JUDGMENT 1. (Oral)- All these 689 writ petitions arise out of the selection held by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission under the Rajasthan Subordinate Offices Ministerial Staff Rules, 1957 for the post of LDC in the various subordinate offices under the Government of Rajasthan, Secretariat of the Government of Rajasthan and the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. The petitioners have come with the grievance that, although, the candidates having lesser percentage of marks in the examination held by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission have been appointed on the post of LDC, whereas they have been deprived of this appointment despite their higher percentage of marks. 2. Before I proceed with the facts and submissions made in these cases, it may be pointed out that earlier a bunch of 58 writ petitions was decided on 1st August, 1990 by a single bench of this Court [(1) judgment reported in 1990 (1) RLR 45 ] with regard to the same controversy being raised on behalf of 58 petitioners in those cases and all these 58 writ petitions were allowed on 1st August, 1990, in the following terms:- "9. As already given out by the learned counsel for the respondents, 140 seats remained unfilled in Bikaner District and the petitioners can be given appointment on the vacant posts. It is, therefore, directed that since all the petitioners have given their second choice for appointment in Bikaner District they shall be considered to be given appointment on the posts still lying vacant in Bikaner District in order of merit, provided none of them has secured less than 38% marks. They shall be given seniority at appropriate place in accordance with their merit. So far as petitioners Ashok Kumar Chordh, Dilip Gupta and Kamlesh Savlani are concerned, who have approached this Court by way of letter petition, the RPSC shall verify the marks obtained by them and if they have got not less than 38% marks, they shall also be given appointment in Bikaner District in accordance with their merit. This shall be done within four works. 10. The writ petitions are allowed, as indicated above, with no order as to costs". 3. This shall be done within four works. 10. The writ petitions are allowed, as indicated above, with no order as to costs". 3. While the aforesaid judgment was appealed against by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission by way of filing D.B. Special Appeals (Writ) No. 263/90 and 264/1990 and these two Special Appeals were pending before the Division Bench several other writ petitions were filed before this Court by a large number of petitioners, because as per the earlier judgment of the Single Judge, the relief was granted and kept confined only to those candidates who had preferred the writ petitions. When the other candidates who were similarly situated to the 58 writ petitions or were having higher marks than these 58 writ petitioners found that they will not get the relief unless they also file writ petitions and claim the relief from the Court, they also started filing writ petitions. Hence, all these writ petitions raising common questions based on common facts have been filed with a common grievance and the same are being decided by this common judgment. 4. When all these matters came up before the Court on 5th September, 1990 and it was found that no reply had been filed in any of the petitions, the following order was passed:- "During the course of arguments, it was considered necessary that the actual number of vacancies of LDCs which are available in various subordinate offices and the Secretariat and the office of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Ajmer, may be placed on the record of these proceedings. Further this information may also be placed on record as to how many persons are working against the posts of LDCs on urgent temporary basis and on daily wages in the aforesaid offices. Mr. Khan has submitted that he would also like to file the reply on behalf of respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and he submits that looking to the large number of petitions, he may be permitted to argue the matters on the basis of the replies filed in the following cases:- (1) S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3920/1990, Subhash Chand Joshi v. State of Raj. & Ors. (2) S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3917/1990, Miss Sunita Gupta v. State of Raj. & Ors. (3) S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3617/1990, Lalit Kumar Gurdia v. State Raj. & Ors. & Ors. (2) S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3917/1990, Miss Sunita Gupta v. State of Raj. & Ors. (3) S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3617/1990, Lalit Kumar Gurdia v. State Raj. & Ors. (4) S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3715/1990, Narendra Kumar Verma v. State of Raj. & Ors. With the consent of the parties the lawyers who are representing the petitioners in various cases which has been mentioned in the cause list to be 370 in number connected with S. B. Civil writ petition No. 3920/90. It is agreed between both the sides that all these matters will be agreed on the basis of the pleadings contained in the various writ petitions and the replies to be filed in the aforesaid 4 cases. Mr. Khan would furnish a copy of the reply to the learned counsel for the petitioners. In case a learned counsel is appearing in more than one matters, giving of one set of the replies to him will be sufficient and copies need not be furnished in each and every case. Mr. B.L. Samdaria, who is appearing in large number of such cases has requested that the respondents may also de called upon to furnish the details regarding the percentage and merit position of the candidate last appointed in each district in the subordinate offices, in the Secretariat and in the office of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. In my opinion, the above-referred information is necessary to conclude these matters and to decide the same effectively but at the same time a reasonable opportunity has to be given to the Government and the RPSC. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the time is granted to the respondents to place on record the aforesaid information and to file the replies in the aforesaid 4 cases on or before 15th October, 1990 and all these matters will be listed now on 15th October, 1990, for final disposal. This order-sheet will govern all identical cases." 5. Accordingly four writ petitions, as referred to above, were taken up as the main petitions out of the whole lot, as agreed between the parties. It was agreed between the parties that all these matters will be argued on the basis of the pleadings contained in the four writ petitions and the replies to be filed in the aforesaid four cases. It was agreed between the parties that all these matters will be argued on the basis of the pleadings contained in the four writ petitions and the replies to be filed in the aforesaid four cases. Shri M. I. Khan, Additional Advocate General was required to let this Court know the actual number of vacancies of LDCs available in the various subordinate offices, Secretariat and the office of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission and to place on record as to how many persons in fact are working against the posts of LDC on urgent temporary basis and daily wages. It was also directed to furnish the details regarding the percentage of marks and merit position of the candidate last appointed in each District in the Subordinate Offices, in the Secretariat and in the office of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. Thereafter the matters came up before the Court on 16th October, 1990, 8th November, 1990 and finally on 22nd November, 1990 and the arguments commenced. In the meanwhile, the appeals preferred before the Division Bench, being Special Appeals No. 263/1990 and 264/1990 (against the order dated 1st August, 199 passed by the Single Judge whereby 58 writ petitions were decided) were also decided on 10th Oct., 1990 [(2) judgment reported in 1990 (1) RLR 182 ] and the operative part of judgment of the Division Bench dated 10th October, 1990, is reproduced as under:- "In view of the above discussion, we allow these appeals in part and set aside the order of the learned Single Judge dated August 1, 1990 in so far as it relates to the consideration of candidature of petitioners alone against the remaining posts of LDCs. Instead, we direct that candidature of all candidates who have passed the combined competitive examination for LDC held by the Commission in the year 1987/1988 be considered on the basis of their respective merits. We direct the Commission to issue a general notice to be published in the news papers having wide circulation, and call upon all the remaining candidates who have been successful at the examination to give their options for second District and then prepare a select list on the basis of merit and choice of districts and forward the same to the Government for the purpose of making appointments. The Government shall make appointments from this list against the posts of LDCs, which were available with it, including those which had become available within six months from the date of the original list was forwarded by the Commission to the Government in the Department of Personnel. This would of course include 140 posts which have been referred to in the judgment of the learned Single judge. This entire exercise must be completed by the Commission and the Government within a period of three months from the date of this judgment. Costs made easy." 6. No reply has been filed in any of the matters and all that has been placed on record by Shri M.I. Khan, Addl. Advocate General is the information of last candidate appointed on the basis of the examination of LDCs in the year 1586, in the typed sheet under the covering letter as was given by Shri M.I. Khan, under the signature of the Officer-in-charge of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission and an application presented on 23rd November, 1990 with the copy of letter dated 12th November, 1990 and the chart showing the number of vacancies in existence in various units. All these papers have been filed in SBCW No. 3920 Subhash Chand Joshi v. State of Rajasthan & RPSC. The information regarding percentage of marks of last general candidate selected and appointed for the post of LDC is for 26 districts in Rajasthan from Ajmer to Udaipur. The chart showing the statement of vacancies contains the information regarding the availability of vacancies as on 5th September, 1990 (i.e. the date on which the court had directed the respondents to place the position of vacancies). This chart includes the information about 27 offices mentioned in this chart from all over Rajasthan. Shri Khan has submitted that there are more offices and he has not received information from some districts. He submits, while the judgment is being dictated, that he is likely to receive the same and in case the same is received, it will be placed on record of the Court, but nothing more has been placed on record. 7. With this back-drop of the litigation and the facts, I now proceed to narrate the case with which the petitioners have come before this Court in all these cases. 8. 7. With this back-drop of the litigation and the facts, I now proceed to narrate the case with which the petitioners have come before this Court in all these cases. 8. The petitioner's case is that an examination is conducted by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission to make recruitment for appointment to the post of LDCs in various offices. For this purpose, on the requisition of the Government of Rajasthan, a notice inviting applications in the form of an advertisement was issued by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission way back on 23rd July, 1986, and by this notice inviting applications 888 vacancies of LDCs in the various subordinate offices under the Government of Rajasthan; 57 in Rajasthan Government Secretariat and 12 in the office of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Ajmer were advertised. 9. The last date for submission of the applications in response to this notice inviting applications was 15th October, 1986, which was then extended to 31st December, 1986 and, thus, the last day of the year 1986 was the last date for submission of the applications. In pursuance to this advertisement inviting applications, recruitment was to be held in two parts for the candidates belonging to general category i.e. written examination plus typing test in Hindi or English. The written examination was held on 13th December, 1987 and the typing test was then held on 29th and 30th October, 1988 for those candidates who had qualified in the written examination which was held on 13th December, 1987. The result of this examination was declared on 17th April, 1989 and the mark-sheets were issued to the candidates in December, 1989/January, 1990. On the basis of the result of this competitive examination, a list of selected candidates was sent by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission to the Government of Rajasthan on 1st September, 1989, as stated by Shri M. I. Khan. Thus 1st September, 1989 is the date on which the original list was sent by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission to the Government of Rajasthan. On the basis of this list, appointments were made in respect of about 1882 candidates and in doing so, as per the information made available by Shri M. I. Khan, the candidates having percentage of marks ranging between 37.5% to 69.5% in the various districts, as is shown as under, were given appointments:- 1. Ajmer 61.5% 2. Alwar 63 % 3. Ajmer 61.5% 2. Alwar 63 % 3. Banswara 61.5% 4. Barmer 61.0% 5. Bharatpur 60.5% 6. Bhilwara 60.0% 7. Bikaner 37.5% 8. Bundi 40.5% 9. Chittorgarh 69.5% 10. Churu 65.5% 11. Dholpur 40.5% 12. Dungarpur 51.5% 13. Jaipur 64.5% 14. Jaisalmer 57.5% 15. Jalore 43.5% 16. Jhalawar 62.0% 17. Jhunjhunu 67.0% 18. Jodhpur 60.5% 19. Kota 66.0% 20. Nagaur 47.5% 21. Sawai Madhopur 58.0% 22. Sri Ganganagar 52.0% 23. Sikar 60.5% 24. Sirohi 49.0% 25. Tonk 60.5% 26. Udaipur 64.5% 10. The above data show that in Bikaner District, appointments had been given to those candidates who had obtained 37.5% marks and the result is, therefore obvious that the candidates having much more percentage than 37.5% of marks were deprived of the appointments in the districts other than Bikaner. Shri Khan has submitted that within a District there is no case in which any more meritorious candidate has been deprived of the appointment in that particular district ; but according to the preference given for the district, if a candidate was not having the percentage corresponding to number of vacancies available, the appointment could not be given to him in that district and since he had not given any preference for the other district, the question of giving appointment to him in other districts did not arise despite his higher merit. 11. It is in this context that a bunch of 58 writ petitions was earlier allowed by this Court on 1st August, 1990; but while allowing these writ petitions the relief was kept confined only to those who had approached the Court by way of filing the writ petitions. The respondents challenged the aforesaid decision of the Single Bench before the Division Bench precisely on the ground that the direction given by the Single Bench had resulted into denial of appointment to those candidates who were having a merit higher than those persons who had approached the Court. To quote exactly the contention which was put forward before the Division Bench by Shri M.I. Khan, the relevant portion from the Division Bench judgment may be quoted as under:- "The only point raised by the learned Additional Advocate General Shri M.I. Khan, who argued the case on behalf of the appellant is that the learned Single Judge had committed an error of law in giving directions for consideration of candidature of the petitioners (respondent in appeals) alone. According to Shri Khan, the candidates with higher merit than the respondents were available and therefore, the learned Single Judge ought to have given direction for inviting options from all remaining candidates and on the basis of a general merit, appointments could be given against the remaining posts. He submitted that the direction given by the learned Single Judge would amount to infraction of constitutional dictate of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 Shri Khan referred'-to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Thaper Institute of Engineering and Technology Patiyala v. Abhimar Taneja and others ( AIR 1990 SC 1222 ) , wherein the Supreme Court has reversed the decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court, in which directions was given to admit the petitioners notwithstanding the availability of more meritorious candidates." 12. The above contention of Shri Khan that more meritorious candidates should not be deprived of the appointment merely because they had not filed the writ petitions and, on that account the directions given by the Single Bench should be set aside, prevailed with the Division Bench and, the Division Bench while distinguishing the case of Miss Nilima Sangala v. State of Haryana (1986) 4 SCC 268 and the Division Bench decision of this Court in D. B. Civil Special Appeal No. 33/77, (4) Ram Swaroop v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., decided on 21st August 1985 , from other decisions of the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. T. P. Roshana (1979) 1 SCC 572 held that more meritorious candidates should not be deprived of the appointment and, at page 9 and 10 of the judgment the Division Bench has observed as under:- "In our view, when the candidates with higher merit are available, there can be no justification whatsoever for ignoring their cases only on the ground that they had not approached the court by way of writ petitions." 13. The appeals were allowed partly by accepting the above referred sole point raised by Shri Khan, Addl. Advocate General before the Division Bench and the directions, as have been quoted hereinabove, were given by the Division Bench on 10th October, 1990 while these writ petitions were pending being filed. 14. So far as these writ petitions are concerned, on the basis of the pleadings in one of the above referred four sample cases, namely Miss Sunita Gupta v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. 14. So far as these writ petitions are concerned, on the basis of the pleadings in one of the above referred four sample cases, namely Miss Sunita Gupta v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3917/1990) , it is made out on the basis of the list Annexure/A, a list enclosed by Shri B.L. Samdaria alongwith the application dated 21st November, 1990 that the various candidates having percentage of marks from 38.5% to 66.5% who are the petitioners, have been deprived of appointments in various districts Similarly, on the basis of a list prepared and submitted by Shri Dalip Singh (included in the file of SBCW No. 3920 of 1990 Subhash Chand Joshi v. State & RPSC) who is also representing the various petitioners, the candidates having percentage of marks ranging from 41.5% to 64.5% have been deprived of the appointments. A similar list has also been filed by Shri Lokesh Sharma and Shri R.K. Bhargava, representing the petitioners in large number of cases and, according to this list (available in file of SBCW No. 3920/90 Subhash Chand Joshi v. State & RPSC , for convenience), the candidates having percentage of marks ranging from 40.5% to 67% have been deprived of the appointment. Thus it is clear that the fact situation is un-controvertible and undeniable that large number of candidates, running into hundreds in number, having much more percentage than 37.5% marks have been denied appointment merely by applying the concept of option taken for one district, as was notified, as the candidates were called upon through the advertisement in form of notice inviting applications, as was issued by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioners by Shri Dalip Singh, Shri B.L. Samdaria, Shri S.K. Keshote and all other counsel who have adopted the arguments that the condition of calling option for one district, as was notified in the notice inviting applications was contrary to the scheme of the Rules under the Rajasthan Subordinate Offices Ministerial Staff Rules, 1957 and, the in in thrust of the whole argument made before this Court is that on the basis of the option for one district, the right of consideration was limited to one District and the same has resulted into a glaring and hostile discrimination, violation of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India and the rights of the petitioners have been made to be defeasible at the altar of the option for a district which is antithesis to the concept of equality for opportunity in the matters relating to employment as provided in Article 16 of the Constitution of India and, it has resulted into negation of merit. The rights of the meritorious persons have been sacrificed in the name of the option for a district and, such a negation of merit cannot be sustained. It was also argued that according to Rule 21, as it was amened on 18th August, 1987, with retrospective effect from 3rd Feb., 1986 vide Notification F 3(6) DOP/A-II/83 G.S.R. 22, August 18, 1987, the applications to sit in the examination either competitive or qualifying for LDCs and Stenographers shall be invited by the Commission by advertising the posts in such manner, as they may deem fit and shall be made in such form as they may approve provided that in case of competitive examination for the post of LDC candidates shall be required to state in the application form the name of 2 districts or Departments in which he desires to serve but in case of non-availability of vacancies in the Districts of his desire he may be posted in any of the District of the State. Submissions have been made before me with reference to Rules 19, 21 and 24 and the texts of these rules amended and unamended with dates is reproduced as under for ready reference:- Rule 19, Existing prior to 3/2/86 Rule 19 substituted on and from 3/2/86 19. Submissions have been made before me with reference to Rules 19, 21 and 24 and the texts of these rules amended and unamended with dates is reproduced as under for ready reference:- Rule 19, Existing prior to 3/2/86 Rule 19 substituted on and from 3/2/86 19. Frequency of Examination:- The competitive examination prescribed in rule 7 shall be held every year at such places as the Commission may decide Rule 19, 24 amended & R. 25(1)- Proviso, added) Notification No. F. 3(6) DOP/A-II/83, G.S.R. 105 February, 1986. In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the Governor of Rajasthan hereby makes the following amendments in the Rajasthan Subordinate Offices Ministerial Staff Rules, 1957, namely, Provided that the Commission may hold the combined competitive examination for the vacancies of Lower Division Clerks under the provisions of the Rajasthan Secretariat Ministerial Service Rules, 1970. A candidate shall be entitled to apply for vacancies in the Subordinate Offices as well as Secretariat for which there shall be only one application form for Lower Division Clerks' Combined Competitive Examination and the candidate shall mention his choice of Lower Division Clerk (Secretariat) or Lower Division Clerk (Subordinate Offices), in the application form. Only one examination fee will be payable by the candidate of such Combined Competitive Examination. The Commission shall prepare list of successful candidates in accordance with Rule 24 who apply for the Rajasthan Subordinate Offices Ministerial Staff Rules, 1957 and according to rule 22(1)(b) of the Rajasthan Secretariat Ministerial Service Rules, 1970, in case of candidate who applied for the said Service. Provided further that the Competitive examination for the posts of Lower Division Clerks in the Subordinate Offices shall be held Zonewise by the Commission. The Zones for this purpose shall be as under:- 1. For the existing Rule 19, the following shall be substituted namely:- 19. Frequency of Examination:- The competitive Examination as prescribed in Rule 7, shall be held every year on such dates and at such places as the Commission may order without waiting for the requisition from the Government unless intimation to the contrary is received from it : Provided that the Commission may hold the Combined Competitive Examination for the vacancies of Lower Division Clerks under these Rules and also under the provisions of Rajasthan Secretariat Ministerial Service Rules, 1970. A candidate would be entitled to apply for the vacancies in the Secretariat as well as Subordinate Offices for which there shall be only one application form for Lower Division Clerks Combined Competitive Examination and the candidate shall mention his choice for either Lower Division Clerk (Secretariat) or Lower Division Clerk (Subordinate Offices), in the application form. Only one examination fee will be payable by the candidate for such Combined Competitive Examination. The Commission shall prepare two lists of successful candidates. One list shall be in accordance with Rule 22 of the Rajasthan Secretariat Ministerial Service Rules, 1970 and other list shall be under rule 24 of the Rajasthan Subordinate Offices Ministerial Staff Rules, 1957. Provided further that the Competitive Examination for the posts of Lower Division Clerks is the Subordinate Offices shall be Districtwise by the Commission. (Published in Raj. Gaz. Ex. Ordi. 4(Ga) (1) dated 5-2-86 page 436). (1) Jaipur Zone I : which shall include District of Jaipur, Ajmer, Tonk, Sikar and Jhunjhunu. (2) Jaipur Zone-II : which shall include Districts of Alwar, Bharatpur and Sawai Madhopur. (3) Kota Zone which shall include Districts of Kota, Bundi Jhalawar (4) Udaipur Zone : which shall include Districts of Udaipur, Dungarpur, Banswara Chittorgarh and Bhilwara. (5) Bikaner Zone : which shall include Districts of Bikaner, Churu and Ganganagar. (6) Jodhpur Zone : which shall include Districts of Jodhpur, Barmer, Jalore, Sirohi Pali, Nagaur and Jaisalmer Rule 21 : Inviting of applications : The applications to sit at the Examination shall be invited by the Commission by adversiting the posts in such manner as they may deem fit and shall be made in such form as they may approve and each candidate shall be required to state in his application form the name of 3 districts or departments in which he desires to serve. (Raj. Sub. Ordi. Offices Ministerial Staff Rules, 57, R. 21, amended w.e.f. 3/2/86). (Raj. Sub. Ordi. Offices Ministerial Staff Rules, 57, R. 21, amended w.e.f. 3/2/86). Notification No. F.3(6) DOP/A-II/83 G.S.R 22, August 18, 1987 in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India the Governor of Rajasthan hereby makes the following amendments in the Rajasthan Subordinate Offices Ministerial Staff Rules, 1957, namely Provided further that in case of competitive examination for the post of Lower Division Clerks, candidates shall be required to apply zonewise, as referred to in Rule 19 and each candidate, in his application shall mention the names of two Districts in the order of preference in which be wants his appointment In the said Rules:- For the existing rule 21, the following shall be substituted and shall always be deemed to have been substituted with effect from 3/2/86, namely : 21. Inviting of applications:- The application to sit in the examination either competitive or qualifying examination for LDCs & Stenographers shall be invited by the Commission by advertising the posts in such manner, as they may deem fit, and shall be made in such form as they may approve : Provided that in case of competitive examination for the post of LDC candidate shall be required to state in the application form the name of 2 Districts or Departments in which he desires to serve. Bat in case of non-availability of vacancies to the Districts of his desire he may be posted in any of the District of the State. (Published in Raj. Gaz. Ex. Ordi. 4 (Ga) (I) dated 20/8/87, page 64). Rule 24. Selection:- (I) The Commission shall prepare merit lists "on the basis of Zones" prescribed in rule 19 "and also a combined list for the State as a whole", of the candidates declared successful according to the minimum qualifying marks obtained by them in the Lower Division Clerk examination In sub-rule (I) of rule 24 of the said rules, the existing expression and also a combined merit list for the State as a whole" occurring between the expression "Drstrictwise prescribed in the rule 19" and the expression "of the candidate declared successful" shall be deleted. (Published in Raj. Gaz. 4(Ga) (1) dated 11/8/88, page 123. 24. (Published in Raj. Gaz. 4(Ga) (1) dated 11/8/88, page 123. 24. Selection : (1) The Commission shall prepare merit lists Districtwise prescribed in Rule 19 of the candidates declared successful according to the minimum qualifying marks obtained by them in the Lower Division Clerks examination." 15. The submissions have been made with reference to the amendment made on 30th June, 1988 and, according to Shri Dalip Singh this amendment of 30th June, 1988 is only prospective and it does not have a retrospective effect, whereas according to Shri Samdaria this amendment dated 30th June, 1988 should be deemed to be retrospective by implication. According to Shri Keshote, this amendment dated 30th June, 1988 is retro-active, though, it is prospective. Shri Dalip Singh also submitted that once the amendments were made applicable in the scheme of the Rules, as were made applicable retrospectively from 3rd Feb., 1986, they should be deemed to cover the process of recruitment right from the date the process of recruitment was initiated. Therefore, these amendments, except the amendment made on 30th June, 1988, according to Shri Dalip Singh, would apply and cover the whole process of recruitment as was initiated at the time when the notice inviting applications was issued by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission on 23rd July, 1986. Shri Dalip Singh has laid much stress on the language of Rule 21 and, it has been submitted that on the face of language of Rule 21, appointments cannot be confined to certain districts and argument was also raised that once examination has been held and results have been declared unless and until, all the successful candidates are not appointed and the list is not exhausted, no further appointments should be allowed to be made. 16. On the other hand, Shri Khan has first of all raised two preliminary objections before this Court against all these writ petitions. His first preliminary objection is that once the matters have been decided by the Division Bench with regard to the same selection this Court should stay its hands from adjudicating the grievances raised by these petitioners and all the writ petitions should be deemed to have been decided by the decision of the Division Bench and no bearing on merit should be afforded, to the petitioners. I am afraid, acceptance of such a contention would be denial of right of adjudication of a grievance raised by these petitions. I am afraid, acceptance of such a contention would be denial of right of adjudication of a grievance raised by these petitions. All these petitioners are claiming before this Court that they are the candidates having more percentage of marks than the last candidate appointed in the general category and, therefore, if the rule of law is to prevail, if at all we mean the society to be governed by rule of law, the merit has to prevail. The grievance has to be adjudicated and in case their grievance is found to be legitimate this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction mast come to the rescue of the petitioners against the injustice caused to them and appropriate relief should be granted to them. 17. I am not impressed by the argument that in this very matter, the Division Bench has given certain directions and, therefore, this Court should stay its hands and should not adjudicate these writ petitions. 17. I am not impressed by the argument that in this very matter, the Division Bench has given certain directions and, therefore, this Court should stay its hands and should not adjudicate these writ petitions. At the very outset it may be pointed out that in the two appeals before the Division Bench, the sole argument which was raised by Shri Khan was that the learned Single Judge has committed an error of law in giving directions for consideration of the candidature of the petitioners (respondents in appeals) alone and the Division Bench has decided the question that not only those who have come to the Court are entitled to the relief, but even those candidates who had not filed the writ petition and were more meritorious, are also entitled to the relief; and on the basis of the facts which were made available by the parties, the Division Bench gave a direction that the Commission will issue a general notice, to be published in the newspapers having wide circulation and call upon all the remaining candidates who have been successful at the examination, to give their option for the second district and then prepare a select list on the basis of merit and choice of the district and forward the same to the Government for the purpose of making appointments and that the Government shall make appointment from this list against the posts which were available with it, including those which had become available within six months from the date the original list was forwarded by the Commission to the Government in the Department of Personnel and this would, of coarse, include 140 posts which have been referred to in the judgment of the learned Single Judge, (emphasis supplied by this Court) 18. I have gone through the judgment of the Single Bench as well as the Division Bench. I have gone through the judgment of the Single Bench as well as the Division Bench. I find that, although, a reference has been made to the scheme of the Rules in the judgment of the Division Bench and reference has also been made to the Rules 19, 20, 21 and 24 at page 3 of the judgment of the Division Bench but the arguments which have been raised before me in these writ petitions, particularly with reference to Rule 21 were not there before the D.B. It appears that the Division Bench was actually not called upon to give a decision on this aspect of the matter because the only ground which was urged before the Division Bench was that the learned Single Judge has committed an error of law in keeping the relief confined to the petitioners alone and, therefore, so far as the principle, which has been decided by the Division Bench, it can be said that the Division Bench has decided this question that the relief could not be kept confined to the petitioners alone and for that purpose this principle decided by the Division Bench is certainly an authority which is binding on the Single Bench and, there cannot be any quarrel with this proposition of law, rather this principle has to be followed and applied. On the basis of this principle if any relief can be extended to the present petitioners such relief cannot be denied, and the writ petitions cannot be left unadjudicated merely because in the D.B. Special appeal, which had been preferred by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission certain directions have been given for the candidates who had not even filed the writ petitions. Before the Division Bench, the detailed facts regarding percentage of last appointed candidate in the general category was also not there. Neither the district-wise break-up nor the chart regarding the vacancies, which has been now placed on record by Mr. M.I. Khan in partial compliance of this Court's order dated 3th September, 1990, was there. Thus, on the basis of the material which was there before the Division Bench in he appeals which were preferred by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, directions had been issued by the Division Bench of course, such directions are of general nature and cover the cases of even those who had not filed the writ petitions. Thus, on the basis of the material which was there before the Division Bench in he appeals which were preferred by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, directions had been issued by the Division Bench of course, such directions are of general nature and cover the cases of even those who had not filed the writ petitions. But the fact cannot be lost sight of that all these petitioners who have filed the present writ petitions were not there before the Division Bench and, on the contrary, before the Division Bench 58 writ petitioners who had filed the writ petitions, and who were respondents in the appeals filed by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, were opposing and, it was argued on their behalf that the relief must be kept confined only to those who had filed the writ petitions Thus, the directions issued by the Division Bench is a part of the relief and had not been issued in the presence of the present petitioners and after hearing them. Therefore, on the basis of the principle propounded by the Division Bench, it the petitioners before me have a right to place their claims for the appropriate relief. I will be failing in my duty if I refuse to adjudicate grievance for grant of appropriate relief if it can possibly be given on the basis of the principle laid down in the Division Bench. In this view of the matter, the first contention raised by Shri M.I. Khan fails and the same is rejected. 19. Shri Khan has raised the second contention that all these petitioners had participated in the combined competitive examination conducted by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission knowing it fully well that the option had been given to them for one district only and, therefore they are actually estopped from challenging the appointments made on the basis of merit of the particular district and so also the cases of these petitioners should not be heard on merits and the writ petitions should be dis missed as being not maintainable. In support of this submission Shri Khan has placed reliance on Om Prakash Shukla v. State (1986) Suppl. SCC 285) para 24 thereof Shri Samdaria has cited Rameshwar v. Jot Ram and others ( AIR 1976 SC 49 ). Against the submissions based on the aforesaid authority cited by Mr. In support of this submission Shri Khan has placed reliance on Om Prakash Shukla v. State (1986) Suppl. SCC 285) para 24 thereof Shri Samdaria has cited Rameshwar v. Jot Ram and others ( AIR 1976 SC 49 ). Against the submissions based on the aforesaid authority cited by Mr. M. I. Khan, what I find is that this objection itself is not open for Mr. M. I. Khan because the respondents themselves by filing the two appeals before the Division Bench and raising the contention before the Division Bench that the relief should be given even to those candidates who had not filed the writ petition because they are higher in merit has conceded to the right of those candidates who were having a higher merit. Moreover, it is not a case in which the petitioners are challenging the examination. The grievance which the petitioners seek to ventilate through these writ petitions is the discrimination on the basis of the examination in the matter of giving appointment to the post of LDC and even if they had appeared in the examination knowing it fully well that they had given an option for only one district as they were required to do so under the conditions of advertisement and the notice inviting applications, the rights, if any, which are in their favour on the basis of the scheme of the rules under which the examination has been held for the purpose of giving appointment, such legal right cannot be defeated and, therefore, no theory of estoppel, waiver or acquiescence can be applied so far as the legal rights, rather fundamental rights of the petitioners are concerned and thus, I find that the second objection raised by Shri Khan is devoid of any substance and deserves to be rejected. Strictly speaking, this objection, as a matter of fact, does not arise in the facts and circumstances of the case. 20. Strictly speaking, this objection, as a matter of fact, does not arise in the facts and circumstances of the case. 20. Coming to the merits, Shri Khan has opposed the passing of any orders in this case by arguing that once the Division Bench has given a direction that a general notice has to be issued calling upon all the successful candidates to give their option for second district and then prepare the select list and for that purpose the posts of LDCs which were available with it including the posts which have become available within six months of the date on which the original list was sent by the Commission to the Government in the Department of Personnel, the relief will be granted to those candidates including the previous petitioners who are covered by this direction of the Division Bench by including 140 posts which were referred in the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Shri Khan has also opposed the argument raised on behalf of the petitioners that no further appointment should be allowed to be made unless the whole list of the successful candidates at the examination in question is exhausted on the basis of Rule 7 read with Rule 9 of the Rules of 1957. Shri Khan's argument is that under the scheme of the Rules, as it stands, the examination has to be held every year as provided in Rule 9 and, in case a direction is issued that no further recruitment should be held until the whole list of the previous examination is exhausted, it would amount to rendering Rule 9 to be a waste and such a direction would be contrary to the rules. While dealing with the submissions made by Shri Khan, at the out-set, it may be observed that in the instant case, the examination has been held only once in the past five years and, thus, the compliance of rules has been a successive casuality for all these years at the hands of the respondents themselves and the party which has itself violated the rules and the mandate of Rule 9 in particular should not have taken refuge to Rule 9 before this Court in the facts and circumstances of the case. But, in any case, looking to the facts of this case in its entirety and that the scheme of the Rules operates year-wise it is rather difficult to accept this contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that no further recruitment should be allowed to be made unless the whole list of the successful candidates at the previous examination is exhausted. 21. In view of the previous history of the litigation in this subject-matter, by the 58 writ petitions and the appeals which were filed before the Division Bench, it is clearly discernible that merit has been assassinated while making appointments; merit has been eroded and merit has failed to prevail I do not consider it necessary to adjudicate upon the various rules which have been referred by the learned counsel for the petitioners and, I propose to deal with the arguments advanced before me with reference to Rule 21 only. Proviso to Rule 21 lays down specifically that in case of competitive examination for the post of LDC candidate shall be required to state in the application form the name of two Districts or Departments in which he desires to serve. But in case of non-availability of vacancies to the Districts of his desire he may be posted in any of the District of the State. The language of this rule is of very wide amplitude and takes care of the situation in which it not be possible for the Government to give appointment to a particular candidate in the district of his choice; but in such a case, the rule making authority has clearly taken care that the persons with higher merit should not suffer on account of preference for the district given by him and in order to meet that contingency, the rule making authority provided that in case of nonavailability of vacancy in the district of his choice, he may be posted in any of the districts of the State. Thus, even if a candidate had given a preference for one district and for want of availability of vacancy in that particular district, he failed to get an appointment in that particular district, it should never be taken to mean that he should not be considered for appointment in any other district of the State. Thus, even if a candidate had given a preference for one district and for want of availability of vacancy in that particular district, he failed to get an appointment in that particular district, it should never be taken to mean that he should not be considered for appointment in any other district of the State. Once the rule speaks of any district of the State there is no question of denial of appointment to a more meritorious candidate, even if it is accepted that the preference should be called upon and the candidate should he called upon to give option for one district, as was given out in the advertisement and even if for two districts, as has been directed by the Division Bench. If any of the candidates is called upon to give his option for two districts, as has been directed by the Division Bench and yet he fails to be accommodated in any of the two districts for which he may have opted, although he is having a higher merit, he cannot be deprived of consideration for appointment in the other districts of the State and, if such a relief is granted, it would be rather in continuity with the directions given by the Division Bench and the directions given by the Division Bench are no impediment for the purpose of granting such a relief on the basis of the language of Rule 21. Shri Khan submitted before me that the option was to serve and not for appointment. He went to the extent of citing before this Court Websters Dictionary to show the meaning of the word 'serve' in contradistinction with appointment and argued that the option to serve is different than the option for appointment. I may first observe that dictionaries are not the dictators of the statute and whatever meaning is there with reference to the word 'serve' and 'appointment', the question of service comes subsequent to the appointment. Whether a person wants to serve at a particular place is a question which arises after the appointment. The person who applies in response to the notice inviting applications is the seeker of appointment and once he seeks the appointment, the option for a place or a district is to serve in pursuance of that appointment. Therefore, this argument, according to me is rather prepostrous and straightway deserves to be rejected. The person who applies in response to the notice inviting applications is the seeker of appointment and once he seeks the appointment, the option for a place or a district is to serve in pursuance of that appointment. Therefore, this argument, according to me is rather prepostrous and straightway deserves to be rejected. Desire to serve in a particular district does not mean that in case it is not possible to provide any service in a particular district, he is no more interested in appointment. No such declaration is ever sought and can be conceived from the seeker of appointment On the plain meaning of Rule 21, which provides that in the situation of non-availability of vacancy in the desired district, the posting to be given in any other district, clearly postulates that the moment the appointing authority comes to the conclusion that the vacancy is not available in the district of desire in case of a particular candidate, it must at once switch on to the choice of that district in which the appointment can be provided to them. Of course, if a person has a higher merit, he may certainly get the appointment in the district of his desire, but this cannot result into absurdity of denying the appointment to a more meritorious candidate on the basis of desire of the district and to say that once the vacancies are exhausted in the district of desire, he can avail the opportunity of appointment in the other district. It has been held by the Supreme Court in the catena of cases that equality of opportunity in the matters relating to employment as enshrined in Article 16 extends from his date of appointment to the date of cessation of employment. Therefore, if a candidate with a higher merit is there, the merit must prevail, come what may, and the merit of a candidate cannot be made to be defeasible for any reason and the merit cannot be made to suffer because of the preference for the district. As a matter of fact, the question of allocation of district comes later on and should come later on. As a matter of fact, the question of allocation of district comes later on and should come later on. In my opinion, the preference for district must be considered after appointment and the respondents, according to the scheme of the Rules, should have, as a matter of fact, prepared a general merit list of whole State and whatever number of vacancies were available, or which may be available appointment orders should be issued in the order of merit prepared at the State level. It is thereafter after that the Districts should have been allocated for the purpose of serving, as has been mentioned in the language of Rule 21 itself because the preference and the desire was to serve after appointment and not to refuse the appointment altogether in case the district of desire or preference is not available. The submission made by Shri Khan runs counter to his own case and, I find that districts should be allocated subsequent to the appointment and had this course of action been followed, the respondents could have saved the candidates who were seekers of job of clerks, from the entire litigation at the threshold of their career.I am bemoaned to find that the preference given or the desire of district, has in this case, out-weighed the desire for appointment. The application itself was for appointment as LDC and therefore, the first job to be considered as to whether the applicant was entitled for appointment as LDC, or not and, once this question was decided as to whether a candidate is entitled for appointment or not then only the appointing authority should have considered as to in which Department or in which district he should be given a posting. This having not been done the respondents, as a matter of fact, invited litigation against them. After the decision by the Single Bench on 1st August, 1990 in the earlier cases filed by the 58 writ petitioners, there has been a mushroom growth of writ petitions on the same subject-matter and hundreds of writ petitions have been filed. 600 and odd writ petitions are being decided by this judgment. Many more are still said to be pending. 22. 600 and odd writ petitions are being decided by this judgment. Many more are still said to be pending. 22. Shri Dalip Singh has cited before me A.A. Calton v. Director of Education ( AIR 1983 SC 1143 ) (at page 1145, para 5), Prakash Chardra Agarwal v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1985 SC 1709 ) (Paras 8, 9, and 10 thereof), Kuldeep Singh v. Punjab & Sindh Bank (1989) Suppl-II SCC 234 (paras A, 12 and 13), and P. Rajendran v. State of Madras ( AIR 1968 SC 1012 ). 23. In P. Rajendran v. State of Madras (supra) it has been observed in paras 11 and 11 as under:- "This in our opinion is no justification for districtwise allocation, which results in discrimination, even assuming that candidates from Madras city will get a larger number of seats in proportion to the population oi the State. That would happen because a candidate from Madras city is better. If the object is to attract the best talent, from the two sources, districtwise allocation in the circumstances would destroy that object." 24. In view of such categorical observations of the Supreme Court that districtwise allocation destroys the very object, the denial of appointment on the basis of preference of the district to serve cannot be countenanced. Shri Samdaria has cited : (12) N.T. Devin Katti v. Karnataka PSC, (1990) 3 SCC 159) (Para 15, page 167) (13) Miss Shainda Hassan v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (Judgments Today 1990-11 SC 178) (Paras 5, 8, and 9) (14) The Distt. Collector & Chairman Vizianagaram v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi (Judgment Today 1990 (2) SC 169) (Para 6) Shri S.K. Keshote has cited : (15) Radha Kant Saxena v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. ( 1983 RLR 185 ) 25. Shri Khan has cited before me the judgment of this Court in ` Jitendra Vijay Vargiya v. State (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1646/1988) and Sangraro Singh v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1717/1988), decided on 22nd July, 1988. In these cases the proposition is that the vacancies tan be increased or decreased. Shri Khan has cited before me the judgment of this Court in ` Jitendra Vijay Vargiya v. State (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1646/1988) and Sangraro Singh v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1717/1988), decided on 22nd July, 1988. In these cases the proposition is that the vacancies tan be increased or decreased. I find that at this stage when there is no dispute about the permissibility of increase or decrease in the number of vacancies, this judgment is of no avail and there cannot be any quarrel with the proposition laid down in the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench, but it is of no help on the point which is there for consideration in the facts of the case. 26. Once it has been found that the meritorious candidates have been denied the appointments, the question comes as to what relief can be granted to the petitioners in the facts and circumstances of the case. I find that the direction given by the Division Bench gives an opportunity to all the successful candidates to give option for the second district and certainly this option will also be available to the present petitioners as and when such an option is called for by a general notice to be published in the newspapers. But, in my opinion, even if such options are given by those candidates, such option cannot be acted upon and given effect to by the respondents unless they are appointed. Therefore, even if the options are taken and for that purpose, the question with regard to the entitlement for appointment has to be decided and once it has been established, rather admitted that the last candidate of general category appointed on the basis of the result of the combined competitive examination is a candidate having 37.5% marks, no candidate out of the successful candidates, including the present petitioners having a percentage of marks equal to 37.5% or more can be denied the appointment and, 1 find that the relief has to be given to all those candidates who have been able to secure 37.5% or more. Shri Khan has raised the question of availability of the vacancies. Shri Khan has raised the question of availability of the vacancies. Once it has been found that a candidate with lesser marks has been appointed and, this situation has been precipitated because of wrong interpretation of the rules given by the respondents, the candidate with higher merit cannot be made to suffer-whether the vacancies as such may have been available or not, the respondents have to find their own way as to how to accommodate the candidates having 37.5% marks or more than that. Whether the respondents create supernumerary posts or they evolve out a scheme to utilise the vacancies on equivalent posts in the State controlled Corporation and Enterprises or in other agencies or instrumentalities of the State or they determine as to in fact how many candidates are working in the various departments of the State on ad hoc or daily wages and as to how many of them will have to make way for the regularly selected candidates having percentage of marks 37 5% and more than that, is a matter for the authorities to consider who have, as a matter of fact, created this situation. But, so fir as this Court is concerned, the Court cannot say 'No' to a candidate who has obtained 37.5% marks or more than that. Once it has been admitted before the Court by the respondents themselves that the last appointed candidate in the general category is a candidate having 37.5% marks, in case such a relief is denied, it would be doing violence to the merit and this would dwindle the object sought to be achieved and shake the mounting faith which the youth and the people of India repose in the Judiciary for the purpose of protecting the fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Courts have been often confronted with such situation wherein illegality is committed by the Government and thereafter helplessness is pleaded before the Court that the benefit which has been unlawfully extended in somebody's favour has become a fait accomplice with such person who was not entitled to the appointment or such favour or benefit, and an argument is raised that he is not a party before the Court and, therefore, his appointment cannot be set aside, and for the other candidates even if they are more meritorious, the Government has no vacancy and, therefore, it will be onerous to accommodate such candidates for appointment despite their higher marks. But such technical and hypertechnical objections have never prevailed with the Court enjoined with the duty to administer justice, upholding the constitutional provision. Such a situation had come up even before the Supreme Court in Viderdra Kumar v. Union of India ( AIR 1981 SC 1775 ). in which certain candidates who were not eligible had been promoted without having two years service and when similarly situated candidates raised grievance that they should also be promoted, an argument was raised that they had not passed the departmental examination. Even in such a case the Supreme Court did not deny the relief. While dealing with the question of employment the Supreme Court considered in this case with reference to the rules governing promotion to the post of charge-Man-II that large number of persons had been promoted to this post though they had completed only one year's service, the Government then insisted before the Supreme Court that they cannot be considered for promotion unless they complete three years' service and the Supreme Court observed that there was no justification for any such differential treatment being given to the appellants if large number of other persons similarly situated had been promoted as Chargemen-II after completing two years' service, there is reason why the appellants should also not be similarly promoted after completing the same period of service. 27. 27. I accordingly allow these writ petitions with the directions that the respondents would prepare a merit list of all the successful candidates having 37.5% or more and would consider the candidature of all those persons having 37.5% of marks or more for the purpose of giving appointments to the post of LDC in the various subordinate offices and departments under the Government of Rajasthan, Rajasthan Secretariat and the office of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission etc. and would ensure that no candidate having a percentage of 37.5% and more than that at the previous examination, which is the subject-matter of this litigation and have been deprived of the appointment merely on the basis of the preference given for the district and the preference which has been given for the purpose of district to serve is left without job. The above order will be applicable to all the petitioners and other successful candidates of the examination in question having 37.5% marks or more irrespective of the fact whether their writ petitions are pending before this Court or the cases in which no writ petitions have been filed. 28. The writ petitions are allowed as indicated above, with no order as to costs.Petitions allowed. *******