State of Rajasthan v. Rameshwar Lal Sharma — 1990 DIGILAW 686 (RAJ)

G.S. SINGHAVI, J. - This order will dispose of DB Civil Writ petition No. 647/80 and 24 other connected writ petitions, details of which have been given in Schedule A 2: All the aforesaid writ Petitions are directed against the order of the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal dated March 20, 1979. All these writ petitions involve common questions of law and are based on more or less identical facts. Therefore, it would be appropriate to refer to the facts of one petition No. 647/80 State V. Rameshawarlal. 3. The respondent No. 1 was appointed as Lower Division Clerk in the Police Department prior to 1961 and was drawing pay of Rs. 72/- per month on 31.8.1961. The Rajasthan Civil Services (Revised Pay Scale ) Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 1961 Rules) were enacted by the Governor in exercise of the powers conferred under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Prior to coming into force of these Rules, some Lower Division Clerks who were working in the Anti-Corruption Branch of the Police Department, were drawing special pay in addition to their pay in the Time Scale of Lower Division Clerk. After coming into force of 1961 Rules vide Notification No. F.2 (b)(5) FD/(E-R)/64 dated 10.06.1964, the special pay of Lower Division Clerks of Anti-Corruption Branch was merged in their basic pay with effect from 1.9.1961. The Government in Finance Department issued Meupo No. F. 1 (8)FD(Exp-Rules)67 dated 28.4.1969 and thereby issued instructions for stepping up of pay of senior person in case his junior started getting higher pay on account of enforcement of Rules regarding pay fixation. In pursuance of the aforesaid memorandum dated 28.4.1969, the Lower Division Clerks of the Police Department submitted representation for stepping up of their pay because persons junior to them who were posted in the Anti-Corruption Branch of the Police Department started getting higher pay. On this representation by an order dated 21.9.1971, the pay of senior persons was stepped up with effect from 24.10. 1969. However, later on some objections were raised and the inspector General of Police (II) Rajasthan, Jaipur ordered recovery from the pay of senior persons vide his order dated 17.3.1972. One Shri Hajarilal Sharma filed an appeal before the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal assailing the order of recovery. This appeal was accepted by the Tribunal vide its order dated 25.1.1977. However, later on some objections were raised and the inspector General of Police (II) Rajasthan, Jaipur ordered recovery from the pay of senior persons vide his order dated 17.3.1972. One Shri Hajarilal Sharma filed an appeal before the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal assailing the order of recovery. This appeal was accepted by the Tribunal vide its order dated 25.1.1977. A Writ petition filed by the petitioner against the order of the Tribunal was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide its order dated 19.5.1978. That judgment of the High Court in SB Civil Writ Petition No. 85/78 has become final. However, in the meantime the Government issued another Memo No. F.1(a)(13) FD (Gr.II)77 dated 5.7.1977 laying down that the stepping up of pay of Lower Division Clerks of Police Department had been made erroneously on the basis of Memorandum dated 28.4.1969. When respondent No. 1 and other similarly situated employees claimed similar treatment as was given to Hajarilal, their claim was rejected by the Government in Home Department vide its letter dated 23.6.1978. The Government took the view that the judgment of the Tribunal and the High Court in Hajarilals case cannot be made applicable to other cases and cases of those persons whose matters were not pending before the High Court or the Tribunal would be governed by circular dated 5.7.1977. Against this order dated 23.6.1978, the respondent No. 1 and other similarly situated persons filed separate appeals before the Tribunal. The Tribunal vide its order dated March 20, 1979 allowed 28 appeals. It quashed the communications of the Home Department dated 23.6.1978. After the decision of the Tribunal was rendered, on June 10, 1979, an amendment was made in the Rules of 1961, Whereby Rule 13-A was inserted with retrospective effect w.e.f.1.9. 1961. A copy of this notification has been placed on record as Ex.8. 4. The present writ petition was filed on 10.1.1980. A Single Bench of this court vide its order dated April 11, 198- dismissed the writ petition holding that the order of the Tribunal cannot be quashed on the basis of subsequent amendment. The court declined to grant any relief to the petitioner on the ground that by way of writ petition, a declaration about the validity of the amendment cannot be granted. 5. The court declined to grant any relief to the petitioner on the ground that by way of writ petition, a declaration about the validity of the amendment cannot be granted. 5. The petitioner filed appeal before the Division Bench and the Division Bench in Special Appeal No. 2/80 State of Rajasthan Vs. Rameshwarlal Sharma decided on November 25, 1980 held that several important questions of law had arisen in the writ petitions, which deserve serious consideration. Accordingly, the special appeal for fresh decision by the single Bench after recording decision on all points, which may be argued by the parties. 6. Since question relating to the constitutionality of the amendment introduced vide Notification dated 12.6.1979 has arisen, these matters have been placed before the Division Bench for decision in terms of Rule 55 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952. 7. Learned Additional Government Advocate vehemently argued that the special pay was given to the Lower Division Clerks serving in the Anti Corruption Branch of the Police Department because they were discharging duties of ardous nature and this benefit cannot be claimed by other persons serving in the Police Department. He further submitted that the Government was fully justified in enforcing recovery because the decision of the Tribunal and that of the High Court in Hajarilals case cannot be applied in the case of the respondents. He further submitted that by virtue of rule 13-A which was introduced w.e.f.1.9.1961, the pay fixation of the respondents has been rendered illegal and even though they might be senior, they cannot claim benefit of stepping up of pay. He submitted that the Governor was fully competent to enact a rule like Rule 13-A of 1961 Rules. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 urged that once the benefit had been given to the respondent No. 1 on the basis of interpretation of the Rules by the government itself, a right had come to be vested in favour of respondent no. 1 to have his pay fixed at par with his juniors and this right cannot be taken away by a retrospective amendment in the Rules. He further submitted that Rule 13 A of 1961 Rules results in hostile discrimination being practised against the persons who are similarly situated. 1 to have his pay fixed at par with his juniors and this right cannot be taken away by a retrospective amendment in the Rules. He further submitted that Rule 13 A of 1961 Rules results in hostile discrimination being practised against the persons who are similarly situated. He submitted that posting in the Anti- Corruption Branch of the Police Department was a matter of discretion of the Departmental authorities and grant of special pay only to the Lower Division Clerks serving in the Anti- Corruption Branch of the Department was based on fortuitous circumstance of mere posting at a particular point of time in the Anti-Corruption Branch. Such fortuitous circumstance cannot be made a basis for justifying a discrimination. He submitted that once the Tribunal had rendered judgment and declared that the respondent No. 1 was entitled to have his pay stepped up at par with his juniors, such judgment cannot be nullified merely by enactment of Rule with retrospective effect. 9. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in these cases, we may refer to some provisions of 1961 Rules. Rule 5 (2) of 1961 rules contains definition of the term basic pay and it reads as under : 5(2)(1) Basic Pay in respect of an employee drawing pay in the pay scale protected under the Rajasthan Service (Protection of Service Conditions) Rules, 1957 means Pay as arrived by fixing his pay in the Rajasthan Scale of Pay prescribed for the post at a stage equal to his pay in the protected for Scale plus dearness pay protected under Rule 14 of the aforesaid Rules and if there is no such stage at the stage next below plus personal pay equal to the difference. (ii) Basic pay in respect of employees not covered by clause(l) above means Pan as defined in Rule (7) (24) (1) of the Rajasthan Service Rules. Provided where special pay forms part of existing scale and is merged in the revised scale, basic pay includes special pay." 10. In Schedule — II of 1961 Rules, which contains schedule of special pays, a reference has been made to various orders, by which special pay has been abolished by being merged with the basic pay. In the Police Department, a reference has been made to the posts of L.D.C. and U.D.C. working in the Anti-Corruption Department. For both these posts the special pay of Rs. In the Police Department, a reference has been made to the posts of L.D.C. and U.D.C. working in the Anti-Corruption Department. For both these posts the special pay of Rs. 15/-and 10/- respectively has been merged with the basic pay in the new pay scale. In Part IV, reference has been made to the special pays, which are for ardous duties or higher responsibilities and which are to continue. In this schedule also certain posts in the Police Department have been specified. For C.I.D. and A.C.D. the posts for which special pays have been retained are those of Inspector, Sub-Inspector, Head Constable and Constable. 11. A perusal of these provisions clearly shows that by virtue of specific order the special pay which was being drawn by the holders of the post of L.D.C. in the Anti-Corruption Branch of the Police Department prior to 1.9.1961 had been merged in their basic pay. Thus the basic Pan of such employees had been raised w.e.f. 1.9.1961. It has been admitted by the learned Additional Government Advocate that a number of persons senior to those posted in the Anti-Corruption Branch of the Police Department continued to draw less pay in the pay scale of L.D.C. It has also been admitted by him that there is no specific policy of posting in the Anti-Corruption Branch and that it was a matter of discretion of the competent authority. Now once the special pay had merged in the basic pay, the plea raised by the learned Additional Government Advocate that special pay was given to the employees of the Anti-Corruption Branch on account of ardous duties or higher responsibilities is rendered wholly untenable. This argument is based on wholly misconceived assumption that the special pay was still being paid separately to those L.D.Cs. who were posted in the Anti-Corruption Branch. Only after taking note of the fact that junior persons in the Anti-Corruption Branch of the Police Department had started getting higher pay than senior persons working in the same department, namely, Police Department, the Government took decision to step-up the pay of senior persons so as to bring it at par with the junior persons. In our view, this ought to have been done even without the existence of Circular dated 28.4.1969. Any other situation would have resulted in anomaly and discrimination. In our view, this ought to have been done even without the existence of Circular dated 28.4.1969. Any other situation would have resulted in anomaly and discrimination. A purely fortuitous circumstance of posting of a junior person in a particular branch of the Department cannot be used to create a situation where a senior would get less pay as compared to junior person. If at all the petitioner wanted to act fairly, the only course open to it was to have posted senior persons in the Anti Corruption Branch, so that the disparity in the pay of senior person qua a junior person would not have arisen. 12. Now as far as the order of Tribunal dated March 20, 1979 is concerned we cannot accept the submission of the learned Additional Government Adrocate that the Government was justified in making recovery or reducing the pay of persons like respondent No. 1. This argument cannot stand scrutiny even for a moment. The incontroverted factual position which has emerged from the averments made in the appeal before the Tribunal and in this writ petition are that one Purushottam Das Sabnani, who was junior to Hajarilal Sharma and was posted in the Anti-Corruption Branch of the Department started getting higher pay after 1.9.1961 because the special pay being paid to him was merged in the basic pay by virtue of Notification dated 10.6.1964. On the claim of the employees, the principle of stepping up of pay was given effect to. However, after some time, recovery was sought to be made. In the appeal of Hajarilal Sharma, the Tribunal invalidated the action of the petitioner and its officers in seeking to revise the pay of senior person so as to make it lower in comparison to junior persons. The High Court in Writ petition No. 85/78 State of Rajasthan V/S Hajarilal Sharma held in unequivocal terms that both Hajarilal Sharma and Purshottam Das were officials of the Police Department having combined seniority list and that Hajarilal Sharma was entitled to stepping up of his pay. The High Court upheld the order of the Tribunal dated 25.1.1977. That judgment of the High Court acquired finality in as much as, no special appeal was preferred. In fact, letter dated June 23, 1978 shows that the Government had considered it not proper to file any appeal and accepted the decision of the High Court. The High Court upheld the order of the Tribunal dated 25.1.1977. That judgment of the High Court acquired finality in as much as, no special appeal was preferred. In fact, letter dated June 23, 1978 shows that the Government had considered it not proper to file any appeal and accepted the decision of the High Court. Surprisingly enough even after accepting the decision of the High Court in Hajarilals case, the petitioner insisted that the Judgment shall not be given effect to in the cases of other persons similarly situated. We note with distress that inspite of the judgment of the High Court having become final, the petitioner and its functionaries adamantly declined to give effect to the ratio of the said decision in the cases of similarly situated persons. It is highly unsatisfactory state of affair that the Government servants are compelled to enter into unnecessary litigation. Even the Tribunal had felt uneasy with the action of the Government in refusing to accept the decision of the High Court in Hajarilals case. The Tribunal observed as under :- "It could not be denied that equity and propriety demands that in cases of identical nature, same decision would apply, particularly in all these appeals where the Government is the employer from whom it is expected that they will act, as if not as a benevolent employer, that atleast in just and fair manner. Consistency and uniformity in case of persons similarly situated are cardinal principle of any Government, based on rule of law, or of any judicious system. In these cases, which are on all the fours with Hazari Lals case and that the persons are even senior, it was reasonably expected from the Government that they would grant same relief automatically. It would have not only been graceful but quite a legally consequential action and would have inspired confidence in the employees. We are however, constrained to point out that desirability of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings has not been appreciated by the Government and all these appellants had to file all these appeals to seek redress on a matter in which this Tribunal has already given its decision in and which has also been upheld by the High Court. If an objective view would have been taken by the Government these appeals could have been avoided and relief granted by the Government straight way." 13. If an objective view would have been taken by the Government these appeals could have been avoided and relief granted by the Government straight way." 13. It is rather unfortunate that instead of accepting these observations of the Tribunal, the Government under the garb of exercising its constitutional right to file writ petitions has refused to abide by the decision of this court in Hajarilals case. 14. We have now to examine the effect of amendment dated 12.6.1979 by which Rule 13A was inserted to the Rules of 1961 on the judgement of the Tribunal dated March 20, 1979, which had admittedly been rendered prior to the issuance of the amendment notification. This Rule has been added with retrospective effect from 1.9.1961. However, Rule 13A does not declare that the order passed by the Tribunal shall be treated as nullity or shall not be treated as binding. It does not make any provision for review of the order passed by the Tribunal. In our view, mere amendment in the Rule with retrospective effect given by itself cannot nullify the decision rendered by the Court or Tribunal. The Tribunal has been created under the Rajasthan Civil Services Service Matters Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1976 and as per Sec. 8 of 1976 Act, the order passed by the Tribunal is final. Ofcourse, such order of Tribunal is always subject to judicial review by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India or by the Supreme Court of India under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. However, a mere amendment, which was not even in existence on the date of decision of the Tribunal cannot ipsofacto take away binding force of the order of the Tribunal or the finality attached to it by virtue of Sec. 8 of 1976 Act. 15. A Single Bench of this Court in Bansidhar Bohra Vs. State of Rajasthan (1) held that the amendment made in the Rules framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution with retrospective effect cannot validate selection and appointments, which had been quashed by the High Court in the writ Petition. The Court held that by mere amendment in the definition of the term Commission as contained in Rule 4 (b) of the Rajasthan Mines and Geological Subordinate Service Rules, 1960 cannot validate the section which has already been declared as void. In Kartika Chintamandi Dori Vs. The Court held that by mere amendment in the definition of the term Commission as contained in Rule 4 (b) of the Rajasthan Mines and Geological Subordinate Service Rules, 1960 cannot validate the section which has already been declared as void. In Kartika Chintamandi Dori Vs. Anamma Naidu & Others (2), the Supreme Court held that the rights of the parties are to be decided according to law as it existed when the action was begum unless there was a clear intention in the new statute showing clear intention to vary such rights to frame such rules. The Court proceeded to observe as under :- "In approaching these questions, two fundamental principles of interpretation have to be kept in view. The first is that if the Legislature, acting within its competence, wants to neutralise or reopen a courts decision, "it is not sufficient" to use the words of Hidayatullah, C J. in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. V. Broach Borough Municipality : "to declare merely that the decision of the court shall not bind, for that is tent amount to reversing the decision in exercise of judicial power which the Legislature does not possess or exercise. A Courts decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances." Thus the first test to be applied is whether the Amending Act 20 of 1960 has so radically altered the conditions on which the said decrees proceed, that they would not have been passed in the altered circumstances. The point is that the law which was the basis of the decision must be altered and then, the foundation failing, the binding value of the decision fails when the non obstance clause is superseded. As shall be presently seen, by this test, the answer to this question must be in the negative. "The Second Principle to recall the words of Bowen, L.J., in Reid Vs. Reid-is, that in construing a statute or, "a section in a statute which is to a certain extent retrospective, we ought nevertheless to bear in mind the maxim that is, except in special cases; the new law ought to be construed so as to interfere as little as possible with vested rights) as applicable whenever we reach the line at which the words of the section ceases to be plain. That is a necessary and logical corollary of the general proposition that you ought not to give a larger retrospective power to a section, even in an Act which is to some extent intended to be retrospective, than you can plainly see the Legislature meant." 16. Likewise, in Gurudutt Singh Vs. State of Punjab (3) the Supreme Court had dealt amendment in Pepsu Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 whereby Section 32 DD was inserted with retrospective effect from October 19,1956 and even which contained a non obstante clause, it was held as under:- "The Collector purported to act under Sec. 15 of the Land Revenue Code, which obviously, has no application. The High Court did not rest its decision on Sec. 15 of the Punjab Land Revenue Code for holding that Collector had jurisdiction to pass the order dated May 20, 1963. When the Collector passed the order dated March 28, 1961 determining the surplus area in the hands of first appellant he took into consideration the effect of the judgment of the civil court declaring that the mutation of the name of first appellant in the revenue record was affected only to enable him to obtain a gun licence. That order of the Collector dt. March 28, 1961 was a perfectly valid one when it was passed. No one challenged that order and it became final for all purposes. It was only when Section 32-DD was incorporated in the Act with retrospective effect from October 30, 1956 that the question arose whether that order was valid. The Collector could not have anticipated the enactment of the section with retrospective effect and passed the order conforming to its provisions. It is rather curious that the drafts-man of the amending Act No. 16 of 1962 did not incorporation a provision for reopening orders already passed before Sec. 32-DD came to be enacted as that section was made retrospective. We cannot subscribe to the view that the order of the Collector passed on March 28, 1961 became null and void merely because he failed to take into account the provisions of sec. 32-DD even if by virtue of the fiction it is to be assumed that the section was on the statute book when he passed it. We cannot subscribe to the view that the order of the Collector passed on March 28, 1961 became null and void merely because he failed to take into account the provisions of sec. 32-DD even if by virtue of the fiction it is to be assumed that the section was on the statute book when he passed it. We are aware that in Anisminic Ltd. V. Foreign Compensation Commissioner, the House of Lords had held that even if a tribunal had jurisdiction to enter upon an enquiry, the fact that it overlooked an applicable mandatory provision in the course of enquiry would denudeit of its jurisdiction; but we doubt whether that principle has any application in a case when the provision overlooked was not in actual existence at the time when the inquiry was conducted and the order was passed. In other words, we do not think that we can extend the ratio of the decision in that case to a case where the provision overlooked during the course of the inquiry was not on the statute book but was begotten and brought into being subsequently, though with retrospective vitality. The imagination sometimes has to boggle before stark reality. The order of the Collector dated March 28, 1961 cannot, therefore, be regarded as null and void. It was a valid order when it was passed, and there was no provision in the amending Act which enabled the Collector to review it. We cannot stretch the fiction so far as to make the order null and void without further ado." 17. Again in Sharif Ahmed & Ors. Vs. Regional Transport Authority (4), the Supreme Court held that there was nothing in the Ordinance of U.P. Act No. 15 of 1976 to make the order of the Tribunal illegal. The order when made was legal and within jurisdiction. Retrospective change in law had not the effect nullifying that order. To have that effect two formalities had to be gone through, namely issuing a special direction and following the procedure for review set out therein. 18. In the light of these principles, if we examine the notification dated 12.6.1979, we find that this notification though retrospective in nature, nowhere lays down that the fixation of pay which has already been done should be reviewed. 18. In the light of these principles, if we examine the notification dated 12.6.1979, we find that this notification though retrospective in nature, nowhere lays down that the fixation of pay which has already been done should be reviewed. It does not lay down that this provision will have the effect notwithstanding the order passed by the High Court or the Tribunal. In the absence of specific provision declaring the judgment or the order of the Tribunal as nullity, it cannot be said that by virtue of amendment dated 12.6.1969 the order passed by the Tribunal on 20.3.1979 which was perfectly valid and within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal at the time of its passing, shall be treated as void by virtue of the amending notification dated 12.6.1969. If we look at the matter from another angle, we find that this retrospective amendment in substance seeks to legalise what was patently arbitrary and unconstitutional. The Tribunal as well as the High Court had found that denial of pay to a senior person at par with junior was discriminatory and unjustified. Now if, the amendment dated 12.6.1979 is treated as valid, it would mean that discrimination practised by the petitioner in the matter of pay fixation of Lower Division Clerks will now be treated as justified. In our view, a provision which seeks to validate a wholly. arbitrary and unconstitutional action, cannot be made in the form of rule under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. A similar situation had arisen in State of Mysore Vs Padmanamacharya (5) Nanjappa was a trained teacher who was entitled to continue in service up to the age of 58 years. However he was retired at the age of 55 years. After his retirement vide order dated February 3, 1958, relevant rules were amended vide notification dated March 25, 1959, by which retirements made before a particular period were treated to have been validly made. A challenge was made to the action of retirement as well as the amendment/notification. The High Court accepted the writ petition. After his retirement vide order dated February 3, 1958, relevant rules were amended vide notification dated March 25, 1959, by which retirements made before a particular period were treated to have been validly made. A challenge was made to the action of retirement as well as the amendment/notification. The High Court accepted the writ petition. On appeal of the State of Mysore, the Supreme Court examined the question relating to the powers under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India and observed that "under proviso to Article 309, the Governor has the power to make rules regulating recruitment of conditions of service of persons appointed to such service and the posts in connection with the affairs of the State. The Notification dated March 25, 1975 cannot be said to be a rule relating to the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to the service and posts in connection with the affairs of the State. All that the rule does is to show in so many words that certain persons who had been invalidly retired should be validly retired on superannuation." According to their Lordships of the Supreme Court, if such amendment is given effect to, the same would contravene Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The Court further held that the power of validating the order which was in valid when it was made does not flow from the powers conferred on the Governor to make Rules under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. 19. We are further of the view that Rule 13-A clearly results in hostile discrimination and serious anomalous position has been sought to be created. As far as Purushottam Sabnani is concerned, he got higher pay by way of merger of special pay with the basic pay. Hajarilal Sharma, Who was Senior to Purushottam Sabnani has acquired a right to get pay at par with Purushottam Sabnani by virtue of the decision of the Tribunal dated 25.1.1977 which has been affirmed by the High Court and that the decision has become final. Respondents No. 1 and other similarly situated persons who are senior to both Purushottam Das Sabnani and Hajarilal Sharma of Time Scale to be given lower pay in the scale of time Scale of L.D.Cs. by virtue of amendment dated 12.6.1969. Respondents No. 1 and other similarly situated persons who are senior to both Purushottam Das Sabnani and Hajarilal Sharma of Time Scale to be given lower pay in the scale of time Scale of L.D.Cs. by virtue of amendment dated 12.6.1969. In our view a rule like the one contained in the Notification dated 12.6.1979 is on the face of it arbitrary and results in violation of the constitutional rights of equality enshrined in Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 20. There is yet another facet of the submission made on behalf of respondent No. 1. The argument is that a right had already come to be vested in favour of respondents No. 1 to have his pay stepped up on the basis of the order passed by the Government on 21,9.1971 and in fact the benefit had been given to the respondent No. 1 in terms of the aforesaid order of the Government. On the basis of the aforesaid fixation of pay, benefit has also been given under the provisions of Rajasthan Civil Service (New Pay Scale) Rules, 1969 and Rajasthan Civil Services (Revised New Pay Scale) Rules, 1976. This retrospective amendment would now result in affecting adversely the rights which have already vested in respondents No 1. Reliance has been placed in this connection on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ex-capt. K. C. Arora V. State of Haryana ( AIR 1987 SC 1858 ). In that case the provisions contained in Punjab National Emergency (Concession) Rules 1965 giving benefit of military services to those persons who were appointed as Assistant Engineers after discharge from Indian Army. This benefit was sought to be taken away by retrospective amendment made in the Rules of 1965 by virture of amendment dated 9.08.1976, After referring to the Various decision, the Supreme Court held that the Haryana Government Could not take away the accrued rights of such persons by making amendment with retrospective effect by adding proviso to Rule 4 (ii) taking away the benefit of counting Military service towards seniority or by making amendment to the definition of Military service in Rule 2 restricting the benefit of Military service up to 10.01.1978. 21. 21. In the light of the aforesaid principles, it must be held that the amendment dated 12.6.1979 cannot be sustained because it seeks to retrospectively take away the rights which had accrued in favour of respondent No. 1. 22. In view of the above discussion, We do not find any merit in these writ petitions filed by the State of Rajasthan and the Same Are here by dismissed. Costs made easy.