RAJENDRA BABU, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition is directed against the order made by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, dismissing the appeal filed before it affirming the order of Award made by the Arbitrator under the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act (in short the 'act') in a dispute arising under Section 70 thereof. The facts giving rise to this petition are as follows: ( 2 ) THE petitioners father borrowed a sum of Rs. 12,960/- from the first respondent-society in the year 1974-75 with a condition to repay the same in instalments and the loan was secured by a mortgage under a Deed; the term of the loan was that the same shall be repaid fifteen annual instalments as stipulated in the bond. On the allegation that the petitioners' father did not pay the amount, steps were taken to recover the same by initiating proceedings under Section 70 of the act. An award thereto came to be made. The only ground pointed out by the petitioners in this writ petition is that the award is bad as barred by limitation as action is brought after a lapse of six years, after the cause of action arose, as provided under Section 70-A of the Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the term of repayment of loan was that, even if there is a single default, the entire amount due thereunder becomes due and payable by the parties and therefore, the dispute should have been raised on or before 31-3-1983. In this case, it is contended that dispute had been filed in the year 1984 and that the same is clearly barred by limitation. Section 70-A of the Act reads as follows:"70-A. PERIOD OF LIMITATION:- no dispute under Section 70 shall be entertained unless it is referred to the Registrar within six years from the date of cause of action: provided that a dispute relating to the election of a member, President, Vice-President, managing Director, Honorary secretary or other officer of the committee shall be referred to the Registrar within thirty days from the date of declaration of the result of the election. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Registrar may entertain a dispute referred after the period specified in sub-section (1) if he is satisfied that the person making the reference had sufficient cause for not making the reference within that period. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Registrar may entertain a dispute referred after the period specified in sub-section (1) if he is satisfied that the person making the reference had sufficient cause for not making the reference within that period. " ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel for the first respondent relying upon a decision of the Privy Council in Lasa Din v Mt. Gulab Kanwar And Others, air 1932 Privy Council 207 contended that a proviso of this nature for recovery of entire amount with single default clause is far the benefit of the mortgagee and the time limit within which the payment should be made in instalments is " exclusively for the benefit of the mortgagees" and that it purported to give them an option either to enforce their security at once, or if the security was ample, to stand by their investment for the full term of the mortgage. ( 4 ) HOWEVER, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the principles that are applicable in regard to Limitation Act cannot be adopted to a case arising under the Karnataka co-operative Societies Act. In view of the decision of this Court in Thimmappa v Town cooperative Society Ltd. , Kunigal in W. P. No. 4738 of 1979 reported in Mys. Law Journal short notes of recent decision at item 338, it is contended that the Limitation Act is not applicable to the proceedings before the Arbitrator. ( 5 ) THE proposition set-forth in the aforesaid un-reported decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is un-exceptionable, but what is stated therein is that Limitation Act as such is not applicable. It is not the contention of the learned Counsel for the first respondent that Limitation Act is applicable to the facts of the present case, but the contention is understanding as to when the cause of action arises the principles that are applied in the context of limitation Act could be applied to the facts of the present case. In the aforesaid decision of the privy Council, it has been categorically held that in case a default occurs in payment of instalment, the benefit given to the mortgagee either to enforce the security at once, or if the security is ample, to stand by their investment for the full term of the mortgage. In the aforesaid decision of the privy Council, it has been categorically held that in case a default occurs in payment of instalment, the benefit given to the mortgagee either to enforce the security at once, or if the security is ample, to stand by their investment for the full term of the mortgage. This position in law is reiterated in the decision in Ramprasad dagaduram v Vijaykutnar Motilal Hirakhanwala and Others, AIR 1967 SC 278 wherein it is stated that the deed gave the mortgagee an option to enforce the mortgage in the event of non-payment of any of the five instalments, or it was open to the mortgagee not to exercise this option. As the mortgagee did not not exercise the option, the mortgage money fell due on the expiry of nine years, that is to say, when the time limit begins to run. In this case, the question that falls for consideration is as to when the limitation prescribed under Section 70-A of the Act commenced to run and that is clear in the light of the decision made in the Privy Council and the supreme Court decision that, it is open to the mortgagee to exercise option to initiate proceedings under Section 70-A of the Act at once after the default in payment of instalment occurs or wait till the entire term was completed. So, it is not open to the petitioner to contend that the suit has become as barred by time. In view of the aforesaid reasons, I reject the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner and there is no substance in this petition. Petition shall stand rejected. Writ Petition rejected. --- *** --- .