N. Y. HANUMANTHAPPA, J. ( 1 ) SINCE questions of law involved in these petitions are similar all these writ petitions are clubbed and a common order is passed. The points that are to be considered in these writ petitions are:1. Whether the services of the employees can be dismissed by giving 3 months notice in view of availability of such a Rule in the rules that govern the service conditions of the employees? ( 2 ) IN spite of enquiry resulted in dismissal, whether this court can direct the parties aggrieved to work-out the remedy before some other forum, say in case of industrial worker in industrial tribunal by seeking remedy under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act or can this court interfere under Article 226 of Constitution of India?2. The facts which are not in dispute are: a) petitioners 1 and 2 were workers of respondent-company which is an undertaking of government of kamataka and an authority under Article 12 of Constitution of India. B) the rules known as Karnataka food and civil supplies corporation Ltd. , Service rules framed and came into existence with effect from 1-12-1980. Whereas these petitioners became the employees of the corporation earlier to coming into force of these rules. ( 3 ) THE management alleged that the petitioners committed certain acts which were in the nature of misconduct deserving serious enquiry including their removal or dismissal from service. As per the service regulations services of an employee be dismissed by exercising powers conferred under Rule 15 (b) of the rules which reads as under: " (b) the service of any employee appointed under these rules may be terminated by the appointing authority on giving him (i) 3 months notice or pay in lieu thereof in the case of an employee or the rank of assistant manager and above. (ii) 30 days notice or pay in lieu thereof in the case of an employee below the rank of the assistant manager. " Services of both petitioners were terminated at Annexure-F and a resolution to this effect came to be passed as per Annexure-G by respondent to terminate the services of both petitioners. (ii) 30 days notice or pay in lieu thereof in the case of an employee below the rank of the assistant manager. " Services of both petitioners were terminated at Annexure-F and a resolution to this effect came to be passed as per Annexure-G by respondent to terminate the services of both petitioners. Relevant portion of the resolution is hereunder: 'taking into consideration, the larger interest of the corporation, maintenance of discipline and morale in the organisation, the board resolved to terminate with immediate effect the services of Sri A. N. Vishwanath, district manager, K. F. C. S. C. Ltd. , Mysore, Sri Shivakumara Swamy, office manager, K. F. C. S. C. , Ltd. , Mysore and Sri D. Jayadevaraj URS, quality inspector, Mysore district office. It was also resolved that each of these individuals be paid three months' salary at the time of termination. The board directed the general manager, KFCSC Limited to furnish a confidential performance report of all the officers of the corporation on the basis on which the board could take appropriate action. " This was followed by notice of termination issued as per Annexure-E. "karnataka food and civil supplies corporation Ltd. E-block, combined board administrative building complex, district office compound, Bangalore - 560 069 No. Kfcsc/1981-82/4357 may 19,1982. Sub: estt-termination of the services of Sri D. Jayadevaraj URS, quality inspector, Mysore as the Kamataka food and Civil supplies corporation Ltd. , No longer required his services. Proceedings of the managing director, Karnataka food and civil supplies corporation limited (a government of Karnataka undertaking, Bangalore) as the Karnataka food and civil supplies corporation limited, no longer require your services, I hereby terminate your services with effect from the afternoon of 19-5-1982. 2. Enclosed (1) is a cheque bearing No. 202350, dated 19-6-1982 for Rs. 2,435. 55 being your salary for three months which may be acknowledged. . 3. You are directed to hand-over complete charge of your office to Shri t. a. rsmachandra, graduate assistant, mysore, immediately. (sd) (s. Swatantra rao) managing director. 2. Enclosed (1) is a cheque bearing No. 202350, dated 19-6-1982 for Rs. 2,435. 55 being your salary for three months which may be acknowledged. . 3. You are directed to hand-over complete charge of your office to Shri t. a. rsmachandra, graduate assistant, mysore, immediately. (sd) (s. Swatantra rao) managing director. " Immediately after service of this order of termination both the petitioners approached this court seeking for the following reliefs: "reliefs in W. P. No. 27675/1982 (a) for the foregoing reasons, the petitioner respectfully prays that this Hon'ble court be pleased to: (1) declare and quash Annexure-E dated 19-5-1982 as illegal and arbitrary; (2) issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service as a quality inspector, granting to him, all the consequential benefits including monetary benefits, and the cost of the proceedings, in the interest of Justice and equity; (3) declare Rule 15 (a) of Karnataka food and civil supplies corporation Ltd. (service) rules, vide Annexure-C as arbitrary and illegal. " "reliefs in W. P. No. 2482/1983 (b) therefore, the petitioner respectfully prays that this Hon'ble courtbe pleased to: (i) issue a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ or direction, quashing the order of termination dated 21-3-1983 i. e. , Annexure-D ; (ii) declare that Rule 15 (b) of the services rules of the respondent-corporation is void and strike it down as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India; (iii) grant such other relief or reliefs as the Hon'ble court deems just and expedient in the circumstances of the case including the award of exemplary costs to the petitioner. " The grounds of attack to the orders of termination by both the petitioners are almost identical in nature. According to them: (1) order of termination at Annexure-F including the resolution passed at Annexure-E are emanated from the resolution passed at Annexure-G are quite arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of fee Constitution of India. (2) the authority cannot punish a person without holding an enquiry and giving an opportunity of hearing. According to them: (1) order of termination at Annexure-F including the resolution passed at Annexure-E are emanated from the resolution passed at Annexure-G are quite arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of fee Constitution of India. (2) the authority cannot punish a person without holding an enquiry and giving an opportunity of hearing. (3) the Rule which empowers the management to terminate services of these two petitioners by giving 3 months' notice is Rule 15-b which Rule according to petitioners is not only unconstitutional but it is a clear case of "hire and fire policy" which approach this court time and again has held as illegal and unconstitutional and penal in nature. For the above reasons both the counsel for the petitioners in both the writ petitions viz. , Ms. Vijayalaxmi in first petition and Dr. M. s. kagaraja Rao in second petition submitted that Rule 15 (b) be declared as unconstitutional. Further, order of termination in Annexure-E be quashed and the petitioners shall be reinstated and be given to them all consequential benefits. Regarding alternative remedy both the counsel submitted that great hardship would be caused to petitioners if they are asked to try their luck before industrial tribunal by seeking a reference under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act. According to them that it is not proper to drive them to go before industrial tribunal when on the face of it, it is clear that the order of termination is resultant of non-compliance of principle of natural Justice coupled wife arbitrariness. In support of their case they relied upon certain decisions of this court and Supreme Court which will be referred to a little later. ( 4 ) AS against these contentions Sri K. S. Desai, learned counsel for respondent submitted that none of the contentions raised by fee petitioners have any merit. (i) to him Rule 15 (b) is quite valid. It is not for fee employees to say that rules which govern the service conditions of employees shall be hi fee manner which they desire. It is for fee management to frame its own rules. When once employees accepted such service conditions, it is not open for them subsequently to say such rules are either arbitrary, illegal, against public policy, void or unconstitutional. It is for fee management to frame its own rules. When once employees accepted such service conditions, it is not open for them subsequently to say such rules are either arbitrary, illegal, against public policy, void or unconstitutional. In the instant case according to Sri Desai when order of termination made, Rule 15 (b) was in vogue and even now it is in vogue. Such a Rule had to be framed by fee corporation in order to maintain the discipline among its employees and management, and also to avoid unnecessary hardship to both the employees and management. (ii) the order of termination at Annexure-E based on the resolution passed at Annexure-G is a just one in view of the serious allegations made against fee petitioners. According to him the principle of audi altrem partem is not a universal rule. Under given circumstances the management would be the best judge to decide whether adherence to such principle is a must or Rule 15 (b) or similar Rule be applied and thus get rid of an unwanted employee who by his own conduct attempted to bring bad name to the institution and also to some extent became responsible to spread indiscipline among the employees. (iii) under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act, according to him any dispute between management and the employees is governed by the Provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. If petitioners aggrieved by order of termination at Annexure-F they are at liberty to approach the industrial tribunal under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act instead of approaching this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a request to quash the order under challenge. According to him (hat in each and every case if this court attempts to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of Indiamhen there will be no meaning to so-called alternative remedy and its existence becomes redundant. (iv) according to him in this case question of misconduct and its denial are questions of fact which could be dealt with only by adducing evidence. Such things can only be done in industrial tribunal. (iv) according to him in this case question of misconduct and its denial are questions of fact which could be dealt with only by adducing evidence. Such things can only be done in industrial tribunal. The same cannot be instigated by this court in these writ petitions, (v) scope under Article 226 of the Constitution of India here is not to investigate about the correctness or otherwise or disputed facts but this court is only to (i) interfere if it is shown that action of an authority is one without jurisdiction, (ii) constitutional or legal right is infringed, (iii) order is against the principles of natural justice. His further contention is that the grievances made out by the petitioners do not fall in one of the ingredients mentioned above. For these reasons he submits that writ petitions be dismissed or in the alternative, petitioners be directed to approach industrial tribunal to work-out their remedy. In support of his contentions he also relied upon following decisions: the first one is case of hariba v k. s. r. t. c. , 1983 (1) KAR. L. J. 261. "as far as the submissions made by the learned counsel for the corporation that the petitioner is a workman and the corporation is an industry, and therefore he could raise an industrial dispute, is concerned, there is not and cannot be any controversy. Further, as regards the wide powers of, and the procedure required to be followed by the industrial court is concerned, also there can be no doubt that even if there has been any procedural defect in the disciplinary inquiry held by the corporation, in that, there has been violation of the rules of procedure or principles of natural Justice in the holding of the disciplinary inquiry against a workman, the corporation has the right to prove the charge before the industrial court and can sustain the order of dismissal. This position is well settled by the various decisions of the Supreme Court, on which the learned counsel for the corporation relied, quoted earlier. This position is well settled by the various decisions of the Supreme Court, on which the learned counsel for the corporation relied, quoted earlier. The substance of the ratio of all the decisions of the Supreme Court as to the procedure required to be followed by the industrial court may be summarised as follows: (1) the industrial court should, whenever there is an objection that the disciplinary inquiry held, was in violation of the prescribed rules of procedure or rules of natural justice, decide the validity of the inquiry as a preliminary issue. (2) even if the inquiry held is found to be invalid the tribunal cannot set aside the order of dismissal straightaway, if the management offers to prove the charge, in which event, the industrial court is bound to record evidence of both the parties and give its findings; (3) if the finding is that the charge levelled against the workman is proved the order of dismissal or removal, as the case may be, has to be upheld. If the finding js that the charge is not proved, the penalty has to be set aside. (4) even if the finding is that the charge is proved, the trial can substitute the order of dismissal or removal by a lesser penalty. (see 11-a of the act) in a petition under Article 226, the high court cannot do, what the tribunal is required and competent to do, vide (2) and (4) above. All that the high court can do, if it comes to the conclusion that there has been procedural defect is to set aside the order of dismissal or removal, as a result of which the petitioner gets reinstated into the service and he would also become entitled to apply before the industrial court under Section 35 (c) (2) of the act for payment of salary from the date of dismissal to reinstatement consequent to the order of this court and the corporation would become liable to pay the salary, unless it is in a position to prove that the workman had been gainfully employed elsewhere, in which event a proportionate deduction in payment of arrears of salary could be claimed. The dispute however does not come to an end and the corporation would have the power to institute a de novo inquiry, if it considers the gravity of the charge is such that a de-novo inquiry is called for. 9. learned counsel for the corporation has rightly pointed out that in cases where petitions are finally disposed of after 3 or 4 years after their institution, as it normally happens, and the orders of dismissal or removal were to be quashed on grounds of procedural defect, the corporation not only stands deprived of its. Opportunity to prove the charge which it would have had, if the proceedings were taken up before the industrial court, the corporation would also become liable to pay heavy arrears of salary without final adjudication about the misconduct of the workman, and thus it would suffer irretrievably. " The second decision which was relied upon is the one rendered by division bench of this court in the case of sreeramulu, b. V general manager, K. S. R. T. C. and others, 1984 (2) KAR. L. J. 307; which reads as follows: "3. A preliminary objection was raised by Sri B. M. Chandrasekharaiah, learned counsel appearing for the K. S. R. T. C. , to the effect that this is not a case in which this court ought to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner having an effective alternate remedy available under the relevant Provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. He contended that if this court were to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution the respondents would be deprived of the valuable rights and privileges to which they would be entitled to if the dispute is referred for adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act. In support of this contention, he relied upon a decision of Justice rama jois reported in hariba v k. s. r. t. c. , 1983 (1) KAR. Lj. 261. That was also a similar case in which a conductor of the K. S. R. T. C. that had challenged the order of the dismissal on various grounds. A contention was raised in that case on behalf of the K. S. R. T. C. that the writ petition should be dismissed relegating the petitioner to the remedy available to him under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. A contention was raised in that case on behalf of the K. S. R. T. C. that the writ petition should be dismissed relegating the petitioner to the remedy available to him under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Justice rama jois, after considering the entire matter, has concluded as follows in paragraph 16 of the judgment: "the result of the discussion may be summed up as follows: whenever a workmen employed in an industry is dismissed or removed from service and the workman desires to challenge the legality of such action of the management of an industry, on grounds of violation of procedure, as regulated by the prescribed rules or rules of natural justice, the workman should resort to the remedy available under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act and a petition under Article 226 should not be entertained, notwithstanding the fact that the industry is under the management of a statutory corporation or a body which is an 'authority' falling within the definition of the word 'state' as defined in Article 12 and amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the constitution. " The learned single judge dismissed the said writ petition of the conductor reserving liberty to him to resort to the remedy available under the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act. The said decision of Justice rama jois was challenged in writ appeal No. 1844/1983 and the appeal came to be dismissed summarily on 26-10-1983. Sri Chandrasekharaiah submitted that he has since received information that the special leave petition challenging the aforesaid orders has been dismissed by the Supreme Court. 4. We are in entire agreement with the view taken by Justice rama jois in hariba 's case that whenever a workman employed in an industry is dismissed or removed from service and the workman desires to challenge the legality of such action on the ground of violation of the prescribed procedure or the principles of natural Justice the workman should resort to the remedy available under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act and that a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained particularly because the parties would be deprived of the valuable rights and privileges to which they would be entitled to if the dispute is adjudicated upon under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. But, it was contended by Sri Achar, learned counsel for the petitioner that the principle laid down in hariba's case does not preclude laid down in this case from invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution. It was contended that the grievance of the petitioner that he was not furnished with the report of the enquiry officer is in respect of stage subsequent to the enquiry and that therefore the principle laid down in hariba's case does not apply to the facts of this case. " Sri Desai also submitted that even the Supreme Court has taken a similar view in the matter of this type. ( 5 ) AS against this as observed earlier learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon following decisions not only in support of his contentions, but even as an answer to the principles laid down in the decisions referred to by Sri K. S. Desai and they are as follows: the first case is that one decided by this court in the case of t. g. srtnivasa murthy v b. e. m. l. , reported in 1982 (1) LLJ 268 : "termination of service of permanent employees of the companies and the reserve bank, otherwise than by retirement or pre-retirement, would be per se removal or dismissal within the meaning of the service rules of the companies and the bank which could be inflicted only after following the procedure prescribed under rules, which procedure is similar to the one prescribed in Article 311 of the constitution. In the case of terminated employees of the union and the states, a termination of the service would be violative of both Articles 311 (2) and 16 and 14 of the Constitution whereas termination of employee of the agencies or instrumentalities of the union or the states would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 only but not Article 311 (o) as it does not apply to them. " Under similar circumstances Supreme Court of India held such rules are unconstitutional. The first one is AIR 1985 SC 722 paras 4 and 5 in the case of West Bengal state electricity board and others v desh bandhu ghosh and others, which reads as follows: "4. We are not impressed with the submission of the learned counsel for the board. The first one is AIR 1985 SC 722 paras 4 and 5 in the case of West Bengal state electricity board and others v desh bandhu ghosh and others, which reads as follows: "4. We are not impressed with the submission of the learned counsel for the board. On the face of it, the regulation is totally arbitrary and confers on the board a power which is capable of vicious discrimination. It is a naked 'hire and fire' Rule, the time for banishing which altogether from employer-employee relationships is fast approaching. Its only parallel is to be found in the henry viii clause so familiar to administrative lawyers. In moti ram deka v north east frontier railway, AIR 1964 SC 600 , rules 148 (3) and 149 (3) of the Indian railway establishment code were challenged on the ground that they were contrary to Article 311 (2) of the constitution. The challenge was upheld though no opinion was expressed on the question whether the Rule offended Article 14 of the constitution. Since then Article 14 has been interpreted in several decisions of this court and conferment and exercise of arbitrary power on and by the state or its instrumentalities have been frowned upon and struck down by this court as offending Article 14. In S. S. Muley v J. R. D. Tata, 1979 (2) Serv. L. r. 438:1980 lab ic 11, p. b. Sawant, J. , Of the Bombay high court considered at great length regulation 48 (a) of the AIR India employees' service regulations which conferred similar power on the corporation as regulation 34 confers on the board in the present case. The learned judge struck down regulation 48 (a) and we agree with his reasoning and conclusion. In workmen, hindustan steel Ltd. V hindustan steelltd. , Air 1985 SC 251 this court had occasion, to hold that a standing order which conferred such arbitrary, uncanalised and drastic power to enable the employer to dispense with an enquiry and to dismiss an employee, without assigning any reason, by merely stating that it was expedient and against the interest of the security to continue to employ the workman was violative of the basic requirement of natural justice. 5. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon manohar p. Kharkhar v raghuraj, 1981 (2) lab lj 459:1983 lab ic 350 (bom.) To contend that regulation 48 of the AIR India employees' service regulations was valid. It is difficult to agree with the reasoning of the Delhi (sic) high court that because of the complexities of modem administration and the unpredictable exigencies arising in the course of such administration it is necessary for an employer to be vested with such powers as those under regulation 48. We prefer the reasoning of Salwant, J. Of the Bombay high court and that of the Calcutta high court in the judgment under appeal to the reasoning of the Delhi (sic) high court in the result the appeal is dismissed with costs. " Appeal dismissed. ( 6 ) ON another occasion, Supreme Court of India dealt quite exhaustively on the point of agitating before industrial tribunal held as follows in the case of central inland water transport corporation Ltd. , Reported in AIR 1986 SC 1571 relevant observations read as follows: " (c) Constitution of India, Articles 14,39 (a), 41 and 226, central inland water transport corporation Ltd. Service discipline and appeal rules (1979), r. 9 (i) - r. 9 (i) empowering corporation to terminate services of permanent employees without giving any reason and by giving notice. It is void under Section 23 of Contract Act as being opposed to public policy. It is also ultra vires of Article 14 of Constitution and also violative of directive principles contained in Articles 39 (a) and 41. However, right to resign is not void. (Contract Act 9 of 1872, Section 23 ). 1987 lab ic 494 (cal.), Partly reversed. Whereas various other Provisions of the service rules of the corporation mention grounds on which services of an employee can be terminated, clause (i) of Rule 9 is the only Rule which does not state in what circumstances a permanent employee can be removed from service. 1987 lab ic 494 (cal.), Partly reversed. Whereas various other Provisions of the service rules of the corporation mention grounds on which services of an employee can be terminated, clause (i) of Rule 9 is the only Rule which does not state in what circumstances a permanent employee can be removed from service. Clause (i) of Rule 9 is void under Section 23 of the Contract Act as being opposed to public policy and is also ultra vires of Article 14 of the constitution to the extent that it confers upon the corporation the right to terminate the employment of a permanent employee by giving him three months' notice in writing or by paying him the equivalent of three month's basic pay and dearness allowance in lieu of such notice in that, besides being arbitrary and unreasonable, it wholly ignores audi alteram partem rule. It is also violative of directive principles contained in Articles 39 (a) and 41. It cannot be supported on the basis of mutuality on the ground similar right is conferred on employees also. The right conferred on the employee by the clause to resign is, however, not void. 1986 lab ic 494 (cal.), Partly reversed. " ( 7 ) THE third case is the one rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of o. p. bhandari v Indian tourism development corporation Ltd. And others, reported in AIR 1987 SC 111 which reads as follows: "rule 31 (v) of the i. t. d. c. rules, the constitutional validity of which if questioned from the platform of Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution of India, provides: "31. Termination of services. The services of an employee may be terminated by giving such notice or notice pay as may be prescribed in the contract of service in the following manner: i) to (iv) v) of an employee who has completed his probationary period and who has been confirmed or deemed to be confirmed by giving him 90 days' notice or pay in lieu thereof. " This Rule cannot co-exist with Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution of India. The said Rule must therefore die, so that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the aforesaid constitutional Provisions remain alive. " This Rule cannot co-exist with Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution of India. The said Rule must therefore die, so that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the aforesaid constitutional Provisions remain alive. For, otherwise, the guarantee enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution can be set at naught simply by framing a rule authorizing termination of an employee by merely giving a notice. In order to uphold the validity of the Rule in question it has to be held that the tenure of service of a citizen who takes up employment with the state will depend on the pleasure or whim of the competent authority unguided by any principle or policy and that the services of an employee can be terminated even though there is no rational ground for being so, even arbitrarily or capriciously. To uphold this right is to accord a "magna carta" to the authorities invested with these powers to practice uncontrolled discrimination at their pleasure and caprice on considerations not necessarily based on foe welfare of the organisation but possibly based on personal likes and dislikes, personal preferences and prejudices. An employee may be retained solely on the ground that he is a sycophant and indulges in flattery, whereas the services of one who is meritorious (but who is wanting in the art of sycophancy and temperamentally incapable of indulging in flattery) may be terminated. The power may be exercised even on the unarticulated ground that the former belongs to the same religious faith or is the discipline of the same religious teacher or holds opinions congenial to him. The power may be exercised depending on whether or not the concerned employee belongs to the same region, (religion) or to the same caste as that of the authority exercising the power, of course without saying so. Such power may be exercised even in order to make way for another employee who is a favourite of the concerned authority. Provincialism, casteism, nepotism, religious fanatism, and several other obnoxious factors may in that case freely operate on the mind of the competent authority in deciding whom to retain and whom to get rid of. And these dangers are not imaginary ones. They are very much real in organisations where there is a confluence of employees streaming in from different states. Provincialism, casteism, nepotism, religious fanatism, and several other obnoxious factors may in that case freely operate on the mind of the competent authority in deciding whom to retain and whom to get rid of. And these dangers are not imaginary ones. They are very much real in organisations where there is a confluence of employees streaming in from different states. Such a Rule is capable of robbing an employee of his dignity, and making him a supine person whose destiny is at the mercy of the concerned authority (whom he must humour) notwithstanding the constitutional guarantee enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution of India. To hold otherwise is to hold that the fundamental right embedded in Articles 14 and 16 (1) is a mere paper tiger and that it is so ethereal that it can be nullified or eschewed by a simple device of framing a Rule which authorizes termination of the service of an employee by merely giving a notice of termination. Under the circumstances the Rule in question must be held to be unconstitutional and void. This court has struck down similar rules in similar situations. In W. B. State Electricity Board v D. B. Ghosh, (1985)2 SCR 1014 : AIR 1985 SC 722 , Chinnappa Reddy, J. , Speaking for a three-judge bench of this court has observed that a (similar) regulation authorizing the termination of the services of a permanent employee, by serving three months* notice or on payment of salary for the corresponding period in lieu thereof, was ex fade 'totally arbitrary' and 'capable of vicious discrimination'. And that it was a naked 'hire and fire* Rule and parallel of which was to be found only in the "henry viii clause" which deserved to be banished altogether from employer-employee relationship. The regulation thus offended Article 14 of the Constitution of India and deserved to be struck down on that account. And that it was a naked 'hire and fire* Rule and parallel of which was to be found only in the "henry viii clause" which deserved to be banished altogether from employer-employee relationship. The regulation thus offended Article 14 of the Constitution of India and deserved to be struck down on that account. In central inland water transport corporation Ltd. Vbrojonath ganguly and central inland water transport corporation limited v tarun kanti sengupta, AIR 1986 SC 1571 , (supra) a division bench of this court has struck down a similar Rule in so far as it authorized termination of employment by serving a notice thereunder as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, inasmuch as it was capable of being selectively applied in a vicious manner by recourse to 'pick and choose' formula. There is, under the circumstances, no escape from the conclusion that Rule 31 (v) of the aforesaid i. t. d. c. rules which provides for termination of the services of the employees of the respondent corporation simply by giving 90 days' notice or by payment of salary for the notice period in lieu of such notice, deserves to be quashed. As the occasion so demands, we feel constrained to place in focus and highlight an important dimension of the matter. The impugned regulation is extremely wide in its coverage in the sense that it embraces the 'blue collar' workmen, the 'white collar' employees, as also the 'gold collar' (managerial cadre) employees of the undertaking. Insofar as the 'blue collar' and 'white collar' employees are concerned, the quashing does not pose any problem. Insofar as the 'gold collar' (managerial cadre) employees are concerned, the consequence of quashing of the regulation calls for some reflection. In the private sector, the managerial cadre of employees is altogether excluded from the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act and similar labour legislations . The private sector can cut the deadwood and can get rid of a managerial cadre employee in case he is considered to be wanting in performance or in integrity. Not so the public sector under a Rule similar to the impugned rule. The private sector can cut the deadwood and can get rid of a managerial cadre employee in case he is considered to be wanting in performance or in integrity. Not so the public sector under a Rule similar to the impugned rule. Public sector undertaking may under the circumstances be exposed to irreversible damage at the hands of a 'gold collar' employee (belonging to a high managerial cadre) on account of the faulty policy decisions or on account of lack of efficiency or probity of such an employee. The very existence of the undertaking may be endangered beyond recall. Neither the capitalist world nor the communist world (where an employee has to face a death sentence if a charge of corruption is established) feels handicapped or helpless and countenances such a situation. Not being able to perform as per expectation or failure to rise to the expectations or failure to measure up to the demands of the office is not misconduct. Such an employee cannot thus be replaced at all. If this situation were to be tolerated by an undertaking merely because it belongs to the public sector, it would be most unfortunate not only for the undertaking but also for the nation. The public sector is perched on the commanding heights of the national economy. Failure of the public sector might well wreck the national economy. On the other hand the success of the public sector means prosperity for the collective community (and not for the an individual industrial house ). The profits it makes in one unit can enable it to run a losing unit, as also to develop or expand the existing units, and start new units, so as to generate more employment and produce more goods and services for the community. The public sector need not therefore be encumbered with unnecessary shackles or made lame. It is wondered whether such a situation can be remedied by enacting a regulation permitting the termination of the employment of employee belonging to higher managerial cadre, if the undertaking has reason to believe, that his performance is unsatisfactory or inadequate, or there is a bona fide suspicion about his integrity, these being factors which cannot be called into aid to subject him to a disciplinary proceeding. If termination is made, under such a Rule or Regulation, perhaps it may not attract the vice of arbitrariness or discrimination condemned by Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as the factor operating in the case of such an employee will place him in a class by himself and the classification would have sufficient nexus with object sought to be achieved. Of course it is for the concerned authorities to tackle the sensitive problem after due deliberation. We need say no more. " The principles laid down in the above decision once again came up for consideration before the Supreme Court to pronounce whether such rules are valid, constitutional or otherwise and the Supreme Court reviewed its earlier decisions and gave authoritative verdict on this point in an unreported decision in the case of Delhi transport corporation v Delhi transport corporation mazdoor congress and others in civil appeal No. 2876/1986, dated 10-9-1990. "delhi road transport Act, 1950-Delhi road transport (Amendment) Act, 1971-Delhi road transport authority (condition of appointment and service) Regulation, 1952, regulation 9 - termination of service without holding an enquiry-whether by giving reasonable notice or pay in lieu of notice but without holding any inquiry, service of an employee of the public sector undertaking is constitutionally valid? Supreme court by majority of 4:1 with chief Justice of India S. Mukharji as the sole dissenter held that the court had no power to make a Rule, providing for the sacking of permanent employees on unspecified grounds and by merely giving a month's notice or pay in lieu thereof, constitutional by reading into it conditions which are nowhere provided for by the legislature. Held regulations 9 (b) of the regulations to be illegal and ultra vires" apart from the view taken in the above decisions even this court in the case of Dr. R. Srinivasan v Karnataka state industrial investment and development corporation Ltd. , Ilr 1987 KAR. 2567 interpreting Rule 17 of ksiidc service rule. Rule 17 is similar to Rule 15 (b) of present Rule, 2568 para 26: "rule 17 of the rules is worded in such a vulnerable manner, that no court of conscience invested with the power and charged with the duty to declare law as unconstitutional if it contravenes the Provisions of the constitution, can spare such a rule. Rule 17 is similar to Rule 15 (b) of present Rule, 2568 para 26: "rule 17 of the rules is worded in such a vulnerable manner, that no court of conscience invested with the power and charged with the duty to declare law as unconstitutional if it contravenes the Provisions of the constitution, can spare such a rule. Accordingly, Rule 17 of the rules is held unconstitutional, being violative of Article 14 of the constitution. " ( 8 ) IN view of the above discussion made and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and this court the only conclusion which can be drawn is that Rule 15 (b) of the rules in question has violated Article 14 of Constitution of India, as the same is quite arbitrary and has given unguided, uncontrolled power to management. It is oppressive in nature and against principles of natural justice. Hence, the said Rule is struck down as invalid and unconstitutional. ( 9 ) NOW, the second point to be considered is whether in view of the availability of alternative remedy under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act can this writ petition be entertained and order of termination be held as illegal or the petitioners be directed to approach the industrial tribunal for necessary relief. ( 10 ) IN case of hariba vk. s. r. t. c. , Dr. B. Sreeramulu vk. s. r. t. c. , this court took a view that whenever there is an alternative remedy particularly when the issues involved can be tried only after the evidence is leading including question to pay compensation or allowance or salary to the employees involved, proper thing is to direct the parties to agitate their rights before the industrial tribunal seeking relief under Section 10 of the industrial tribunal act and not to interfere under Article 226 of Constitution of India as it is in extraordinary circumstances. ( 11 ) OF course in other cases under similar circumstances this court has taken altogether a different view. ( 12 ) THE first-case is the one taken in case of h. s. achuta v chief engineer (chakra) and others, held as follows in KAR. Lj. 1985 (2) 44. "it is not an inflexible Rule that before court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution, to drive the party always to exhaust the alternative remedy under the statute. ( 12 ) THE first-case is the one taken in case of h. s. achuta v chief engineer (chakra) and others, held as follows in KAR. Lj. 1985 (2) 44. "it is not an inflexible Rule that before court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution, to drive the party always to exhaust the alternative remedy under the statute. If the petitioner is not driven to remedy under the Act, the respondent will loose its valuable right of sustaining the wrongful dismissal by adducing proper evidence before the labour court or the tribunal, as the case may be, and therefore, having regard to that this court should decline to exercise the jurisdiction. But the court also has to consider the difficulty the writ petitioner and the like of him will have in getting government to refer the dispute to the labour court or to the tribunal under the protracted preparatory proceedings contemplated under Section 10 of the act. The time consumed till the disposal of the case by the tribunal, will be time which accumulates in favour of the petitioner, assuming his dismissal would be sustained by the employer before the labour court or the tribunal and he is paid back wages till the date of the order of labour court or the tribunal. But, if high court interferes under Article 226 of the c istitution, as the respondent-corporation is among that corporate bodies, the time saved is money gained to the corporation if on a finding recorded by the high court that there has been a violation of rules of natural justice, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. Therefore, the high court need not always rely upon ground of alternative remedy and drive the parties to such a remedy. " ( 13 ) THE second one is one decided in the case of k. Maruti v k. Dasappa and others, wherein this court while interpreting the scope of Section 70 vis-a-vis Article 226 following the decision rendered by Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka state road transport corporation, Bangalore and another v Karnataka state transport authority and another, AIR 1984 KAR. 4, held as follows: "6. Aggrieved by this order of rejection, the petitioner filed writ petition No. 1379 of 1983 from the order in which these appeals arise. 4, held as follows: "6. Aggrieved by this order of rejection, the petitioner filed writ petition No. 1379 of 1983 from the order in which these appeals arise. The learned chief Justice by his order dated 8-4-1983, now under appeal allowed the writ petition and held that the view of the sta as to the effect and consequences of the non-inclusion in the gazette publication of the Andhra Pradesh government of the inter-state route at sl. No. 153 shown in part-a to the appendix to the inter-state agreement dated 1-9-1975 as published in the Karnataka gazette was erroneous. The learned chief Justice was of the view that as the said route found a place at sl. No. 153 in the gazette publication made by the Karnataka gazette, the 'sta' had the jurisdiction to consider that as a source of grant of additional trips. In regard to the question of need for the additional trips the learned chief Justice held that in view of the circumstances that there was an inter-state agreement covering the said inter-state route under entry 153 the existence of the need did not require to be established separately. As to relief grantable to the petitioner, the learned chief Justice did not consider it necessary to remit the matter to the 'sta' for a fresh consideration; and granted the additional trips. Learned chief Justice did not also find any merit in the contentions of the appellants-respondents that while their applications which were in effect for grant of variation of permits respecting the same or substantially the same route, all the applications, including that of petitioner pungappa, required to be considered together, learned chief Justice did not also accept the contention that the writ petition should not be entertained in view of the remedy by way of appeal available under the 'act' against the refusal to grant the variation of the conditions of the permit. Pursuant to the order of the learned single judge dated 8-4-1983, the 'sta' made a consequential endorsement granting the additional trips with additional vehicles. " ( 14 ) IN addition to this under similar circumstances in respect of the same management in the case of umesha S. Naik and others v Karnataka food and civil supplies corporation in W. P. No. 14174 to 14180 and other connected writ petitions by my order dated 3-7-1990 held as follows: "6. " ( 14 ) IN addition to this under similar circumstances in respect of the same management in the case of umesha S. Naik and others v Karnataka food and civil supplies corporation in W. P. No. 14174 to 14180 and other connected writ petitions by my order dated 3-7-1990 held as follows: "6. In the instant cases before passing the orders of termination on 5-8-1989 neither a notice was given to any of the petitioners nor they were given an opportunity to submit their say in the matter of their termination. Hence, I feel that the orders of termination are in clear violation of principles of natural justice. Therefore, the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the management reported in 1985 (2) kar, l. j. 307 has no application to the present cases. 7. Wherever there is violation of principles of natural justice, definitely this court cannot sit silent and direct the parties to exhaust the alternative remedy available. It can definitely exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to chide the erring officers or authorities who have flouted principles of natural Justice by taking law into their own hands and passed arbitrary orders. 8. In addition to this, the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present cases as it was a case where the very suspension was disputed on several facts. Those questions of facts had to be decided only by way of adducing evidence by raising a dispute before the appropriate forum, namely the labour court. This court in that case was right in saying that in view of the disputed facts the appropriate forum was to go before the labour court and not to approach this court under Article 226 of the constitution. In the instant cases there are no disputed facts. " ( 15 ) FROM the above discussions, it is clear no purpose would be served if at this juncture the petitioners are directed to approach the industrial tribunal for necessary relief. Moreover the issue involved is, whether the corporation was justified in terminating the services of petitioners just mentioning that they committed act of misconduct without establishing it. The order of termination was passed on 19-5-1982, writ petitions came to be filed on 21-5-1982. A little later Rule came to be issued. Moreover the issue involved is, whether the corporation was justified in terminating the services of petitioners just mentioning that they committed act of misconduct without establishing it. The order of termination was passed on 19-5-1982, writ petitions came to be filed on 21-5-1982. A little later Rule came to be issued. Thus, nearly 8 years 6 months have been spent from the date of termination and 8 years 4 months from the date of filing of these writ petitions. If time factor is one of the factors to be considered by the courts to decide a case and to mould the relief, definitely it is one of the circumstances which again compel me to interfere under Article 226 of Constitution of India instead of directing the petitioners to approach industrial tribunal. In fact under similar circumstances the Supreme Court in the case of RAJ soni v AIR officer in-charge administration and another reported in AIR 1990 SC 1305 at para 11 as follows: "it is not necessary and we do not propose to go into the question in this case as to whether the petition is maintainable under Article 32 of the constitution, because this petition has been pending in this court since 1981. The petitioner's claim is just. It will, therefore, be a travesty of Justice to send her to any other forum at this stage. In any case the petitioner seeks to enforce her statutory right under Section 8 of the act read with Rule 110 of the rules with a further contention that she has been discriminated in the matter of superannuation so much so that other teachers similarly situated were retired at the age of 60 years whereas the petitioner has been singled out and retired at the age of 58 years. ". ( 16 ) HENCE, keeping in mind that avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings which is also one of the duties of the court to mould the relief, the writ petitions are allowed and order of termination made at Annexure-F , is quashed. (2) the respondents shall reinstate the petitioners to the posts which they were holding at the time of termination and to give them all consequential benefits. (2) the respondents shall reinstate the petitioners to the posts which they were holding at the time of termination and to give them all consequential benefits. (3) as far as entitlements of salary from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement is concerned, the same shall be decided by the management if necessary by collecting information about these petitioners whether during the period they were employed in gainful trade or business or otherwise, within 3 months from the date of the receipt of this order. No costs. --- *** --- .