JUDGMENT R.K.Gulati, J. 1. This Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the proceedings arising under Section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings ?? (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short "the Act"). The dispute relates to house no. 97, Jhanda Mohalla, Dehradun. The third respondent, Narendra Kumar is the owner and landlord and is in occupation of a part of the house. An accommodation of two small rooms on the ground floor is in the occupation of the tenant-petitioner. An application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act was moved by the respondent-landlord for getting released the accommodation under the tenancy of the tenant-petitioner, as the landlord required the same for his use and occupation. The release application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority. It found that the need of the landlord was bona fide and genuine, further the comparative hardship of the landlord was greater than that of the tenant. The Prescribed Authority also allowed two years' rent as compensation in favour of the tenant-petitioner payable by the landlord-respondent. An appeal against that order, at the instance of the petitioner, was dismissed by the appellate authority. The order passed by the courts below have been challenged in this petition. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. At the outset, it may be mentioned that the learned counsel for the petitioner has not challenged the findings recorded in regard to the bona fide need and comparative hardship of the respondent-landlord. This Court is thus relieved of the burden of going into these questions. The solitary argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner was that the impugned orders are vitiated in law, for the courts below have not addressed themselves to the question, whether the need of the landlord could have been met by release of only a part of the accommodation as envisaged under Rule 16 (1) (d) of the Rules framed under the Act. Rule 16 (1) (d) reads : "(d) Where the tenant's needs would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under tenancy and the landlord's needs would be served by releasing the other part, the prescribed authority shall release only the latter part of the building." 3. Rule 16 (1) (d) reads : "(d) Where the tenant's needs would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under tenancy and the landlord's needs would be served by releasing the other part, the prescribed authority shall release only the latter part of the building." 3. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner never put forward the plea based on Rule 16 (1) (d) either before the prescribed authority or before the appellate court. This question has been raised for the first time in these proceedings. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited me to certain decisions of this Court where the view expressed is that it is the imperative duty of the court to take into account the applicability of Rule 16 (1) (d) aforesaid and whether such a plea was taken or not in the pleadings or canvassed before the court. In the face of decisions brought to my notice, I invited learned counsel for the parties to address the Court on the question whether the tenant's need would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the accommodation under tenancy and the landlord's need would be served by releasing a part as contemplated in Rule 16 (1) (d) of the Rules. The only question for consideration, therefore, is whether the two rooms which are in the occupation of the tenant-petitioner, can be said to be more than absolutely necessary to meet, the requirement of the landlord. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary to have a look at the size of the family of the landlord and also the accommodation at his disposal. So far as the family is concerned, it consists of eight members. These are :,the landlord and his/wife, a married brother and his wife, mother and father, another grown up younger brother and a grown up sister. Coming to the accommodation with the landlord, it consists of one room approximately 8'x8' on the ground floor, which was released from the tenancy of the petitioner in the year 1977, and on the first floor one room 8'xll', one improvised store 4'x8', one kitchen and some open space. Coming to the accommodation with the landlord, it consists of one room approximately 8'x8' on the ground floor, which was released from the tenancy of the petitioner in the year 1977, and on the first floor one room 8'xll', one improvised store 4'x8', one kitchen and some open space. It is admitted to the petitioner that out of this accommodation the room on the ground floor is used as a store room where the goods and articles received by the landlord on his marriage are lying dumped. During the course of argument it was also not disputed that a married sister of the landlord often visits him along with her husband. 5. Now considering the size of the family, one separate bedroom is necessary, for the landlord and his wife, another for his married brother and his wife a separate room is also required for the parents and atleast one room for the brother and sister, although both of them are grown up and they may need a separate room, inasmuch as in the year 1934 when the application for release was filed, their age was shown as 22 years and 15 years respectively. Some provision is also necessary for guests such as, the married sister and other relations which cannot be lost sight of having regard to the social obligations and customs in the society. It does not require a mention that bed room alone does not constitute the requirement of a family and some other accommodation is also needed for various other purposes. In setting out the above requirement, mention of another need of the landlord ion which both the courts below have recorded a categorical finding in his favour, has not been taken note of. It has come on record that the landlord is a Commerce graduate and has received higher education in Music who wants to set up music classes in his own house. He is in possession of a large variety of musical instruments which he received on the death of his music teacher one Kishori Lal besides the disputed house, under a will executed by Kishori Lal. The instruments, for want of space, for the present are lying with one Brij Lal, a retired Principal of the College, who has given notice to the landlord to remove them. 6. The instruments, for want of space, for the present are lying with one Brij Lal, a retired Principal of the College, who has given notice to the landlord to remove them. 6. In the above background the imminent minimum requirement of the landlord is for six rooms besides a kitchen and bath room in his occupation. As against the above, the landlord has only two rooms or at any rate three rooms if the improvised store room (4'x8') is counted as a room. IN this stage of affair, judge (sic) whatever standard, it is difficult to hold that the need of the landlord can adequately be met by release of a part of the accommodation under the tenant-petitioner. The question of applicability of Rule 16 (1) (d) of the Rules does not arise and that seems to be the reason why this question was not raised before the courts below. There is no merit in the case advanced on behalf of the petitioner impugning the orders of the lower authorities. For the petitioner it was argued that the case should be sent back to the court below to determine the question whether Rule 16 (1) (d) of the Rules applies to the facts of the case or not. On a careful consideration of the evidence on record and the facts of the case, the submission is not acceptable. There is sufficient evidence and other material on record to decide the question as to the application of Rule 16 (I) (d) raised in these proceedings. The parties knew their respective case and had led evidence. Nothing was brought to my notice which might require investigation by the court below necessitating a remand of the case. It is true, the question relating to accommodation needed by a party should ordinarily be left for the decision of the fact finding court or authority. This, however, is not an absolute or invariable rule. The Court has a discretion in the matter of remand and it is not bound to remand a case. The discretion, however, is not arbitrary and is to be exercised on sound judicial principles. The general principles about remand are that the power cannot be exercised lightly and on mere asking because it affects the parties. The power of remand is required to be exercised with caution and sparingly. The discretion, however, is not arbitrary and is to be exercised on sound judicial principles. The general principles about remand are that the power cannot be exercised lightly and on mere asking because it affects the parties. The power of remand is required to be exercised with caution and sparingly. Ordinarily a remand of a case may be justified where a court after examination of the material already placed on record by way of evidence comes to a conclusion that it Is not possible for it to make a final order without the help of some other evidence which is not on the record and without a clear finding by the authority from whose order the proceedings before it had arisen. When there is sufficient evidence already on record having bearing on the issue for consideration, the Court is not precluded from going into the merits of the question arising in the case and to decide it finally in one way or other. In Ziaul Haq v. 1st Addl District Judge, Nainital, 1983 (2) ARC 38, where, Honourable Mr. Justice N. D. Ojha (as his Lordship then was) dealing with a similar situation opined as under : "I am aware that normally the question as to whether the extent of the accommodation which would be sufficient to meet the need of the landlord is to be decided by the fact finding authorities and not by this Court in a writ petition. However, this is not an absolute rule and the proposition of law cannot be disputed that if the necessary material is already on record and if the circumstances of a particular case require to do so, this Court is not precluded from considering the said question. In my opinion, in the instant case the necessary material is already on the record and the circumstances are also such that it would not be in the ends of justice to prolong the litigation by remanding the case to the Additional District Judge for consideration of this question alone." This decision was followed by another Honourable Judge of this Court in Devi Prasad Misra v. II Addl. District Judge, Bareilly, 1986 (1) ARC 247. 7. With respect, I am in full agreement with the view expressed in the above decisions. 8. There is another aspect of the matter which requires notice. District Judge, Bareilly, 1986 (1) ARC 247. 7. With respect, I am in full agreement with the view expressed in the above decisions. 8. There is another aspect of the matter which requires notice. The release application in this case was filed in the year 1984. Over six years have already elapsed in getting a decision. Ends of justice demand that a litigation should be concluded finally as far as possible, and a party litigant who has undergone all the ordeal and trouble of protracted litigation should not be relegated to remand proceedings unless it is unavoidable. On the facts of this case a remand would only result in unnecessary further litigation between the parties besides wasteful expenditure and loss of time. It is a fit case where in my opinion the prayer for remand must be rejected on the ground that final curtain should be drawn. The prayer for remand is accordingly rejected. Before parting with this case, I may also refer to the findings recorded by the courts below on the question of comparative hardship as it has some bearing on the issue under consideration. The courts below have found that the petitioner has not a house at Majra on Dehradun-Saharanpur Road which has a large accommodation, out of which 8-10 rooms in number are let out to different tenants and also there are shops. In fact, except for the petitioner and one of his sons who is deaf and dump and carries on painting and art gallery work in the disputed accommodation, the other members of the family are living in that house at Majra. There is also a finding to the effect that Majra is 6-7 Kms. away from the disputed accommodation and is well linked with transport facilities. There are also a number of schools nearby. The petitioner's son can set up his painting and art gallery there and there would be no difficulty for him to find new students for his school. These findings, as stated earlier, have not been challenged in these proceedings and must be accepted as correct. These findings also do not support the petitioner's case taken up in these proceedings for partial release. 9. For what has been stated above, this writ petition is without any merit and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.