Sivasamy Thevar v. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowment Board, Madras
1990-08-27
GOVINDASAMY
body1990
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. The petitioner has filed the writ petition to quash the order of the first respondent made in Proceedings R.C. No. A1/28552/80 dated 2-2-1983. 2. ArulmiguMadyapureeswarar Temple, Parakalakottai, Pattukottai Taluk, Thanjavur District was classified under S. 46(i) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and had been under the supervisory control of the Deputy Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable En lowments Administration Department, Thanjavur. The third respondent herein, namely, Sadagoparamanujam, was the hereditary trustee of the temple functioning from 1963. The petitioner has stated that he filed O.A. No. 18 of 1968 before the Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., Thanjavur wherein he has pointed out certain irregularities committed by the third respondent who was the hereditary trustee of the temple and also prayed for framing of a scheme and for removing the third respondent from the trusteeship. The Deputy Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., Thanjavur, (the 2nd respondent) by order dated 29-12-978 in O.A. No. 18 of 1968 directed that a scheme should be settled for the proper administration of the suit institution and also directed the parties on record and persons having an interest over the institution to submit a draft scheme. In the meantime, the 2nd respondent herein initiated disciplinary proceedings under S. 53 of the Act, against the 3rd respondent herein for certain irregularities noticed in the administration of the Thirukoil and framed about 22 charges against him. During the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, the second respondent herein by his order dated 9-1-1975, placed the 3rd respondent under suspension and appointed a fit person to run the administration of the temple. In response to the charges framed against him, the third respondent submitted his representations. 3. As per the provisions of the Act, as amended by Act 42 of 1978, the temple in question was reclassified under S. 46(ii) deleting from S. 46(i) for which the Commissioner is the appropriate authority to pass the order on the disciplinary proceedings initiated against a hereditary trustee. Consequently, the Commissioner by his Proceedings R.C. No. A1/28552/80 dated 28-10-1980, based on the report of the second respondent, framed about 13 charges against the 3rd respondent, who was then under suspension, and issued memo of charges to the 3rd respondent herein, catling upon the 3rd respondent to submit his representations, if any, in respect of the charges framed against him.
The third respondent submitted his written explanation to the charges framed against him by the Commissioner, the 1st respondent, on 15-11-1980. The Commissioner, after providing adequate opportunity to the third respondent, who was represented by counsel, dropped the proceedings and also vacated the suspension order. Consequently, the third respondent, the hereditary trustee of the said temple, was restored to the office and the fit person was directed to hand over charge of the temple and the connected records to the 3rd respondent. It is, in these circumstances, the petitioner has filed the above writ petition to quash the aforesaid order by a writ of certiorari. 4. The learned counsel for the petitionercontended that though the petitioner was nota party to the disciplinary proceedings, thedisciplinary proceedings were initiated onlyat the instance of the petitioner and consequently the petitioner should be given an opportunity in the disciplinary proceedings initiatedagainst the third respondent and failure toprovide adequate opportunity to the petitionerin the disciplinary proceedings initiatedagainst the third respondent, vitiates theentire proceedings. 5. Mr. W.C. Thiruvengadam, learnedcounsel appearing on behalf of the third respondent, contended that the impugned proceedings were originally initiated by the 2ndrespondent against the third respondent andlater by the 1st respondent and it is only the 3rd respondent who should be given an adequate opportunity to disprove his guilt andthe petitioner has no locus standi to participate in the enquiry initiated against the 3rdrespondent and he has also no locus standi to cross-examine anybody. Learned counsel forthe 3rd respondent cited a decision in W.P. No. 960 of 1970 wherein it has been held thatthe persons like the petitioner has no right toparticipate in any disciplinary proceedingsinitiated as against the 3rd respondent. 6. Mr. P.M. Bhaskaran, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents 1 and 2, contended that the impugned order is one by which the suspension was revoked and the proceedings were dropped and it is sustainable in law. 7. Considering the contentions put forth by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, it is clear that the impugned order was passed in a disciplinary proceedings initiated against the 3rd respondent by respondents 1 and 2 and the Jrd respondent alone, as of right, is entitled to have an opportunity to participate in the enquiry to disprove bis guilt and prove his innocence with reference to the charges that are framed.
The petitioner has no right to participate in the proceedings initiated by respondents 1 and 2 against the third respondent. The petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved as a result of the impugned order which is not in any way connected with any of the interest of the petitioner. The petitioner has instituted the proceedings in O A. 18 of 1968 for settlement of a scheme for proper administration of the institution and to remove respondent 3 from the office. The 2nd respondent by order dated 29-12-1988 directed that a scheme should be settled for the proper administration of the institution and that the parties on record and persons having interest over the institution were required to submit a draft scheme. However, the Deputy Commissioner has not passed any order in O.A. 18 of 1968 removing the 3rd respondent from the office of the hereditary trusteeship. Having regard to the fact that the second respondent passed an order in O.A. 18 of 1968 instituted by the petitioner that a scheme should be settled without passing any order removing the 3rd respondent from the office of hereditary trusteeship, if at all the petitioner is aggrieved as a result of the order passed by the 2nd respondent in O.A. 18 of 1968. he should have initiated such action as may be available to him under law. In so far as the impugned proceedings are concerned, the petitioner hat no locus standi whatsoever and cannot claim as of right that he should be given an opportunity by reason of the fact that the impugned proceedings are purely disciplinary proceedings, against the 3rd respondent for certain alleged irregularities which were ultimately not proved. In the circumstances, the petitioner cannot have any grievance. There is no substance in saying that the petitioner should be given an opportunity in the proceedings initiated against the third respondent. Consequently, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, it is dismissed. No costs.