1965. There is no justification or rhyme or reason for such an ill-considered order in the context of the circumstances driving the petitioner to make an application more so in the back-drop of the rules specially intended for rehabilitation of displayed holders under the Provisions of the Mysore land revenue (Amendment) rules, 1960. What ought to have been a matter of course has become the bone of contention driving the petitioner to an agitational approach through litigation. Discretion no doubt is vested in the special officer for rehabilitation but the discretion is meant to be exercised failry and reasonably. Exercise by quasi-judicial authority of discretion is to be guided by consideration of equity and good conscience. It does not contemplate a mechanical exercise of power. The context in which power came to be vested in the special officer for rehabilitation and the context in which the benefit of exercise of power is meant to be made available to the displaced person are considerations which should guide the Justice delivery process. I am afraid that in the instant case the power which is vested in the special officer for rehabilitation has not been properly used. The spirit of rehabilitation has been ignored. The order of the special tahsildar does not satisfy the requirements of law. The petitioner is entitled to be adequately rehabilitated. The state government is under a legal obligation to honour its commitment to the displaced holder and in no less measures is the special officer for rehabilitation. ( 9 ) VIOLATION of principles of natural justice, failure to exercise jurisdiction vestedin it, im-proper exercise of jurisdiction, error of law apparent on the face of the record, jurisdictional error of substantial nature are grounds recognised for the purpose of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution even if despite the existence of an alternative remedy under the statute. ( 9 ) VIOLATION of principles of natural justice, failure to exercise jurisdiction vestedin it, im-proper exercise of jurisdiction, error of law apparent on the face of the record, jurisdictional error of substantial nature are grounds recognised for the purpose of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution even if despite the existence of an alternative remedy under the statute. I do not agree with the contention of the learned government pleader that the doors of the court should be shut to the petitioner for the simple reason that there is an appeal provision under the statute against the impugned orders. ( 10 ) THE learned government pleader, as the last contention, urged that grant of land to a displaced person under Rule 43-d (2) is only discretionary and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to the grant of land upto the ceiling limit prescribed under the rules. ( 11 ) IN this regard, my attention was drawn to a decision of this court rendered in Vijaya v Government of mysore, 1974 (1) kar. L. j. 88. In the said decision, while specifically referring to Rule 43-d (2) of the Mysore land revenue (Amendment) rules, 1960, the learned judge observed as follows:"the first part of this Rule clearly enables the authority to grant the land, and sets a limit as to the extent to be so granted. In other words, a ceiling has been fixed as to the extent to be granted. The words 'shall not exceed' occurring therein would not mean that the grantee shall be entitled to an extent equivalent to the land lost under acquisition in all circumstances. Indeed, as the Rule is worded, I am inclined to think that certain amount of discretion is vested in the authority competent to grant land, upto a maximum of the total extent of land lost by a grantee by any acquisition. Putting it in another way, it vests a discretion in the authority to grant the maximum extent of something less than that. Looked at from any point of view, the Rule does not make it mandatory on the part of the authority to grant the same extent of land or vest any right in a grantee to claim such land as of right. Looked at from any point of view, the Rule does not make it mandatory on the part of the authority to grant the same extent of land or vest any right in a grantee to claim such land as of right. " ( 12 ) INSOFAR as the observation that certain amount of discretion is vested in the authority competent to grant land upto a maximum of the total extent of land lost by a grantee by any acquisition is concerned, I am in respectful agreement. However, the point which arises for consideration is whether the discretion so vested in the authority which may be described as statutory discretion has been exercised reasonably and fairly in the circumstances of the case and whether there are reasons assigned for declining to grant the balance of 4 acres of land to the petitioner who is undoubtedly a displaced person who has lost 18 acres of land on account of submersion. Discretion, in my opinion, being statutory in nature is not unfettered and ought to be exercised in accordance with the rules of fairness and equity. Otherwise, the discretion cannot be said to have been properly exercised. It may be even possible to say that improper exercise of discretion or unguided exercise amounts to abuse of discretion. That would amount to arbitrariness which is not in keeping with the concept of Rule of law. In the instant case, there is absolutely no material to hold that refusal to grant the balance extent of land to the petitioner is based on good reasons or valid reasons or guided by valid considerations. Hence, though the discretion is vested in the competent authority, there is no reason to hold that it has been properly and validly exercised. Even though the petitioner may not have a right to grant of a maximum extent of land permissible under the ceiling limit, there is no unregulated discretion vested in the competent authority to exercise power arbitrarily. I, therefore, hold that the decision relied upon by the learned government pleader is of no assistance to the respondents. ( 13 ) A principle which is apposite in the context of this case is the principle of reasonableness. In rooke's case rendered in 1598, coke said ". . . . . I, therefore, hold that the decision relied upon by the learned government pleader is of no assistance to the respondents. ( 13 ) A principle which is apposite in the context of this case is the principle of reasonableness. In rooke's case rendered in 1598, coke said ". . . . . and notwithstanding the words of the commission given authority to the commissioners to do according to their discretions, yet their proceedings ought to be limited and bound with the Rule of reason and law. For discretion is an essence or understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between wrong and right, between shadows and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and pretences and not to do according to their wills and private affections; for as one saith 'talis discretio discretionem confundit' ", (1598)5 co. Rep. 99b. In Williams v Siddy, (1911) AC 381, lord macnaghten said "nobody of course, can dispute that the government or the board had a discretion in the matter. But it was not an arbitrary discretion, as pring, j. Seems to think. It was a discretion to be exercised reasonably, fairly and justly". In Roberts v Hobwood, (1925) AC 578 (613), lord wrenbury laid down the law;"a person in whom is vested a discretion must exercise his discretion upon reasonable grounds. A discretion does not empower a man to do what he likes merely because he is minded to do so he must in the exercise of his discretion do, not what he likes but what he ought. In other words, he must, by the use of his reason, ascertain and follow the course which reason directs. He must act reasonably". ( 14 ) FOR the reasons stated above, I allow this writ petition and quash the impugned eviction notice under anncxurc-f. I direct the respondents to consider without further loss of time the application of the petitioner for grant of 4 acres of land in survey No. 1 of hadalaghatta village, bhadravathi taluk, shimoga district and dispose of the same on merits and in accordance with law within a time-limit of 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. A copy of this order shall be communicated to the respondents forthwith. --- *** --- .