S. MOHAN, C. J. ( 1 ) THE following three questions have been referred by the Division Bench for our opinion:" ( 1) Whether the provisions of Section 68 of the Act are applicable to a case where the corporation seeks to recover contributions for a period prior to the issuance of the notice calling upon the employer to register its institution and cover its employees with effect from an anterior date? (2) Whether the provisions of Section 68 of the Act are applicable to a case where the principal employer has failed to cover his employees and the Corporation had not extended any benefits or rendered any service to the employees for the period prior to the issuance of the notice calling upon the employer to cover its employees? (3) Whether the E. S.. Corporation can demand payment of contribution without notifying the facilities available for the employees to the employer?" ( 2 ) THE appellant -- Karnataka Food Packers -- has preferred this appeal against the order dated 29-5-1982 passed by the Employees State Insurance Court, Mangalore, in ESI Application No. 28/1983. The said application was filed by the appellant under Section 75 of the Employees State insurance Act, 1948, (for short 'the Act'), challenging the notice issued by the Regional Director, employees State Insurance Corporation (for short 'the Corporation'), calling upon the appellant to cover the factory in question under the E. S. I, scheme for the period 1-7-1979 to 30-6-1982. The challenge was mainly on two grounds, namely: (i) the business of processing, packing and exporting of shrimps carried on by the appellant is a seasonal business and, therefore, it is not covered by the Act, and (ii) at any rate, during the period 1-7-1979 to 30-6-1982, no service was rendered by the Corporation to the employees of the appellant; equally no benefit was claimed by the employees from the respondent; the respondent-Corporation had not spent any amount on the employees of the appellant; and therefore, having regard to the provisions contained in section 68 of the Act the Corporation was not entitled to claim the amount there being no quid pro quo. It may at this stage be stated that for the period subsequent to 30-6-1982 the coverage of the appellant's factory is not questioned. The ESI Court raised the following issues: (i) Whether the applicant is a seasonal factory? It may at this stage be stated that for the period subsequent to 30-6-1982 the coverage of the appellant's factory is not questioned. The ESI Court raised the following issues: (i) Whether the applicant is a seasonal factory? (ii) Whether the applicant is liable to be covered as from the time demanded by the respondent? (iii) What order? in answering issue No. 1, it held that the appellant's factory was not a seasonal factory. Issue no. 2 was answered holding that the appellant would be liable to be covered. In that view, the application was dismissed and the notice was upheld. ( 3 ) WHEN this appeal came up before a Division Bench consisting of K. A. Swami and Vithal Rao,. , the Division Bench thought fit to raise an additional issue and have the same decided by the esi Court and a finding recorded thereon. Accordingly, by an order dated 18-2-1988, an additional issue was framed viz. "whether the Corporation was in a position to render services as contemplated under Chapter V of the Act as on 1-7-1979?" and a finding was called for. The ESI court submitted its finding on that additional issue on 13-7-1988 holding that the Corporation was in a position to render service as on 1-7-1979 as envisaged under Chapter-V of the Act. On receipt of this finding, the appeal was heard afresh, and in the light of the contentions raised by the parties, two questions of law were posed for determination as follows: "1) In the facts and circumstances of the case, whether in law, the appellant is liable to pay the amount of contribution under Chapter IV of the Act from 1-7-1979 to 30-6-1982? (2) If so, in the facts and circumstances of the case, whether Section 68 of the Act is attracted to determine the amount payable by the appellant?" the Division Bench held that as on 1-7-1979 the appellant employed more than 20 workers and, therefore, it was a factory and as such it ought to have covered its workers under the Act from that date. On this factual position, after referring to the case law, the Division Bench found that the observations made by a Division Bench of this Court in HIND ART PRESS v. ESI [1989 (59 )FLR778 ], ILR1989 KAR 2001 , 1989 (2 )Karlj227 , (1990 )II LLJ195 Kant ran counter to the decision of the Supreme Court in GASKET RADIATORS pvt. LTD. v. ESIC. AIR1985 SC 790 , [1985 (50 ) FLR426 ], (1985 )I llj506 SC , 1985 (1 )SCALE337 , (1985 )2 SCC68 , [1985 ]2 SCR1085 , 1985 (17 )UJ588 (SC ) The Division Bench found difficulty in agreeing with the view expressed in Hind Art Press case [1989 (59 )FLR778 ], ILR1989 KAR 2001 , 1989 (2 )Karlj227 , (1990 )II LLJ195 Kant on the scope and ambit of Section 68 of the Act, and in view of this disagreement has referred the aforementioned three questions to a larger Bench of three Judges for opinion. ( 4 ) MR. F. L. F. Alvares, learned Counsel for the appellant, would submit as follows: on 31-10-1976, the ESI Act came into force. It was in 1977 that the appellant commenced production. Form No. 01 was filed only in 1982. Till then, the appellant was not made aware about the applicability of the Act. The demand now raised is for the period 1-7-1979 to 30-6-1982. Section 2a of the Act deals with registration of factories. That registration is required to be done as per Regulation 10b. For that, Form No. 01 requires to be filed. Where therefore such a form came to be filed only in 1982 by the appellant, if no service was rendered prior to that date. e. , prior to 30-6-1982 to the appellant, nor did the employees avail themselves of any service from the Corporation, the liability cannot be imposed at all. If what is collected under the Act is a fee, there must be an element of quid pro quo. Therefore, if no service was rendered, a fee cannot be charged at all. The fact that the Corporation was in a position to render service even on 1-7-1979 is of no consequence; such a service ought to have been rendered as of fact. Therefore, if no service was rendered, a fee cannot be charged at all. The fact that the Corporation was in a position to render service even on 1-7-1979 is of no consequence; such a service ought to have been rendered as of fact. In support of this submission, the learned Counsel relies on AIR1985 SC 790 , [1985 (50 )FLR426 ], (1985 )I LLJ506 SC , 1985 (1 )SCALE337 , (1985 )2 SCC68 , [1985 ]2 SCR1085 , 1985 (17 )UJ588 (SC ) in which it was held that in dealing with the scope of Chapter VA the element of quid pro quo was necessary. Chapter VA was introduced by Amending Act No. 53/1951. Though as on today the provisions of that Chapter do not apply since they cease to have effect from 1-7-1973, yet while deciding the scope of Section 73a if it was held that there must be an element of quid pro quo the same would apply to the contributions under Chapters IV and V; the learned Counsel relies on maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition, page 34 wherein it is said that earlier Act is explained by later Act. In ESIC, STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. FARIYAZ HOTELS 1989 (1) LLJ 356 it has been held that the Corporation has to set up a machinery to provide for medical benefits and has to implement the scheme and cover the establishments, provided minimum facilities are available to discharge the obligations under the Act. Where, therefore, no such facilities are offered the demand is invalid. Accordingly, It is submitted that the Corporation was not justified in making a demand prior to the issuance of notice. Equally Section 68 of the Act will not apply to a case where the Corporation had not extended any benefit or rendered any service. Thus, the Corporation cannot demand payment of contribution without notifying the facilities available for the employees to the employer. ( 5 ) IN opposition to this, Mr. Papanna, learned Counsel for the respondent, submits as follows: as to whether the Corporation was in a position to render service on 1-7-1979, is clear from the finding rendered on additional issue. It has been found on the additional issue that the corporation was in a position to render service as contemplated in Chapter-V as on 1-7-1979. Papanna, learned Counsel for the respondent, submits as follows: as to whether the Corporation was in a position to render service on 1-7-1979, is clear from the finding rendered on additional issue. It has been found on the additional issue that the corporation was in a position to render service as contemplated in Chapter-V as on 1-7-1979. In that factual background, a question would arise whether the element of quid pro quo is necessary? in ESCORTS LTD. v. REGIONAL DIRECTOR, ESIC ILR1986 KAR 3595 one of the points posed for consideration was about the element of quid pro quo. In answering that, it was held that the concept of quid pro quo has dwindled down; even otherwise, it is not necessary that each and every payer of contribution should be rendered service. Again in MYSORE KIRLOSKAR LTD. v. ESIC1980 (2) KLJ 122 it was held that this was not a fee but a tax. Whatever it may be, in AIR1985 SC 790 , [1985 (50 )FLR426 ], (1985 )I LLJ506 SC , 1985 (1 )SCALE337 , (1985 )2 SCC68 , [1985 ]2 SCR1085 , 1985 (17 )UJ588 (SC ) it has been categorically held that the payment of contribution under the act is not a fee but a compulsory insurance falling under Entries 23 and 24 of List III of the VII schedule of the Constitution. Further, there was no need to justify it as a fee. Having regard to this authoritative pronouncement, all other arguments pale into insignificance. ( 6 ) WE will now proceed to consider the merits of the respective contentions. The appellant's factory employed more than 20 workers with effect from 1-7-1979 and it was operated by power. In such an event under Section 1 (4), the Act would apply. Chapters IV and V of the Act were made applicable to the area by an order bearing No. SWL 93 ESI 76 dated 25-9-1976. The ESI dispensary was also opened on 31-10-1976. If, therefore, on 1-7-1979 the appellant had employed more than 20 workers and used power for production it ought to have covered its workers under the Act from that date. This is because, as we pointed out just now, once an establishment is held to be a factory, the law imposes liability. The ESI dispensary was also opened on 31-10-1976. If, therefore, on 1-7-1979 the appellant had employed more than 20 workers and used power for production it ought to have covered its workers under the Act from that date. This is because, as we pointed out just now, once an establishment is held to be a factory, the law imposes liability. However, this is sought to be avoided by the appellant stating that during the period 1-7-1979 to 30-6-1982 the Corporation rendered no service at all to the employees of the appellant, nor again the employees of the appellant obtained any benefit from the Corporation. It is added that the Corporation was not even aware of the existence of the appellant, and only when the return was filed by the appellant as per Ex. R-1, R-2 Notice was issued on 3-9-1982 informing the appellant that as per notification dated 23-1-1976 the provisions of the Act were applicable to the factories situated in the area. The appellant would be a 'factory' within the meaning of Section 2 (12) of the Act in that it had employed 20 or more persons and was carrying on manufacturing process with the aid of power. Under this notice, when the appellant was directed to pay contribution as per the Act, it did not pay. Therefore, another notice dated 22-9-1982 was issued. We may at this stage say that it has been held by the Division Bench that the factory of the appellant is not a seasonal one. It has been found so by the Division Bench. However, the liability is sought to be got over on the ground that there is no element of quid pro quo in that no service was rendered for the period 1-7-1979 to 30-6-1982. As to what exactly the scope of the Act is, we may look to BASANT kumar v. STATE OF W. B AIR1964 SC 1260 , [1964 (8 )FLR334 ], (1964 )II LLJ105 SC , [1964 ]6 SCR913 , it has been observed thus:" the Act has prescribed a self-contained Code in regard to the insurance of the employees covered by it; several remedial measures which the Legislature thought fit necessary to enforce in regard to such workmen have been specifically dealt with and appropriate provisions have been made to carry out the policy of the Act as laid down in its relevant Section. . . . . . . . . . The preamble to the Act shows that it was passed because the legislature thought it expedient to provide for certain benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and to make provision for certain other matters in relation thereto. So, the policy of the act is unambiguous and clear. The material definitions of 'benefit period', 'employee', 'factory', 'insured person', 'sickness', 'wages', and other terms contained in Section 2 give a clear idea as to the nature of the factories to which the Act is intended to be applied, the class of persons for whose benefit it has been passed and the nature of the benefit which is intended to be conferred on them. Chapter II of the Act deals with the Corporation, Standing Committee and Medical benefit Council and their constitution; Chapter III deals with the problem of finance and audit; chapter IV make provisions for contribution both by the employees and the employer, and chapter V prescribes the benefits which have to be conferred on the workmen; it also gives general provisions in respect of those benefits. Chapter V-A deals with transitory provisions; chapter VI deals with the adjudication of disputes and claims; and Chapter VII prescribes penalties, Chapter VIII which is the last chapter, deals with miscellaneous matters. In the very nature of things, it would have been impossible for the legislature to decide in what areas and in respect of which factories the Employees State Insurance Corporation should be established. It is obvious that a scheme of this kind, though very beneficent, could not be introduced in the whole of the country all at once. Such beneficial measures which need careful experimentation have sometimes to be adopted by stages and in different phases, and so, inevitably, the question of extending the statutory benefits contemplated by the Act has to be left to the discretion of the appropriate Government. . . . Such beneficial measures which need careful experimentation have sometimes to be adopted by stages and in different phases, and so, inevitably, the question of extending the statutory benefits contemplated by the Act has to be left to the discretion of the appropriate Government. . . . " in B. M. LAKSHMANAMURTHY v. ESIC AIR1974 SC 759 , [1974 (28 )FLR223 ], (1974 )I LLJ304 SC , (1974 )4 SCC365 , [1974 ]3 SCR142 it was held that the act is a beneficial piece of social security legislation in the interest of labour in factories at the first instance and with power to extend to other establishments; provisions of the Act will have to be construed with that end in view to promote the scheme and avoid the mischief. The liability to pay contribution is dealt with in Chapter IV. It deals with the insurance of the employees, contributions, liability of the principal employer to pay contribution in the first instance, recovery of contribution from immediate employer, obligation on the part of the employer to furnish return and maintain register, determination of contribution and recovery of contribution as an arrear of land revenue. Chapter V deals with benefits conferred on the insured persons such as sickness benefit, maternity benefit, disablement benefit etc. Section 68 deals with the corporation's right where a principal employer fails or neglects to pay any contribution, Section 85b deals with power to recover damages. We may at once state that Sections 68 and 85 operate in different fields. Though the marginal note of Section 68 would seem to cover a wide amplitude, on a careful reading of that Section it is seen that what is stated in that Section is right of the Corporation to recover contribution in respect of any employee who by reason of that negligence becomes either disentitled to the benefits or is made available the benefit at a lower scale; the Corporation could pay the benefit that is due and recover the difference or twice the amount of contribution which the employer neglected to pay, whichever is great. Therefore, this deals with an individual case. In contra distinction to this, Section 85b occurring in Chapter VII viz. Penalties, penalises the employer for failing to pay the amount due in respect of any contribution or any other amount payable under the Act; this could be recovered as an arrear of land revenue. Therefore, this deals with an individual case. In contra distinction to this, Section 85b occurring in Chapter VII viz. Penalties, penalises the employer for failing to pay the amount due in respect of any contribution or any other amount payable under the Act; this could be recovered as an arrear of land revenue. There is no individualisation under Section 85b. It was this line of reasoning which met with approval in M. F. A. No. 486/1982 and 331/1982 decided on 3-8-1989. We are in agreement with the same. ( 7 ) WE will now go on to the question whether the element of quid pro quo is necessary. In ILR1986 KAR 3595 , the Division Bench had to deal with the following contention: "that, as no services were capable of being rendered under the ESI scheme to the unidentifiable and shifting-mass of workmen engaged by the Contractors, there is obviously no quid pro quo for the levy and the demand is insupportable on that ground. " In dealing with the said contention, it was held as follows in paras 19 and 20: "19. Re: Contention (e) this point is squarely and fully covered against the appellant and we are referring to the contention out of deference to the learned Counsel who took the trouble to present it over again, sri Ullal submitted that the workmen engaged by the Contractor were an unidentifiable and shifting mass of workmen and no services of the Corporation were available to them and that as there was no quid pro quo by way of services, the levy of contribution is not supportable. There are two aspects. First, the imperatives of the concept of quid pro quo have themselves dwindled down. The contribution need no longer be required to be supported by the correlative of quid pro quo. The second thing is that even if quid pro quo is required to be shown, it is not necessary that each and every payer of the contribution and each workman covered by the scheme is to be shown to have received the services. Service is to be rendered to the class of persons generally and not individually. Even if services are not available in an area the exaction is not rendered illegal. 20. Service is to be rendered to the class of persons generally and not individually. Even if services are not available in an area the exaction is not rendered illegal. 20. In regard generally to the requirement of the correlative of quid pro quo for a 'fee', the following observations of the Supreme Court in the City Corporation of Calicut v. Thachambalath Sadasivan and others AIR1985 SC 756 , 1985 (1 )SCALE294 , (1985 )2 SCC112 , [1985 ]2 SCR1008 , 1985 (17 )UJ688 (SC ) are to be recalled: "it is thus well settled by numerous recent decisions of this Court that the traditional concept in a fee of quid pro quo is undergoing a transformation and that though the fee must have relation to the services rendered, or the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough, It is not necessary to establish that Chose who pay the fee must receive direct benefit of the services rendered for which the fee is being paid. If one who is liable to pay receives general benefit from the authority levying the fee, the element of service required for collecting fee is satisfied. It is not necessary that the person liable to pay must receive some special benefit or advantage for payment of the fee. " However, this proposition under the very legislation fell for consideration in Gasket Radiators pvt. Ltd. v. Employees State Insurance Corporation and another AIR1985 SC 790 , [1985 (50 ) FLR426 ], (1985 )I LLJ506 SC , 1985 (1 )SCALE337 , (1985 )2 scc68 , [1985 ]2 SCR1085 , 1985 (17 )UJ588 (SC ). The Supreme Court observed: "we are afraid that the very approach of the appellant to the problem at issue suffers from a basic defect. The appellant's argument proceeds on the fundamental misconception that the payment of contribution directed to be made by the employer under the Employees State Insurance Act or other similar payment or benefit under various other social welfare legislations must either be labelled as a tax or a fee in order to attain legitimacy or not at all. The idea that such payment, contribution or whatever name is given to it should be so pigeon-holed and fitted in stems from a misunderstanding of the scheme of our Constitution in regard to social welfare legislation. The idea that such payment, contribution or whatever name is given to it should be so pigeon-holed and fitted in stems from a misunderstanding of the scheme of our Constitution in regard to social welfare legislation. The payment of contribution by an employer towards the premium of an employee's compulsory insurance under the Employees State Insurance Act falls directly within entries 23 and 24 of List iii and it is wholly unnecessary to seek justification for it by recourse to entry 97 of List I or entry 47 of List III in any circumlocutous fashion. We see no reason to brand or stamp the contribution as a tax or fee in order to seek to legitimise it. Legitimation need not be sought fictionally from entry 97 of List I or entry 47 of List III when legitimation is directly derived for the charge from entries 23 and 24 of List. Even if the charge is to be construed as a fee as the High Court has done, it appears to us to be justifiable on that basis too. It is not disputed and indeed it is not capable of any controversy that services and benefits are indeed meant to be and are bound to be conferred on the employees and through them on the employer, in due course, when the scheme becomes fully operative in all areas. Merely because the benefits to be received are postponed, it cannot be said that there is no quid pro quo. It is true that ordinarily a return in presenti is generally present when fee is levied, but simultaneity or contemporaneity of payment and benefit is not the most vital or crucial test to determine whether a levy is a fee or not. In fact, it may often happen that the rendering of a service or the conferment of a benefit may only follow after the consolidation of a fund from the fee levied. Hospitals, for instance, cannot be built in a day nor medical facilities provided right from the day of the commencement of the scheme. " The authoritative pronouncements also hold that, even if the correlative of services is necessary to support the levy, the correlation need not be shown in each case and there need not be service rendered to each of the intended beneficiaries. Service rendered to a class as a whole is sufficient. " The authoritative pronouncements also hold that, even if the correlative of services is necessary to support the levy, the correlation need not be shown in each case and there need not be service rendered to each of the intended beneficiaries. Service rendered to a class as a whole is sufficient. Accordingly contention (e) also requires to be, and is hereby, held against the appellant. " in reading the Judgment in AIR1985 SC 790 , [1985 (50 )FLR426 ], (1985 )I LLJ506 SC , 1985 (1 )SCALE337 , (1985 )2 SCC68 , [1985 ]2 SCR1085 , 1985 (17 )UJ588 (SC ) the Division Bench which has made this reference concludes: "in respect of the period falling outside the purview of Chapter V-A of the Act there is an element of quid pro quo. " This conclusion is drawn from the observations in AIR1985 SC 790 , [1985 (50 )FLR426 ], (1985 )I LLJ506 SC , 1985 (1 )SCALE337 , (1985 )2 SCC68 , [1985 ]2 scr1085 , 1985 (17 ) UJ588 (SC ). As a matter of fact, the argument in that case was as follows: "the main ground on which the appellant canvasses the correctness of the Judgment of the High court is that the contribution payable under Chapter V-A is a fee and its levy is illegal as the Act does not contemplate the rendering of any service or the conferment of any benefit to the appellant company or its employees as quid pro quo for the payment. The provisions of Chapter va therefore, according to the learned Counsel, are ultra vires. " in answering this, in para-6, it was held: "6. We are afraid that the very approach of the appellant to the problem at issue suffers from a basic defect. The appellant's argument proceeds on the fundamental misconception that the payment of contribution directed to be made by the employer under the Employees State insurance Act or other similar payment or benefit under various other social welfare legislations must either be labelled as a tax or a fee in order to attain legitimacy or not at all. The idea that such payment, contribution or whatever name is given to it should be so pigeon-holed and fitted in stems from a misunderstanding of the scheme of our Constitution in regard to social welfare legislation. The idea that such payment, contribution or whatever name is given to it should be so pigeon-holed and fitted in stems from a misunderstanding of the scheme of our Constitution in regard to social welfare legislation. Apart from the preamble which promises to secure to all its citizens 'justice, social, economic and political', the State is enjoined by the Directive Principles of State Policy to secure a social order for the promotion of the welfare of the people. In particular Articles 41, 42 and 43 enjoin the State to make effective provision for securing the right to work to education and public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of any undeserved want to make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief and to secure by suitable legislation or economic organisation or in any other way, to all workers, agricultural, industrial or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities. It is in pursuance of these Directive Principles that we find entries 23 and 24 in List III of the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution. Both Parliament and the Legislature of any State, subject to conditions with which we are not concerned, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List. It is pursuant to the power entrusted in respect of entries 23 and 24 of List III that Parliament hap enacted the Employees State insurance Act. In our understanding, entries 23 and 24 of List III, of their own force, empower parliament or the legislature of a State to direct the payment by an employer of contributions of the nature of those contemplated by the Employees State Insurance Act for the benefit of the employees. These contributions or for example contributions to provident funds or payments of other benefits to workers are not required to be and cannot be labelled as taxes or fees for the sole and simple reason that they are neither taxes nor fees. These contributions or for example contributions to provident funds or payments of other benefits to workers are not required to be and cannot be labelled as taxes or fees for the sole and simple reason that they are neither taxes nor fees. List I and List II contain several entries in respect of which taxes may be levied by the Parliament, by the Legislature of any State and by both, Entry 97 is a residuary clause which enables Parliament to legislate in respect of any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of those lists. Entry 96 of List I enables Parliament to levy fee in respect of any of the matters in that list, but not including fee taken in any Court. Similarly entry 66 of List II enables the legislature of a State to levy fee in respect of the matters in that list, but not including fees taken in any Court, Again entry 47 of List III enables Parliament and the Legislature of a State to levy fees in respect of any of the matters in that list but not including fees in any Court. The payment of contribution by an employer towards the premium (what else is it?) of an employees' compulsory insurance under the Employees State Insurance Act falls directly within entries 23 and 24 of List III and it is wholly unnecessary to seek justification for it by recourse to entry 97 of List I or entry 47 of List III in any circumlocutous fashion. We see no reason to brand or stamp the contribution as a tax or fee in order to seek to legitimise it. Legitimation need not be sought fictionally from entry 97 of List I or entry 47 of List III when legitimation is directly derived for the charge from entries 23 and 24 of List. " After so holding, even if it is construed as a fee how the matter is to be dealt with, is discussed in the later part of the Judgment. Then it was held that if the charge was to be levied as a fee there was sufficient quid pro quo. From this, it does not follow that this ruling is an authority for holding that there must be an element of quid pro quo. Chapter VA of the Act consisted of transitory provision. Then it was held that if the charge was to be levied as a fee there was sufficient quid pro quo. From this, it does not follow that this ruling is an authority for holding that there must be an element of quid pro quo. Chapter VA of the Act consisted of transitory provision. That ceased to have effect from 1st July, 1973. In dealing with the liability of employers to make special contribution under Section 73a, decided cases hold that it is a tax; for example SAKTI PIPES LTD. v. ESIC1979 Lab.. C. 410, GWALIOR RAYON SILK MFG. CO. v. ESIC. 1975 Lab.. C. 1395 Then again in 1980 (2) Kar. L. J. 122 it was held that what is recovered under Section 73a is not in the nature of a fee but is in the nature of a tax and, therefore, there was no question of refund on the ground of services not having been rendered during the period of payment. Therefore, the law applicable to special contribution will equally apply to contributions talked of under Chapter IV. Accordingly, we hold that no element of quid pro quo is necessary. From this point of view, we do not think we need refer to the passage occurring in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn. The last of the cases is 1989 (1) LLJ 356 in which it was held as follows; "the State Government has power to extend the provisions of the Act or any of them in any other establishment or class of establishments. . . . . The Corporation has to set up a machinery to provide for medical benefits and has to implement the scheme and cover the establishments, provided minimum facilities are available to discharge the obligations under the Act. The State government has to examine whether all the establishments. . . . . or whether extension should be granted only to those establishments in the areas where sufficient medical facilities are available and where the employer and the employees can easily bear the burden of the contribution. . . . . " In so far as under the additional issue, it has been held that the Corporation was in a position to render services as on 1-7-1979, this question does not loom large. . . . . " In so far as under the additional issue, it has been held that the Corporation was in a position to render services as on 1-7-1979, this question does not loom large. ( 8 ) IN the result, we answer the questions referred to us as follows: (i) It would be open to the Corporation to recover contribution for the period prior to the issuance of notice calling upon the employer to register its institution and cover its employees with effect from an anterior date since the liability of the employer is statutory. (ii) Where the principal employer had failed to cover his employees irrespective of the corporation extending benefits or rendering any service, Section 68 could be invoked for the period prior to the issuance of notice, because as was held in AIR1985 sc 790 , [1985 (50 )FLR426 ], (1985 )I LLJ506 SC , 1985 (1 )SCALE337 , (1985 )2 SCC68 , [1985 ]2 SCR1085 , 1985 (17 )UJ588 (SC ) the contribution is compulsory insurance falling under Entries 23 and 24 of List. (iii) The Corporation could demand payment of contribution without notifying the facilities available for the employees to the employer.