JUDGMENT B.L.Loomba, J. 1. Sumer Chand Sharma has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to assial the validity of the order dated 30-6-1989 of the Chairman, State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U P. passed in revision No. 84 of 1981 under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 Through this impugned order, the Tribunal set aside the order dated 25-6-1981 of the Regional Transport Authority, Dehradun where under transfer of half share in the regular stage carriage permit No 803 on Manglaur-Lakhnoti via Asif Nagar and allied routes (covered by vehicle HRR 189) was permitted in favour of present petitioner Sumer Chand Sharma. 2. It is the undisputed position that permit for this route was granted in the year 1973 to Sukhbir Singh Sharma, respondent no. 4 by the R. T. A. Dehradun. This permit was lifted by respondent Sukhbir Singh Sharma with reference to the said vehicle in the year 1975. Sukhbir Singh Sharma entered into an agreement to transfer half share in the said vehicle aloogwith its covering permit in favour of respondent no. 3 Dhanpal Singh. This transfer was allowed by R. T. A. by order dated 9-4-1975. Respondents 4 and 3, as such were the co-owners and co-permit holders in respect of the said vehicle and the permit. The case of the petitioner Sumer Chand Sharma bas been that on 13-3-1977, respondent no. 4 Sukhbir Singh Sharma entered into an agreement with him to transfer bis half share in the said vehicle alongwith the permit for a consideration of Rs. 72000/- and an amount of Rs. 60,000/- out of the said 'sale consideration was paid to the said respondent on the same day and receipt acknowledging this payment and to testify the transfer of the share was executed. After about two years of the execution of this receipt, the petitioner moved an application before the R. T. A. seeking permission and order in respect of this transfer. This application was published in the U. P. Gazette on April 11, 1V81, as provided in Section 57 (3) of the said Act. Respondent no. After about two years of the execution of this receipt, the petitioner moved an application before the R. T. A. seeking permission and order in respect of this transfer. This application was published in the U. P. Gazette on April 11, 1V81, as provided in Section 57 (3) of the said Act. Respondent no. 4 Sukhbir Singh Sharma filed his objection to the said application therein stating in categorical terms that he had not made any such transfer of the share in the vehicle or the permit and that the receipt dated 13-3-1977 relied upon by the petitioner was fictitious and forged and only to harm the interest of the respondent. It was mentioned in this objection that the petitioner Sumer Chand Sharma had also filed a criminal complaint under Section 392 of the Indian Penal Code against a fictitious person and without impleading the respondent and on the basis of wrong assertions some order has been obtained in that criminal case The application seeking transfer of the share in the vehicle and the permit was thus opposed by respondent Sukhbir Singh Sharma (Annexure 3 to the Writ Petition). 3. Matter of disposal of the application of the petitioner for transfer of the vehicle and permit came up for consideration before the R. T. A., Dehradun in its meeting dated 25-6-1981. It was disposed of under Resolution No. 13 (Copy Annexure 5). From perusal of this resolution it appears that one of the consideration which weighed with the R. T. A. was that Sukhbir Singh Sharma could not give any reason as to how the vehicle was in possession of Sumer Chand Sharma since 13-3-1987. It was also, observed that Sukhbir Singh Sharma could not give reason as to why he did not take any legal step against Sumer Chand Sharma in regard to receipt dated 13-3-1977. The receipt was accepted as a prima facie proof of the transfer of the share in the vehicle and the permit and on that basis the application was allowed. It was directed that Sumer Chand Sharma should pay Rs. 12000/- to Sukhbir Singh Sharma as agreed on 13-3-1977 as per the contents of the said receipt. 4. The order of the R. T. A. was challenged before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and the revision was allowed as aforesaid. It was directed that Sumer Chand Sharma should pay Rs. 12000/- to Sukhbir Singh Sharma as agreed on 13-3-1977 as per the contents of the said receipt. 4. The order of the R. T. A. was challenged before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and the revision was allowed as aforesaid. Learned Tribunal while allowing the revision observed that the receipt dated 13-3-1977 which is the main, rather a' the only basis of the claim of Sumer Chand Sharma was not free from suspicion. The respondent had denied its execution from the very beginning when application for transfer was notified in the Gazette and this receipt was stated to be fictitious and forged. It was observed that the R. T. A. appeared to have been influenced by the report of the District Magistrate wherein it was stated that there was no objection to the transfer and that this report itself was not prepared on any relevant and acceptable material and the assumption that Sumer Chand Sharma was put in possession of the vehicle and remained in its possession was wrong. The order of the Sub Judicial Magistrate dated 15-1-1979 permitting the vehicle to be given in the Supurdagi of tbe co-permit holder Dhanpal Sidgh and Sumer Chand Sharma was not enough to lead to this inference and, in any case, did not confer any right or . title on the Superdar -because property remained in the legal custody of the Court. It was also mentioned that the report of tbe Tahsildar which was forwarded by the District Magistrate was based on the order of the Magistrate regarding custody of the vehicle in criminal proceedings. Learned Tribunal rightly observed that the real point of controversy is as to whether the receipt dated 13-3- 1977 is genuine and since its genuineness was disputed, and it was said to be forged and fictitious, it could not be accepted without being proved to the satisfaction of the authority concerned and that the application seeking transfer being unilateral, it could not be accepted on its lace value. It was also observed that it was an incomplete transfer because nowhere it was alleged that the balance of the sale consideration of Rs. 12000/- had been paid The affidavits of the witnesses of the receipt were not filed. It was also observed that it was an incomplete transfer because nowhere it was alleged that the balance of the sale consideration of Rs. 12000/- had been paid The affidavits of the witnesses of the receipt were not filed. It appears that comparison of the admitted and disputed* signatures was also made by the Learned Tribunal for prima facie satisfaction about the genuiness or otherwise of the; receipt and for all the reasons set out in the order, the receipt was not found to be free from suspicion and, as such the revision was allowed as mentioned above. 5. The validity of the order of the learned Tribunal has been challenged in the writ petition filed on 25th July, 1989 mainly on the ground that the order of the Tribunal is based on mere conjecture and suspicions and it was not open to the Tribunal to question the genuineness and validity of the transfer without there being any denial of the signatures thereon by respondent Sukhbir Singh Sharma It is also stated that the revision could not be allowed by the Tribunal merely on the basis of any technical error, omission or irregularity because the order of the R. T. A. did not result in failure of justice between the parties. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties well at length and perused the material placed on record. From the averments contained in the affidavits exbanged between the parties and the two notices, one sent by the Advocate of Dhanpal respondent no. 3 to the Instalment Supply Private Ltd., New Delhi dated 13-2-1978 and its reply dated 21-2-1978, Annexure CA-6 and CA-7 it appears that the vehicle in question was financed by Instalment Supply Private Ltd., New* Delhi in favour of Sukhbir Singh Sharma and Dhanpal Singh and Sumer Chand Sharma was a guarantor, vide hire-purchase agreement dated 7-2-1976. According to the financier (Instalment Supply Private Ltd, New Delhi) they were entitled to re-posses the vehicle because of the failure of the borrowers to pay the hire instalments and on 9-12-1977 the employees of the financiers along with one Raj Pal seized the bus. It further appears that the complaint under Section 392 of the Indian Penal Code of petitioner Sumer Chaod Sharma was against Rejpal Singh and not against respondents nos. 3 and 4 (Annexure CA-4 to the counter affidavit of respondent no. 4). It would.. It further appears that the complaint under Section 392 of the Indian Penal Code of petitioner Sumer Chaod Sharma was against Rejpal Singh and not against respondents nos. 3 and 4 (Annexure CA-4 to the counter affidavit of respondent no. 4). It would.. thus, be obvious that no advantage could be derived by the petitioner in support of bis application seeking transfer of the share of the vehicle and permit on the basis of his possession which was relatable to the order of the criminal Court in a case under Section 392 of the Indian Penal Code filed against a third person who, according to the respondent, was either a fictitious persons or, in any case, was not connected with the respondent. Nothing acceptable material could thus be made out that the petitioner was in joint possession of the vehicle since 13-3-1977 or on the basis of any order of the Court as against respondent no. 4. The joint custody of the vehicle with respondent no. 3 was merely on the basis of Supurdari permitted by the criminal Court and it was rightly observed by the learned tribunal that the possession of the vehicle in law would be that of the Court on behalf of the rightful claimant. No material could be placed to show that any inquiry was made either about prima facie rights or possession of the petitioner by the District Magistrate whose report appears to have been taken into account by the R. T. A. The observations of the learned Tribunal in this regard cannot as such be said to be arbitrary and irrelevant. Two other points referred to in the order of the Tribunal also appear relevant. The application seeking transfer of the vehicle was unilateral and, secondly, the same was after about two years from the receipt dated 13-3-1977, Normally, the same would have been moved soon after the transaction relied upon by the petitioner and that too jointly by the respondent and the petitioner. The doubts arising in regard to these points, as mentioned in the order of the learned Tribunal cannot, as such, be said to be unjustified, presumptuous and irrelevant. Learned Tribunal then rightly observed that it was not open to the R. T. A. to go into the disputed question of fact and decide the rights and title merely on the basis of receipt dated 13-3-1977. Learned Tribunal then rightly observed that it was not open to the R. T. A. to go into the disputed question of fact and decide the rights and title merely on the basis of receipt dated 13-3-1977. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends with vehemence that the respondent nowhere disputed bis signatures on the said receipt. It is difficult to accept this contention. As is mentioned already, from the very beginning, the respondent challenged the genuineness of this receipt and shaded it fictitious and fraudulent and that implies the denial of its execution and the signatures. It is hotly disputed that this receipt was executed by the respondent or that he received Rs. 60,000/- from the petitioner and handed over possession of the vehicle. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of this court in Asad Yar Khan v. State Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1976 Alld. 185, wherein it was held that the R. T. A. in granting permits or allowing transfer of a permit acts as a quasi judicial authority and decides incidental questions relating to the rival claims of the parties and it will be open to the aggrieved party to go to a Civil Court for declaration that he is the owner of the vehicle. 7. Khwaja Bakhsh v. Mirza Mohammad Ismail, AIR 1984 Alld 83, a Full bench decision was in appeal against a decision in a civil suit for permanent injunction. The plaintiff had applied for permission for transfer of the permit. The defendant had initially given his consent but, subsequently, withdrew it and tried to take forcible possession of the vehicle and with such facts the suit for injunction was brought before the Court. It was held that the agreement represented a completed contract between the parties and mandatory injunction could be issued directing the defendant to execute the necessary documents required to effect transfer of permit in favour of the plaintiff. 8. The revision before the Tribunal was filed and decided under section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The Tribunal has the power to interfere with the orders of the R. T. A./.S. T. A. on its appearing to the Tribunal to be improper or illegal. In the present case, learned Tribunal has passed the impugned order after hearing the contesting parties and upon consideration of the material on record. The Tribunal has the power to interfere with the orders of the R. T. A./.S. T. A. on its appearing to the Tribunal to be improper or illegal. In the present case, learned Tribunal has passed the impugned order after hearing the contesting parties and upon consideration of the material on record. The same cannot be said to be arbitrary and suffering from any manifest error of law, fact of procedure. It is difficult to accept the plea that the order is based on surmises and conjectures or on irrelevant considerations and in arbitrary in nature. In the analysis as above, the impugned order cannot be said to be illegal or improper and no case has been made out for interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is liable to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. Interm stay order stands vacated. Petition dismissed.