JUDGMENT Nainar Sundaram, J. 1. These six writ appeals are directed against the common order of the learned Single Judge in W.P.Nos.1617 and 1789 of 1981. The parties are the one and the same in both the writ petitions and it will be convenient for us if we refer to the parties as per their array in the writ petitions. Lands in four survey numbers in Koothapakka Village, Cuddalore Taluk, of the total extent of 5.77 acres were the subject-matter of acquisition in April, 1970 for the purpose of construction of buildings for the Government Basic Training School for Women at Thiruppapuliyur. Of the four Survey numbers, R.S. No. 16/1 of an extent of 3.40 acres belonged to the third respondent: R.S. No. 16/2 of an extent of 1.60 acres belonged to respondents 4 and 5; R.S. No. 16/3 of an extent of 0.64 cents belonged to one T.M. Krishnaswami Pillai and R.S. No. 16/4 of an extent of 0.13 cents belonged to the 7th respondent. Pursuant to acquisition, possession was handed over to the Education Department, on 30.6.1970. The lands were not put to use for the purpose for which they were acquired. The concerned District Revenue Officer ordered resumption of the lands by proceedings dated 2.7.1974. On 13.8.1974 the third respondent requested the cancellation of the award proceedings and for reassignment of the lands to it. The matter was under consideration and was not disposed of. In the meanwhile, there was a proposal to utilise the acquired lands for the construction of a school building for the Blind; and even that proposal was abandoned. The petitioner requested the second respondent on 7.5.1978 for alienation of the lands, subject-matter of acquisition. This request was considered, and by G.O. Ms. No. 404, Education Department, dated 14.3.1979 the lands were directed to be alienated by the first respondent to the petitioner relaxing the concerned Board's Standing Orders, on collection of land value with interest including the enhanced compensation awarded by the Court. On 12.3.1981 by G.O. Ms. No. 450, Education Department, hereinafter referred to as the Impugned Government Order, the first respondent considered the representations of the third respondent and the fourth respondent and rescinded the order, G.O. Ms. No. 404, Education Department, dated 14.3.1979. On 12.3.1981 by G.O. Ms. No. 450, Education Department, hereinafter referred to as the Impugned Government Order, the first respondent considered the representations of the third respondent and the fourth respondent and rescinded the order, G.O. Ms. No. 404, Education Department, dated 14.3.1979. This gave room to the petitioner to come to this Court byway of the two writ petitions; the first one asking for a writ of mandamus not to disturb the possession of the petitioner pursuant to the impugned Government Order; and the second one asking for a writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the impugned Government Order and to prevent disturbance of the possession of the petitioner. 2. We have broadly delineated the facts of the case without going into the minute details because we have refrained from going into the merits of all the points that were urged before the learned single Judge and we are inclined to concentrate only on one aspect which relates to the grievance of the petitioner over the non-hearing of the petitioner and not affording an opportunity to it to make its say before the impugned Government order came to be passed. The learned single Judge considered four points urged before him and they run as follows: 1. What is the scope of G.O. Ms. No. 404, dated 14.3.1979? 2. Does the doctrine of promissory estoppel apply? 3. Are the Government right in passing G.O. Ms. No. 450, dated 12.3.1981? 4. Does the impugned Government Order violate the principles of natural justice? 3. On the first point, the learned single Judge held that the Government finding the lands were no longer useful for the purpose for which they were acquired or even for a revised purpose of locating a Government Blind School, alienated the lands in favour of the petitioner. On point No. 2, the learned single Judge held that G.O. Ms. No. 404, Education Department, dated 14.3.1979 did not remain dormant and it had been acted upon, that too to the detriment of the petitioner. On point No. 3 the learned single Judge opined that a valid, proper and considered decision which was taken earlier has been interfered with by the impugned Government order buttressing it with some reason or other and all those reasons have fallen to the ground. On point No. 3 the learned single Judge opined that a valid, proper and considered decision which was taken earlier has been interfered with by the impugned Government order buttressing it with some reason or other and all those reasons have fallen to the ground. On point No. 4, the learned single Judge held that there was violation of the principles of natural justice in that there was no opportunity afforded to the petitioner to make its say before the impugned Government Order came to be passed. As a result, the learned single Judge allowed the writ petitions. As already noted, these six writ appeals are directed against the common order of the learned single Judge in that two writ petitions. W.A. Nos. 593 and 644 of 1984 have been preferred by the 3rd respondent W.A. Nos. 58 and 59 of 1986 have been preferred by respondents 1 and 2 and W.A. Nos. 450 and 451 of 1989 have been preferred by respondents 4 and 5. 4. As already indicated, we are inclined to consider the question of the violation of the principles of natural justice as complained of by the petitioner and if that grievance has got to be sustained, concurring with the view of the learned single Judge, we are of the firm conviction that the matter requires a re-hearing on merits on all the relevant aspects at the hands of the first respondent itself, so that all the parties can put forth their respective cases and place all the required materials in substantiation thereof, before a decision is rendered by the first respondent one way or the other. Very many points are being urged by the parties, each from its own stand point of view. All the relevant aspects must have adjudication by the first respondent, who was earlier and who is to be now seized of the matter, removing the lacuna or the drawback of non-hearing of the petitioner. That there was no hearing afforded to the petitioner before the impugned Government Order came to be passed is the admitted factual position. However, an attempt was made by the learned Counsel appearing for the third respondent to say that in the instant case, only on the ground of alleged patent irregularities, if not illegalities, the earlier G.O. Ms. That there was no hearing afforded to the petitioner before the impugned Government Order came to be passed is the admitted factual position. However, an attempt was made by the learned Counsel appearing for the third respondent to say that in the instant case, only on the ground of alleged patent irregularities, if not illegalities, the earlier G.O. Ms. No. 404, Education Department, dated 14.3.1979 was set at naught by the impugned Government Order and in such a contingency the -petitioner could not complain of any prejudice on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice and what has been done by the impugned Government Order is only setting aright matters which should not have happened earlier. It was further argued that the proceedings of the first respondent are only administrative in character involving no civil consequences and hence it will not be in order to insist for adhering to the principles of natural justice. These submissions could not have countenance at our hands because they I are archaic in nature and in ignorance of the march of law on the subject. Now the principle is well-settled that even administrative orders which involve civil consequences could arrive only after the principles of natural justice have been followed. In the instant case, it cannot be pleaded that by the impugned Government Order no civil consequences had followed. By the earlier G.O. Ms. No. 404, Education Department, dated 14.3.1979, rights in lands were conferred on the petitioner. By the impugned Government Order they have been taken away. Certainly the impugned Government Order, be it so an administrative one, involves civil consequences. Furthermore, the contention that the impugned Government Order has only set aright certain alleged irregularities and hence there is no need to follow the principles of natural justice, since the petitioner could not complain of prejudice, could not also be countenanced. It has been laid down by the highest Court in the land that the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice have been observed; the non-observance of natural justice is itself is prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary". A Bench of this Court, to which one of us (Nainar Sundaram, J.) had been a party, considered the case law on the subject in Ittycheria v. State of Tamil Nadu and two Ors. W.A. No. 685 of 1983, Judgment dated 4.1.1984 and in particular with reference to the same contentions urged by the learned Counsel for the third respondent herein and upheld the propositions as we have briefly delineated above. If this is the resultant legal position, which we should arrive on the question, when we cannot accept even on theory, the propositions advanced by the learned Counsel for the third respondent. The petitioner certainly should have been heard and ought to have had his say on the question of rescinding the Government Order Ms. No. 404, Education Department, dated 14.3.1979. 5. It is true that respondents 3 to 5 would say that the very alienation accorded to the petitioner under G.O. Ms. No. 404, Education Department, dated 14.3.1979 was totally unsustainable. If that could relevantly and validly form a ground for rescinding it, respondents 3 to 5 can press forth this point as well as any other point available to them before the first respondent when the process of reconsideration is going to be done by it. Then the question is as to whether the reasonings expressed by the learned single Judge on the other points except the one relating to the violation of the principles of natural justice should stand. They need not and should not stand, since we are remitting the matter back to the first respondent for a reconsideration of the whole matter and that should be done without reference to and without being influenced by the reasonings expressed by the learned single Judge on other points. All the parties are at liberty to urge their respective stands and substantiate the same and that will have due consideration on merits at the hands of the first respondent, before any fresh decision is taken. An apprehension was expressed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the first respondent, having preferred writ appeals against the decision of the learned single Judge, may not do the reconsideration Impartially. An apprehension was expressed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the first respondent, having preferred writ appeals against the decision of the learned single Judge, may not do the reconsideration Impartially. Now we are vacating the reasonings and findings of the learned single Judge on other points, we direct the first respondent to view, consider and assess all the relevant aspects of the case independently and impartially and adjudicate them and take a fresh decision on merits. Accordingly, we vacate the reasonings and findings of the learned single Judge on all other points, except the one relating to the violation of the principles of natural justice, which we have confirmed and on the basis of which the impugned Government Order is quashed and we are remitting the matter back to the first respondent for a fresh consideration as above. These writ appeals are ordered in the above terms. No costs. 6. Now the question arises as to what should the position in the interregnum until fresh decision is taken by the first respondent. We are told that constructions have been put up by the petitioner on portions of the lands and a school is being run in them. They shall not be supplemented by any further construction by the petitioner until the matter is disposed of by the first respondent as per our above direction of remittal. In short, the status quo as on date shall be maintained. The rights of the parties shall be worked out depending upon the ultimate decision in the matter.