B. N. KRISHNAN, J. ( 1 ) BOTH these appeals arise from the same judgment and award in M. V. C. 14/1981, a claim preferred by the mother, sisters and brother of one somasekhara who died as a result of a motor vehicle accident involving motorcycle No. Mey 7885 which occurred on 7-8-1980 in K. R. Pel. The tribunal awarded global compensation of Rs. 13,200/- only in favour of the mother of the deceased and that too, only against the alleged driver of the vehicle. The owner and insurer were exonerated from their liability. The claimants have preferred the first appeal seeking enhancement of the compensation and also for award in favour of all the claimants and also against the owner and insurer of the vehicle. The alleged driver has preferred the second appeal challenging the finding that he was driving the vehicle or that he was negligent and he has also challenged the award, so far as the other respondents being exonerated. ( 2 ) FOR easy reference, the parties shall hereafter, be referred to by virtue of their ranks before the tribunal. ( 3 ) THE finding that the sisters and brother of the deceased arc not entitled lo recover any compensation as they arc not legal reprcsenlalives of the deceased is clearly unsupportable as it is fairly well settled that persons who arc not legal rcprcscnlatives in strict sense of the term, but nevertheless were dependants on the deceased arc entitled lo recover compensation on the groundof loss of dependency. This aspect of the matter was not disputed by anyone in the course of these appeals. The finding of the tribunal that the motorcycle was driven at the lime of the accident by respondent No. 2 and that the accident was occasioned on account of the rash and negligent driving were not seriously disputed by his learned advocate. Even otherwise, there is sufficient material to justify the conclusion of the tribunal in this regard. P. w. 2 has sworn about respondent No. 2 being the driver of the motor cycle at the relevant time and, there is no serious cross-examination. Respondent No. 2 who has examined himself as D. W. 3 has admitted that he was prosecuted by the police in respect of this accident and further he also sustained injuries in the course of the same. Respondent No. 2 who has examined himself as D. W. 3 has admitted that he was prosecuted by the police in respect of this accident and further he also sustained injuries in the course of the same. No particular material has been placed by him to the effect that the police had any grouse against him and, therefore, they had falsely implicated him in the criminal case. Having regard lo all ihcsc aspecls, it appears to us that no different conclusion is possible on this aspect of the matter. ( 4 ) THEN, we arc lo take the quantum of compensalion awardablc lo ihc claimants. The age of the deceased in the posl-morlcm report has been given as 33 years. One of the claimants who has been examined as P. W. 2 has sworn thai her deceased brolher was running a holel. The first claimant who has examined herself as P. W. 1 has staled that he was earning a sum of Rs. 1,000/- per month. That the deceased was running a hotel has not been seriously challenged in the course of cross-examination of this witness. Even taking that there is an clement of exaggeration in the stalcmcnl of the molhcr, having regard lo the nature of the avocation of the deceased and the fact that quite a number of persons were dependant upon him, we could take the loss of dependancy off the claimants at Rs. 500/- per month and, therefore, the annual loss of dependancy comes to Rs. 6,000/ -. Having regard to the age of the deceased and also the age of the 1st claimant, it appears to us operative multiplier of 12 should be adopted and the amount awardable under the head of loss of dependancy comes to Rs. 72,000/ -. To this we should add a sum of Rs. 5,000/- towards loss of benefit to the estate of the deceased and Rs. 1,000/- towards funeral expenses. There is material to show that from the place of accident the injured was taken by taxi to Mysore and he died in Mysore hospital on the third day of the accident. Having regard to the nature of injuries sustained by him, he should have necessarily undergone a lot of pain and suffering during the period he was in the hospital. It appears to as that a sum of Rs. Having regard to the nature of injuries sustained by him, he should have necessarily undergone a lot of pain and suffering during the period he was in the hospital. It appears to as that a sum of Rs. 1,000/- should be awarded towards the expenses incurred in shifting the injured to the hospital and also in maintaining him there and Rs. 5,000/- towards the pain and suffering undergone by the deceased. Thus, the global compensation awardable comes to Rs. 84,000/ -. ( 5 ) THEN, we are left with the question of liability of the respondents. That respondent No. 2 being the driver of the vehicle is liable to make good the compensation cannot be disputed. It has to be seen whether the owner and insurer are not liable as held by the tribunal. The owner of the motorcycle who has examined himself as D. W. 1 has sworn that he had given the same to motorcycle mechanic abdul gani to effect repairs on 7-8-1980 at about 7. 00 or 7. 30 p. m. and at 10. 00 p. m. , he went to take delivery of the same and it was not there and abdul gani told him that the second respondent had taken the motorcycle without his permission and had caused the accident. That abdul gani has been examined as D. W. 2 and he has sworn that about 1 and 3/4th or 2 years prior to his examination at 7. 00 p. m. D. W. 1 gave his motorcycle No. Mey 7885 for effecting some repairs and he effected the same and went home for food and he instructed his worker shankara to give that motorcycle to D. W. 1 and when he returned at about 9. 45 or 10. 00 p. m. , the motorcycle was not in the shop and when he enquired with shankara, he was told that 2nd respondent had taken the motorcycle. ( 6 ) THAT the motorcycle had been entrusted by the 1st respondent to r. w. 2 for repairs just prior to the accident has not been disputed. Shankara in whose custody the vehicle is stated to have been left by r. w. 2 has not been examined. Therefore, we do not find any material as such, to establish the circumstances under which the vehicle was taken by the 2nd respondent. Shankara in whose custody the vehicle is stated to have been left by r. w. 2 has not been examined. Therefore, we do not find any material as such, to establish the circumstances under which the vehicle was taken by the 2nd respondent. In the absence of examination of that shankara, it is difficult to hold that the vehicle was taken by 2nd respondent with his consent. If that is not there, the two other possibilities may be, that the vehicle was given by R. W. 2 to the 2nd respondent for purposes of testing or that the 2nd respondent took away the vehicle without the consent of R. W. 2. ( 7 ) THAT R. W. 2 was having custody of the motorcycle in the course of the authority given to him by the 1st respondent owner, cannot be disputed and it has in fact not been disputed before us. If the motorcycle had been entrusted by the repairer R. W. 2 to 2nd respondent for purpose of checking, the vehicle was being driven by respondent No. 2 in the course of the authority given to the repairer and also for the very purpose of the owner of the motorcycle. In such an event, the owner i. e. the 1st respondent would also be held vicariously liable, has also not been disputed before us. ( 8 ) IF the conclusion is that the 2nd respondent took the vehicle without the permission or consent of R. W. 2, it has to be seen whether still the owner and insurer could be held liable. The tribunal has referred to the decision of the supreme court reported in 1966 0 ACJ 89, Ditaram Motilal Kalal v Santanuprasad Jaishankar Bhatt and others and has held that the owner and insurer are not liable to make good the compensation awarded in the case. Even in this decision the principle of extension of the responsibility of the principal for the act of the agent and the recent trend in that regard has been referred to at page 95 as hereunder:"there has been in recent years another extension of the responsibility of the principal for the act of an agent. Even in this decision the principle of extension of the responsibility of the principal for the act of the agent and the recent trend in that regard has been referred to at page 95 as hereunder:"there has been in recent years another extension of the responsibility of the principal for the act of an agent. "this principle recognised in this decision has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the subsequent decision reported in AIR 1977 SC 1735 at 1744, Pushpabai Parshottam Udeshi and others v M/s. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing co. Pvt. Ltd. And another, as hereunder:"before we conclude, we would like to point out that the recent trend in law is to make the master liable for acts which do not strictly fall within the term "in the course of the employment" as ordinarily understood. We have referred to Sitaram Motilal Kalal v Santanuprasad Jaishankor Bhatt where this court accepted the law laid down by lord denning in Ormrod v Crosville Motor Services Ltd. , (1953)2 all. Er 753 (supra) that the owner is not only liable for the negligence of the driver if that driver is his servant acting in the course of his employment but also when the driver is, with the owner's consent, driving the car on the owner's business or for the owner's purposes. This extension has been accepted by this court. "in yet a later decision reported in AIR 1988 SC 1332 , Guru Govekar v Miss Filomena F. Lobo and others, with reference to a case of entrustment of a motor vehicle by an owner to the repairer, this is what has been observed by the Supreme Court at page 1335:"when the owner of a motor vehicle entrusts his vehicle to a repairer to carry out repairs he is in fact allowing the repairer to use his vehicle in that connection. It is also implicit in the said transaction that unless there is any contract to the contrary the owner of the vehicle also causes or allows any servant of the repairer who is engaged in the work of repairs to use the motor vehicle for the purpose of or in connection with the work of repairs and when such work of repair is being carried out in a public place if on account of the negligence of either the repairer or his employee, who is engaged in connection with the work of repair, a third party dies or suffers any injury either to his person or property, the insurer becomes liable to pay the compensation under the Provisions of the act. " ( 9 ) THUS, the various decisions make it abundantly clear that the narrow principle recognized in the law of torts has been enlarged from time to time as above. ( 10 ) SO far as the decision in the first case of the Supreme Court, it may be pointed out that despite recognizing this principle on facts, the Supreme Court refused to saddle the insurance company with the liability because undisputedly, the vehicle was being used by the driver for a purpose other than the one for which it was made, viz. , To train a cleaner in the art of driving the vehicle. Therefore, the insurer in the said case was exonerated. This court in the decision reported in ILR 1985 (2) KAR. 2979, managing director, Ksrtc v Annappa Vaidya, with reference to the said responsibility of the owner, has observed thus at page 2987:"the law puts a special responsibility on the owner who allows the vehicle to go on the road in-charge of someone else. The liability subsists not only with his driver acting in the course of his employment; but also where the driver, with the owner's consent, is driving the car on the owner's business or for the owner's purpose. In the present case, the bus apparently, had no lockable doors; it had a push-button ignition-system; it was accessible. . . . and a virtual invitation. . . . to any mischief monger. This constituted also a breach of statutory duty imposed by Section 84 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 7. In the present case, the bus apparently, had no lockable doors; it had a push-button ignition-system; it was accessible. . . . and a virtual invitation. . . . to any mischief monger. This constituted also a breach of statutory duty imposed by Section 84 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 7. We, therefore, hold that the failure on the part of the driver in leaving such a vehicle unattended and which enabled the said sarvotham to misuse the vehicle is something which the, owner becomes answerable for. " ( 11 ) SRI Narayan who appears for the insurer contended that there is conflict in the ratio decidendi as laid down by the Supreme Court in the first and third decisions referred to already and the decision in the first case was rendered by a bench of three judges and, therefore, it should be followed in preference to the ratio laid down in the third decision referred to already. An examination of the several decisions with particular reference, to the observations extracted already, will make it clear that there is absolutely no conflict in any of these decisions of the Supreme Court and only on the facts of the particular case, relief was negatived to the claimants in the first case. Therefore, the question of preferring the first decision as contended by Sri Narayan does not arise. ( 12 ) IF the vehicle has been taken by 2nd respondent, without the authority of r. w. 2, it has to be necessarily held that r. w. 2. had left the vehicle in such a way as to be meddled by any other mischief monger. Therefore, it has to be held that he was negligent in discharging of his duties pursuant to the entrustment of the vehicle to him for repairs. ( 13 ) IN this view of the matter, it is clear that there is absolutely no scope to hold that the owner respondent No. 1 is not liable to make good the amount awardable to the claimants and the finding of the tribunal in this regard cannot be sustained. Once the owner is held liable to make good the amount and when no other ground of exemption has been urged on behalf of the insurer, it is clear that the insurer 3rd respondent is also liable, to make good the amount awarded. Once the owner is held liable to make good the amount and when no other ground of exemption has been urged on behalf of the insurer, it is clear that the insurer 3rd respondent is also liable, to make good the amount awarded. ( 14 ) IN the result, in modification of the award of Rs. 13,200/- made by the tribunal, we direct that a sum of Rs. 84,000/- with interest thereon at 9% per annum from the date of petition till the date of payment and full court costs shall be paid to the claimants and there shall be an award against all the respondents and as the insurance coverage and the liability are undisputed, we direct that the entire amount shall be paid by the 3rd respondent. The amount of Rs. 5,000/- awarded under the head of loss of benefit to the estate of the deceased and Rs. 5,000/- awarded towards pain and suffering shall be paid exclusively to the 1st claimant the mother of the deceased. Rest of the amount shall be equally shared by all the claimants including the mother. Advocate's fee in this court is quantified at Rs. 1,000/-, in each appeal. ( 15 ) IN these terms, the appeals are allowed. Appeals allowed. --- *** --- .