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1990 DIGILAW 706 (ALL)

Swarup Vegetable Products Industries Limited v. State of U. P.

1990-07-28

B.P.JEEVAN REDDY, R.K.GULATI

body1990
JUDGMENT B.P.Jeevan Reddy, CJ. 1. Supreme Court in Ch. Tika Ramji v. The State of U. P., Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri H. R. Misra, learned Standing Counsel for the State. 2. The petitioners are engaged in manufacture of Vanaspati Ghee among other articles According to them, raw materials for manufacture of Vanaspati Ghee are 'Sesame oil, rice bran oil, palm oil, soyabin and cotton seed oil." The petitioners hold a licence under the Industries (Development and Regulation) 4ct, 1951 (hereinafter called the IDR Act), where under he is permitted to manufacture 50 tonnes of Vanaspati Ghee per day. On 8th May, 1990, the premises of the petitioners were inspected by the Senior Marketing Inspector and other officials and certain quantities of "Edible oils including rice bran oil,, cotton seed oil, Mahua oil and sesame oil" were seized, on the ground that the petitioners did not hold a licence under the U. P. Scheduled Commodities Dealers (Licensing and Restriction on Hoarding) Order, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the U. P. Order). The said seizure is questioned in this writ petition as incompetent and totally without the authority of law. 3. The petitioners' contention, in short, in this 1 Vanaspati Ghee (hydro genated vegetable oil) is one of the items mentioned in the 1st Schedule to the IDR Act, which means that an industry engaged in manufacture or production of Vanaspati Ghee is exclusively governed by the provisions of the said Act. Entry 28 in the First Schedule to the Act takes in 'Vegetable oils and Vanaspati'. The commodities seized are vegetable oils. They are used in manufacture of Vanaspati. Section 18-G of Act empowers the Central Government to control and regulate supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, any article or class of articles reliable to any schedule industry. It includes the power to regulate the trade and commerce in the scheduled goods by licences, permits or otherwise; and this power extends to distribution, transport, disposal, acquisition, possession, use or consumption of any such article or class thereof. It is immaterial, it is contended, whether any rule or order is made under sub-section (2) of Section lb-G by the Central Government or not. It is immaterial, it is contended, whether any rule or order is made under sub-section (2) of Section lb-G by the Central Government or not. Once the power of licensing and the power to control or regulate possession, use, acquisition and disposal of the scheduled commodities is taken over by the Parliament by making the declaration contemplated by Entry 52 of List I of the Seventh Scheduled to the Constitution, the State is denuded of the said power. In other words, according to the petitioners, the State Government is incompetent to provide for licensing or tor control or regulation of possession, use, acquisition and disposal of such articles or class of articles in any manner. For this reason, it is contended, the petitioners were not obliged to obtain a licence under the U. P. Order. The seizure of goods for non- possession of a licence under the said Order is, therefore, totally without the authority of law. 4. In our opinion, the entire reasoning of the petitioners is faulty and unacceptable. The IDR Act is a law made by parliament under Entry 52, List I of the Seventh Schedule by making the declaration contemplated therein. Once such a declaration is made, the State is denuded of the power to make any law relating to Entry 24, List II of the Seventh Schedule. Indeed, Entry 24 is expressly made subject to Entries 7 and 52 of List I of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. But, the question is whether the U. P. Order, impugned herein, is a law, or a statutory order, made with reference to Entry 24 or, for that matter, any other Entry in List affected by the "declaration". We do not think so. The impugned U. P. Order is issued under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, which is an enactment made by Parliament under Entry 33, List 111 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. We do not think so. The impugned U. P. Order is issued under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, which is an enactment made by Parliament under Entry 33, List 111 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Entry 33 reads as follows :- "Trade and commerce in and the production, supply and distribution of - (a) the products of any industry where the control of such industry by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, and imported goods of the same kind as such products; (b) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils; (c) cattle fodder, including oilcakes and other concentrates; (d) raw cotton, whether ginned or unginned, and cotton seed; and (e) raw jute." For the sake of convenience, we may also set out Entry 52 of List I and Entry SA of List 11 : "52 (List I). Industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest." "24 (List II)). Industries subject to the provisions of Entries 7 and 52 of List I." The Constitutional history leading to substitution of Entry 33 in List III is set out in the decision of the Supreme Court in Ch. Tika Ramji v. The State of U. P., AIR 1956 SC 676 , which we do not think necessary to repeat here. Entry 33 empowers both the Parliament and the State Legislatures to make a law relating to trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of, "(a; the products of any industry where the control of such industry by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest and imported goods of the same kind as such products, (b) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils......". 5. In our opinion, a reading of Entry 52 in List I and Entry 33 in List III itself brings out the distinct fields occupied by these two Entries, namely, Entry 52 in List I and Entry 33 in List III. Not only these two Entries have to be read harmoniously keeping their essential content intact, but that we have also to keep in mind the doctrine of pith and substance while construing these Entries. Not only these two Entries have to be read harmoniously keeping their essential content intact, but that we have also to keep in mind the doctrine of pith and substance while construing these Entries. So read, it is clear that while Entry 52 in List I empowers the Parliament to make a law providing for control over industries, the control over which by Union is declared by Parliament to be expedient in public interest, Entry 33 in List 111 empowers both the Parliament and the State Legislatures so make a law relating to trade and commerce in, and the production, supply, and distribution of products of such industries as well as of edible oils and edible oilseeds, it is true that Section 18-G of the 1DR Act does empower the Central Government to control and regulate supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, any article or class of articles relatable to any scheduled industry, and to regulate trade and commerce in the scheduled goods by licences, permits, or otherwise, as also to regulate distribution, possession, use, or consumption of any such articles or class thereof, but this section in the IDR Act has to be read consistent with Entry 33 in List III which expressly empowers the Parliament and the State Legislatures to make a law relating to trade and commerce in, and the production, supply, and distribution of products of Scheduled industries as well as edible oilseeds and oils. It is not necessary to pursue this reasoning further for the reason that the Essential Commodities Act -where under the impugned U. P. Order is issued-is a law made by the Parliament itself, and not by a State Legislature. The U. P. Scheduled Commodities Dealers (.Licensing and Restriction on Hoarding) Order, 1989 has no doubt been issued by the State Government, but it has done so as the delegate of the Parliament under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. The said Order is, therefore, relatable, to, and in truth an extension of, the Essential Commodities Act. The said Order is not relatable to any enactment made by U. P. Legislature with reference to any Entry in List II of the Seventh schedule. The reliance upon Entry 52 of List 1, therefore, is of no help to the petitioners. 6. There is yet another aspect which needs to be pointed out. The said Order is not relatable to any enactment made by U. P. Legislature with reference to any Entry in List II of the Seventh schedule. The reliance upon Entry 52 of List 1, therefore, is of no help to the petitioners. 6. There is yet another aspect which needs to be pointed out. It is not brought to our notice that any order has been issued by the Central Government under Section 18-G regulating the possession, distribution etc. of vegetable oils concerned herein. Section 18-G is merely an enabling provision. In this connection reference may be had to the observations of the Supreme Court in the last sub-para in para 34 of AIR 1956 SC 676 (at 703j. The only law governing the possession, distribution etc. of the said vegetable oils is the impugned U. P. Order, which, as stated above, is not a legislation by the State Legislature, but a piece of subordinate legislation made by the State Government as the delegate of Parliament. The impugned Order is thus an extension of and an elaboration of the Essential Commodities Act. Hence, the entire controversy regarding powers of 'Parliament and State Legislatures is really beside the point. For the above reasons, we are unable to agree with the petitioners' counsel that the U. P. Control Order is either incompetent or ultra vires the power of the State Government, or the Essential Commodities Act. It Is not suggested that the U. P. Order travels beyond the purview of the Essential Commodities Act. In this view of the matter, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 7. It was then submitted that some of the raw materials seized do not come within the purview of the U. P. Scheduled Commodities Dealers Order since they are not edible. We do not wish to express any opinion on this question except to point out that, even according to the petitioners' own averment, rice-bran oil and cotton-seed oil go into manufacture of Vanaspati Ghee. If so, we are not inclined to agree prima facie with the petitioners' counsel that rice-bran oil and cotton-seed oil are not edible oils and, therefore, are not within the purview of the said U. P. Order. If so, we are not inclined to agree prima facie with the petitioners' counsel that rice-bran oil and cotton-seed oil are not edible oils and, therefore, are not within the purview of the said U. P. Order. Be that as it may, it is always open to the petitioners to apply to the appropriate authorities- before whom the said goods may be produced pursuant to the seizure-foe release of the same. If and when any such application is made, the same shall be disposed of in accordance with law. 8. After this case was heard on 24th of May 90 and orders reserved, the order could not be pronounced on 25th May 'SO. When we proposed to deliver the order soon after the reopening of the Court, a representation was made by the counsel for the petitioner that there have been certain subsequent developments which may be taken note of by this Court and for that purpose the delivery of order may be postponed. In view of the said request we did not pronounce the orders on that day. Today we heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. He says that the time for obtaining licence under the U. P. Order was extended up to 31st May 1990 and that the petitioner hast in fact, obtained such a licence within that date. This is a fact touching the merits of the case upon which we have expressed no opinion in this order. The petitioner can always bring the subsequent developments to the notice of the authority before whom the proceedings for the alleged violation are instituted and we are sure that the authority will deal with the same in accordance with law. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.