RAMACHANDRIAH, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER is one of the several accused in crime No. 158/90 registered at chittakula police station in u. k. district for offences punishable under sections 143, 147, 148, 324, 326, 302 and 427 read with Section 149 IPC. The said case is still under investigation. The prosecution has been able to apprehend only 3 out of about 20 to 25 persons mentioned as the persons who had committed the above mentioned offences in the evening of 7-11-1990 as the other accused persons including the petitioner are keeping themselves out of the reach of the police. ( 2 ) APPREHENDING his arrest and detention in custody in crime No. 158/90, the petitioner filed an application under Section 438 cr. P. c. for anticipatory bail in the court of the sessions judge, u. k. district at karwar (for short 'the sessions judge' ). It was registered as cr. Misc. No. 27/90. By order dated 21-11-1990, learned sessions judge has rejected the prayer of the petitioner by accepting the prosecution version that the petitioner is likely to abscond and even indulge in similar acts of violence alleged against him having regard to the fact that he is a very influential person and he is the driving force behind the offences committed by bootleggers in that area. ( 3 ) THEREFORE, the petitioner has approached this court with a fresh bail petition under Section 438 cr. P. c. for anticipatory bail. ( 4 ) THE said prayer of the petitioner is strongly opposed by the respondent-state for the reasons stated in their 11-page objection statement. ( 5 ) SRI m. v. devaraju, learned counsel for the petitioner, read out the contents of the complaint of ullas nagesh murdeshwar on the basis of which crime No. 158/90 is registered and submitted that the offence under Section 120-b IPC is subsequently introduced as the said offence was not mentioned at the time of registering crime No. 158/90. He also submitted that out of 5 cases mentioned in paragraph-14 of the objection statement filed by the state petitioner is accused only in crime No. 307/90 registered for offences under sections 143, 147, 148, 353 and 188 read with Section 149 IPC. He further contended that the petitioner's name is falsely mentioned in the complaint at the behest of his opponents. He further contended that the petitioner's name is falsely mentioned in the complaint at the behest of his opponents. He further submitted that the petitioner may be granted anticipatory bail by imposing stringent conditions on him as he is a very respectable person in the locality and there is no likelihood of his jumping bail or tampering with the prosecution evidence. ( 6 ) ON the other hand, Sri k. h. n. kuranga, learned state public prosecutor, referred to the allegations made against the petitioner in paragraphs 8 to 11 and 17 of the objection-statement filed by the state. He further submitted that it is too premature to say that the petitioner has nothing to do with crime nos. 308 to 311/90 mentioned against sl. Nos. 2 to 5 in paragraph-14, the objection-statement as the investigation in the said cases is still in progress. He also referred to the allegations made against the petitioner in paragraph-21 of the objection statement in which it is stated that another incident took place at kadira village coming under mallapur police station limits at 11 a. m. on 8-11-1990 in respect of the incident in which the accused persons trespassed into an arrack shop of excise contractor and caused damage to his shop and also looted money to the tune of of Rs. 2,250/- and crime No. 15/90 is registered at mallapur police station for offences under sections 395 and 427 IPC and investigation is pending. He also invited the attention of the court to the averments made in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the objection statement to the effect that the petitioner is a powerful and influential politician and he is bringing all sorts of political pressure on the investigating agency and other government machinery in order to deter them from proceeding with the investigation and he is intimately connected with the bootleggers who used to visit police station and excise office whenever officials arrest excise offenders in order to get them released on bail. It is also mentioned in paragraph-32 of the objection statement that the presence of the petitioner is required by the police for the purpose of interrogation and also to find out the whereabouts of the other accused involved in the case. It is also mentioned in paragraph-32 of the objection statement that the presence of the petitioner is required by the police for the purpose of interrogation and also to find out the whereabouts of the other accused involved in the case. Sri k. h. n. kuranga further submitted that it would be practically impossible to apprehend the other accused persons if the petitioner were to be granted the relief of anticipatory bail. ( 7 ) IN my opinion, it would not be proper for this court to express any opinion on the merits or de-merits of the allegations made by the prosecution against the petitioner in the light of the caution administered by the Supreme Court in the case of Niranjan Singh v Prabhakar Rajaram kharote and others, AIR 1980 SC 785 , that the court should avoid elaborate documentation of merits at the time of considering bail petitions. ( 8 ) AT the same time, the cumulative effect of several allegations made by the prosecution against the petitioner by making reference to the specific instances of violence committed either in the presence of the petitioner or at his behest cannot be lightly brushed aside as false and invented allegations. ( 9 ) WHAT circumstances would weigh with the court while considering the application for anticipatory bail have been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Pokar Ram v State of Rajasthan and others, (1985)2 SCC 597 . This important decision is somehow not referred to in the division bench decision of this court in the case of Chanda Earappa v State of Karnataka, 1989 (2) kar. L. j. 585 : 1lr 1989 Karnataka 2882. The facts of that case are that a case was registered in the first instance against 2nd respondent-accused for offences under Section 307 IPC amongst others. Later on, the injured succumbed to the injuries. On receiving that information, the offence under Section 302 IPC was added against the accused by the investigating officer. Soon thereafter, the accused appeared before the sessions judge on 29-8-1983 and moved an application under Section 438 Cr. P. C. for grant of anticipatory bail. The sessions judge granted anticipatory bail. The high court held that a case for cancellation of bail was not made out. Soon thereafter, the accused appeared before the sessions judge on 29-8-1983 and moved an application under Section 438 Cr. P. C. for grant of anticipatory bail. The sessions judge granted anticipatory bail. The high court held that a case for cancellation of bail was not made out. Thereupon, the appellant at whose instance the case was registered against the accused in that case moved the Supreme Court by filing a special leave petition. The Supreme Court has granted the said prayer of the complainant by observing that although ordinarily, the Supreme Court is loath to interfere with the orders granting or refusing bail but it cannot be an insurmountable obstacle in the way of rectifying an order which tends to disclose miscarriage of justice. In the said decision, a 3-judge bench of the Supreme Court has made certain observations which are relevant for the present case. It is observed in paragraphs 5 and 6 at pages 600 and 601 as under:"5. Relevant considerations governing the court's decision in granting anticipatory bail under Section 438 are materially different from those when an application for bail by a person who is arrested in the course of investigation as also by a person who is convicted and his appeal is pending before the higher court and bail is sought during the pendency of the appeal. Three situations in which the question of granting or refusing to grant bail would arise, materially and substantially differ from each other and the relevant considerations on which the courts would exercise its discretion, one way or the other, are substantially different from each other. This is necessary to be stated because the learned judge in the high court unfortunately fell into an error in mixing up all the considerations, as if all the three become relevant in the present situation. 6. The decision of the Constitution bench in Gurubaksh Singh Sibbia v State of Punjab, 1980 SCC (cri.) 561 clearly lays down that the 'distinction between an ordinary order of bail and an order of anticipatory bail is that whereas the former is granted after arrest and therefore means release from the custody of the police, the latter is granted in anticipation of arrest and is therefore effective at the very moment of arrest'. unlike a post-arrest order of bail, it is a pre-arrest legal process which directs that if the person in whose favour it is issued is thereafter arrested on the accusation in respect of which the direction is issued, he shall be released on bail. A direction under Section 438 is intended to confer conditional immunity from the touch as envisaged by Section 46 (1) or confinement. In para-31, chandrachud c. j. clearly demarcated the distinction between the relevant considerations while examining an application for anticipatory bail and an application for bail after arrest in the course of investigation. Says the learned chief Justice that 'in regard to anticipatory bail, if the proposed accusation appears to stem not from motives of furthering the ends of Justice but from some ulterior motive, the object being to injure an humiliate the applicant by having him arrested, a direction for the release of the applicant on bail in the event of his arrest would generally be made. It was observed that 'it cannot be laid down as an inexorable Rule that anticipatory bail cannot be granted unless the proposed accusation appears to be actuated by mala fides; and, equally, that anticipatory bail must be granted if there is no fear that the applicant will abscond'. Some of the relevant considerations which govern the discretion, noticed therein arc"the nature and seriousness of the proposed charges, the context of the events likely to lead to the making of the charges, a reasonable possibility of the applicant's presence not being secured at the trial, a reasonable apprehension that witnesses will be tampered with and 'the larger interests of the public or the state', are some of the considerations which the court has to keep in mind while deciding an application for anticipatory bail". A caution was voiced that 'in the evaluation of the consideration whether the applicant is likely to abscond, there can be no presumption that the wealthy and the mighty will submit themselves to trial and that the humble and the poor will run away from the course of justice, any more than there can be a presumption that the former are not likely to commit a crime and the latter are more likely to commit it. "thereafter, their lordships have observed in paragraph-11 at pages 602 and 603 while considering the question whether the learned sessions judge was justified in granting anticipatory bail on the facts and circumstances of the case as under:"let it be made distinctly clear that status in life, affluence or otherwise, are hardly relevant considerations while examining the request for granting anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail to some extent intrudes in the sphere of investigation of crime and the court must be cautious and circumspect in exercising such power of a discretionary nature. This case amply illustrates that the power was exercised sub silentio as to reasons or on considerations irrelevant or not germane to the determination. This court, to avoid miscarriage of Justice must interfere. " their lordships have again observed in paragraph-13 that "it must be made distinctly clear that very compelling circumstances must be made out for granting bail to a person accused of committing murder and that too when the investigation is in progress. " their lordships have also criticised the inaction of the investigating officer in not even attempting to arrest the appellant (sic accused) "though the initial accusation was under Section 307 ipc punishable with imprisonment for life" and it is further observed that "as soon as the victim of the assault succumbed to his injuries and an offence under Section 302 was registered, promptly an application for anticipatory bail was made and granted. If such an order is allowed to stand, faith of public in the administration of Justice is likely to be considerably shaken. Therefore, we have no option but to cancel the order granting anticipatory bail". ( 10 ) IN this context, i consider it proper to refer to the allegations made in the fir wherein it is clearly mentioned that after a group of 20 to 25 persons attacked the excise officer and officials, petitioner who was said to be present with them instigated and abetted them to attack the excise officers and officials. The specific allegations made in the complaint read as under: ( 11 ) WHETHER the various acts attributed to the petitioner are true or false is a matter on which this court need not express any opinion for the reasons already stated above. The specific allegations made in the complaint read as under: ( 11 ) WHETHER the various acts attributed to the petitioner are true or false is a matter on which this court need not express any opinion for the reasons already stated above. But, suffice it to say for the present that various allegations specifically made against the petitioner would, if true, form a strong prima facie case against the petitioner. ( 12 ) APPLYING the above referred observations of the Supreme Court to the above mentioned facts of the case on hand and in particular a series of incidents which have taken place from about 10-30 a. m. to 1 p. m. on 7-11-1990 and again to the incident under advertance which has taken place at about 4-30 p. m. on 7-11-1990 followed by the incident said to have taken place on 8-11-1990 and without being misunderstood by the petitioner and the other accused concerned in crime No. 158/1990 as expressing any opinion against them, I am of the opinion that it would be highly hazardous to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner even by imposing very stringent conditions on him as submitted by his learned counsel Sri m. v. devaraju. ( 13 ) IN the result, the petition is dismissed. Criminal petition dismissed. --- *** --- .