JUDGMENT 1. A short question, as to whether an appeal lies against an order sanctioning the building plan under section 15 (5) of The U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, arises in this appeal. 2. A few facts in the background qf which the present petition has been filed may first be stated in brief The petitioner and respondent no 2 are the owners of adjoining land in semi-hill town of Dehradun. There was some dispute between the parties which resulted in two cross-suits being filed in the civil court but the same was compromised by the parties. Thereafter the petitioner applies for sanction of a building plan in respect of the land owned by him and this again gave rise to several civil suits between the parties with which we are not concerned at present. It is undisputed that the plan submitted by the petitioner was sanctioned by the concerned authority. An appeal purporting to be one under section 15 (5) of the U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 was filed by respondent no. 2. After filing of the appeal respondent no. 2 also applied for ad-interim relief which has been granted by respondent no. 1 vide its order dated 21-12-1989 (Annexure 7 to the writ petition). In the objection filed by the petitioner before respondent no. 1 it was contended that the appeal was not maintainable and the appellant (respondent no 2 here) had no locus standi to file the same. Despite all these objections respondent no. 1 proceeded to hear the application for interim relief and has stayed the operation of the sanction to build granted to the petitioner. It is against this order primarily that the present petition has been filed. Parties have exchanged their counter and rejoinder affidavits and have prayed that the writ petition may be finally disposed of at the stage of admission itself. We, therefore, proceed to hear the same on merits also. 3. It is undisputed that the appeal before respondent no. 1 had been filed by respondent no. 2 against an order sanctioning the building plan of the petitioner. The submission made by the petitioner is that respondent no. 2 was not a person aggrieved within the meaning of sub-clause 5 of section 15 of the 1973 Act. Section 15 deals with an application for permission to develop. 1 had been filed by respondent no. 2 against an order sanctioning the building plan of the petitioner. The submission made by the petitioner is that respondent no. 2 was not a person aggrieved within the meaning of sub-clause 5 of section 15 of the 1973 Act. Section 15 deals with an application for permission to develop. Sub-clause 3 thereof lays down that after receipt of the application for permission the Vice Chairman, after making necessary enquiry by order in writing either grant permission subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order or refuse to grant permission. Sub-clauses 4 and 5 of section 15 are relevant and are being quoted below : Sub-clause (4) "Where permission is refused, the grounds of such refusal shall be recorded in writing and communicated to the applicant. Sub-clause (5) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section 4 may appeal to the Chairman against that order within 30 days from the communication thereof and may after giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant and, if necessary, also to the representative of the Vice Chairman either dismiss the appeal or direct the Vice-Chairman to grant the permission applied for with such modification, or subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified.". 4. Stress of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that it is only when permission is refused that a right to file an appeal under sub-clause 5 accrues and that too to the person to whom permission has been refused. The submission from the side of respondent, however, was that according to sub-clause 5 "any person aggrieved" has a right to file an appeal. This argument, however, does not make into consideration the remaining part of the opening sentence which says that "any person aggrieved by an order passed under sub-section 4" on making a reference to sub-section 4 it will be obvious that it is only in a case when permission is refused that the right of appeal has been granted. As a corollary, therefore, an appeal shall not lie in a case where permission had been granted. The view that we are taking can be supported in another way also. The remaining provision of sub-clause 5 lays down that opportunity of hearing Is to be given only to the appellant and to the representative of the Vice Chairman. As a corollary, therefore, an appeal shall not lie in a case where permission had been granted. The view that we are taking can be supported in another way also. The remaining provision of sub-clause 5 lays down that opportunity of hearing Is to be given only to the appellant and to the representative of the Vice Chairman. If we were to agree with the respondent then, in an appeal against grant of permission, the person having the permission shall have no right to be beard Such a situation cannot be countenanced in law as it will amount to denial of the right to defend the grant of permission before its reversal in appeal. Obviously a reading of the entire sub-section (5) would make it clear that it is only when a permission is refused that a right to appeal accrues and not otherwise. That being so an appeal under section 15 (5) will not lie and the authority can have no jurisdiction to pass any interim order either. 5. In the alternative it is submitted by Sri H. S. Nigam, learned counsel for respondent no. 2 that merely because the document is captioned under section 15 (5) it does not necessarily mean that it was an appeal under that provision alone. He urged that respondent no. 2 only intended to submit a representation before the Chairman to apprise him of the illegality committed by an authority under him at the behest of the petitioner. The learned counsel has referred to paragraph 4 of the supplementary affidavit also which was filed today. However, we are not concerned as to what respondent intended to do, to submit a representation or to file an appeal. We have only to look at the memo filed by respondent no. 2 to find out which was indeed a memo of appeal under section 15 (5) or not. 6. In this very connection it was next urged that even though an appeal may not be maintainable but if the document instead of being treated as memo of appeal is considered a representation to a higher authority, the impugned order can still be upheld. Reference has been made to a Supreme Court decision in State of U. P. v. Maharaja Dharamander Prasad Singh, 1989 (2) UP LB EC 73. Reference has been made to a Supreme Court decision in State of U. P. v. Maharaja Dharamander Prasad Singh, 1989 (2) UP LB EC 73. In that case the Chaiman exercising the powers under section 41 (3) set aside the order of the Vice-Chairman granting permission. It was held by the Supreme Court that : "The power of regulation which stretches beyond the mere grant of permission, takes within its sweep the power, in appropriate cases to revoke or cancel the permission as incidental or supplemental to the power to grant" Advertising to the "appropriate cases" the Supreme Court observed that only in a very limited class of cases where permission had been obtained by misrepresentation or fraud or where authority granting permission had no jurisdiction at all, the power to review can be exercised. The ratio of that decision, therefore, is hardly applicable to the case in hand. An attempt was made to urge that even if the order may not be sustainable in appeal, it could still be sustained as an order passed pending representation. Here again learned counsel for respondent no. 2 does not appear to be on a firm ground. We may refer to a decision of this court in Haqiqullah v. Niaz Ahmad, 1980 AWC 70 , where the court observed that i "the two jurisdiction viz, the jurisdiction to hear an appeal and the jurisdiction to hear a revision are different and are governed by distinct principles In the instant case the Sessions Judge treated the proceedings before him as an appeal and decided the said proceedings on the said assumption. While disposing of the said proceeding the Sessions Judge did not have in his mind the relevant consideration which apply in a case while deciding a revision. True it is that while hearing an appeal it was open to the Sessions Judge to treat the appeal as a revision and decide the proceedings before him in accordance with the well recognised limitation placed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. He, however, did not do so." 7. The court, therefore, upset the decision of the Sessions Judge. In the present case also different considerations will arise before the appellate authority while deciding an appeal under section 15 (5j or a representation made by a 3rd party before it challenging the grant of permission to develop granted under section 15 (3). Had respondent no. The court, therefore, upset the decision of the Sessions Judge. In the present case also different considerations will arise before the appellate authority while deciding an appeal under section 15 (5j or a representation made by a 3rd party before it challenging the grant of permission to develop granted under section 15 (3). Had respondent no. 2 approached the Chairman, Dehradun Development Authority to treat his application as representation instead of an appeal the position might have been different. However, the Chairman has passed the order in exercise of powers under section 15 (5) and this is what is being assailed by the petitioner. 8. From a perusal of the memo of appeal which is Annexure 5' to the petition, however, it does appear to us that it was basically a memo of grounds of appeal and not a mere representation and, therefore, in the light of what we have said earlier no appeal under section 15 (5) was legally maintainable. This, however, does not mean that if under law respondent no. 2 is otherwise entitled to file any representation before the Chairman he will be debarred from doing it. We, therefore, find substance in the submissions made by the petitioner and for the reasons stated above we are of the opinion that the order dated 21-12-1989 (Annexure 7 to the petition) must be quashed, as being without jurisdiction. We, however, leave it open to the respondent no. 2 to approach the Chairman of Dehradun Development Authority through representation, if such a representation is legally permissible and we have no doubt that the authority concerned will then dispose it of according to law. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2, however, pointed out that the Vice Chairman has also stayed the operation of the sanction but the copy of that order has not been annexed and we are not called upon to adjudicate upon the validity of the same. However, we make it clear that the order that we have passed today is not intended to nullify any order passed by the Vice-Chairman. 10. With these observations the writ petition is allowed- The order dated 21-12-1989 (Annexure 7 to the writ petition) is hereby quashed. Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.