JUDGMENT 1. - This contempt petition has been filed by the petitioner for punishing the non-petitioners for non-compliance of the order dated 18.12.1987 passed by this court in the writ petition referred to here in above. 2. Initially, non-petitioner No. 1 was impleaded as party to the contempt petition. During the pendency of the contempt petition, an application dated 16.11.89 was moved on behalf of the petitioner for impleading non-petitioner No.2 as party to the contempt petition and by order of this court dated 6.12.1989 and the non-petitioner No.2 was ordered to be impleaded as party to the contempt petition. Both the non-petitioners have been served and they are represented by Shri M.I. Khan, Additional Advocate General. 3. According to the averments made in the petition, the petitioner's writ petition for grant of pay in the regular pay scale on the post of Lower Division Clerk was accepted by the Division Bench of this Court on 18.12.1987. The Court found that the petitioner is entitled to the same pay as is admissible to the others, who are working as Clerks in Raj Bhawan. The State Government was directed to make payment to the petitioner with effect from 29.10.1984. The petitioner submitted a copy of the order dated 18.12.1987 on 22.12.1987. Despite submission of the copy of the order of this court, nothing was done to make payment to the petitioner in terms of the Court's order dated 18.12.1987. The petitioner again submitted an application dated 16.11.1988 for compliance of the Court's order. It was also pointed out in this application that even Special Leave Petition filed against the order of the High Court has been dismissed by the Supreme Court. The petitioner submitted that the non-petitioners were wilfully disobeying the order of the High Court and they are liable to be punished for having committed contempt of court. 4. A reply was filed on behalf of the non-petitioners on 12.9.90 with affidavits of the non-petitioners No. 1 and 2 . In the said reply, it was stated that the petitioner has been granted regular pay scale of a Lower Division Clerk, by order dated 25.5.1989, Annexure-1. 4. A reply was filed on behalf of the non-petitioners on 12.9.90 with affidavits of the non-petitioners No. 1 and 2 . In the said reply, it was stated that the petitioner has been granted regular pay scale of a Lower Division Clerk, by order dated 25.5.1989, Annexure-1. It has also been stated that as per directions of this court, the petitioner has been granted the benefits of minimum of the pay scale available to the regular employees, with effect from 29.10.1984 and he has been paid arrears to the tune of Rs. 31,971 /-. In para 4, it has been stated that the petitioner is not entitled to house rent allowance, city compensatory allowance and other compensatory allowances as per Rules and as per various judgments of this court. In para 5 of the reply, it has been stated that the Court's direction dated 18.12.1987 were executed after delay. It is further stated that the answering respondents have tendered unqualified apologies for this delay. The explanation for the delay has been given on the ground that the State Government took a decision to file Special Leave Petition against the judgment of This court and for that reason the record was help-up for processing. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed on 28.8.1988 and, therefore, the matter was processed by the Governor Secretariat and thereafter it was referred to the General Administration Department on 25.5.1989. The General Administration Department obtained the final sanction from the Finance Department and issued order dated October 28,1989. The delay has occurred only on account of processing of the matter at various levels of the Government and its various functionaries. However, if any contempt is borne out, the answering respondent tenders unconditional apology for the same. Annexure R/3 was filed along with the reply, containing some particulars of the correspondence exchanged between the Governor Secretariat and the General Administration Department or the Finance and Law Department. After going through these affidavits, the Court asked the non-petitioners to produce the record, in which factum of apology is said to have been recorded because the affidavits including statement of apology were sworn on the basis of office record. Subsequently, an application was filled on 21.10.1990, in which it was stated that due to some technical defects, fresh reply with additional affidavit was being filed. A prayer was made to withdraw the earlier reply. Subsequently, an application was filled on 21.10.1990, in which it was stated that due to some technical defects, fresh reply with additional affidavit was being filed. A prayer was made to withdraw the earlier reply. In the additional reply, it has been stated that the Office of the Secretary to the Governor had executed the order of the High Court by order dated 25.5.1989 (Annexure R-1). In para 4, it has been stated that the matter was referred to the General Administration Department for issuing necessary orders for implementation of the Court's direction. By letter dated 21.10.1989, the General Administration Department allowed minimum of the regular pay scale to the petitioner, but the General Administration Department refused to grant other allowances, viz., house rent allowance and city compensatory allowance. According to the non-petitioners, this order has not been assailed by the petitioner. In this reply, it has been stated that the delay had occurred because of various administrative exigencies and processing of the matter at different levels of the department concerned. It has been stated that time was consumed in processing the matter for filing Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court and getting sanction from the Government. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed on 28.8.1988 and thereafter, the matter was processed by the Governor Secretariat and then it was referred to the General Administration Department on,25.5.1989. The General Administration Department obtained final sanction from the Finance Department and then order was issued for payment to the petitioner. According to the non-petitioners, they have not committed contempt of court deliberately nor have wilfully disobeyed the Court's order. However, if any contempt is borne out, they tender unconditional apologies and for the delay also they submit their apologies. Separate affidavits of the non- petitioners have been filed along with this reply. Also filed along with the reply is an affidavit of Shri O.P. Bhargave, Deputy Secretary, Governor Secretariat. It would be proper to quote the details given in para 2 of this affidavit: "2. That in the above case, after the judgment dated 18.12.1987, the following steps were taken by the Governor House, i. 19.12.1987: Certified copy of the judgment was obtained. ii. 29.12.1987 Governor Secretariat wrote letter to S.S.(GAD) by letter No. 10154 for taking action on the judgment. iii. That in the above case, after the judgment dated 18.12.1987, the following steps were taken by the Governor House, i. 19.12.1987: Certified copy of the judgment was obtained. ii. 29.12.1987 Governor Secretariat wrote letter to S.S.(GAD) by letter No. 10154 for taking action on the judgment. iii. 8.1.88: Cabinet Secretariat wrote letter to Governor's Secretariat for sending the copy of writ petition and reply to the writ petition. iv. 15.1.1988: Governor Secretariat wrote letter to G.A. by letter dated 15.1.88 for sending the writ petition by bearer. v. 25.1.1988: Governor's Secretariat sent copy of writ petition along with the proposed reply to writ petition, the case was decided without reply. vi. 23.1.1988: The Law Department issued Notification for conducting the case to GA by letter No.1(1655) L-5/87 dated 23.1.1988. vii. 19.2.1988: Governor's Secretariat sent reminder to SS (GAD) by letter dated 19.2.88 for taking necessary action. viii. 25.2.1988: Cabinet Secretariat sent U.O. Note to Law Department for giving instructions to file SLP as per letter MR No. 31 dated 9.2.1988. ix. 25.2.1988. Law Department issued instructions to Advocate on record for filing SLP. 29.2.1988: Cabinet Secretariat had sent letter to the Secretary to the Governor for appointment of OIC in this case for filing SLP. 7.3.88: Governor's Secretariat had appointed Sh. D.R. Mamoria, A.O., as Officer Incharge. 18.3.1988: Special Leave Petition was filed in the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 8.6.88: Governor's Secretariat had intimated the Cabinet Secretariat that SLP had been filed on 18.3.1988. 6.9.1988: OIC sought the progress of the case from the Advocate on record. 15.11.88: Sh. H.C. Agrawal, AO., had been appointed as OIC. 16.11.88 to 24.4.89: All attempts were made by the Governor's Secretariat to obtain information from the Supreme Court and the certified copy of order from the Advocate on record and other sources and to expedite the matter the petitioner was also requested to file the certified copy of the order. 19.5.1989 Contempt notice was received from the Hon'ble High Court in the name of Sh. N.K. Bairwa, Secretary to the Governor. 22.5.89 The Secretary to the Governor sent letter to Law Department for issuing instruction to Govt. Advocate. 23.5.89 Instruction had been issued by the Law Department to Sh. S.H. Khan, the then Asstt. Govt. Advocate. 25.5.1989 The petitioner submitted certified copy of judgment to the Dy. Secretary to the Governor. N.K. Bairwa, Secretary to the Governor. 22.5.89 The Secretary to the Governor sent letter to Law Department for issuing instruction to Govt. Advocate. 23.5.89 Instruction had been issued by the Law Department to Sh. S.H. Khan, the then Asstt. Govt. Advocate. 25.5.1989 The petitioner submitted certified copy of judgment to the Dy. Secretary to the Governor. 25.5.89 The Governor's Secretariat, recommended for the creation of post of LDC in terms of the judgment. 25.5.89 The Governor's Secretariat issued orders allowing scale of LDC w.e.f. 29.10.1984. 1.6.1989: Cabinet Secretariat enquired from the Governor Secretariat about the initial appointment of the petitioner and the nature of payments made to him. 7.6.89 The Governor's Secretariat intimated the nature of initial appointment of the petitioner and about the requirements of High Court judgment. 21.7.89: Reminder was sent by the Governor Secretariat. 21.10.1989: Clarification for payment of salary to the petitioner was made by the Governor Secretariat. 8.8.89 to 27.3.90: The petitioner was pressing for HRA and other compensatory allowance for which the matter was referred to the Government and the Cabinet Secretariat sought clarification. 21.5.1990 The Governor's Secretariat clarified the position and replied the quarries of the Cabinet Secretariat. 21.6.1990: The Governor's Secretariat again reminded the Government. 20.7.90: Additional Advocate General, Jaipur informed DLR with a copy to the Governor's Secretariat to implement the judgment and to remain present in the Court. 25.7.90 The Governor's Secretariat enquired from the A.G. about the continuance of earlier law officer. 10.8.90: The Law Department was requested to issue instructions for another law officer as Sh. S.H. Khan was no more Govt. Advocate. 13.8.1990: The AAG's letter received in this connection for filing Vakalatnama and executing the court order. 30.8.90 Instructions were issued in favour of Shri N.L. Pareek for appearing in the contempt petition. 8.8.90: The Governor's Secretariat reminded the Cabinet Secretariat to create the post. 30.9.90 Letter had been sent to S.S.(GAD) by the Secretary to the Governor for creation of post. 17.10.1990 Governor's Secretariat had issued a orders for allowing Rs. 950/- as minimum of the regular pay scales with D.A. to the petitioner and the same has been paid". 5. The arguments were heard in this case on 17.11.1990 and during course of hearing the learned Additional Advocate General stated that he would give details of the period of working of the two non-petitioners as Secretary to the Governor. 950/- as minimum of the regular pay scales with D.A. to the petitioner and the same has been paid". 5. The arguments were heard in this case on 17.11.1990 and during course of hearing the learned Additional Advocate General stated that he would give details of the period of working of the two non-petitioners as Secretary to the Governor. But the same was not furnished and,therefore, the matter was listed in the Court on 19.11.1990. On that day, the learned Additional Advocate General sought one day's time to furnish necessary information. On 20.11.1990, learned Additional Advocate General filed an affidavit of Shri Alok Mathur, Accounts Officer in the Governor Secretariat. From that affidavit, it is revealed that the non- petitioner No. 2 had remained Secretary to the Governor between 185.1989 to 8.4.1990 and the non -petitioner No. 1 had remained as Secretary to the Governor from 1.10.1986 to 175.1989. 6. Shri R.D. Rastogi, learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the non- petitioners have wilfully disregarded the Court's order and even till this day, full compliance has not been made. He pointed out that although there was a clear direction for grant of the same pay as is admissible to others who are working as Clerks in the Raj Bhawan, as per directions of the Court, by an order dated 25.5.1989 only sanction was given for payment of minimum of the regular pay scale and not the salary at par with other clerks working in the Governor Secretariat. Even according to order dated 25.5.1989 the payment was made only on 293.1990. He further pointed out that by order dated 16.10.1990 also only minimum pay in the revised pay scale has been sanctioned to the petitioner. Shri Rastogi has submitted that from 19.12.1987 to 25.5.1989 no step whatsoever was taken by the non-petitioner No.1 for making payment in terms of the order of the Court despite the fact that he was in full know of the Court's order and its implications and even thereafter the matter continued to be tossed between the Departments of the Government. He submitted that both the non-petitioners have committed contempt of Court. According to Shri Rastogi, mere filing of Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court can be no ground for withholding compliance of the Court's order. 7. He submitted that both the non-petitioners have committed contempt of Court. According to Shri Rastogi, mere filing of Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court can be no ground for withholding compliance of the Court's order. 7. Shri M.I. Khan, learned Additional Advocate General argued that compliance of the Court's order could not be made because the non-petitioners were required to act in accordance with the Rules of Business of the Government and they could not pay the salary to the petitioner in the regular pay scale in absence of sanction from the concerned department. According to Shri Khan, time was also consumed in processing the matter for filing Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court and thereafter, at various levels of the Government Departments. Shri Khan submitted that the non-petitioners have not willfully or intentionally disregarded the Court's order. According to him, the petitioner is not entitled to anything else than the minimum pay and Dearness Allowance. He cannot claim house rent allowance, city compensatory allowance and other compensatory allowances. Lastly, Shri M.I. Khan submitted that the non-petitioners have tendered their unconditional apologies for delay in implementation of the Court's order and, therefore, the Court should discharge the notices of contempt issued against the non-petitioners. 8. Shri M.I. Khan, learned counsel for non-petitioners was asked by the Court to show as to why the orders dated 25.5.1989 and 16.10.90 had been issued for grant of minimum pay only to the petitioner instead of same pay as is admissible to others who are working as Clerks in the Raj Bhawan. His attention was drawn to the categorical order of the Court passed on 18.12.1987, in which it was observed that the petitioner is entitled to the same pay as is admissible to those who are working as Clerks in the Raj Bhawan and also to the fact that the State Government was directed to make payment to the petitioner w.e.f. 29.10.1984. Shri Khan did not say that other Clerks were being paid minimum of the regular pay scale, but stated that it might be due to mistake. 9. The people of India have constituted India into a sovereign Socialist Secular democratic republic. The State has three main organs; Legislature, Executive and Judiciary and the Constitution has demarcated the area of functioning of these three organs for the smooth running of the democracy. 9. The people of India have constituted India into a sovereign Socialist Secular democratic republic. The State has three main organs; Legislature, Executive and Judiciary and the Constitution has demarcated the area of functioning of these three organs for the smooth running of the democracy. For maintaining rule of law, which is the comer stone of every democracy, each organ has to act within sphere of its authority and respect the authority of the other organ of the State. Under our Constitution, the legislature has been conferred with the responsibility of enacting laws containing policies for the governance of the policies and for achieving the goal of social, economic and political justice, liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship, equality of status and opportunity. The executive has to give real life to these legislative policies formulated by the legislature. The judiciary has been assigned with the task of administration of justice. In the process, a pious obligation has been imposed on the judiciary to adjudicate upon the laws enacted by the Parliament and the actions of the executive and to keep the executive as well as Legislature within the constitutional parameters of their authority. The Judiciary does not possess police powers under our constitutions. However, the system of check and balance, which is inherent in the Constitutional frame work enjoins upon all to respect the order of the Court. If the two other wings of the State start defying the authority and orders of the court, the whole edifice, on which the people have thought to constitute India into a sovereign socialist secular democratic republic would collapse. 10. The idea of contempt of court has emerged with the emergence of the rule of law and generally speaking, any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect or disrepute or any act which interferes with the administration of justice is, contempt of Court. 11. In India the history of 'law of contempt' can be traced as early as in 1560 (Mughal period). Instance is to be found in Tabaquat, De-Il (quoted by Sterling in 'Crime and Punishment in Mughal India'). While Akbar was on his way to Pun- jab, Shah Abdul Macali in the Pargana of Jhajar wanted to salute him while seated on his horse. Akbar felt annoyed and handed him over to Shahabuddin Ahmed Khan to be kept in custody, as a prisoner. While Akbar was on his way to Pun- jab, Shah Abdul Macali in the Pargana of Jhajar wanted to salute him while seated on his horse. Akbar felt annoyed and handed him over to Shahabuddin Ahmed Khan to be kept in custody, as a prisoner. In Kautilya's Arthasastra, details can be found on the theory of contempt of King and King's Council. Even Judges who violated law were held liable for punishment. Thus Kautilya was of the view that all persons who violated law were to be punished, including those who administer law and in fact in the later case, the punishment would be more severe. 12. Oswald in his work on 'contempt of court' defines contempt as any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of law into dis- respect or disregard or to interfere with or prejudice parties or their witnesses during litigation. 13. The law of contempt of court in the modern sense as developed in our Country is on the pattern of English law. Since to punish contempt was an inherent power in England with all the courts of record, as soon as courts of record were established in India under different charters the power to punish contempt was necessarily given to these courts. When the Constitution of India came into force in the year 1950, some provisions relating to contempt matters were also included in it. The contempt of the Supreme Court and High Court as topics for legislation have been mentioned in the Union list and Concurrent list. In the year 1952, the Parliament enacted the 'Contempt of Courts Act,1952'.After examining the law of contempt, which developed during a period of almost two decades after coming into force of the Constitution, the Parliament enacted the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Under the Act of 1971, the term 'Contempt' has been defined in Section 2. For the purpose of this case, it would be appropriate to quote Section 2(a) and (b): "2. Under the Act of 1971, the term 'Contempt' has been defined in Section 2. For the purpose of this case, it would be appropriate to quote Section 2(a) and (b): "2. In this Act unless the context otherwise requires, (a) "contempt of Court" means civil contempt or criminal contempt; (b) "Civil Contempt" means, wilful disobedience to any judgment decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court." This definition is in consonance with the views expressed by the English and Indian Courts from time to time and the Parliament in India has tried to give a concrete shape to the law of contempt by enacting Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The object of contempt proceedings is primarily to protect the public confidence in the system of administration of justice. In Brahm Prakash Sharma v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 10 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court underlined the object of contempt proceedings in the following words: "The summary jurisdiction exercised by superior courts in punishing contempt of their authority exists for the purpose of preventing interference with the course of justice and for maintaining the authority of law as is administered in the courts.The object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection to Judges personally from imputations to which they may be exposed as individuals; it is intended to be a protection to the public whose interests would be very much affected if by the act or conduct of any party, the authority of the court is lowered and the sense of confidence which people have in the administration of justice by it is weakened." 14. In Aligarh Municipal Board v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union and others, AIR 1970 SC 1767 , the Supreme Court has observed as under : "The contempt proceedings against a person who has failed to comply with the courts' order serves a dual purpose; (1) Vindication of the public interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct and (2)coercion to compel the contemner to do what the law requires of him." 15. In Advocate General, Bijar v. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries, (1980)3 SCC 311 , the Supreme Court held : ".. ....... In Advocate General, Bijar v. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries, (1980)3 SCC 311 , the Supreme Court held : ".. ....... it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends it pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The Court has the power to commit for contempt of court, not in order to protect the dignity of the court against insult or injury as the expression "contempt of Court" may seem to suggest, but, to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with." It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage." (Per Frankfurter, J. in Offutt v. U.S. (1954) 345 US 11 .) 16. In Hedkinson v. Hedkinson 1952 2 All E.R. 997 , it has been held: "It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against or in respect of whom the order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromised nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the persons affected by the order believes it to be irregular or even void." 17. Again in Jennison v. Backer, 1972(1) All E.R. 997 , Curtish Raleigh, J. observed: "The law should not be seen to sit by simply, while those who defy it go free and those who seek its protection loose hope." 18. In Bardkanta Mishra v. Bhimsen Dixit, AIR 1972 SC 2466 , the Supreme Court observed as under : "The contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to the authority, justice, dignity thereof. It signifies a wilful disregard or disobedience of the court's order. It also signifies such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute (vide 17 Corpus Juris Secundum pages 5 and 6; Contempt by Edward N. Dangel (1939) Edition page 14, Oswald's Contempt of Court (1910) End. pages 5 and 6)". 19. These authorities clearly show that every one whosoever high, he may be, is bound to carry out the courts order. pages 5 and 6)". 19. These authorities clearly show that every one whosoever high, he may be, is bound to carry out the courts order. The order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction is binding on all concerned and those who defy or dis-obey or fail to comply with the Court's order do at their own peril. No one can think himself above the law and the court is under a duty to see that confidence of the public in the institution of the courts is not shaken by the executive authorities by their disregard to the orders of the Court. 20. Having taken note of the object and purpose of the proceedings of the contempt of court, we now advert to another aspect of the matter, as to what is the meaning of wilful disobedience of the judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court. Much emphasis was laid by the learned Additional Advocate General on the word 'wilful' and it was urged that the non-petitioners cannot be said to have wilfully disobeyed the court's order. 21. 'Wilful' according to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Fifth Edition, implies nothing blameable, but merely that the person of whose action or default the expression is used is a free agent, and that what has been done arises from the spontaneous action of his will. It amounts to nothing more than this, that he knows what he is doing, and intends to do what he is doing, and is a free agent, what is intentional is 'wilful'. The ordinary meaning of 'Wilful' as defined in Concised Oxford Dictionary is that, action or state for which compulsion or ignorance or accident cannot be pleaded as excuse, intentional, deliberate, due to perversity or self-will. 22. According to Black's Law Dictionary (Revised 4th Edition), 'Wilfulness' implies an act done intentionally and designedly; "wantonness" implies action without regard to the rights of others, a conscious failure to observe care, a conscious invasion of the rights of others, willful, unrestrained action and "reck-lessness" a disregard of consequences, an indifference whether a wrong or injury is done or not, and an indifference to natural and probable consequences. 23. In Stancomb v. Trowbridge Urban District Council, (1910)2 ch. 23. In Stancomb v. Trowbridge Urban District Council, (1910)2 ch. 190 , Warrington, J. said: " In my judgment if a person or a corporation is restrained by injunction from doing a particular act, that person or corporation commits a breach of the injunction and is liable for process for contempt, if he or it in fact does the act, and it is no answer to say that the act was not contumacious in the sence that, in doing it, there was no direct intention to disobey the order. I think the expression "Wilfully" in Or. XLII Rule 31 is intended to exclude only such casual or accidental and intentional acts as are referred to in Fairclough v. Manchesr Ship Canal Company ." 24. This view was followed by House of Lords in Heatons Transport Ltd. Vs. Transport and General Workers Union, 1953 Cr. L.J. 136 . The House of Lords observed: " to establish that disobedience was wilful, it was not necessary to show that it was contumacious in the sense that there was a direct intention to disobey the order; it was sufficient to show that disobedience was not casual or accidental or unintentional". The House of Lords further observed: "It is also the reasonable view, because a party in whose favour an order has been made is entitled to have it enforced and also the effective ad- ministration of justice normally requires that some penalty for disobedience to the order of the court if disobedience is more than casual, accidental or unintentional." 25. In Tarafatuallah v. S.N. Maitra 1953 Cr. L.J.136 , the Calcutta High Court had dealt with the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 and observed as under: "When an injunction is granted against a corporation, which afterwards does or permits an act in breach of the injunction, there is a wilful dis- obedience of the order and it will be no answer for the corporation to say that the act was done or the omission allowed to occur unintentionally, or through carelessness, or through dereliction of duty on the part of servants of the corporation. The same principle would apply in the case of a Government or a State, but before an individual officer of the Government can be held to be liable it must be established that he was the person in charge of the subject matter to which the injunction or order, alleged to have been disobeyed, related and unless that is established, no case against an individual officer can succeed." 26. From the above quoted dictionary meaning, of the term 'Wilful' and the decisions of the courts, it is reasonable to derive that term 'wilful disobedience' used in Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 cannot be construed to mean that an act must in all cases be designed and deliberate to be held as civil contempt. If a party who is fully in know of the order of the court or is conscious and aware of the consequences and implications of the Court's order, ignores it or acts in violation of the Court's order, it must be held that disobedience is wilful. It is not the requirement that the act must be done with criminal intention or motive. In our view, it is never practicable to prove the actual intention behind the act or omission. A court can approach the question only objectively and is forced to presume the intention from the act done, from the maxim that every man is presumed to intend the probable consequence of his act. 27. Having considered the position of law, we would now examine the facts of this case. However, before dealing with the facts in detail, we would like to dispose of two arguments, which have been advanced by Shri Khan, learned Additional Advocate General. First is , that non-petitioners were not to comply with the Court's order because several steps are required to be taken under the Rules of Business and till those steps were completed and financial sanction was received, no action could be taken by the non-petitioners. We are amazed that such argument could possibly be put forward on behalf of the functionaries of the State. We are amazed that such argument could possibly be put forward on behalf of the functionaries of the State. The Rules of Business are framed under Article 166 of the Constitution, for more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State and for allocation amongst Ministers of the said business in so far as, it is no business with respect to which the Governor by or under this Constitution is required to act in its discretion. 28. We have carefully perused Article 226 of the Constitution of India and we do not find any provision to the effect that the orders passed by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would be subject to the Rules of Business framed under Article 166 (3) of the Constitution of India. The logical corollary of the argument of the learned Addl. Advocate General is that we must read the existence of Proviso to Article 226 of the Con- situation of India making the Court's order dependent on the fulfilment of the requirements of the Rules of Business. In our view, such type of argument deserves summary rejection. No person who is under an obligation to comply with the Court's order can possibly contend that he is to seek instructions from his superiors or he has to comply with some rules before he can carry out his obligation of complying with the Court's order. The entire edifice, on which the system of dispensation of justice which has developed for many centuries would collapse, if the Government and its functionaries would start flouting and ignoring the Court's order on filmsy (sic flimsy) pretext of compliance of the Rules of Business. Argument similar to compliance of the rules of Business was advanced Before the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Taluri Seshaian v. M. Narain Rao 1967 Cr. L.J. 19 , and the Andhra Pradesh High Court repelled this argument in the following words: "The risks involved in hesitation or delay, for whatever reason, in complying with the orders of the court are serious, and the person disobeying them or not complying with them will alone be responsible for the consequences and he cannot be heard to say that he has referred the matter to his official superiors; and for that matter, his official superiors cannot give him any kind of protection. It may be pointed out that the term of law is long enough to reach even the superiors officers themselves if they give instructions contrary to the orders of the Court, or give an impression to the subordinate officials.that compliance with orders of Court without their approval will open them to disciplinary action or make them blameworthy." 29. We have no hesitation in holding that the argument of the learned Additional Advocate General to the effect that Business Rules will have to be complied with before giving effect to the orders of the Court is wholly misconceived and is, therefore, rejected. 30. The other point, which has been raised by Shri M.I. Khan is that the Government had decided to file a Special Leave Petition and the matter was processed for obtaining sanction for filing special Leave Petition and this has caused delay in compliance of the Court's order. We would not hesitate for a moment in saying that the Government has a constitutional right to approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Petition against the order passed by the High Court or by the Tribunal. It has also a right to make a prayer for grant of stay against implementation of the order passed by the High Court or the Tribunal. However, we would also not hesitate for a moment in observing that mere filing of special leave petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court does not and cannot operate as a stay on the order of the High Court and that cannot afford a ground to delay the implementation of the order of the High Court. This plea has been repelled by the Supreme Court as early as in 1972 in Barat Kant Mishra's case (supra). The Supreme Court had rejected the plea that filing of Special Leave Petition would permit non-compliance of the order passed by the High Court. The Supreme Court took the view that the appellant who was Judicial Officer, was deliberately avoiding to follow the decision of the High Court by giving wrong and illegitimate reasons and his conduct was clearly mala fide and amounted to disobedience and disregard of the authority, justice and dignity thereof and thereby bringing the administration of law into disrepute. The Supreme Court took the view that the appellant who was Judicial Officer, was deliberately avoiding to follow the decision of the High Court by giving wrong and illegitimate reasons and his conduct was clearly mala fide and amounted to disobedience and disregard of the authority, justice and dignity thereof and thereby bringing the administration of law into disrepute. Similar view has been expressed about filing of appeal by a Single Judge of this Court in Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan and others, 1982 R.L.R. 744 , and we agree with the same. 31. Now coming to the facts of this case, we find that this court had passed the order on 18.12.1987 holding that the petitioner is entitled to the same pay as is admissible to others, who are working as Clerks in the Raj Bhawan. The Government directed to make payment to the petitioner w.e.f. 29.10.1984: This order was passed after notice to the State of Rajasthan, which was represented through the Secretary to the Governor. The order was passed after hearing the learned Government Advocate. The non- petitioners have not disputed that this order was in their knowledge. A certified copy of the order was obtained on 19.12.1987 and a copy of the same was submitted by the petitioner also on 22.12.1987. It has, therefore, to be held that the non- petitioner No. 1 had become aware of the Court's order, which was clear and unambiguous, in the month of December, 1987 itself. In fact the non-petitioner No. 1 has nowhere pleaded that the matter was not in his notice upto a particular point of time. The Governor's Secretariat (11) 1982 R.L.R. 744 had rested by sending a letter dated 29.12.1987 for taking action on the judgment. Instructions for filing Special Leave Petition were issued in February, 1988. The Special Leave Petition was filed in March, 1988 and it was dismissed on August 28, 1988. The petitioner had informed the non-petitioner vide his letter dated 16.11.1988 that the Special Leave Petition has been dismissed. The notice of this contempt petition was in fact served in the month of May, 1989 itself, as is evident from page 3 of the affidavit of Shri O.P. Bhargava. The petitioner had informed the non-petitioner vide his letter dated 16.11.1988 that the Special Leave Petition has been dismissed. The notice of this contempt petition was in fact served in the month of May, 1989 itself, as is evident from page 3 of the affidavit of Shri O.P. Bhargava. Thereafter, an order was issued on 25.5.1989 for giving minimum pay to the petitioner in the Scale of L.D.C. According to the petitioner, actual payment was made only on 293.1990 and that too was in part compliance of the Court's order. The non- petitioner No.1 was holding the office of the secretary to the Governor between 1.10.1986 to 17.5.1989. It is thus more than evident that non-compliance of the order of the Court continued throughout the period the non-petitioner No. I was Secretary to the Governor. He had not taken steps for payment of salary to the petitioner in compliance of the Court's order dated 18.12.1987. He rested on the premise that the Government has filed Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. Admittedly, no stay was granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the order dated 18.12.1987. Therefore, it was obligatory for the non-petitioner No. I to have complied with the directions contained in the order dated 18.12.1987. The non- petitioner No. 1 was Head of the Governor Secretariat and, therefore, it was his responsibility to have seen that the order of the High Court is given effect to promptly. We must emphasise that wherever the Court sets up a time limit for implementation of its order, the order must be given effect to within that time, unless it is extended by the Court or the order of the court is stayed in appeal. In cases, where no time limit is set up, the will must be implemented within a reasonable time and obviously a period of more than one year and five months cannot be a reasonable period. The Officers of the Government cannot just sit over the matter and when contempt notice is issued by the Court, come forward with a plea that exchange of correspondence was going on between the departments, instructions were being sought and sanction was being obtained. In our view, it was the bounden duty of the non- petitioner No. 1 to have passed proper orders for making payment to the petitioner in accordance with the order of the Court dated 18.12.1987. In our view, it was the bounden duty of the non- petitioner No. 1 to have passed proper orders for making payment to the petitioner in accordance with the order of the Court dated 18.12.1987. Even if, for a moment, it is assumed that the non- petitioner No. 1 was under an erroneous impression that he could wait for compliance of the Court's order till the decision of the Special Leave Petition, there could be absolutely no justification for withholding compliance after dismissal of the Special Leave Petition in August, 1988. Thus, non-compliance continued despite dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by the Supreme Court. In our considered opinion the non-petitioner No. 1 has failed to obey the writ issued by the court and, therefore, he is guilty of having committed contempt of Court as defined in Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 32. So far as non-petitioner No. 2 is concerned, he took over charge as Secretary to the Governor on 18.5.1989. The order dated 255.1989 was passed during his tenure as Secretary to the Governor and part payment was also made on 29.3.1990 when he was Secretary to the Governor. The non- petitioner No. 2 has also not pleaded that he was not aware of the order passed by the Court. In fact, the affidavit of Shri O.P. Bhargava shows that between 18.5.1989 to March, 1990, only correspondence was exchanged between the Government Secretariat and the other Departments of the Government. However, nothing concrete was done to make payment to the petitioner. The order dated 25.5.1989 was also not in terms of the directions given by the Court. No plea of carelessness or inadvertence has been raised by the non- petitioner No.2. Omission to comply with the mandate issued by the court is apparent from the actions of the non-petitioner No.2 also. Thus, in our view, the non-petitioner No. 2 is also responsible for wilful disobedience of the Court's order and he is held guilty of having committed the contempt of Court as defined in Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Court's Act, 1971. 33. Having held the two non-petitioners guilty of committing contempt of Court, we may examine the apologies tendered by them. 33. Having held the two non-petitioners guilty of committing contempt of Court, we may examine the apologies tendered by them. At the cost of repetition we may refer to the fact that in the first reply, a statement was made to the effect that the answering respondent tenders his unconditional apology for this delay. In para 6, however it is said, "however, if any contempt is borne out, the answering respondent tenders his unconditional apology for the same. This reply was filed as late as on 12.9.1989. On that day also even partial payment had not been made to the petitioner in terms of the directions of the Court. The order dated 255.1989 was not in conformity with the directions given by the Court, whereas, the court had given direction for giving the petitioner same pay as was admissible to others who were working as Clerks in the Raj Bhawan. The order contains stipulation that sanction is conveyed for payment of minimum pay in the scale of Lower Division Clerk. In the second reply the statement contained in para 1 of the first reply is missing and only a statement contained in para 6 of the previous reply to the effect that if any contempt is borne out, the answering respondents tender their unconditional apology for the same, has been made. The second reply was filed on 22.10.90 and the order passed on 16.10.1990, which has been referred to in the affidavit of Shri O.P. Bhargava only allows minimum of the regular pay scale to the petitioner. The non-petitioners have not come to the court with a straight forward apology. True it is, that under Section 12 the exception provides that apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional, if the accused makes it bona-fide. 34. The apology is an act of contrition. Unless apology is offered at he earliest opportunity and in good grace, apology is shorn of penitence. If apology is offered at a time when the contemnor finds that the Court is going to impose punishment it ceased to be an apolo and it becomes an act of a charging coward. Mulkh Rajasthan V.State of Punjab, AIR 1972 SC 1972 . The apology in a case of contempt is intended to a genuine expression of regret of the contemner who frankly admits his guilt and expresses contrition and seeks forgiveness. Mulkh Rajasthan V.State of Punjab, AIR 1972 SC 1972 . The apology in a case of contempt is intended to a genuine expression of regret of the contemner who frankly admits his guilt and expresses contrition and seeks forgiveness. Jai Prakash Berl Prasad v. Ram Swarup, AIR 1958 Punjab 461 . The apology is acceptable if it is bona-fide and genuinely made as a measure of atonement but if apology is tendered merely as pretext to escape consequences of the contumacious act in contempt proceeding it cannot be accepted as of right. Kallo Mal v. State of UP, 1974 Cr.LJ.529 . In Laxmi Nara' v. Mira Rani, 1984 Cr.L.J. 1033 , the Calcutta High Court expressed concern about the manner?) which the orders of the Court are being flouted in the hope that if necessary at the last moment by tendering apologies the contemnors would be excused, if any acts of violation, if found guilty. The Court observed as under : "It seems that the trend of today is more to disregard the orders of court than to comply with the same with the belief that apologies tendered at the time of hearing will condone all acts of the contemnor. The time has come when it must be made clear to the litigant public and all, that when a direction is given and orders are made, the orders are required to be carried out to their fullest extent and any wilful disregard to the same will not be tolerated by a court of law and severe consequence will follow if orders are found to have been violated." 35. Very recently, Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, Shri R.N. Mishra while disposing of a contempt petition against Shri A.N. Verma, Secretary, Industries, Government of India, held that the Secretary was guilty of contempt of Court and after taking note of the fact that full compliance had been made of the Court's order accepted the unconditional apology, but observed: "Frequency of non-compliance by the Union Government of the Court's order had increased and this tendency needed to be curbed in the interest of the respect and credibility of the Court as an institution. It was expected of the Union of India to show exemplary conduct. Contempt power had to be used to curb this tendency of non-compliance". (The Hindustan Times, daily dated 6.11.1990) 36. It was expected of the Union of India to show exemplary conduct. Contempt power had to be used to curb this tendency of non-compliance". (The Hindustan Times, daily dated 6.11.1990) 36. From a perusal of the apologies tendered in this case, we find that they have been filed only with a view to avoid consequences of disobedience of the Court's orders. The non- petitioners did not comply with the Court's order. Even while passing the order dated 25.5.1989, the non-petitioners had not cared to see that the order of the Court is fully complied with. The payments were not made to the petitioner even in terms of the order dated 25.5.1989 for a period of 8 months after the receipt of notice of contempt by the non-petitioner No. 1. In our view, the apologies tendered by the non-petitioners cannot be accepted, because non-compliance of the Court's order continued. 37. Now the question arises as to what punishment should be awarded to thereon-petitioners ? The petitioner is a Class III employee. He is in service since 1983. After he failed to get relief from the Administration, he had approached the Court The court passed order on 18.12.1987. Payment for the first time was made to the petitioner on 29.3.90 and that too in partial compliance of the order dated 18.12.1987. He had to file contempt proceedings after having been successful in the High Court. A citizen comes to the court after he fails to get justice at the hands of the Government. We are of the view that a clear case of contempt of court has been made out against the non-petitioners. If the order passed by the High Cowl is not fully complied with for almost 3 years, the public would start loosing faith in the efficacy of the orders passed by the High Court. The actions of the non-petitioners clearly tantamount to under-mining the authority of the Court as an intuition. In our view, looking to the over-all picture, the ends of justice would be n"t if a penalty of fine is imposed on the non-petitioners. Since the non-petitions No. 1 had not complied with the court's order during his entire tenure between 18.12.1987 to 165.1989, a penalty of fine of Rs. 2000/- should be imposed on to non-petitioner No. 1. In our view, looking to the over-all picture, the ends of justice would be n"t if a penalty of fine is imposed on the non-petitioners. Since the non-petitions No. 1 had not complied with the court's order during his entire tenure between 18.12.1987 to 165.1989, a penalty of fine of Rs. 2000/- should be imposed on to non-petitioner No. 1. So far as the non-petitioner No. 2 is concerned, partial compliance of the Court's order had been made and therefore, the ends of justice would be met, if a penalty of fine of Rs. 500/- is imposed on him. 38. In the result, the non-petitioners are held guilty of contempt of court. A penalty of fine of Rs. 2000/- is imposed on the non-petitioner No. 1. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo simple imprisonment of one month. A penalty of fine of Rs. 500/- is imposed on the non-petitioner No. 2. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo simple imprisonment of one week. Out of the fine realised, Rs. 1500/- shall be paid to the petitioner by way of damages. 39. We also feel that since the petitioner, who is a low paid employee and has been unnecessarily harassed, should get costs from the non-petitioners. We award costs of Rs. 1,000/- on each of the non-petitioners. *******