Judgment :- Bellie, J. This petition is by one Mohammed Ali under Art.226 of the Constitution for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus challenging the detention of his brother-in-law Mr.C.P. Mohammed in pursuance of an order passed under Sec.3(l)(iii) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (Central Act 52 of 1974) (hereinafter called ‘COFEPOSA’ Act) with a view to preventing him from engaging in transporting, concealing and keeping smuggled goods. 2. The case against the detenu is that on 10. 1988 while the Officers attached to Headquarters Central Excise Preventive, Coimbatore were keeping surveillance over the passengers alighting from Train No.510 from Calicut at Podanur Railway Station, they intercepted the detenu C.P. Ahamed and subjected him to personal search in the presence of two independent witnesses. The officers found one paper packet kept in his waist fastened to the dhoti worn by him and the packet contained live gold bars with foreign markings ‘SUISSE 10 TOLAS 999.9 ASSAYEUR FOUNDER - 5 GOLD BARS". The detenu was not having any valid document to show that the gold bars were licit ones. The gold bars were found to weigh 583 grams with 24 carat purity and they were valued at Rs. 1,80,730/-. On belief that the gold bars were smuggled into India the Officers seized them under a mahazar. On (he same day the detenu gave a statement saying that he was residing in Kerala and was unemployed; he told his difficulties to one C.P. Abdul Sathar-his relative and neighbour and his business was to buy foreign goods from people coming from gulf countries for sale; he (Abdul Sathar) told him that if could carry gold bars he would get commission and he agreed to that; five days before Abdul Sathar took him to Coimbatore and there he introduced him to a person by name Gounder saying that he used to purchase gold bars; on 10. 1988 Abdul Sathar told him that he would have to go to Coimbatore to hand over gold bars to Goundcr and on the next day morning at 7.00 A.M. Sathar himself, as pre-arranged, met him at Chemmad bus stand and Sathar gave him five gold bars with foreign marking wrapped in a paper packet; he (detenu) kept the packet in his waist fastened to his dhoti and he travelled in train and when he alightened at Podanur Railway Station he was apprehended and the said five gold bars were seized. 3. The detenu was remanded and kept in Judicial Custody on 10. 1988. As the detenu was not able to show any document in proof of the gold bars being licit he was liable to be punished under Sec.135 of the Customs Act. From the materials the State Government were satisfied that the detenu has indulged in engaging in transporting, concealing and keeping smuggled goods and they were also satisfied that if he was let to remain at large he would again indulge in smuggling activities and the recourse to normal criminal law would not have the desired effect, and to effectively preventing him from indulging in such activities the State Government considered that it was necessary to detain him under Sec.3(1)(ii) of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974. 4. Now, in the affidavit filed in support of this petition, it is contended that the detenu is innocent and he has not committed any offence and he was never in possession of the contraband gold. It is further contended that a false and involuntary statement obtained from the detenu by the Central Excise Officers by force, threat and intimidation, and on the basis of that detention order has been passed. Then the detention order is challenged in the affidavit and additional affidavit on several grounds as follows: i. The alleged incident was on 10. 1988, but the detention order was passed after a long delay of 10 months i.e., on 37. 1989 and therefore there was no live-link between the incident and the order and the detaining authority has not applied its mind to the said delay; ii. 1988, but the detention order was passed after a long delay of 10 months i.e., on 37. 1989 and therefore there was no live-link between the incident and the order and the detaining authority has not applied its mind to the said delay; ii. The detaining authority has referred to and relied on the Passport No.V.595653 of an alleged co-accused K. Ponnusamy in the grounds of detention but copy of the said Passport has not been supplied to the detenu along with the grounds of detention and therefore the detenu could not make effective representation; iii. The Customs authorities searched the premises of the detenu, C.P. Sathar and K. Ponnusamy but the search warrants were not placed before the detaining authority and copies thereof were not supplied to the detenu; .iv. The detention order and the documents were not read out and explained to the detenu; .v. Copy of the written proposal sent by the Customs authorities has not been furnished to the detenu; vi. In connection with the same incident, show cause notices were sent to the detenu, C.P. Sathar and Ponnusamy and each of them sent replies thereto but those replies were not placed before the detaining authority; vii. The detaining authority did not considerall the documents together at a single point of time and on the basis of the additional documents received from the sponsoring authority the grounds of detention were suitably modified without the knowledge and approval of the detaining authority; viii. The Assaying Certificates issued by the Mint, Bombay were neither placed before the detaining authority nor a copy thereof was supplied to the detenu; .ix. After the detention order was passed on 27. 1989 the State Government has not sent the report to the Central Government within ten days and thus it did not comply with the provisions of the said Act; .x. The detenu by his representation dated 19. 1989 requested the detaining authority to supply copies of five important and vital documents but the detaining authority rejected the same on 10. 1989; xi. There is no declaration issued against the detenu under Sec.9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act but still the Advisory Board had opined that there is sufficient cause for the continued detention of the detenu and this is against the provisions of Sec.8(C) of the Act and therefore the detention is vitiated; xii. 1989; xi. There is no declaration issued against the detenu under Sec.9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act but still the Advisory Board had opined that there is sufficient cause for the continued detention of the detenu and this is against the provisions of Sec.8(C) of the Act and therefore the detention is vitiated; xii. The replies to the show cause notice sent by the detenu, Ponnusamy and C.P. Sathar have not been placed before the Advisory Board or the State Governmental the time of passing of the confirmation order. We will now consider the above points one by one. 5.Point (i): The point raised by the detenu is that there is delay in passing the detention order. The incident occurred on 10. 1988and the detention order was passed on 37. 1989, i.e., nearly 10 months after. To this the respondents in their counter affidavit have stated as follows: The case was detected on 10. 1988; the investigation of the case was completed on 2. 1989; the case was recommended for detention on 12. 1989; the proposal for detention order was sent on 30.3.1989; the proposal was received on 4. 1989; the file was submitted to the first respondent on 4. 1989 and this respondent was placed the file on 14. 1989; the file was sent to the Law Department on 14. 1989; it was sent back by the Law Department on 24. 1989; again the file was submitted to the first respondent on 24. 1989 and this respondent passed the file on 24. 1989; this respondent called for some clarifications from the sponsoring authority on 24. 1989; a reply was received thereto on 5. 1989; further clarification was called for from the sponsoring authority on 15. 1989; reply was received on 26. 1989; again further particulars were called for on 26. 1989; and reply was received therefor on 17. 1989; a note for circulation was submitted to the first respondent on 17. 1989; this respondent passed the file on 20.7.1989; the Additional Secretary (Law) passed the file on 27. 1989 and the Minister for Law passed the file on 27. 1989; after taking of the copies the detention order was passed on 37. 1989. Now it is well settled law that delay in passing the detention order by itself is not material but only unexplained or unsatisfactorily explained delay only is fatal. 1989 and the Minister for Law passed the file on 27. 1989; after taking of the copies the detention order was passed on 37. 1989. Now it is well settled law that delay in passing the detention order by itself is not material but only unexplained or unsatisfactorily explained delay only is fatal. In Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1982S.C. 8:1982 Crl.L.J. 150: (1981) 4S.C.C. 647:1982S.C.C. (Crl.) 16: (1982)1 S.C.R. 1028 , the Supreme Court has stated inclear words that: “Delay ipso facto in passing an order of detention after an incident is not fatal to the detention of a person, for, in certain cases delay may be unavoidable and reasonable. What is required by law is that the delay must be satisfactorily explained by the detaining authority.” In Ashok Narain v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1222:1982 Crl.L.J. 729: (1982)2 S.C.C. 487:1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 466: (1982)2 S.C.J. 165, in which also detention order was passed under the COFEPOSA Act, there was a delay of about eight months from the date of the incident and passing the order of detention i.e., from February, 1981 to 14th October, 1981. There the delay was held to have been satisfactorily explained in the following words: "In order to satisfy ourselves that there was no undue or unnecessary delay in making the order of detention, we sent for the original files and we have perused them. We are satisfied that the matter was examined thoroughly at various levels and the detaining authority applied his mind fully and satisfactorily to the question whether the petitioner should be detained under the COFEPOSA Act." Then in Shiv Raton Makim v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 610: 1986 Crl.L.J. 813: (1986)1 S.C.C. 404 :1986 S.C.C. (Crl)74: (1986)1 S.C.J. 1, Bhagwati, C.J., speaking for the Court said that: "It is no doubt true that where an unreasonably long period has elapsed between the date of the incident and the date of the order of detention, an inference may legitimately be drawn that there is no nexus between the incident and the order of detention and the order of detention may be liable to be struck down as invalid. But there can be no hard and fast rule as to what is the length of time which should be regarded sufficient to snap the nexus between the incident and the order of detention." It was then said: "We are of the view that here the lapse of time between the date of the incident and the date of the order of detention has been sufficiently explained by the detaining authority and hence we are not prepared to draw the inference of mala fides merely because the order of detention happened to be made about five months after the petitioner was found carrying two pieces of foreign marked gold." (underlining ours) Later in Rajendrakumar Natwarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat,A.I.R. 1988S.C. 1255,the Supreme Court again dealing with a case under the COFEPOSA Act has made an apt and elaborate observation as follows on the aspect of the delay in passing the order of detention: "In the enforcement of a law relating to preventive detention like the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 there is apt to be some delay, between the prejudicial activities complained of under Sec.3(1) of the Act and the making of an order of detention. When a person is detected in the act of smuggling or foreign exchange racketeering, the Directorate of Enforcement has to make a thorough investigation into all the facts with a view to determine the identity of the persons engaged in these operations which have a deleterious effect on the national economy. Quite often these activities are carried on by persons forming a syndicate or having a wide network and therefore this includes recording of statements of persons involved, examination of their books of accounts and other related documents. Effective administration and realisation of the purposes of the Act is often rendered difficult by reason of the clandestine manner in which the persons engaged in such operations carry on their activities and the consequent difficulties in securing sufficient evidence to comply with the rigid standards, insisted upon by the Courts. Sometimes such investigation has to be carried on for months together due to the magnitude of the operations. Sometimes such investigation has to be carried on for months together due to the magnitude of the operations. Apart from taking various other measures i.e., launching of prosecution of the persons involved for contravention of the various provisions of the Acts in question and initiation of the adjudication proceedings, the Directorate has also to consider whether there was necessity in the public interest to direct the detention of such person or persons under Sec.3(1) of the Act with a view to preventing them from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation and augmentation of foreign exchange or with a view to preventing them from engaging in smuggling of goods etc. The proposal has to be cleared at the highest quarter and is then placed before a Screening Committee. For ought we know, the Screening Committee may meet once or twice a month. If the Screening Committee approves of the proposal, it would place the same before the detaining authority. Being conscious that the requirement of Art.22(5) would not be satisfied unless the ‘basic facts and materials’ which weighed with him in reaching his subjective satisfaction, are communicated to the detenu and the likelihood that the Court would examine the grounds specified in the order of detention to see whether they were relevant to the circumstances under which the impugned order was passed, the detaining authority would necessarily insist upon sufficiency of the grounds which would justify the taking of the drastic measure of preventively detaining the person." In this Supreme Court case, even though there was no explanation for the delay between 2nd February and 28th May, 1987 (i.e. about four months), it was held that would not give rise to a legitimate inference that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the District Magistrate was not genuine or that the grounds were stale or illusory or that there was no rational connection between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. From the above decisions of the Supreme Court two things are clear, viz. From the above decisions of the Supreme Court two things are clear, viz. (1) Even in the case of long delay if the Court is satisfied that there was sufficient reason for the delay that delay will not be fatal to the detention order; and (2) in the case of detention order made under the provisions of Acts like COFEPOSA, in considering whether the delay is fatal or not, various factors such as the complexities of the case and the magnitude of the operations and difficulties in securing sufficient evidence that would be believed in the Court have to be considered. In the light of these we will now consider the facts in our case. On going through the explanation given in the counter regarding the delay alleged in passing the detention order it would appear clear that there was no lapse of time and the authorities were all along in touch with and considering the case. The learned counsel for the petitioner would point out that as per the explanation given in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents the case was detected on 10. 1988 but the investigation was completed only on 2. 1989and thus there was a delay of four months. But it is a case in which five gold bars have been seized on search of the person of the detenu which are of the value of Rs. 1,80,730 and he had in his confession statement implicated two others one of them being a resident of Coimbatore whereas the detenu and the other are from Kerala. In these circumstances, four months time taken for completing the investigation in our view cannot be said to be an inordinate delay. Then it is pointed out that further clarification was called for from the sponsoring authority on 15. 1989 and the sponsoring authority sent the reply only on 26. 1989. Here again the further clarification asked for might have to be gathered from different records at different places and scrutinised by various authorities and therefore this also cannot be said to be a long delay. In a case in K. Aruna Kumari v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 227, the detenu was found to have committed an offence under the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Acton 112. 1987. The investigation was completed on 15. In a case in K. Aruna Kumari v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 227, the detenu was found to have committed an offence under the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Acton 112. 1987. The investigation was completed on 15. 1987 and the detention order was passed on 15. 1987. It was held that the delay cannot by itself vitiate the decision to detain the person and the delay of five months in passing the detention order was satisfactorily explained. As against this on the side of the petitioner a decision in Anand Prakash v. The State of U.P. and others, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 516, was cited. But that was a case in which the detention order was passed under the National Security Act. The recovery of electric wire alleged to have been stolen was recovered from one Munshi Sharma who was a servant of the detenu on 3. 1989. The factory of the detenu was raised on 3. 1989. No action was taken against him till 5. 1989. On being arrested on 5. 1989 the detenu moved a bail application and the detention order was made on 5. 1989. Though bail was granted, in view of the detention order, he could not be released from jail. In these circumstances it was held that the delay has not been explained and the ground instance therefore could not be a proximate case for a sudden decision to take action under the National Security Act and this vitiates the order. The facts of this case are entirely different from the facts in the instant case and in the instant case the detention order was passed under the COFEPOSA Act whereas in the said judgment case in (Anand Prakash v. The State of U.P. and others, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 516 - supra), the detention order was passed under the National Security Act. Therefore we do not think that the petitioner can rely on this judgment. Therefore we do not think that the petitioner can rely on this judgment. On the side of the petitioner three judgments of this Court also were relied upon and they are: (i) A.Chenchiah v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by Additional Secretary to Government, Public (SC) Department, Madras and another, 1987 M.L.J. (Crl) 306, (ii) Hyder Ali v. The State of Tamil Nadu and others, 1987 M.L.J. (Crl) 626 and (iii) Droupadhi Devi v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by its Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Home Department, Madras and another, 1989L. W. (Crl.) 442. In the first case, A. Chenchiah v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by Additional Secretary to Government, Public (SC) Department, Madras and another, 1987 M.L.J. (Crl) 306, it was held that there was no proper explanation for the delay of 8 months and 15 days in passing the detention order and therefore it vitiates the detention. In the second case, Hyder Ali v. The State of Tamil Nadu and others, 1987 M.L.J. (Crl) 626, it was found that the unexplained lapse of time of 7 1/2 months in passing the order of detention, and particularly the delay of six months in securing the detenu affects the validity of the order of detention. In this case, the Court appears to have thought that the cumulative effect of both the delay in passing the order of detention and the delay in securing the detenu renders the order of detention invalid. In the third case, Droupadhi Devi v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by its Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Home Department, Madras and another, 1989 L. W. (Crl) 442,also it was found that the delay of 8 months in passing the order of detention and the delay in 4 months in arresting the petitioner in pursuance of the order of detention invalidates the detention order. In our case, as aforementioned, we are really concerned with the delay of four months in investigating the case only and as regards the rest of the period it cannot be stated that there was no explanation. In all the above three judgments of this Court none of the decisions of the Supreme Court adverted to above have been referred to at all. In all the above three judgments of this Court none of the decisions of the Supreme Court adverted to above have been referred to at all. In view of the clear out and authoritative view expressed by the Supreme Court in its said decisions we find it difficult to think that the above three decisions of this Court could be of any assistance to the petitioner. Thus we are unable to accept the argument that the detention order is vitiated by the delay in passing the detention order. 6. It is further argued that since there was long lapse of time from the date of incident and the date of passing the detention order the detaining authority itself should have considered this delay and then decided whether this delay renders the detention order that was to be passed invalid. It appears the learned counsel has put forth this argument on the basis of an observation made in Ashok Narain v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1222:1982 Crl.L.J. 729: (1982)2 S.C.C. 487:1982 S.C.C. (Crl.) 466: (1982)2 S.C.J. 165, that: “We find from the file that the very question whether the passage of time had made it unnecessary to order the detention of the detenu was also considered by the detaining authority.” This does not necessarily mean that it is the view of the Supreme Court that the detaining authority must write in the detention order itself that it considered the alleged delay aspect of the matter. The very fact that the detaining authority has passed the order itself would show that according to it there was no inordinate delay. But certainly the Court can consider the question of delay whatever is the view of the detaining authority. Thus we find no merit in this point. Hyder Ali v. The State of Tamil Nadu and others, 1987 M.L.J. (Crl.) 626 and Rajagopal Chettiar v. Union of India, 1987 M.L.J. (Crl) 653, were also cited as regards this point. But we do not see any relevancy of these decisions to the point at issue. 7.Point (ii): As per the detention order the detenu in his statement dated 10. But we do not see any relevancy of these decisions to the point at issue. 7.Point (ii): As per the detention order the detenu in his statement dated 10. 1988 has stated that one C.P. Sathar, a relative and neighbour of the detenu was trading in smuggled goods and he told him that if the detenu could be a carrier of gold bars he would get commission and C.P. Sathar took the detenu to Coimbatore and introduced a person by name Gounder saying that this Gounder used to purchased gold bars and five gold bars were also given to that Gounder and then five days after Sathar gave the detenu five gold bars to be taken and handed over to the said Gounder. It is then stated in the grounds of detention that one Kannammal gave a statement on 10. 1988 that her husband Ponnusamy was also called as Gounder and she handed over the Passport of her husband to the officers for the purpose of investigation and the detenu in his further statement on 10. 1988 said that the photograph affixed in the passport was that of the Gounder. It is then stated that the said Ponnusamy gave a statement that he was doing brokerage in gold in Coimbatore. It is clear that these statements are narration of facts and the reference to the passport of K.Ponnusamy is only casual and the detaining authority has not relied on this passport as a ground for passing the detention order. The question now arises is whether such a document should have been supplied to the detenu along the detention order. It is argued on behalf of the detenu that copy of any document referred to in the detention order shall be supplied and failure to supply would invalidate the detention order. In this connection the learned counsel for the detenu has referred to Shalini Soni v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 431: 1980 Crl.L.J. 1467: (1980)4 S.C.C. 544 :1981 S.C.C. (Crl.) 38, where in the learned Judges have stated that: "In our view copies of documents to which reference is made in the ‘grounds’ must be supplied to the detenu as part of the ‘grounds’." The point is whether according to this Judgment copies of any document just referred to even casually or incidentally shall be given to the detenu. On going through the judgment we find that the judgment is not very clear about this aspect of the matter. It is next relied on Nafisa Khalifa Ghanem v. Union of India and others, (1982)1 S.C.C. 422 , where it is observed that: "The detenu cannot make any effective representation unless he gets copies of the documents which are expressly mentioned in the grounds of detention." Here too the same question i.e., whether copies of any document expressly referred to must be given to the detenu even if it is unimportant and insignificant. The learned counsel further cited a decision Mohd. Zakir v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 696: 1982 Crl.L.J. 611: (1982)3 S.C.C. 216 , for the proposition that the documents must be supplied to a detenu even if there was no demand for it. In this judgment, it was held that some documents of vital importance were not supplied to the detenu and therefore the continued detention of the detenu was void. But we have held above that the document is not of vital importance and it was casually or incidentally mentioned. As against the above contention of the learned counsel for the detenu the learned Public Prosecutor brought to our notice a decision in L.M.S. Ummu Saleema v. B.B. Gujaral and another, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1191: 1981 Crl.L.J. 883: (1981)3 S.C.C. 317 :1981 S.C.C. (Crl.) 726, where it is very clearly and authoritatively laid down by a three Judge Bench that, "...every failure to furnish copy of a document to which reference is made in the grounds of detention is not an infringement of Art.22(5), fatal to the order of detention. It is only failure to furnish copies of such documents as were relied upon by the detaining authority, making it difficult for the detenu to make an effective representation, that amounts to a violation of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Art.22(5)." We are therefore clearly of the view that non-supply of the passport in question does not vitiate the detention order. 8. Point (iii): It is argued that the houses of the detenu, C.P. Sathar and Ponnusamy were searched but the search warrants were not placed before the detaining authority. 8. Point (iii): It is argued that the houses of the detenu, C.P. Sathar and Ponnusamy were searched but the search warrants were not placed before the detaining authority. As to this it is stated in the counter affidavit that the houses were searched of course but no material was recovered and therefore it was not necessary to place any search warrant before the detaining authority. The detention order does not relate to any article recovered from any house as a result of any search but it relates to contrabands recovered from the person of the detenu. Therefore, any search warrant issued will be of no consequence at all. Hence, it is quite understandable that no search warrant need be placed before the detaining authority. It is next argued that no copy of the search warrant has been supplied to the detenu. But a reading of the detention order shows that no reference to any search warrant has at all been made therein and therefore there is absolutely no need to give any copy of the search warrants. What all stated in the detention order is that: "Your house and the houses of Thiru C.P. Abdul Sathar and Thiru. K. Ponnusamy were searched with nil results.” This does not mean that the detention order refers to search warrants. However, a decision of the Delhi High Court in Gurdeep Singh v. Union of India, 1989 Crl.L.J. (Noc.) 41 (Delhi), was cited but according to that judgment all the documents relied upon for the purpose of ordering detention are to be supplied pari pasu with the grounds of detention to the detenu and documents not relied upon but casually referred to for the purpose of narration of facts are also to be supplied to the detenu if he so demands. As seen above, the documents in question, i.e., search warrants were not even casually referred to in the detention order. Therefore, this ruling will not apply to the facts of this case. It was also relied on two unreported judgments of this Court in M. Jainulabdeen v. The Joint Secretary to the Government of India and another, W.P.No.8739 of 1989 dated 112. 1989 and S.B. Umar v. The Joint Secretary to the Government of India and another, W.P.No.11999 of 1989 dated 23. 1990.But we find that the facts in those cases are entirely different from the facts in this case. 1989 and S.B. Umar v. The Joint Secretary to the Government of India and another, W.P.No.11999 of 1989 dated 23. 1990.But we find that the facts in those cases are entirely different from the facts in this case. Hence they are not of any assistance to the detenu. 9.Point (iv): It is seen from detention order that the Tamil Nadu Government which has passed the detention order has requested the Government of Kerala to explain the contents of the order, the grounds of detention as well as the documents to the detenu in the language known to him. It is argued that the grounds of detention order and the documents were not read over and explained to the detenu and therefore he is very much prejudiced. As to this in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents it is stated that the entire grounds of detention and its enclosures were read over and explained to the detenu in Malayalam by the Jail Authorities and the detenu understood the contents and acknowledged the same and has affixed his signature at each page of the documents. Hence, we do not see any merit in this point raised. 10.Point (v): It is the case of the detenu that the written proposal of the sponsoring authority has not be supplied to him. To this the respondents contended in the counter affidavit that the proposal is only a communication between the sponsoring authority and the detaining authority and therefore no copy of the proposal need be given to the detenu. We think that the respondent’s contention must be held to be correct. 11.Point (Vi): It is submitted that the show cause notices were sent to the detenu and also to C.P. Sathar and Ponnusamy and all of them submitted replies there to but those replies have not been placed before the detaining authority and this vitiates the detention order. To this point raised in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, in the counter statement filed by the respondents it is not disputed that to the show cause notice sent replies were received from the detenu and the said two others and they have not been placed before the detaining authority. It appears, they (respondents) seem to say that the reply from the detenu was received late. The reply was received from the detenu on 7. It appears, they (respondents) seem to say that the reply from the detenu was received late. The reply was received from the detenu on 7. 1989 and even before that the replies were received from the other two persons but the detention order has been passed only on 37. 1989. It may also be noted here that in the counter affidavit itself it is stated that the detenu in his letters dated 14. 1989 and 15. 1989 called for copies of certain documents to enable him to reply to the show cause notices and the required documents were also supplied to him on 6. 1989 and the detenu sent his reply to the show cause notice on 7. 1989 through his advocate and also sought for personal hearing. From these facts it would appear that atleast from the point of view of the detenu the reply to the show cause notice is an important document which would explain his defence. Therefore, there is no doubt that the reply of the detenu to the show cause notice is a vita! document and that should have been placed before the detaining authority. Since the reply has been received on 7. 1989 and the detention order was passed only on 37. 1989 the reply could have been and should have been placed before the detaining authority for its consideration. Therefore non-placing of the reply of the detenu to the show cause notice vitiates the detention order. In Dharamdas Shamlal Agarwal v. The Police Commissioner, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1282: 1989 Crl.L.J. 1130, it has been held that: "The requisite subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, the formation of which is a condition precedent to passing of a detention order will get vitiated if material or vital facts which would have bearing on the issue and weighed the satisfaction of the detaining authority one way or the other and influenced his mind are withheld or suppressed by the sponsoring authority or ignored and not considered by the detaining authority before issuing the detention order." This decision supports our view that non-placing of the reply to the show cause notice which is a vital document renders the detention order invalid. This Court in an unreported decision in G. Philomina alias Mayalagu Mageswari v. The State of Tamil Nadu and another, W.P.No.626 of 1988, dated 24. This Court in an unreported decision in G. Philomina alias Mayalagu Mageswari v. The State of Tamil Nadu and another, W.P.No.626 of 1988, dated 24. 1988, has held that the non-placing of the reply to the show cause notice of the detenu and the co-accused is fatal, and on this ground the detention order was quashed. The learned Public Prosecutor would however argue that in view of Sec.5-A of the COFEPOSA Act, even if the reply to the show cause notice has not been placed before the detaining authority, that itself will not vitiate the order of detention. In support of his contention he would also reply on Madan Lal Anand v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1990 S.C.176. We are afraid that this submission is not tenable. Sec.5-A of the Act would come into play when the detention order against a person is passed on two or more grounds, and if one or some of the grounds is or are to be held defective and cannot be relied on for the reasons stated in the section then it must be deemed that the order has been made on being subjectively satisfied with respect to the remaining ground or grounds. That is not the case here. We are not concerned with any ground or grounds in the order. What is being argued is a vital document which according to the detenu explains his defence for the entire case against him has not been placed before the detaining authority and therefore the detention order is vitiated. Thus Sec.5-A is not at all attracted. The result is, as we have said above, for non-placing of the reply of the detenu and also the other two persons before the detaining authority the order stands vitiated. 12.Point No. (vii): It is mere staled that the detaining authority has not formulated the grounds of detention upon consideration of all the documents together at a single point of time, and on the basis of additional documents received from the sponsoring authority the grounds were suitably modified without the knowledge and approval of the detaining authority. But we do not see any material to substantiate this point. In the counter affidavit it is stated that all the documents relied on were placed before the detaining authority before passing the detention order and they were considered. We do not see any substance in this point raised by the detenu. But we do not see any material to substantiate this point. In the counter affidavit it is stated that all the documents relied on were placed before the detaining authority before passing the detention order and they were considered. We do not see any substance in this point raised by the detenu. 13.Point No.(viii): It is submitted that assaying certificate has not been placed before the detaining authority and no copy was supplied to the detenu. In the counter affidavit it is stated that the weight, purity and the value of the five gold biscuits were tested by a certified goldsmith at the time of seizure and on the basis of this and on the basis of the statement made by the detenu himself the detaining authority arrived at the subjective satisfaction and passed the detention order. Considering this we do not see any merit in this point. 14.Point No. (ix): In reply to this point raised in the additional affidavit filed by the detenu it is contended in the counter affidavit that on the very same date of detention order the detaining authority sent the copies of detention order, the grounds of detention and documents to the Central Government. The detenu has not brought to our notice any further material to substantiate this point raised. Hence this point has to be rejected. 15.Point No. (x): The detenu appears to have made a representation to the detaining authority for supplying copies of the following documents, viz., (i) summons issued to Kannammal, (ii) Passport No.595653 issued to Ponnusamy, (iii) summons issued to Ponnusamy, (iv) summons issued to C.P. Ahamed Satharand (v) search warrant for the search conducted in the house of Ponnusamy. The detaining authority has rejected this representation. It is argued that on account of this the detenu could not make an effective representation. But we find that the said five documents do not relate to the detenu but relate to others. Except stating that they are important and vital documents and because of non-supply of those documents the detenu is prejudiced in making his representation, it is not stated how these documents are relevant and important for the detenu to make representation. But we find that the said five documents do not relate to the detenu but relate to others. Except stating that they are important and vital documents and because of non-supply of those documents the detenu is prejudiced in making his representation, it is not stated how these documents are relevant and important for the detenu to make representation. The documents 1, 3, 4 and 5 have not at all been referred to in the detention order and the second documents as seen above, was just referred to casually while narrating the facts of the case and not been relied upon by the detaining authority. In these circumstances can it be said that the detenu is prejudiced due to non-supply of the said documents in making his representation? Learned counsel for the detenu would reply upon Hasmykh v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 28: (1981)1 S.C.R. 353 , wherein it is observed as follows: "If, however, the grounds communicated are elaborate and contain all the ‘basic facts’ but are not comprehensive enough to cover all the details or particulars of the ‘basic facts’ such particulars also, must be supplied to the detenu, if asked for by him, with reasonable expedition within a reasonable time." The learned counsel also relies on Nafisa Krialifa Ghanem v. Union of India and others, (1982)1 S.C.C. 482 , which holds that: "The detenu cannot make any effective representation unless he gets copies of the documents which are expressly mentioned in the grounds of detention." From this the learned counsel submits that the document 2 i.e., passport No.595653 issued to Ponnusamy has been referred to in the grounds of detention and therefore copy of this document ought to have been supplied to the detenu atleast when he asked for it. Even if this argument must be held good, for this reason alone the detention order cannot be said to have been vitiated considering Sec.5-A of the Act. Because of the non-supply of the copy of the said passport it is difficult to say that the detenu identified the photograph of Ponnusamy in the passport as that of the Gounder referred to by him in his statement. Because of the non-supply of the copy of the said passport it is difficult to say that the detenu identified the photograph of Ponnusamy in the passport as that of the Gounder referred to by him in his statement. But even holding so, only because of this the detention order cannot be held to be vitiated because there are other grounds also in the detention order especially the recovery of the five gold bars from the detenu and his confession statement. It must be noted that the confession statement has not been retracted at all. Thus we find non-supply of the five documents asked for by the detenu is not vital and it does not vitiate the detention order. 16.Point No. (xi): As regards this point raised in the additional affidavit filed in support of this petition, in the counter affidavit it is stated that the Advisory Board has in its report correctly stated that there is sufficient cause for the detention of the detenu and only in the confirmation order a mistake has crept in by wrong typing that the Advisory Board has given opinion that"there is sufficient cause for continued defention’. At the time of arguments the original records were looked into and it was found to be only a mistake in the confirmation order as stated in the counter affidavit. Therefore, this point is devoid of any merit. 17.Point No.(xii): We have held already on point No.(vi) that the replies to the show cause notice of the detenu, C.P. Sathar and Ponnusamy have not been placed before the detaining authority and the reply to the show cause notice is an important and vital document which should be considered by the detaining authority, and non-placing of them before the detaining authority vitiates the detention order. In view of this finding of ours, this point No.(xii) that the replies to the show cause notices were not placed before the Advisory Board and the Government at the time of confirmation do not arise. 18. In the result, in view of the point No.(vi) that because of the failure of placing of the replies to the show cause notice by the detenu, C.P. Sathar and Ponnusamy before the detaining authority, the detention order is vitiated. Detention of the detenu cannot be upheld. Accordingly, the order of detention is set aside and the detenu is ordered to be released forthwith.