K.C. AGRAWAL, C.J.-This revision (Civil Revision No.407 of 1990) has been preferred against the order of the Additional District Judge, Nagaur dated 20-9-1990 passed in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.38 of 1989, arising out of Civil Miscellaneous Case No. 26 of 1986. 2. Shyam Sunder Joshi (plaintiff non-petitioner in S.B. Civil Revision petition No.407 of 1990) instituted a suit for permanent injunction restraining the original defendants Nos. I to 5 (non-petitioners Nos. 2 to 6 in S.B. Civil Revision petition No.407 of 1990) from terminating him from the post of Rasayanshala Prabhari and Sahayak Chikitask on the allegations that the plaintiff was employed by Jain Vishwa Bharti Society (for short the Society) in the aforesaid capacity on the monthly salary of Rs.400/- and that he was covered by the Industrial Disputes Act as well as the Factories Act and there were no rules for termination of services, the order terminating him on 10-11-1986 was invalid. Consequently, he filed the suit along with an application under Order XXXIX rules 1 and 2 of the code of civil procedure praying that the defendants (non- petitioners 2 to 6) be restrained from terminating his service. 3. The application for injunction was contested by the defendants 1 to 5 asserting that the non-petitioners plaintiff had been transferred to Sewabhavi Ayurvedic Rasayanshala Trust (for short the Trust). Consequent, upon the transfer he ceased to be an employee of the defendants 1 to 5 and that he became an employee of the Trust with effect from 1-11-1984. Hence, no injunction could be issued against defendants 1 to 5. 4. On the application, the Trust thereafter filed an application for being impleaded as a party in the suit, upon being impleaded, a reply to the injunction application was filed by the Trust that it was not a factory and, as such it was not governed either by Industrial Disputes Act or the Factories Act. It was asserted that the termination order was valid and was passed after due notice. 5. Both the parties filed affidavits as well as documents in support of their respective cases. On the application dated 17-11-86 & 23-8-88 as well as the written statement, the trial court framed the following questions, which arose for decision of the injunction application :- 1. Whether the plaintiff non-petitioner had a prima facie case? 2. 5. Both the parties filed affidavits as well as documents in support of their respective cases. On the application dated 17-11-86 & 23-8-88 as well as the written statement, the trial court framed the following questions, which arose for decision of the injunction application :- 1. Whether the plaintiff non-petitioner had a prima facie case? 2. Whether by rejection of the application, the plaintiff non- petitioner would suffer irreparable loss? 3. Whether balance of convenience lay in favour of the plaintiff non-petitioner? and 4. Whether mandatory injunction could be issued? 7. One of the question, which arose before the trial court, was whether the suit was barred by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act having raised industrial dispute. The plaintiff non-petitioner attempted to meet this objection by asserting that as the suit had been filed before service had been terminated, therefore, the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain it. 8. As would be clear from the narration of facts stated above, one of the controversies was whether the Trust had independent identity and that it was not a part and parcel of the Society. The trial court held that the Trust did not have any independent existence and that it was being controlled financially, economically and administratively by the Society and that the plaintiff non-petitioner was its employee. The trial court repelled the Plea of the defendants 1 to 5 that service of the plaintiff non-petitioner had been transferred by defendants 1 to 5 defendant 6. 9. The trial court repelled the Plea of the defendants 1 to 5 that service of the plaintiff non-petitioner had been transferred by defendants 1 to 5 defendant 6. 9. After having held the aforesaid two points in favour of the plaintiff non-petitioner, the trial court found that termination order was against the principles of natural justice, mala fide and having been passed without any opportunity of hearing to the plaintiff non-petitioner, the net result of the findings on the afore- said controversy was narrated by the trial court in its judgment to the following effect:- mDr rhuksas mi fcUnqvksa ds fu"d"kkZuqlkj ;g izkFkfed :i ls izkekf.kr gS fd foi{kh la[;k 6 dk vyx dksbZ vfLFkLFk ugha gS vkSj og foRrh;] vkfFkZd] izca/kdh;] izkkldh; ,oa vU; lHkh n`f"V;ksa ls foi{kh la[;k 1 ls 5 ds v/khu ,oa fu;a=.k esa gS] foi{kh la[;k 1 }kjk izkFkhZ dh lsok,¡ foi{kh la[;k 6 dks gLrkarfjr ugha dh x;h vkSj izkFkhZ foi{kh la[;k 1 ls 5 dk gh deZpkjh gS vkSj foi{kh la[;k 6 }kjk ikfjr lsokeqfDr dk vknsk izkFkhZ ds fo:) kq: ls gh kwU; ,oa izHkkoghu gSA bl izdkj izkFkhZ ds i{k esa ,d izcy izFke n`"V;k ekeyk gS vr% ;g fcUnq izkFkhZ ds i{k esa ,oa foi{khx.k ds fo:) fuf.Zkr fd;s tkrs gSA 10. Trial court held that the order of termination dated 10-11-1986 was ineffective and void. Consequently, it granted the prayers made in the applications dated 17-11-1986 and 23-8-1988. As a result whereof, the defendants 1 to 6 were restrained from terminating the plaintiff non-petitioner and further directing that the termination order would also not be passed against him during the pendency of the suit. 11. Against this judgment of the trial court two appeals were preferred - one was by the Society and the other by the Trust. The appeals were also dismissed on the finding that the plaintiff non-petitioner was an employee of the Society, which body had not terminated him, therefore, the judgment and order of the trial court granting injunction was valid and legal. It also recorded a finding that the plaintiff non-petitioner had a prima facie case in his favour and the points of balance of convenience and irreparable injury were to be decided in his favour. 12. Against the aforesaid two judgments, the present two revisions have been filed. It also recorded a finding that the plaintiff non-petitioner had a prima facie case in his favour and the points of balance of convenience and irreparable injury were to be decided in his favour. 12. Against the aforesaid two judgments, the present two revisions have been filed. Out of them, S.B. Civil Revision petition No.407 of the 1990 has been filed by Sewabhavi Ayurvedic Rasayanshala Trust; whereas S.B. Civil Revisions petition No.397 of 1990 by Jain Vishwa Bharti. 13. The foundation of grant of an injunction by the trial court as well as by the lower appellate court was that the plaintiff non-petitioner was an employee of the society and not that of the Trust and since his service had not been terminated by the Society, he continued in service and that the order sought to be enforced against him was invalid, inoperative and illegal. The two courts were heavily affected by the consideration of irreparable injury, which would be caused to the plaintiff non-petitioner in the event his services were terminated in pursuance of the order, which in his view was invalid. In arriving at the decision the court also held that the order transferring the plaintiff non-petitioner from the Society to the Trust was ineffective inasmuch as the latter was a part and parcel of the former and asking the plaintiff non-petitioner to work with the Trust did not amount to any transfer. In the opinion of the court, the fact that the plaintiff non-petitioner had been drawing salary from the Trust was of no relevance as the two bodies were one and the same. 14. In the instant case the trial court did not only direct that the termination order dated 17-11-1986 would not be given effect to and that the plaintiff non- petitioner would be deemed to be continuing in service, but also held that till the pendency of the suit the plaintiff non-petitioner would not be terminated by any order of any authority. Such an injunction granted by trial court, which has been preserved in appeal, is contrary to the basic notions of law. Such an injunction granted by trial court, which has been preserved in appeal, is contrary to the basic notions of law. One is aggrieved by a termination order may get the enforcement of the same stayed, but it is not possible for any court to issue an injunction that no termination order would ever be passed against an employee after having complied with the provisions of law, which may be applicable to him. 15. It may be in dispute as to whether the plaintiff non-petitioner was an employee of the society or that of the Trust and further whether that they were two distinct bodies or one part and parcel of the other. However, that could only mean that the order of termination dated 17.11.1986 was ineffective. The trial court could not take away or deprive the employer from terminating the employee by passing a lawful order in future. 16. Coming to the merits of submissions, it appears to me that both the courts have lost sight of the basic cannons of law in granting injunction in favour of the plaintiff non-petitioner. Granting of injunction is a matter in the judicial discretion of the court, which is granting generally upon the same principles and subject to the same conditions as a perpetual injunction. 17. It may be clarified in the very beginning that the petitioners of the two cases, taken singly or jointly, are registered bodies. The Society (Jain Vishwa Bharti) even if it was registered under the societies Registration Act, it was not State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 17. It may be clarified in the very beginning that the petitioners of the two cases, taken singly or jointly, are registered bodies. The Society (Jain Vishwa Bharti) even if it was registered under the societies Registration Act, it was not State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has laid down tests gathered from the decision in the International Airport Authoritys case as follows:- (1) "One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government." (2) "Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication the corporation being impregnated with governmental character." (3) "It may also be a relevant factor....whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected." (4) "Existence or deep and Pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality." (5) "If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government." (6) "Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government." 18. In the instant case, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff non-petitioners has not relied upon the argument that the petitioners of this case were a State or governed by the definition of that word defined in Article 12 of the Constitution. What he contended was that even if the Society was a registered society, since it had not terminated the service of the plaintiff non-petitioner, an injunction could be obtained restraining it from throwing out the plaintiff non-petitioner from employment. 19. If the petitioners of the two case are private parties, the question would be whether a suit for enforcement will lie in a civil court. The plaintiff non-petitioner was working under a contract of employment, which could not be enforced against an employer. The only remedy was to sue for damages. It has been held in Dr. 19. If the petitioners of the two case are private parties, the question would be whether a suit for enforcement will lie in a civil court. The plaintiff non-petitioner was working under a contract of employment, which could not be enforced against an employer. The only remedy was to sue for damages. It has been held in Dr. Bool Chand vs. Chancellor, Kurukshetra University (1) that courts do not grant specific performance of contracts of service and, therefore, when there is a purported termination of service contract a declaration that the contract still subsisted would rarely be made. The relevant portion of this decision is quoted below:- "Where the contract of service gives rise to the relation of master and servant governed by the terms of appointment, in the absence of special circumstances, the High Court would relegate a party complaining of wrongful termination of the contract, to a suit for compensation, and would not exercise its jurisdiction to issue a high prerogative writ compelling the master to retain the services of the servant whom the master does not wish to retain in service." 20. Counsel appearing for the plaintiff non-petitioner had, however, no trouble with the above proposition of law. What was emphasised by the one of the learned counsel was that as contract had not been brought to an end by a valid order, a suit could be filed for injunction against the defendants 1 to 6 from acting on the basis of the alleged termination order passed by the Trust. He contended that the plaintiff non-petition was not its employee and that he could not be asked to go out of employment and stop working on the basis of stranger to the contract, as the said defendant no.6 was a complete stranger, with whom the plaintiff non-petitioner, had no relationship of employer and employee and that the order terminating him was void. 21. There was serious dispute in between the plaintiff non-petitioner and the defendants 1 to 6 as to whether the former was an employee of defendant no.6 or defendant 1. Resolution of this dispute required evidence. Before the trial court only affidavits had been filed and on the basis of those affidavits, at the stage of application for injunction, it was not appropriate for the court to have recorded any finding on the same. Resolution of this dispute required evidence. Before the trial court only affidavits had been filed and on the basis of those affidavits, at the stage of application for injunction, it was not appropriate for the court to have recorded any finding on the same. Findings could be given against the plaintiff non-petitioner after the two sides were given opportunity to adduce and lead evidence in support of their respective cases. It was at premature stage, the trial court went into this controversy. For supporting his submission learned counsel for the plaintiff non-petitioner referred to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v Kamlakar Shantaram Wedge & Ors. (2) wherein the Supreme Court laid down the following proposition:- "To sum up, the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to an industrial dispute may be stated thus : (1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the Civil Court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right of an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33-C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be." 22. Relying on this decision, a Division Bench of this Court in R.S.R.T.C. & Anr. v. Kaluram etc. etc. (3) held that suit filed by an employee of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation in the civil court was maintainable. 23. In the instant case, the status of the plaintiff non-petitioner had not been decided. Relying on this decision, a Division Bench of this Court in R.S.R.T.C. & Anr. v. Kaluram etc. etc. (3) held that suit filed by an employee of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation in the civil court was maintainable. 23. In the instant case, the status of the plaintiff non-petitioner had not been decided. If he was an employee of a registered society, he could not be granted injunction and at the most he would be entitled to is to get damages for the breach of contract. The decisions on this point have already been noted by me above and, in the instant case this court is only concerned with the limited question as to whether granting of an injunction was within the jurisdiction of the trial as well as appellate court or not. If the interest of the plaintiff non-petitioner could be safeguarded in the suit by awarding a decree for damages granting of injunction would be most inappropriate. 24. In Jitendra Nath Biswas v. M/s. Empire of India & Ceylon Tea Co. & Anr. (4) where the appellant was an employee of M/s. Empire of India & Ceylon Tea Company Private Limited, Calcutta, the supreme Court held :- The suit for declaration that dismissal of the plaintiff from service was bad and void, for back wages and for injunction preventing the employer from giving effect to the order of dismissal is in substance a suit for the relief of reinstatement and back wages and is therefore not maintainable before Civil Court." 25. It may be noticed that the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit had been challenged before the trial court. But it did not appropriately and properly derided it by simply cognising itself to irreparable injuries, which would be done to the plaintiff non-petitioner by termination. Termination, no doubt, cause monetary loss to the employee. But if the suit for damages could be decreed for wrongful termination, there would be no occasion for granting of injunction. 26. In Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli & Ors. v. Lakshmi Narain & Ors. (5) the Supreme Court held that the Executive Committee of that case was neither a State nor its instrumentality, hence a decree for declaration could not be granted. 27. In granting mandatory injunction, as held by the Supreme Court in Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden & Ors. v. Lakshmi Narain & Ors. (5) the Supreme Court held that the Executive Committee of that case was neither a State nor its instrumentality, hence a decree for declaration could not be granted. 27. In granting mandatory injunction, as held by the Supreme Court in Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden & Ors. (6), higher standard than & Prima facie case is required for prohibitory injunction. The trial court inducted the defendants 1 to 6 from terminating the plaintiff non-petitioner even in future. Such an injunction was beyond its power. For the reasons given in the above, the revisions succeed and are allowed. The orders of the two courts below are set aside and the injunction applications dated 17.11.1986 and 23.8.1988 are rejected.