JUDGMENT R.A. Sharma, J. - By this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the U.P. Government's notification dated 26-12-1989, constituting single Member Sate Transport Authority (hereinafter referred to as the S.T.A.) Consisting of Transport Commissioner of U.P. after superseding the earlier S.T.A. of which the petitioner was one of the members. The impugned notification is reproduced below : "Notification No. 5163T/XXX-4-113/89 Dated : Lucknow, Dec. 26, 1989. In exercise of the power under sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 68 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Act No. 59 of 1988) read with Section 91 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Act No. X of 1897), and in supersession of Government Notification No.44 GII/30-4-113/89 dated July 29, 1989, the Government considering it necessary and expedient so to do, is pleased to reconstitute the State Transport Authority consisting of the Transport Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh." 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the notification on two grounds. Firstly, in exercise of powers under second proviso to sub-sec. (2) of S. 68, the Government can constitute a single member S.T.A. for the region only and not for the State, and secondly, there was no relevant material before the Government for formation of opinion for constitution of single member S.T.A. Learned Special counsel for the S.T.A., apart from justifying the impugned notification on merit, has also argued that the Government's opinion under second proviso, being based on subjective satisfaction is not liable to be challenged before this Court and further the opinion has been formed by the highest authority in the Government, namely, the Transport Minister and as such, there is strong presumption in favour of regularity of the Act and the writ petition is, as such, liable to be dismissed. 3. Section 68 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which provides for constitution of the Transport Authorities, so far as is relevant, is quoted below : "68 Transport Authorities. 3. Section 68 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which provides for constitution of the Transport Authorities, so far as is relevant, is quoted below : "68 Transport Authorities. (1) The State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute for the State Transport Authority to exercise and discharge the powers and functions specified in subsection (3), and shall in like manner constitute Regional Transport Authorities to exercise and discharge throughout such areas (in this chapter referred to as regions) as may be specified in the notification, in respect of each Regional Transport Authority; the powers and factions conferred by or under this Chapter on such Authorities : (2) A State Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority shall consist of a Chairman who has had judicial experience or experience as an appellate or a revisional authority or as an adjudicating authority competent to pass any order or take any decision under any law and in the case of a State Transport Authority, such other persons (whether officials or not), not being more than four and, in the case of a Regional Transport Authority, such other persons (whether officials or not), being more than two, as the State Government may think fit' to appoint; ........... Provided .......... Provided further that the State Government may. (i) where it considers necessary or expedient so to do, constitute the State Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority for any region so as to consist of only one member who shall be an official with judicial experience or experience as an appellate or a re visional authority or as an adjudicating authority competent to pass any order or take any decision under any law; (ii) .......... (3) The State Transport Authority and every Regional Transport Authority shall give effect to any directions issued under Section 67 and the State Transport Authority shall, subject to such direction and save as otherwise provided by or under this Act, exercise and discharge throughout the State the following powers and functions, namely : (a) to co-ordinate and regulate the activities and policies of the Regional Transport Authorities, if any of the State : (b) to perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authority where there is no such Authority and, if it thinks fit or if so required by a Regional Transport Authority, to perform those duties in respect of any route common to two or more regions; (c) to settle all disputes and decide all matters on which differences of opinion arise between Regional Transport Authorities; and (d) to discharge such other functions as may be prescribed." 4. Section 68 of the Act is almost analogous to S. 44 of the Old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Under the second proviso of sub-sec. (2) of S. 44 of the Old Act, the Government was authorised to constitute a single member Regional Transport Authority (hereinafter referred to as the RT.A.) for any region but no such power was given for constituting a single member S.T.A. Under the Old Act the Government of U.P. had framed rules known as U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940. Although these rules were framed under the Old Act, but they are still in operation by virtue of Section 217(2)(a) of the "(f) The State Government may at any time. (i) determine, without assigning any reason, by notification in the Gazette the term of any nominated official or non-official member of the State Transport Authority; (ii) vary the composition of the Authority, and consequentially reduce or increase the number of official or non-official members. (i) determine, without assigning any reason, by notification in the Gazette the term of any nominated official or non-official member of the State Transport Authority; (ii) vary the composition of the Authority, and consequentially reduce or increase the number of official or non-official members. (g) Subject to the provisions of clause (f), a nominated member (other than an ex official member) of the State Transport Authority shall hold office for a period of two years and thereafter until a successor is nominated; Provided that when any such member dies or is removed or his term is determined, or he vacates office, his successor shall be nominated for the remainder of the period of office of the member whose place he takes and thereafter until a successor is nominated; Provided also that every member whose term of office has expired shall be eligible for re-nomination." According to clause (g) all nominated members of State Transport Authority are to hold office for a period of two years and thereafter until the successor is nominated. However, the State Government has power under clause (f) to determine terms of any nominated member by means of notification in the Gazette and further to vary composition of the authority by reducing or increasing number of official and non-official members. 5. After enforcement of new Act on 1-71989 the Government of U.P. constituted S.T.A. by its notification dated July 29, 1989 after superseding its earlier notification dated November 13, 1987, and S.T.A. so constituted was to consist of Transport Commissioner as Chairman and four non-official members including the petitioner. With the change of Government in December 1989, by impugned notification dated December 26, 1989 a single member S.T.A. was reconstituted consisting of Transport Commissioner, U.P. only. 6. Sub-section (1) of S. 68 provides for constitution of a State Transport Authority for the State and R.T.A. for the region. Subsection (2) empowers the Government to name the Chairman and the members of the S.T.A. and the R.T.A. So far as the S.T.A. is concerned, it is to consist of a Chairman and such other persons not being more than four. An exception has been made in the second proviso where under the Government can constitute a single member S.T.A. or R.T.A. 7. An exception has been made in the second proviso where under the Government can constitute a single member S.T.A. or R.T.A. 7. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that as the second proviso provides for constitution of single member authority for region only, Government was not justified in constituting an S.T.A. for the State by the impugned notification. The emphasis of the learned counsel is on the words "the State Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority for any region." We are not able to agree with this submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Second proviso has been appended to Subsection (2) of Section 68 and as such, will cover the field which is dealt with by subsection (2). It is an exception to what is contained in sub-section (1) of Section 68. Hon'ble Supreme Court in R.N. Sons Ltd. v. Asstt. Commr. of Sales Tax, AIR 1955 SC 765 has declared that, "It is cardinal rule of interpretation that proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other." In Abdul Jabar Butt v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1957 SC 281 similar view was expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which is quoted below : "In the first place it is a fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso." act. Rule 43 deals with the constitution and function of the State Transport Authority. Clauses (f) and (g) of Rule 43 of the Rules of 1940, being relevant, are quoted below : 8. The S.T.A. is created by the Government under sub-section (1) for the whole State, whereas R.T.As. are created for the region. Second proviso carves out an exception to sub-section (2) and not subsection (1). S.T.A. as such, has to be one for the whole State in accordance with subsection (1). The words for any region' refer to the R.T.A. and not S.T.A. 9. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that when S.T.A. exercises the power under Section 68(3)(b) for R.T.A. the Government can constitute S.T.A. for that region under the second proviso. We cannot agree. The words for any region' refer to the R.T.A. and not S.T.A. 9. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that when S.T.A. exercises the power under Section 68(3)(b) for R.T.A. the Government can constitute S.T.A. for that region under the second proviso. We cannot agree. By virtue of sub-section (1) of Section 68, an S.T.A., which is constituted by the Government has to exercise and discharge the powers and functions specified under sub-section (3) of the same section. S.T.A. which is created for the whole State has to exercise all the powers under sub-section (3) including its clause (b). It is not open to the Government to create more than one S.T.A. for the State in view of the clear language of sub-section (1), which lays down that "the State Government shall, by notification in the official gazette, constitute for the State a State Transport Authority .. 10. Before dealing with the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, we may express our disapproval of the submission made by the learned Special Counsel for the S.T.A. regarding jurisdiction of this Court to interfere in the matter, if the opinion has been formed by the Government on subjective satisfaction especially at the instance of the Minister concerned. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295 and other subsequent cases has laid down the grounds on which this Court can interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the orders/decisions of the Government even if they are based on subjective satisfaction. The legal position has been summarised in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 1182 . Para 11 of this decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is quoted below : "By now, the parameters of the Court's powers of judicial review of administrative or executive action or decision and the grounds on which the Court can interfere with the same are well settled and it would be redundant to recapitulate the whole catena of decisions of this Court commencing from Barium Chemicals, 1966 Supp SCR 311 : AIR 1967 SC 295 , case on the point. Indisputably, it is settled position that if the action or decision is per versed or is such that no reasonable body of persons, properly informed, could come to, or has been arrived at by the authority misdirecting itself by adopting a wrong approach, or has been influenced by irrelevant or extraneous matters the Court would be justified in interfering with the same. This Court in one of its later decisions in Smt. Shalini Soni v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCR 962 : AIR 1981 SC 431 , has observed thus, "It is an unwritten rule of the law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever decision on making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters only," eschewing the irrelevant and the remote. Suffice it to say that the following passage appearing at pages 285-86 in Prof. De Smith's treatise 'Judicial Review of Administrative Action' (4th Edn.) succinctly summarises the several principles formulated by the Courts in that behalf thus : "The authority in which a discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion; but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, a discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it. It must not act under the dictation of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has been authorised to do. It must act in good faith must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be swayed by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. Nor where a judgement must be made that certain facts exist can discretion be validly exercise on the basis of an erroneous assumption a ut those facts. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories, failure to exercise a discretion and excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Nor where a judgement must be made that certain facts exist can discretion be validly exercise on the basis of an erroneous assumption a ut those facts. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories, failure to exercise a discretion and excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account, and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires. Nor, is it possible to differentiate with precision the grounds of invalidity contained within each category." This court can set aside the decision of the Government even if it is based on subjective satisfaction on the grounds well established by decisions of the Supreme Court. The court can examine whether the reasons disclosed by the Government for forming opinion are relevant to and the have rational connection with the object sought to be achieved by the Legislature. It is true that if the opinion is formed by the highest in the Government, a strong presumption is drawn by the Courts about regularity and validity of the Government action; but it is only the presumption which is liable to be rebutted and it cannot assume the status of conclusiveness. 11. Regarding the second contention, in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of the writ petition, it has been stated by the petitioner that there was no material available before the State Government on the basis of which it could consider necessity or expedience to constitute a single member of S.T.A. and nothing whatsoever has been considered by the Government for dissolving the existing body. In counter-affidavit the Government has denied the aforesaid allegations of the petitioner and has, in paragraph 7, given the reason for constituting single members S.T.A.; reasons being improper and unsatisfactory functioning of former S.T.A. as (a) it has issued a large number of permits to private operators, (i) on inter-State routes contrary to the terms of the inter-State agreement, (ii) on various inter Regional routes, where whole or part overlaps the notified routes and (b) proposals are pending for grant of permits on inter-State routes and notified routes contrary to the reciprocal agreement and the approved scheme. A chart containing the details of permits granted by former S.T.A. on inter-State routes against inter-State reciprocal agreements and on inter-Regional routes which overlaps wholly or partly the nationalised route regarding which permits could not have been granted which has been supplied by the Secretary State Transport Authority on the information secured from U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, has also been filed by the Government as Annexure CA-1. The petitioner, in rejoinder affidavit, has made a bare denial of the allegations made in paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit, but has not said anything about the details contained in Annexure CA - 1. The details given in Annexure CA-1 is about grant of permits by former S.T.A. on the aforesaid routes from July, 1988 to January, 1991. When the details particulars have been given in C.A.-1, it was the duty of the petitioner-to have controverted or should have explained it in his rejoinder-affidavit. Rejoinder affidavit, as mentioned above, is silent about it. We cannot as such accept the allegations of the petitioner that there was no material with the Government for constituting single member S.T.A. 12. The S.T.A. is constituted by the Government for exercising powers specified by Sub-section (3) of Section 68. It is for the Government to decide whether multi-member S.T.A. under sub-section (2) or single member S.T.A. under Second proviso will exercise statutory powers more effectively. Such a decision of the Government can be challenged only on limited grounds. laid down by the Courts. 13. In the instant case it cannot be said that Government has no material before it for forming opinion under Second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 68 for constituting single member S.T.A. It is well settled that if there is some material with the Government for forming opinion, same cannot be interfered with by this court even if formation of another opinion on the same material is possible. Decision of the Government to constitute single member S.T.A. as such cannot be said to be arbitrary. 14. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.ln view of facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.