Judgment :- Nainar Sundaram, J. The first-respondent in W.P.No.7108 of 1981 is the appellant in this writ appeal. The petitioner in the writ petition is the first respondent herein and the second respondent in the writ petition is the second respondent herein. Convenience suggests to us to adopt in the course of this judgment, the nomenclature assigned to the parties in the writ petition. The petitioner was in. the employ of the respondents. The petitioner was sought to be proceeded against in disciplinary action on the ground that he, along with others and conniving with them, during the period from 13. 1974 to 20.3.1975 committed gross misconduct by fraudulently and dishonestly appending certificates to the bills submitted by a Food Corporation of India contractor to the effect that the services for which charges were claimed, were performed and carried out satisfactorily and the quantity handled was correct and thereby facilitated the contractor to get an excess payment of Rs.19,180 and further he had also prepared, signed and submitted false monthly statements and thereby failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and contravened Regulation 31 of Food Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1971. The issuance of the charge memorandum happened on 4. 1981. Earlier to this, no disciplinary action, by issuance of any charge memorandum, took place. But, there was an order dated 14th March, 1975, placing the petitioner under suspension on the ground that disciplinary proceedings were in contemplation. However, nothing happened pursuant thereto. The proposed disciplinary proceedings were obviously forgotten and not pursued. On the other hand, the petitioner was hauled up in a criminal, case along with others for offences under Sec.120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Sec.5(2) read with Sec.5(l) of Prevention of Corruption Act. The first information report in the criminal case was launched on 26. 1975. The Special Judge for Police Establishment Cases at Hyderabad convicted the petitioner for the aforesaid offences on 21. 1978. On 15. 1978, the petitioner was dismissed on the basis of the conviction by the criminal court. The first information report in the criminal case was launched on 26. 1975. The Special Judge for Police Establishment Cases at Hyderabad convicted the petitioner for the aforesaid offences on 21. 1978. On 15. 1978, the petitioner was dismissed on the basis of the conviction by the criminal court. There was an appeal by the petitioner as against his conviction by the criminal court, and that appeal, along with the appeals by others, similarly involved, was heard by the High Court of Judicature Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad and the petitioner as well as others were acquitted on the ground the prosecution has not proved, beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt of the accused and the accused were entitled to benefit of doubt. The judgment in appeal was rendered on 210. 1979. The petitioner was reinstated in service, but he was visited with the charge memorandum, as stated above, on 4. 1981. The petitioner came to this Court by way of the writ petition praying for the issue of writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the charge memorandum and to interdict the respondents from conducting the departmental enquiry. The point that was advanced on behalf of the petitioner before the learned single Judge, who heard and disposed of the writ petition, was that after the verdict of the Appellate Court in the criminal case, it is not open to the respondents to proceed against the petitioner departmentally. The learned single Judge accepted this proposition and allowed the writ petition. This has obliged the first respondent to prefer this writ appeal. 2.. On the question as to whether the acquittal by the criminal court would bar the initiation or continuation of the departmental enquiry, the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Corporation of Nagpur v. Ramchandra G.Modak, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 626:1984 Lab.I.C. 179: (1981)2 S.C.C. 714 , is the ruling that governs. The following passage in that pronouncement needs extraction as follows: “The other question that remains is if the respondents are acquitted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against the respondents would have to continue. This is a matter which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by the criminal court. This is a matter which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by the criminal court. Normally where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges it would not be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the fact remains however, that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor is its discretion in any way fettered. However, as quite some time has elapsed since the departmental inquiry had started. The authority concerned will take into consideration this factor in coming to the conclusion if it is really worthwhile to continue: the departmental inquiry in the event of the acquittal of the respondents. If, however, the; authority feels that there is sufficient evidence and good grounds to proceed with the inquiry, it can certainly do so”. From the above passage, it is clear that if it is a case of the employee, who is an accused in the criminal case getting honourably and completely exonerated of the charges, it would not be expedient to continue a departmental enquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence. At the same time, there could not be subscribing support to a broad proposition that merely because the accused was acquitted in a criminal case, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental enquiry is taken away. Nor can it be stated that its discretion in any way is fettered. The Supreme Court has also indicated that if it is a case where quite some time has elapsed since the departmental enquiry had started, the authority concerned will take into consideration this factor in coming to the conclusion if it is really worthwhile to continue the departmental inquiry in the event of the acquittal of the employee and if however, the authority feels that there is sufficient evidence and good grounds to proceed with the enquiry, it can certainly do so. This pronouncement of the Supreme Court has been followed by a Bench of this Court in M.M.Rubber Company Ltd. Madras v. S.Natarajan and another, (1985)2 L.L.J. 364 . This pronouncement of the Supreme Court has been followed by a Bench of this Court in M.M.Rubber Company Ltd. Madras v. S.Natarajan and another, (1985)2 L.L.J. 364 . A Bench of the High Court of Allahabad also in P.H.Tripathi v. Central Bank of India and others, (1985)2 L.L.J. 500 has followed the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Corporation of Nagpur v. Ramchandra G.Modak, A.I.R 1984 S.C. 626. Thus, in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court, we are not able to subscribe our support to the broad proposition which has guided the learned single Judge when he dismissed the writ petition that when there has been an acquittal by the criminal court on the very same charges, there could not be initiation and prosecution of departmental action. 3. The above answer does not bring a resolution to the entire controversy in this case. What is being pleaded on behalf of the petitioner by his learned counsel is that the respondents had no justification and warrant to postpone the initiation and prosecution of disciplinary action, if that had been sincerely in their mind, by issuing the appropriate charge memorandum even in 1975 itself and here is a case of inordinate delay in the prosecution of the disciplinary action and that would cause grave prejudice to the petitioner and at this point of time, he would be totally disabled from putting forth any effective defence to the charges levelled. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the charges levelled against the petitioner are based on the Food Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1971 and the disciplinary action could have been and should have been initiated and prosecuted independently and the sustainability or otherwise of the charges levelled ought to have been tested in such disciplinary action at the appropriate time, affording an opportunity to the petitioner to contest the disciplinary action effectively. In our view, the long lapse of time speaks against the initiation and prosecution of disciplinary action in 1981 by the issuance of the impugned charge memorandum in respect of the alleged acts and/omissions of the years 1974-75 thrown against the petitioner. There is force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner on this aspect. In our view, the long lapse of time speaks against the initiation and prosecution of disciplinary action in 1981 by the issuance of the impugned charge memorandum in respect of the alleged acts and/omissions of the years 1974-75 thrown against the petitioner. There is force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner on this aspect. The charge memorandum is based on contravention of the Food Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1971, on the ground that the petitioner failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and contravened Regulation 31. We do not think, on the facts and circumstances of this case, that there should not have been simultaneity of proceedings, and the respondents need not and, should not have awaited and banked upon the results in the criminal proceedings. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we are obliged to say that the respondents should have initiated and prosecuted the disciplinary action, if they had sincerity of purpose, in 1975 itself. They did not do so. The postponement of disciplinary action has caused, as complained of by the learned counsel for the petitioner, grave prejudice to his client. At this point of time, the petitioner is being asked to answer charges, which related to alleged acts and omissions that happened in 1974-75. The complaint is legitimate that the petitioner’s defence would stand crippled by virtue of this inordinate delay, which should have been avoided. The petitioner would not be in a position to muster up the requisite evidence to substantiate his defence to the disciplinary action. It has been countenanced by pronouncements of this Court that delay in the initiation of disciplinary action would sometimes amount to violation of principles of natural justice - vide Ramanaraya-nan v. Food Corporation of India, 1984 T.L.N.J. 123. The present case is one such. The question as to whether there could be simultaneous proceedings has got to be answered only taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of a particular case. Such is’ the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Kusheswar Dubey v. M/s.Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 2118. The present case is one such. The question as to whether there could be simultaneous proceedings has got to be answered only taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of a particular case. Such is’ the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Kusheswar Dubey v. M/s.Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 2118. Our assessment of the facts and circumstances of the case leaves no room for doubt in our mind that the respondents should have prosecuted the disciplinary action separately and independently at the appropriate earliest point of time, instead of deferring it to await the results in the criminal proceedings. This has brought about a situation of inequity, hardship and prejudice to the petitioner and would disable him from effectively defending the disciplinary action at this stage. This feature, which we have taken note of dissuades us from permitting the prosecution of the disciplinary action at a very belated stage and obliges us to maintain the allowing of the writ petition by the learned single Judge, though not on the ground expressed by him, but on this ground. Accordingly, the writ appeal fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.