Judgment : These petitions have been filed, for transfer of the enquiry under Sec.340, Criminal Procedure Code, pending on the file of the J.M.H.L., Poonamallee, to any other competent Court at Madras and for further direction that the enquiry ordered by the said Magistrate in Crime No.29 of 1988, should be conducted by the C.B., C.I.D., Madras instead of the Poonamallee Police Station. 2. A few facts are necessary for the disposal of these two petitions. The petitioner is the first informant in Crime No.29 of 1988 registered at the Korattur Police Station. The crime was investigated by the second respondent, viz., the Inspector of Police, Crimes, Ambattur Industrial Estate Police Station. The F.I.R. related to an offence under Sec.420, Indian Indian Indian Penal Code alleged to have been committed by the first respondent. The first respondent filed Crl.M.P.No.452 of 1988 on the file of this Court for anticipatory bail and by an order dated 28.1.1988, this Court directed the release of the first respondent on bail in the event of arrest, on his executing a bond for Rs.3,000 with two sureties each for a like sum to the satisfaction of the S.D.J.M. (now J.M.I), Poonamallee. It is the case of the petitioner that the first respondent produced fictitious sureties before the Magistrate which necessitated his filing an application under Sec.340, Criminal Procedure Code for taking action against the first respondent and the other persons involved in the production of sureties, who were fictitious. The case of the petitioner is that the certificates of the Village Officers have been forged and fictitious persons were produced before the Magistrate as sureties on behalf of the first respondent. 3. The said application under Sec.340, Cr.P.C., was filed on 23.2.1988. The Magistrate directed the Inspector of Police, P6onamallee, to enquire and submit a report. A report was submitted on 20.3.1988, stating that the sureties were fictitious and the solvency certificate produced by the first respondent was a forged one. It was also brought to the notice of the Magistrate, by the petitioner, that the same rubber stamp which had been used in the solvency certificate produced by the first respondent, had been used in similar such certificates produced before the same Court, in several other cases. It was also brought to the notice of the Magistrate, by the petitioner, that the same rubber stamp which had been used in the solvency certificate produced by the first respondent, had been used in similar such certificates produced before the same Court, in several other cases. The petitioner had on an earlier occasion filed Crl.M.P.No.6901 of 1988 before this Court for transfer of the enquiry from the file of the Judicial Magistrate I, Poonamallee to any other competent Court at Madras. This Court by an order dated 8.2.1989, directed the lower Court to instruct the Inspector of Police, Poonamallee, to conduct the enquiry expeditiously since the matter was pending for several months, and submit a report to the Magistrate within one month, to facilitate further action being taken by the Magistrate. The grievance of the petitioner is that no action had been taken, though several months have elapsed and that would be sufficient ground, for transferring the enquiry from the file of the Judicial Magistrate I, Poonamallee, to any other competent Court. As far as the enquiry by the C.B., C.I.D., is concerned, it is the case of the petitioner that the advocates concerned in the production of sureties were practising before the Courts in Chengalpattu District, including the Judicial Magistrate I, Poonamallee, and therefore, he would not get justice. 4. In the counter filed by the first respondent, it is stated that the complaint of the petitioner, had been referred by the second respondent, as being purely a civil dispute. The first respondent had denied that sureties produced by him were fictitious. A specific ground has been taken in the counter, that the petition for transfer was not maintainable and that there could be no investigation by the police in a matter under Sec.340, Cr.P.C. Only the Court before which the alleged offence is said to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding before it, can conduct an enquiry and no other Court can do so. As an alternative prayer, it is averred in the counter, that since some advocates are stated to be connected with the matter, they may have to be made as parties, before a decision could be taken in these petitions. 4. I have heard Mr.Clavin Jacob, appearing for the petitioner and Mr.T.Sudanthiram, appearing for the first respondent. 6. As an alternative prayer, it is averred in the counter, that since some advocates are stated to be connected with the matter, they may have to be made as parties, before a decision could be taken in these petitions. 4. I have heard Mr.Clavin Jacob, appearing for the petitioner and Mr.T.Sudanthiram, appearing for the first respondent. 6. Sec.340, Cr.P.C., is extracted hereunder: “Procedure in cases mentioned in Sec.195.- When upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in Clause (b) of Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court, may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any as it thinks necessary,- (a) record a finding to that effect; (b) make a complaint thereof in writing; (c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction; (d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate, and (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate. (2) The power conferred on a Court by Sub-sec.(1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made complaint under Sub-sec.(1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of Sub-sec.(4) of Sec.195. (3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed. (a) where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, by such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint; (b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court. (4) In this section, ‘Court’ has the same meaning as in Sec.195. The words ‘in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court’, show that the Court which can take action under this section can only be the Court before which, or in relation to whose proceedings, the offence had been committed. (4) In this section, ‘Court’ has the same meaning as in Sec.195. The words ‘in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court’, show that the Court which can take action under this section can only be the Court before which, or in relation to whose proceedings, the offence had been committed. It will not be necessary that the complaint should be made by the same Judge before whom the offence was committed but it will be sufficient if it was made by. the same Court.” 5. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the relevant provisions in the 1898 Code of Criminal Procedure, which correspond to Secs.340 and 341, Cr.P.C., of the 1974 Code, in Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab 1956 S.C.J. 387;1956 S.C.R. 125;1956 S.C.C. 455;A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 391 wherein the following observations were made: “The plaintiff made an application in the Court of A, the successor of B who had tried the plaintiffs suit as a Subordinate Judge first class, asking that a complaint be filed against the appellant under Secs.193 and 471, Indian Indian Penal Code. But before it could be heard A was transferred and it seems that no Subordinate Judge of the first class was appointed in his place; instead G a Subordinate Judge of the fourth class, was sent to this area and he seems to have been asked to decide the matter. But as he was only a Subordinate Judge of the fourth class he made a report to the District Judge that he had no jurisdiction because the offences had been committed in the Court of a Subordinate Judge of the first class. The District Judge thereupon transferred the matter to the Senior Subordinate Judge P, who made the complaint. The appellant filed an appeal against Ps order to the District Judge. But it was sent for disposal to the Additional District Judge, K who held that the Senior Subordinate Judge P had no jurisdiction to make the complaint because he was not Bs successor. He also held, on the merits that there was no prima faciecase. The matter went to trie High Court in revision and the High Court Judge who heard the matter held that the Senior Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction and the material disclosed a prima faciecase. He also held, on the merits that there was no prima faciecase. The matter went to trie High Court in revision and the High Court Judge who heard the matter held that the Senior Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction and the material disclosed a prima faciecase. Accordingly, he set aside the Additional District Judges order and restored the order of the Senior Subordinate Judge making the complaint. On appeal by special leave to Supreme Court. Held,that (i) the Senior Subordinate Judge P who made the complaint had no jurisdiction to make it, either as the original Court which tried the suit, or as the appellate authority under Sec.476-B, Criminal Procedure Code. It was not enough that he also had first class powers because he was not the same Court. (ii) Since the original Court B made no complaint under Sec.476-A was attracted and the only Court which could have made the complaint was the Court of the District Judge to which Bs Court was subordinate within the meaning of Sec.195. (iii) When the matter was reported by G to the District Judge who had authority under Sec.476-A to deal with it he sent it to P who had no jurisdiction. Therefore, the order of the District Judge sending the case to P was ineffective and the subsequent order of P making the complaint was also without jurisdiction. (iv) Similarly, when the matter came back again in appeal from Ps order to the District Judge the latter could have passed an appropriate order either under Sec.476-A or by sending it to the original Court but instead he sent it to the Additional District Judge K who had no jurisdiction to act either under Secs.476-A or 476-B. Therefore Ks order was also without jurisdiction. (v) Since K had assumed jurisdiction which he did not possess and passed the order rejecting the application for making the complaint, the High Court had jurisdiction either under Sec.439, Cr.P.C., or under Sec.115, C.P.C., to set aside that order. Therefore, in so far as the High Court set aside the order of K it was right. But where it went wrong was in upholding the complaint made by the Senior Subordinate Judge P who had no jurisdiction to make the complaint. Therefore, in so far as the High Court set aside the order of K it was right. But where it went wrong was in upholding the complaint made by the Senior Subordinate Judge P who had no jurisdiction to make the complaint. (vi) Sec.195 contains an express prohibition against taking cognizance of such complaint unless the bar is lifted either by the original Court or the Court to which it is subordinate within the meaning of Sec.195(3). Those are the only Courts invested with jurisdiction to lift the ban and make the complaint. As the High Court was neither the original Court nor the Court to which the Original Court was subordinate, according to the special definition in Sec.195(3), it had no jurisdiction to mate the complaint of its own authority. Therefore, all that the High Court could, and should, have done was to send the case to the District Judge for disposal according to law. Under the circumstances the Supreme Court is bound to interfere in the exercise of its extraordinary powers of appeal under Sec.136 and set right now what the High Court should have done.” It is clear from the law laid down by the apex Court that the Courts which have jurisdiction to lay a complaint would be the Court, before which the offence was committed, in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or by a Court to which such former Court was subordinate within the meaning of Sec.195(4), Cr.P.C. 6. In Rameshar Lal v. Rajdhari Lal Rameshar Lal v. Rajdhari Lal A.I.R. 1927 All. 469 the Allahabad High Court held that Sec.476, Cr.P.C., (of the old Code), corresponding to Sec340 of the present Code must be construed as self-contained and exhaustive, in respect of the matter of a Court making complaint, against litigants on the ground of perjury or forgery. It further held, “The Legislature did not intend the power of making a complaint conferred by this section to be exercised by anyone but the Court before whom the offence has been committed or a Court to which appeals from the Court ordinarily lie. It further held, “The Legislature did not intend the power of making a complaint conferred by this section to be exercised by anyone but the Court before whom the offence has been committed or a Court to which appeals from the Court ordinarily lie. The section contemplates that ordinarily the Court to prefer the complaint shall be the original Court which heard the case and that an appellate Court should only make a complaint when the suit has been before it on appeal or when the original Court has granted or refused a complaint and its order is appealed from to the appellate Court”. 7. In Jethmand v. Emperor Jethmand v. Emperor A.I.R. 1939 Sind. 181 it was held that Sec.476 of the old Code referred not to the Magistrate but to the Court and contemplated the Court itself and not the personality of the trying Magistrate. Therefore, by reason of the words of the section, the request for a transfer of a case to the file of the trying Magistrate before whom alleged offence had been committed which would otherwise be reasonable, could not be granted on the ground that he would be the best Magistrate to decide whether the complaint should be made or not. That Court had occasion to consider the provisions of Sec.526 of the old Code relating to transfer, though not in very great detail. 8. The Nagpur High Court in Budhabai v. Alibhai Budhabai v. Alibhai A.I.R. 1925 Nag. 358 while dealing with Secs.195(3), 476-A, 476-B and 526 of the old Code held that Sec.526 of the old Code, which clothed the High Court with the power to transfer any case from any Court to any other Court, controlled Secs.195(3), 476-A and 476-B of the Code, as well. 9. The Bombay High Court had occasion to consider similar provisions of the old Code in Shaikh Bannu v. State of Maharashtra Shaikh Bannu v. State of Maharashtra 1974 Crl.L.J. 162. It was held that Sec.476 read with 195 of the old Code made it clear that the offences which appear to have been committed must be in relation to the proceeding in Court and that it was that Court or any superior authority or the successor and no other that could forward a complaint. It was held that Sec.476 read with 195 of the old Code made it clear that the offences which appear to have been committed must be in relation to the proceeding in Court and that it was that Court or any superior authority or the successor and no other that could forward a complaint. When the offence had been committed in or in relation to the proceeding in the Court in which the challan was initially filed and subsequently the proceedings before its completion had been transferred to any other Magistrate, that transferee Court would become a successor to that Court and the offence which had been committed, while the proceeding was pending before the first Court could also be said to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in the transferee Court, since the same proceeding was continuing in the latter Court also. But if the proceedings before the original Court and the transferee Court were distinct and separate, then the transferee court cannot be successor Court and could not forward a complaint. Proceedings under Sec.169, Cr.P.C., on production of the arrested person for remand to police custody and proceedings under Sec.173 of the Code for trial are distinct and separate. They are separate even if the Magistrate before whom the arrested person is produced for remand happens to be the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case and the police report is subsequently forwarded. In that case the accused was produced before the Magistrate who remanded him to police custody and subsequently released him on bail. On police report under Sec.173, Cr.P.C., the case came to be transferred to the Magistrate K, who found that in the bail proceedings before D, various offences in executing the bail bonds had been committed by the accused and his surety. K therefore forwarded a complaint under Sec.476. On challenging the jurisdiction of K it was held that K was not the successor of D in respect of proceedings under Sec.167 before D, nor were those proceedings transferred to K. Therefore, K had no jurisdiction to make a complaint of offences committed in the proceedings before D who had released the accused on bail prior to the initiation of the trial. Hence, no cognizance under Sec.195 could be taken on Ks complaint. 10. Hence, no cognizance under Sec.195 could be taken on Ks complaint. 10. Recently, the Allahabad High Court had considered the scope of Secs.340 and 406 to 411, Cr.P.C., and the Courts competent to deal with the same, in Gauri Sharker v. Orn Prakash Gauri Sharker v. Orn Prakash 1984 All. L.J. 148 wherein Wahajuddin, J., observed that a case under Sec.340, Cr.P.C., can be dealt with by the very Court which can file the complaint or by its superior Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decree or sentence, etc:, of that Court, and as such, the case under Sec.340 cannot be transferred to any other Court. The learned Judge had referred to the rulings of the Allahabad High Court in Rameshar Lal v. Rajdhari Lal Rameshar Lal v. Rajdhari Lal A.I.R. 1927 All. 469 the Nagpur High Court in Budhabai v. Alibhai Budhabai v. Alibhai A.I.R. 1925 Nag. 358 and the Supreme Court in Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab 1956 S.C.J. 387 While dealing with the argument that Sec.411, Cr.P.C., providing for transfer of cases, would override Sec.340, Cr.P.C., and even cases covered under Sec.340, Cr.P.C., can be transferred to any other Magistrate, by the proper authority empowered to transfer cases, it was held that though it was no doubt apparent that powers were wide, obviously those powers were limited to transfer of cases to a Court having competent jurisdiction. The crux of the matter would always be whether cases under Sec.340, Cr.P.C., in which the complaint had to be filed before such Magistrate, can be transferred or whether Sec.340, Cr.P.C., which was a self-contained section in itself, should alone govern the procedure laid down. As the learned Judge had put it, the framers of those provisions have made their intention abundantly clear and had expressly laid down that it is the very Court which can file the complaint or its superior Court which can do so. The view of the Allahabad High Court was that the case could not be transferred to any other Magistrate and if any other view were to be taken, the very emphasis contained in Sec.340, Cr.P.C., would stand defeated. The view of the Allahabad High Court was that the case could not be transferred to any other Magistrate and if any other view were to be taken, the very emphasis contained in Sec.340, Cr.P.C., would stand defeated. I am in respectful agreement with the view of Wahajuddin, J., which is based on the observations of the Supreme Court in Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab 1956 S.C.J. 387 and the Allahabad High Court in Rameshar Lal v. Rajdhari Lal Rameshar Lal v. Rajdhari Lal A.I.R. 1927 All. 469 I am satisifed that the proceedings now pending on the file of the Judicial Magistrate I, Poonamallee, could not be transferred as prayed for by the petitioner. Further, no ground has been made out for transferring the case from the file of the said Court. It may be that in extraordinary cases, it may be possible to move for transfer of the case to any superior Court where appeals would normally lie in such situations, and then the matter could be considered in accordance with law. Such contingency does not arise in this case. I further agree that the enquiry contemplated under Sec.340, Cr.P.C., would have to be done by the concerned Court and hence the plea that the investigation may have to be transferred to any other agency does not arise. The Magistrate of course would be competent to get a report before forming his opinion in the preliminary inquiry about laying a complaint or otherwise on the basis of expediency in the interests of justice. Both these petitions which have no merit have to be dismissed and they are accordingly dismissed. 11. However, since the enquiry is pending before the Judicial Magistrate I, Poonamallee, for quite a length of time, the said Magistrate is directed to dispose of the enquiry within eight weeks from today.