JUDGMENT Bellie, J. 1. The appellant herein is the Government of Tamil Nadu. It dismissed one Dr. Balasubramanian a Veterinary Surgeon working in the Animal Husbandry Department after making disciplinary proceedings against him. He filed the suit challenging that order. The Trial Court dismissed the suit. But however in the appeal the appellate court allowed the appeal and set aside the Judgment of the trial court and decreed the suit and ordered reinstatement and also damages claimed. 2. The facts in brief are: While the plaintiff was working as poultry Development Officer in the Department of Animal Husbandary at Tiruchirapalli there was a Scheme sanctioned under G.O.Ms.No. 2839, dated 17.11.1984 for grant of loans to poultry farmers and that Government Order was followed by G.O.Ms.No. 886 dated 8.3.1965 wherein terms and conditions for disbursement of loans were prescribed. In respect of implementation of the scheme four charges were framed against the plaintiff accusing him of receiving bribes and for violating the conditions in G.O.Ms.No. 886. Out of four charges he was found guilty in respect of two charges by the Tribunal for Disciplinary proceedings and the Tribunal recommended stoppage of increments for two years without cummulative effect. But, however, the Government thought that the proposed punishment is not sufficient and he deserved dismissal from service and accordingly by an order dated 1.8.1976 he was dismissed from service. The first charge was that he received a bribe of Rs. 200 from one Muthusamy for grant of loan and violated the conditions of G.O.Ms.No. 886 and the second charge was that he received a bribe of Rs. 200 from one Veerabadran and violated the conditions of G.O.Ms.No. 886. The plaintiff, it appears, first filed a writ petition and in that writ petition it was held that the proper remedy for the plaintiff is to file a suit. 3. In the plaint the plaintiff submitted that he did not receive any bribe as he was charged with and he did not commit any infraction of conditions in the Government order as he is a accused of. He further contended that the charges are vague inasmuch as no particulars as to which of the terms and conditions he has violated has been mentioned. He sanctioned loans only after taking all necessary precautions and there is absolutely no truth in the allegation against him that he received bribes from Muthusamy and Veerabadran. He further contended that the charges are vague inasmuch as no particulars as to which of the terms and conditions he has violated has been mentioned. He sanctioned loans only after taking all necessary precautions and there is absolutely no truth in the allegation against him that he received bribes from Muthusamy and Veerabadran. He further submitted that he was proceeded against with the Departmental proceedings six long years after the alleged commission of offences and irregularities. He further submitted that the evidence let in before the Tribunal for Disciplinary proceedings against him was false and the conclusion of the Tribunal is not based on any acceptable legal evidence. He further pleaded that when the Government differed from the Tribunal as regards the punishment it should have referred the matter back to the Tribunal under Rule 11 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services Rules, 1985, and that having been not done, the order of the Government is vitiated. On these grounds plaintiff prayed for declaration, that the Government order dated 1.8.1976 is null and void and he has also prayed for damages from the date of his dismissal and calculating the damage on the basis of his pay he has claimed for Rs. 13,520. 4. As against this the Government contended that it is true that the plaintiff received bribe and violated the terms and conditions of G.O.Ms.No. 886. There was clinching legal evidence before the Tribunal in proof of the charge of corruption of receiving bribe, and the Tribunal is the best Judge for appreciating the evidence and that cannot be interferred with. It is further contended that the Government has the authority to impose higher punishment than the one recommended by the Tribunal and therefore the order of the Government is not vitiated as submitted by the plaintiff. 5. On these allegations considering the evidence let in the Trial Court (IX Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras) held that there is no reason to differ from the findings of the Tribunal that the evidence with regard to both the charges shows that the plaintiff received bribes from Muthusamy and Veerabadran. It further held that there is no violation of any procedure laid down for conducting disciplinary proceedings. It further held that the charge is not vague as alleged. Then it held that the Government's order of dismissal is not vitiated for non-observance of any procedure. It further held that there is no violation of any procedure laid down for conducting disciplinary proceedings. It further held that the charge is not vague as alleged. Then it held that the Government's order of dismissal is not vitiated for non-observance of any procedure. Therefore, in the result, the trial court dismissed the suit. 6. On appeal by the plaintiff the appellate Court (VI Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras) differed from the findings of the trial court and instead held that the charge is vague for the reason that particulars as to which of the conditions in G.O.Ms.No. 886 have been violated is not mentioned. He further held that what is alleged to have been contravened are only Administrative instructions and not rules under any Act and on the basis of that no action can be taken against the plaintiff. And then it appears to have held that the evidence let in against the plaintiff has to be considered as insufficient and unacceptable. On these grounds the first appellate court allowed the appeal and set aside the Judgment of the trial court and decreed the suit as prayed for. 7. In the second appeal now it is argued that as against the findings of the Tribunal for Disciplinary proceedings the court cannot consider itself as an appellate court and it cannot reappraise the evidence and it also cannot consider the insufficiency of the evidence and only in the case when there is no evidence against the delinquent officer or the evidence on record will not reasonably lead to a finding of guilt the court can interfere with the findings of the Tribunal for Disciplinary proceedings, and in the present case there is direct evidence as regards the charge against the delinquent officer which clearly show that he was guilty of receiving bribe. It is further argued that the first appellate court is absolutely wrong in holding that the charge is vague and it does not show as to which of the terms and conditions in G.O.Ms.No. 886 has been violated. It is further contended that the further finding of the first appellate court that what was violated was only administrative instructions and on the basis of that no action can be taken against a Government servant is absolutely erroneous. 8. It is further contended that the further finding of the first appellate court that what was violated was only administrative instructions and on the basis of that no action can be taken against a Government servant is absolutely erroneous. 8. Taking up the first contention, the plea that unless there is no evidence against the delinquent officer or the evidence on record will not reasonably lead to the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty the court cannot interfere with the finding of the Tribunal is legally correct. This plea is indeed supported by a decision of the Supreme Court, now cited by the learned Counsel for the opposite party i.e., the plaintiff, in State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao . But on a careful consideration of the evidence and the circumstances in the case I am afraid no reasonable person would arrive at the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal i.e., the delinquent officer is guilty. Of course on both the charges there is no doubt that there is some evidence. Regarding the first charge, as seen from Ex.B.14 enquiry report of the Tribunal, three witnesses have been examined and they are Muthusamy P.W.1. Srinivasan as P.W.2 and Ramasamy as P.W.5 P.W.1 has stated before the Tribunal that he paid a bribe of Rs. 200 to the delinquent officer and soon that he sanctioned him a loan of Rs. 5000. This evidence is corroborated by P.W.2 Srinivasan who is said to have gone with P.W.1, to the house of the plaintiff. P.W.5 who is none other than the brother of P.W.1, has stated that the plaintiff delinquent officer has obtained from him signatures in the proforma i.e., recommendation form to be sent with the application stating that his brother had applied for loan and the plaintiff prevailed upon him and got his signature. Regarding the second charge P.W.3 Veerabadran has in his evidence said that on 2.1.1966 the delinquent officer received from him Rs. 200 for sanctioning of loan. P.W.4 Rangasamy has corroborated his evidence. As regards both the charges the first appellate court has stated that the evidence of these witnesses is not believable. Regarding the second charge P.W.3 Veerabadran has in his evidence said that on 2.1.1966 the delinquent officer received from him Rs. 200 for sanctioning of loan. P.W.4 Rangasamy has corroborated his evidence. As regards both the charges the first appellate court has stated that the evidence of these witnesses is not believable. Of course the Court cannot go into the reliability or sufficiency of the evidence, but there are circumstances in the case considering which a reasonable person will not on the basis of this evidence come to the conclusion that the plaintiff is guilty as the Tribunal did. The alleged misconduct is said to have taken place on 1.10.1965 in respect of the first charge and on 2.1.1966 in respect of the second charge. But the plaintiff has been charge sheeted only after 5 1/2 years i.e., on 10.4.1971 and thereafter only the said witnesses have been examined before the Tribunal. The evidence does not disclose any reasons as to this long time lapse in charge sheeting. What is more, no witness has ever started that he or any body else preferred any complaint to anybody against the plaintiff. Nor is there any evidence to show as to in what way the Department came to know about the alleged misconduct of the plaintiff. Further there is total lack of evidence as to how these witnesses were hit upon by the Department as those involved in the alleged misconduct. It appears, according to the department one vigilence officer has examined these witnesses but no such vigilance officer has been examined before the Tribunal. In these circumstances it is indeed difficult to believe on the mere oral evidence of P.Ws.1 to 5 that the alleged misconduct of the plaintiff is true. There may be various reasons for persons to falsely depose against an officer. Therefore for mere want of motive for the witnesses to speak against an officer one will not believe that what the witnesses say is true. In this case even a motive also has been pleaded that the plaintiff took coercive steps for recovery of the loan and therefore the witnesses are speaking falsehood against the plaintiff. It is a fact that coercive steps had to be taken for recovery of the loan from P.W.1 and P.W.3. In this case even a motive also has been pleaded that the plaintiff took coercive steps for recovery of the loan and therefore the witnesses are speaking falsehood against the plaintiff. It is a fact that coercive steps had to be taken for recovery of the loan from P.W.1 and P.W.3. It is possible that some interested persons who are bent upon spoiling the career of the plaintiff have accused him with false charges. Therefore I do not think there is sufficient ground for differing from the finding of the first appellate court that the plaintiff is not guilty of the charges of bribe levelled against him. 9. As regards the second point raised in this appeal that the first appellate court is wrong in holding that the charge is vague and it is not specifically stated as to what terms and conditions the plaintiff has violated, I find there is merit in it. A careful reading of the charges would show that in each of the charges the first paragraph is only a general accusation and therefore we can just ignore it. The second paragraph only deals with the specific charges. This paragraph also deals with two things. One is receiving bribe and the other is violation of the terms and conditions of G.O.Ms.No. 886. As regards the first thing i.e., receiving bribe, it is clearly mentioned with all particulars as to when, where, from who, how much, and for what the plaintiff, received bribe and therefore there is absolutely no ambiguity. As regards the second thing, i.e., violation of the terms and conditions of G.O.Ms.No. 886, that is really unwarranted and unnecessary. It is stated that he has violated the conditions of G.O.Ms.No. 886. G.O.Ms.No. 886 is only a Government order which enables the officers to sanction loans to the poultry farmers on certain conditions. May be even without the conditions being satisfied the plaintiff has sanctioned loans. But the main thing is he has received bribe for sanction of loans. As regards this there is every particular given in the charge and the charge is quite specific. May be the plaintiff can be charged with such infractions. But that need not be linked with the charge of receiving bribe. Such infraction may be matter of evidence to prove the charge of bribe. As regards this there is every particular given in the charge and the charge is quite specific. May be the plaintiff can be charged with such infractions. But that need not be linked with the charge of receiving bribe. Such infraction may be matter of evidence to prove the charge of bribe. Therefore it appears that it is a mistake in linking the charge of violation of the conditions in G.O.Ms.No. 886 with the charge of receiving bribe. Whatever the case may be as regards the charge of receiving bribe the charge is, as said above, clear with all necessary particulars. Therefore as regards the charge of receiving bribe it cannot be said that the charge is vague and hence the finding of corruption is vitiated. 10. Taking up to third point that the first appellate court has erred in holding that what was violated is only administrative instructions and not statutory rules, whether the plaintiff has violated statutory rules or only administrative instructions it does not matter much. As said above the main point to be considered is whether the plaintiff received bribe. Thus there is not real point for consideration of this contention raised by the appellant-State. 11. In consideration of my finding on point No. 1 raised, I hold that the Judgment of the first appellate court has to be upheld. Hence this second appeal is dismissed with costs.