( 1 ) THIS appeal is preferred against the order of the learned judge in W. P. No. 703 of 1983 striking down the order of the the tribunal and restoring the order of the third respondent - the departmental arbitrator. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to this appealare as follow : respondent No. 1 obtained a loan of Rs. 8000/- for the purpose of constructing a house over the plot No. 24 situate at aiwanshahi colony, gulbarga on execution of a mortgage deed in favour of the appellant and also an unregistered agreement by agreeing to repay the loan in 30 equal annual instalments. Respondent No. 1 did not repay any amount. The appellant filed a petition for recovery of Rs. 23,950-10 inclusive of interest and penal interest, under Section 70 of the Karnataka Co-Operative Societies Act, 1959 ('the act' for short) before the assistant registrar of co operative societies, gulbarga. The assistant registrar referred the dispute raised by the appellant to the 3rd respondent for disposal under Section 71 of the act. During the pendency of the proceedings before the 3rd respondent, the appellant filed an application for condonation of delay caused in raising the dispute and it was rejected by the 3rd-respondent on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the same. The 3rd-respondent dismissed the claim of the appellant holding that it was barred by limitation. The appellant preferred an appeal before the 4th-respondent under sec. 105 of the act. After hearing the appeal, the 4th-respondent passed an order on 31-5-1982 allowing the appeal and passed an award in terms of the prayers made in the appeal by the appellant. Respondent No. 1 challenged the said award in w p. No. 703/83 under art. 226 and 227 of the constitution. The learned judge allowed the writ petition and setaside the order of the 4th respondent and restored the order of the 3rd respondent. Hence, this appeal. ( 3 ) THE following two points arisefor our consideration in this appeal :- i) whether the 3rd respondent had any powers to consider the application given by the appellant for condonation of delay in raising the dispute ? II) whether the claim of the appellant was in time ? Reg. Hence, this appeal. ( 3 ) THE following two points arisefor our consideration in this appeal :- i) whether the 3rd respondent had any powers to consider the application given by the appellant for condonation of delay in raising the dispute ? II) whether the claim of the appellant was in time ? Reg. Point No. I : ( 4 ) UNDER Section 70a no disputeunder Section 70 could be entertained unless it is referred to the registrar within six years from the date of the cause of action. The proviso to Section 70a of the act relates to a dispute regarding the election of members, president etc. , With which we are not concerned in this case. Sub-clause (2) of Section 70a lays down that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) the registrar may entertain a dispute referred after the period specified in sub-sec. (1) if he is satisfied that the person making the reference had sufficient cause for not making the reference within that period. From this subsection, it is clear that the registrar has got powers to condone the delay in making the reference. But the question is whether the arbitrator to whom the dispute is referred by the registrar under Section 71 (c) has got powers to condone the delay. Section 117 of the act lays down the procedure for settlement of disputes and powers of the registrar or any other person to whom a dispute is referred for decision under sec. 70 sub-section 3 (a) deals with the powers of the registrar or any other person to whom a dispute is referred. Though Section 117 specifies the various powers given to the person deciding the dispute under Section 70 of the Act, it does not state that the person to whom the dispute is referred by the registrar has got power to condone the delay in raising the dispute. Even Rule 31 (4) (a) of the Karnataka Co-Operative Societies Rules, 1969 ('the rules' for short) dealing with the procedure to be followed by the registrar, the arbitrator or other persons deciding the dispute does not give any such power to the arbitrator to condone the delay in making the reference. ( 5 ) IT is only the registrar who isgiven the power under Section 70-a of the act to entertain a dispute who is invested with the power to condone the delay. ( 5 ) IT is only the registrar who isgiven the power under Section 70-a of the act to entertain a dispute who is invested with the power to condone the delay. If a dispute is referred after six years from the date of the cause of action, the registrar can entertain the reference if he is satisfied that the person making the reference had sufficient cause for not making the reference within that period and thereafter the registrar may decide the dispute himself or transfer it for disposal to any person who has been invested by the state government with powers in that behalf or refer it for disposal to an arbitrator appointed by the registrar. Under Section 71 of the Act, the power of the arbitrator is limited only to decide a dispute which is entertained by the registrar and referred to him for decision under Section 71 of the act. This power includes the power to dismiss a dispute referred to him on the ground that it was barred by limitation. But the arbitrator has no power under the act to condone the delay in raising the dispute. The arbitrator is required to give his decision or award, as the case may be, in accordance with justice, equity and good conscience as laid down in Rule 31 (4) (a) and if the registrar has, without condoning the delay, referred a time barred claim to an arbitrator for his decision. The arbitrator cannot pass an award or judgment decreeing such a time barred claim but has to dismiss the claim as time barred. Therefore, we respectfully agree with the view of the learned judge reg. Point No. II : ( 6 ) RESPONDENT No. 1 borrowed asum of Rs. 8000/- from the appellant and entered into an agreement to repay the said amount in 30 annual equal instalments and the agreement is to the effect that on default of a single instalment, the entire amount shall become due. Respondent No. 1 does not pay even a single instalment. On the failure of respondent No. 1 to pay the very first instalment, the entire amount had become due and the appellant ought to have raised the dispute within six years from the date of such default by respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 does not pay even a single instalment. On the failure of respondent No. 1 to pay the very first instalment, the entire amount had become due and the appellant ought to have raised the dispute within six years from the date of such default by respondent No. 1. Since the appellant did not raise the dispute within six years from the date of first default committed by the first-respondent, the claim of the appellant had become barred by limitation by the time the dispute was raised. Hence we reject this second contention also. ( 7 ) IN the result, we respectfully agree with the order of the learned judge and pass the following order :- the writ appeal is dismissed. Writ appeal dismissed. --- *** --- .