JUDGMENT R.K.Gulati, J. 1. This is a tenant's petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The short question that arises for consideration is whether on the facts of the present case, the courts below have rightly invoked the revision as contained in the explanation attached to sub-section (1) of section 21 of the U. P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short "the Act"). The said explanation reads as under : "Explanation.- In the case of a residential building :- (i) Where the tenant or any member of his family (who has been normally residing with or his wholly dependent on him) has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area, no objection by the tenant against an application under this sub-section shall be entertained; Note- For the purposes of this clause a person shall be deemed to have otherwise acquired a building, if he is occupying a public building for residential purposes as a tenent, allottee or licensee." 2. The brief facts necessary for decision of the aforesaid controversy are these : The dispute relates to House No. S-17/29-29-A, Mohalla Nade- sar, P. S. Cantt. City Varanasi, of which the 3rd respondent, Dhirendra Kumar Srivastava is the owner and landlord. According to the case set up by the 3rd respondent the disputed house amongst certain other non-residential properties, was alloted to his share in a family partition. The house in question was initially in the tenancy of Dharam Pal Kumar who died in the year 1983 leaving behind the petitioner Rajendra Pratap Kumra and another son, his wife and his widow-mother. In the year 1984 The respondent-landlord filed an application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act for release of the accommodation under the tenancy of the heirs and legal representatives of late Dharam Pal Kumra. The release was sought on the ground, inter-alia, that late Dharam Pal Kumra in the year 1982-83 had constructed his own house no. C-27/277-9 at Mohalla Jagatganj, Varanasi and that house was available to the tenant petitioner and other co-tenants on the date when the proceedings under section 21 were instituted. The release was sought on the ground, inter-alia, that late Dharam Pal Kumra in the year 1982-83 had constructed his own house no. C-27/277-9 at Mohalla Jagatganj, Varanasi and that house was available to the tenant petitioner and other co-tenants on the date when the proceedings under section 21 were instituted. Further, the petitioner Rajendra Pratap Kumra also acquired a M-I.G. residential flat under Bhadaun Vikas Yojna in the name of his wife, Smt. Madhu Kumra. The respondent-landlord further alleged that he required the disputed accommodation for his own use and occupation and he had no other accommodation for his residence, and in case, the application was not allowed, he would suffer greater hardship. The Prescribed Authority found that the need of the respondent landlord was genuine and bona fide. On the question of hardship, the Prescribed Authority refused to consider the objections relating to release of the disputed accommodation, put forward by the tenant-petitioner and other co- tenants, in view of the bar envisaged in the explanation attached to subsection (1) of section 21 of the Act extracted above, namely, where the tenant or any member of his family who has been normally residing with or is wholly dependant on him has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area, no objection by the tenant against an application under sub-section (1) of section 21 shall be entertained. 3. The order passed by the Prescribed Authority was confirmed in appeal. Being still aggrieved, Sri Rajendra Pratap Kumra one of the co-tenants, has filed this writ petition, challenging the validity of the orders passed by the courts below. 4. Now, so far as the findings about the bona fide need of the respondent-landlord is concerned, the same were not disputed before me. It is also admitted to the petitioner that the house was built by his father and he also acquired a M.I.G. flat in the name of his wife. There is also not dispute that both these properties are located in the same city and are within the local limits of Varanasi where the disputed accommodation is situated. It is also admitted to the petitioner that the house was built by his father and he also acquired a M.I.G. flat in the name of his wife. There is also not dispute that both these properties are located in the same city and are within the local limits of Varanasi where the disputed accommodation is situated. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, threw a challenge to the Impugned orders on the ground that there are no findings in these orders to the effect that the newly constructed house was complete and, further, it was fit for habitation. In absence of any clear finding on these matters, the counsel urged, the mischief contained in the explanation to sub-section (1) of section 21 could not be brought into play. In this connection, reliance was placed upon a decision of this court in Krishna Kumar v. Prescribed Authority, 1980 (U. P.) 2 RCC 297, and my attention was invited to paragraph 14 of the report and in particular, to the passage exacted below : "......I am of the view that before Explanation (i) to section 21 of the Act can be invoked against a tenant, it must clearly be established that the tenants or any member of their family have acquired in vacant state a residential building. The provisions have serious repercussions on the rights of tenants, inasmuch as on the application of this Explanation, the tenants are debarred from raising any objection to an application under section 21 of the aforesaid Act. The provision must, therefore, be strictly construed. The obvious idea behind the provision is that a tenant who has acquired a residential building in the same city ought not be heard in opposition to an application for release filed by the landlord. It Is clear that if the tenant has acquired an alternative accommodation in a vacant state, which is available for residence, he should be debarred from raising an objection against an application under section 21 of the aforesaid Act. The question, therefore, in each case would be whether the tenant has acquired "in a vacant state" a residential building. A mere acquisition of residential building in a 'vacant state' in a physical sense, even though that building is not fit for human habitation, would not to my mind, bring the case within the sweep of Explanation I. " 5. The question, therefore, in each case would be whether the tenant has acquired "in a vacant state" a residential building. A mere acquisition of residential building in a 'vacant state' in a physical sense, even though that building is not fit for human habitation, would not to my mind, bring the case within the sweep of Explanation I. " 5. Having considered the argument carefully I am clearly of the view that there is no substance in the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner. The authority relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is clearly distinguishable on facts and has no bearing to the facts of the present case. 6. House No. 27/277-9 constructed by the tenant-petitioner's father, was not inspected through an Amin and his report dated 14th of November, 1985 is Annexure-5 to the writ petition. The Amin reported that one hall and four rooms had been constructed in the house and the flooring of three rooms had also been completed, whereas, the floor of the hall and one room was Kachcha. He further reported that a kitchen and 2 latrines had also been constructed. Water and electricity connections had also been obtained. The house was a residential building but was lying vacant. In view of the report of the Amin, the contents of which were neither disputed in the courts below nor have been disputed in these proceedings, it is difficult to hold that the tenants had not acquired "in a vacant state" a residential building within the meaning of the Explanation under consideration. The report further shows that the building was ready for use and was fit for human habitation, The requirement of the explanation is not that the building should have been actually occupied by the tenant or any member of his family before the Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 21 could apply. Any other interpretation will make the explanation absolutely nugatory and will defeat the very object, for which it has been enacted. The object of inserting the explanation to sub-section (1) of section 21 is that if the tenant or any member of his family who has normally been residing with the tenant, has built or otherwise acquired an alternative residential building in "vacant state" he should not be permitted to object to the release application in respect of the accommodation under his tenancy. The bar under these provisions comes into play immediately on the happending of any one of the contingencies talked of in the said explanation to sub-section (1) of section 2h It is not intended by the said Explanation that on the date1 on which release application is filed, the building acquired or built should also be in actual use and possession as residential accommodation As in the instant case the house was built after the disputed accommodation, was taken on rent and was available "in a vacant state" for occupation, the case clearly fell within the purview of the Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 21. Once it was found that the circumstances mentioned under the Explanation existed, the statutory authorities were well within their right in refusing to look into the objections of the tenant-petitioner with regard to the release of the accommodation, sought under sub-section (I) of section 21 under his tenancy. 7. It is also factually incorrect that no findings have been recorded by. the Prescribed Authority or by the Appellate Authority of which the complaint has been made in these proceedings. There is a clear finding recorded by the concerned authorities that the petitioner-tenant and other co-tenants had acquired a residential building and, therefore, their objection was not liable to be entertained. Nothing was brought to my notice to substantiate the contention that the newly constructed building was not fit far human habitation. On the contrary the report of the Amin clearly goes to show that the water and electricity connections had been obtained there exists a kitchen, two latrines, three good living rooms besides a big hall and one another room. Indeed, the plea that the house was not fit for habitation, was never taken before the courts below and a pare question of fact, has been raised for the first time in these proceedings. Apart from the fact that the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise such plea at this stage, as already shown earlier, there is no merit in it. It may also be observed that before the appellate authority the resistance to the application of explanation to sub-section (1) of section 21 was made only on the ground that the newly constructed building was transferred vide a sale deed dated 14-7-1987. It may also be observed that before the appellate authority the resistance to the application of explanation to sub-section (1) of section 21 was made only on the ground that the newly constructed building was transferred vide a sale deed dated 14-7-1987. The underlying argument was that on the date when the Prescribed Authority passed the order namely on 6-6-1988 the newly constructed house was not available to the tenants. This argument was repelled by the appellate authority. In these proceedings no such argument was advanced before me. On the contrary the learned counsel for the petitioner abandoned the plea by saying that he cannot successfully pursue it. In this view of the matter it is not necessary for me to go into this question. 8. As regards the acquisition of M.I.G. flat, it has come on record that it is a residential accommodation. For that reason also the objection of the tenants/petitioner were not liable to be entertained. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the said flat was being used by the tenant- petitioner for his office purpose and not for his residential accommodation. The case put forward in these proceedings is not borne out from the impugned orders. On the contrary, the specific finding recorded is that it is a residential flat. AS the tenant-petitioner had acquired the residential building in a vacant state the objections filed by him against the release application, in my opinion, were rightly rejected. No other point was pressed before me. Accordingly, the writ petition is without any substance and is rejected. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- R. K. Gulati 9. After the Judgment was delivered, the learned counsel for the petitioner made a request that the tenant-petitioner may not be evicted from the disputed accommodation for a period of three months so as to enable him to vacate the premises and to hand over the peaceful possession to the respondent-landlord. On the facts of the present case, I consider this request to be reasonable. The prayer is accordingly, granted subject to the following conditions i 1. On the facts of the present case, I consider this request to be reasonable. The prayer is accordingly, granted subject to the following conditions i 1. That the order of eviction shall not be executed for a period of three months from today provided the petitioner files an undertaking before the Prescribed Authority within three weeks from today to the following effect : (i) That the petitioner will hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the disputed premises to the respondent-landlord on or before expiry of three months; (ii) That the petitioner will pay to the respondent-landlord the arrears of rent, if any, within three weeks from to-day; (iii) That the petitioner will pay the respondent-landlord further compensation for use and occupation month by month before 15th day of every month; (iv) That the petitioner will not- induct any person in the disputed premises, and (v) That on default of any one or more of these conditions or if the undertaking is not furnished as required within the stipulated time, the decree Shall be executable forth with., 10. Let a copy of this order be issued to the petitioner on payment of usual charges within a week. Petition dismissed.