JUDGMENT - B.U. WAHANE, J.:---By this Criminal Appeal No. 150 of 1987, the Union of India through the Assistant Collector, Custom and Central Excise, Division Amravati, Amravati has challenged the acquittal of the respondent Ashok Sukhdeosingh Chavan. The respondent Ashok was tried by Shri Arun D. Kulkarni, Chief Judicial Magistrate Amravti in Criminal Case No. 48 of 1985 Union of India v. Ashok, for the offence under sections 11-C, 11-D, 11-E and 11-F, of the Customs Act, 1962 read with Notified Goods Rules, 1989, punishable under section 15 of the Customs Act. Mr. Natu, the learned Counsel for the appellant Union of India, assailed the acquittal on various grounds. The learned Counsel for the Union of India has argued that the findings given by the learned trial Court are pulpably wrong or manifestly erroneous. So also, he submitted that the reasons given by the learned trial Court are shocking. He also further contended that the reasons given for acquittal by the learned trial Court are not only untenable but perverse and legally erroneous and, therefore, the order of acquittal deserves to be set aside and the respondent be punished according to law. Mr. Natu the learned Counsel for Union of India has argued that the High Court in hearing the appeal against the order of acquittal has full power to review and re-assess the evidence on record and reach its own conclusions upon its estimate of the evidence. 2. In nutshell, the facts leading to the institution of the criminal case against the respondents-accused are as under : The complainant-Union of India on whose behalf the Assistant Collector, Customs and Central Excise, Division Amravti, who is the public servant, has filed the complaint against the respondent Ashok Chavan and the case was registered as Criminal Case No. 48 of 1985. The Collector Custom and Central Excise, Nagpur, has, in exercise of the powers conferred on him under section 137(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 (now called as an "Act"), has authorised the Assistant Collector to file the complaint against the respondent-accused for the offence publishable under section 135 of the Act. 3. In the year 1980-82 the respondent accused was serving as a Manager of M/s. Vikas Watch Corporation, Saroj Chowk, Amravati. On 6-4-1981 Anti Smuggling Squad of Head Quarters Officer, Nagpur had seized contraband wrist watches/and other goods valued at Rs. 3. In the year 1980-82 the respondent accused was serving as a Manager of M/s. Vikas Watch Corporation, Saroj Chowk, Amravati. On 6-4-1981 Anti Smuggling Squad of Head Quarters Officer, Nagpur had seized contraband wrist watches/and other goods valued at Rs. 21,550/- from the possession, custody and control of the respondent accused. Proceedings were instituted against the respondent accused and in the departmental adjudication proceedings, penalty of Rs. 1,000/- was imposed upon the accused. He paid the penalty. 4. The complaint on which basis Criminal Case No. 46 of 1985 was registered, according to the prosecution, is the second offence of the accused. Acting on specific information, the Assistant Collector, Custom and Central Excise, Amravati Division, Amravati , in exercise of the power conferred upon him under section 135 of the Act, issued search warrant on 8-6-1983, authorised Shri V.P. Deshpande, Inspector, Customs and Central Excise, Amravati, to search the residential and business premises of the respondent for the contraband goods or documents and/or any other things relevant to the proceedings which are liable for confiscation under the Customs Act, 1962. The Assistant Collector, Customs and Central Excise further directed Inspector to produce the goods or document or any other things relevant before him for further disposal under the Customs Act, 1962. Shri Deshpande, Inspector, Custom and Central Excise Amravti had searched the residential premises of the accused situated in Ward No. 36, Janardhan Peth, Amravati. The search resulted in recovery of brand new contraband goods of foreign origin to the tune of Rs. 58,690.50. The search was effected in the presence of 2 panchas viz., Ratnakar Mahadeorao Ingle and Manohar Tukaram Ingle. A copy of the search panchanama was given to the accused. Ashok Chavan which bears his signature on the last page of the panchanama (Exh. 9). Similarly, an inventory i.e. list of the contraband goods recovered from the residential premises of the respondent, was prepared. A copy of the same was also given to the respondent which bears his signature. The goods recovered from the residential premises of the respondent-accused are National Panasonic Radio Cassette Recorder, Casettes, Watches, Textile Goods etc. The respondent-accused failed to produce any document before Shri Deshpande, Inspector, Custom and Central Excise to show that the goods seized from his residential premises were legally imported. The goods recovered from the residential premises of the respondent-accused are National Panasonic Radio Cassette Recorder, Casettes, Watches, Textile Goods etc. The respondent-accused failed to produce any document before Shri Deshpande, Inspector, Custom and Central Excise to show that the goods seized from his residential premises were legally imported. As the accused failed to show even any prima facie evidence that the goods seized from his possession are not contraband goods. Consequently those were seized under the panchnama and inventory (Exhs. 9 and 10). 5. Subsequently, statements of the respondent-accused and panchas were recorded under section 108 of the Act. The department also recorded the statements of Ramesh Chavan real brother of respondent accused and of Shri Mahendra, Proprietor M/s. Vikas Watch Corporation. The accused was arrested under section 104 of the Act on 9-6-1983 and was subsequently released on bail by the Court. 6. The department had instituted departmental adjudication proceedings against the respondent-accused. Additional Collector, Custom and Central Excise, Nagpur issued a show cause notice to the accused as to why the goods under seizure should not be confiscated and penalty should be imposed upon him. Thus the accused was given reasonable opportunity for explaining the circumstances regarding confiscation, possession, custody, control and ownership of the goods under seizure. After due consideration an order of confiscation was passed and penalty of Rs. 2,500/- under section 112 of the Act was imposed. The order was passed by Shri R.E. Audin, Additional Collector, Central Excise, Nagpur on 4-2-1985 in Case No. 1/Customs/85 and petty quantity of goods valued at Rs. 750/- at item numbers 19, 25 and 26 as per inventory to the panchanama being found old and of Indian origin, were released. The respondent-accused was also apprised that against this order, the appeal lies under section 129-A of the Customs Act, 1962 to the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal within three months from the date of the order sought to be appealed against. We have been informed and also it is clear from the judgment of the trial Court that no appeal was preferred against the order of confiscation of the goods recovered from the residential premises of the accused. 7. The case of the complainant i.e. Union of India is that the accused-respondent was in conscious possession of the contraband goods in his residential premises where he was living. 7. The case of the complainant i.e. Union of India is that the accused-respondent was in conscious possession of the contraband goods in his residential premises where he was living. Thus, it is said by the Customs Department that the respondent accused was found to be concerned in carrying removing, depositing, has bouring, keeping, concealing, selling or purchasing, circulating, distributing and dealing in the same illicitly and knowingly that these goods were liable for confiscation under section 111 of the Act, thereby the complainant submitted that the accused has committed an offence punishable under section 135 of the Act. 8. The accused abjured the guilt and claimed to be tried. The defence of the accused is that all these goods are not smuggled goods but they are duplicate or counterfeit goods and, therefore, he had committed no offence in breach of the provisions of the Act. Besides this, the accused raised some legal submissions that the issuance of warrant, search, sanction are illegal. The charge was framed against the respondent-accused vide, Exh. 17 and to prove the guilt, the complainant examined 5 witnesses and produced the documents. The learned trial Court, after considering the evidence and documents on record, arrived at the conclusion that the seized goods are not smuggled goods and, therefore, are not offending goods. As the prosecution failed to bring home the guilt to the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the benefit was given to the accused and he was acquitted for the offence under section 135 of the Act. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amravati, also directed the Customs and Excise Department to return the seized goods to the accused after the appeal period is over. 9. Mr. Natu the learned Counsel for Union of India assailing the observations and findings of the learned trial Court, took us through the various provisions of the Act. 10. Mr. De the learned Counsel for the respondent-accused raised the first point that the prosecution must fail for want of proper sanction. Exh. 14 is the order sanctioning prosecution as enjoined by section 137 of the Act. It was issued by the Collector of Customs and Central Excise Nagpur section 137 of the Act bars cognizance without a valid sanction. The order of sanction is assailed on the ground that Exh. Exh. 14 is the order sanctioning prosecution as enjoined by section 137 of the Act. It was issued by the Collector of Customs and Central Excise Nagpur section 137 of the Act bars cognizance without a valid sanction. The order of sanction is assailed on the ground that Exh. 14 does not disclose proper satisfaction on the basis of materials and the materials on which satisfaction was inferred for ordering sanction, were not produced and proved before Court. Without proper and legal sanction, the institution of the criminal proceedings and talking cognizance by the Court is illegal. To substantiate his submissions, he draw our attention to section 137 of the Act which is as under : "Section 137. Cognizance of offences.---(1) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence under section 132, section 133, section 134 or section 135, except with the previous sanction of the Collector of Customs. (2) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence under section 136,- (a) where the offence is alleged to have been committed by an officer of customs not lower in rank than Assistant Collector of Customs, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. (b) where the offence is alleged to have been committed by an officer of customs lower in rank than Assistant Collector of Customs, except, with the previous sanction of the Collector of Customs." 11. Mr. De the learned Counsel for the respondent-accused also relied upon the Delhi High Court case reported in (Y.S. Bawa and others v. Srinivas Jain)1, 1985(2) Crimes 596 and tried to impress upon us that the sanction in the instant case is illegal as a bare reading of the order of sanction would show the total non-application of mind by the sanctioning authority. The sanction order reproduced in the above referred case and the sanction order in the case before us are altogether different. Therefore, this case is not at all applicable in the instant case. Reliance was placed on the case reported in (Boki Shriramulu v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Customs and another)2, 1987 Criminal Law Journal 1382. The learned Single Judge of the Orissa High Court has observed in this case as under : "Under section 137 of the Customs Act, no Court can take cognizance of any offence punishable under sections 132, 133, 134 or 135 except with previous sanction of the Collector of Customs. The learned Single Judge of the Orissa High Court has observed in this case as under : "Under section 137 of the Customs Act, no Court can take cognizance of any offence punishable under sections 132, 133, 134 or 135 except with previous sanction of the Collector of Customs. It is too well known that the sanction contemplated under the aforesaid provisions is not an empty formality and prosecution must establish that facts constituting offence have been considered by the authority before sanctioning prosecution. Further, sanction which itself exhibits non-application of mind is vitiated in the eye of law." The learned Single Judge after perusing Exh. 5 purported to be an order of Collector, Central Excise, observed that :--- "That apart it does not indicate as to what were the materials which reproduced before him on perusal of which he was satisfied as to the necessity of sanctioning the prosecution. Of course, even if the sanction order itself does not indicate the material which were examined by the sanctioning authority, it is open to the prosecution to lead evidence alunde to establish the facts which constituted the offence and the materials which were considered by the sanctioning authority. But here, unfortunately, the sanctioning authority, namely, the Collector, has not been examined." It has been further observed that --- "P.W. 1. Who is the Superintendent of Central Excise, has purported to have proved the sanction under Exh. 5 and according to his evidence, the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, obtained the sanction from the Collector. Even the said Assistant Collector has not been examined to indicate as to what were the material which were produced by him before the Collector on the basis of which he accorded the sanction in question. Thus, neither the sanction order itself discloses nor is there any evidence on record to indicate the materials which were produced before the sanctioning authority and were considered by him and in my view, therefore, the said sanction does not conform to the requirements of law and hence cannot be held to be a valid sanction in the eye of law." 12. Placing heavy reliance on the above observations, Mr. Dey, the learned Counsel for the respondent-accused submitted that the sanction (Exh. 14) alleged to have been accorded by Shri Kashmira Singh, Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Nagpur is illegal. Placing heavy reliance on the above observations, Mr. Dey, the learned Counsel for the respondent-accused submitted that the sanction (Exh. 14) alleged to have been accorded by Shri Kashmira Singh, Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Nagpur is illegal. There is nothing in the order of sanction that what material was placed before the therefore, it is clear that he has not applied his mind. Similarly, P.W. 2 Shri V.M. Mehta, Assistant Collector, Central Excise who only proved Exh. 14 is also silent as to what material was placed before Shri Kashmir Singh, Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Nagpur before passing the order of sanction. Thereby, he submitted that the cognizance taken by the learned trial Judge itself was illegal. 13. Giving our anxious consideration to the submissions of Mr. De the learned Counsel for the respondent-accused, we do not agree. Initially in the case of Orissa High Court (cited supra), the order Exh. 5 purported to be the sanction has not been reproduced and, therefore, it is not possible for us to compare with Exh. 14 the sanction which is before us. We are reproducing the sanction order (Exh. 14) as under : "Whereas it appears from the records of the case and from the facts and materials placed before me that adequate grounds exist for prosecuting Shri Ashok Sukhdeosing Chauhan, Ward No. 2, Janardhan Peth. Amravati (M.S) for offences in relation to the seizure of Contraband Customs Goods valued at Rs. 58,690.50, from his residential premises at Amravati on 8-6-1983; and whereas as per Adjudication Order No. 1/Customs/1985 dated 1-2-1985 passed by the Additional Collector, Central Excise, Nagpur and issued under C. No. VIII (Cus) 10-5/83/Adj/6644 to 48 dated 3-2-1985, the charges framed against the above named have been established; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred on me by section 137(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, I, Kashmira Singh, Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Nagpur hereby accord sanction for filing of complaint by the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Division Amravati, before the competent Court of law for the offence under section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962." 14. Reading the contents of the document purported to be the sanction for prosecution, record of the case and the Adjudication Order No. 1/Customs/1985 dated 1-2-1985 passed by the Additional Collector, Central Excise, Nagpur and issued under C. No. VIII (Cus) 10-5-83/Adj. Reading the contents of the document purported to be the sanction for prosecution, record of the case and the Adjudication Order No. 1/Customs/1985 dated 1-2-1985 passed by the Additional Collector, Central Excise, Nagpur and issued under C. No. VIII (Cus) 10-5-83/Adj. 6644 to 48 dated 5-2-1985 were before the Collector. Exh. 14, the order of sanction for prosecution is dated 30-3-1985. Thus the adjudication order is earlier to the grant of sanction for prosecution. Exh. 14 the order itself shows that the Collector examined the records of the case and the papers of adjudication proceedings placed before him and was satisfied that it is a fit case for sanctioning prosecution. Application of mind is further evidenced by the detailed facts relating to the offence mentioned in Exh. 14. So also it is stated that on perusal of the papers, the Collector of Customs and Central Excise was satisfied that the respondent-accused committed the offence alleged. That is sufficient compliance of the provisions of section 137 of the Act. 15. Sanction for prosecution is undoubtedly not an idle formality. It is a valid protection afforded to public servants as a check against frivolous or vexatious prosecutions. Grant of sanction is a solemn an sacrosanct act which has to be by due application of mind after satisfaction by perusal of the relevant materials. Sanction could be ordered only on proof of certain circumstances which will have to be proved by evidence placed before the sanctioning authority. Satisfaction of the sanctioning authority on the basis of sufficient materials is a fact that has essentially to be proved before Court. It is for the Court to draw a conclusion in that respect on the basis of materials placed before it. Except on a valid sanction, Court cannot assume jurisdiction to try a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Once it is found that there is no valid sanction, the assumption of jurisdiction is illegal because it is a matter affecting jurisdiction of the Court on account of the prohibition contained in section 6 against taking cognizance without sanction. 16. The satisfaction that has to be entertained by the Court regarding the existence of a valid sanction must be on the basis of the materials placed before it by the prosecution. That can be had in two ways. 16. The satisfaction that has to be entertained by the Court regarding the existence of a valid sanction must be on the basis of the materials placed before it by the prosecution. That can be had in two ways. First is by production and proof of the original sanction which itself contains the facts constituting the offence as well as the grounds of satisfaction. Second is by adducing evidence alined to show the facts placed before the sanctioning authority and the satisfaction arrived at by it. In the case before us Exh. 14 itself shows that the sanction was accorded after considering the material on records and being satisfied of the facts constituting the material on records and being satisfied of the facts constituting the offence. Application of the mind is clear from the order itself. Further evidence in that respect is, therefore, not necessary. Such evidence is necessary only in cases where the order of sanction is not self evident. 17. Shri Natu, the learned Counsel for the appellant assailed the findings of the learned trial Court on the point "reasonable belief" envisaged under section 105 of the Act. The learned trial Court has held in para 18 of its judgment that Exh. 8 search warrant under section 105 of the Act was issued by Shri Kaushal, Assistant Collector of Customs and Excise Department on 8-6-1983. Shri Kaushal is not examined by the prosecution. It is not proved under which belief Mr. Kaushal issued the search warrant. As Mr. Kaushal, a material witness not being examined, no evidence was before the Court regarding the 'reasonable belief' on which he issued the search warrant and also prepared his mind about the possession of certain goods which were concealed by the accused in his house. Therefore, the learned trial Court held that the issuance of the search warrant under section 105 of the Act has not been proved. Section 105 of the Act is reproduced herewith. "Section 105. Therefore, the learned trial Court held that the issuance of the search warrant under section 105 of the Act has not been proved. Section 105 of the Act is reproduced herewith. "Section 105. Power to search premises.---(1) if the Assistant Collector of Customs, or in any area adjoining the land frontier or the coast of India an officer of custom specifically empowered by name in this behalf by the Board, has reason to believe that any goods liable to confiscation, or any documents or things which in his opinion will be useful for on relevant to any proceeding under this Act, are secreted in any place, he may authorise any officer of customs to search or may himself search for such goods, documents or things. (2) The provisions of the Code of Criminal procedure, 19\898 (5 of 1898) relating to searches shall, so far as may be, apply to searches under this section subject to the modification that sub-section (5) of section 165 of the said Code shall have effects as it for the word, "Magistrate", wherever it occurs, the word. "Collector of Customs" were substituted." From the reading of definition, it is crystal clear that the Assistant Collector of Customs is empowered and authorised to issue search warrant and further to authorise any officer of Customs to search or may himself search for such goods, documents or things. 18. The officer issuing the search warrant must have a reasonable belief that the person concerned is either in possession, or dealing, selling etc. The 'reasonable belief' being the subjective satisfaction of the officer concerned, he can believe even if there is a complaint or even oral information about the smuggled goods or the person dealing in those goods. The 'reasonable belief' does not mean that the officer concerned must have a personal knowledge or before taking any action regarding the issuance of warrant of search, he should collect the information or data. In the instant case, the search warrant (Exh. 8) issued on 8-6-1983 authorising Shri V.L. Deshpande, Inspector, Customs and Central Excise, Amravti to search the residential and business premises of the respondent accused. The search warrant (Exh. In the instant case, the search warrant (Exh. 8) issued on 8-6-1983 authorising Shri V.L. Deshpande, Inspector, Customs and Central Excise, Amravti to search the residential and business premises of the respondent accused. The search warrant (Exh. 8) dated 8-6-1983 is reproduced below : "Whereas information has been laid before me which is considered to be reliable and I have reasons to believe that goods liable to confiscation under the Customs Act, 1962 or any document or things useful or relevant to the proceedings under the Customs Act, 1962 are secreted in all the residential and business premises of M/s. Ashok Chavan, Janardhan Peth, Amravati. Now, therefore in exercise of the powers conferred upon me under section 105 of the Customs Act, 1962, I authorise and require you to search for the said goods or documents and/or any other thing relevant to the proceedings in all the said residential and business premises of Mr. Ashok Chavan, Janardhan Peth, Amravati, and if found to produce the same forthwith before me for further disposal under the Customs Act, 1962 returning this warrant with an endorsement certifying that you have done under it, immediately upon its execution." Given under my hand and seal of my office, this 8th day of June 1983. 19. Mr. Natu the learned Counsel for the appellant complainant argued that the contents of the search warrant indicate that there was an Information before Shri Koushal, Assistant Collector, Customs, Central Excise which he considered to be reliable and had reason to believe that the goods were liable to be confiscated under the Act which were secreted in the residential and business premises of the respondent accused. In the cross examination of P.W. 1- Shri V.L. Deshpande it has been brought on record that earlier to the alleged seizure of contraband articles from the residential premises of the respondent accused, he was found in possession of smuggled goods and the alleged smuggled goods were found in Vikas Watch Corporation, Saroj Chowk, Amravti. It is clear that besides the secret information which was placed before the Assistant Collector, the department was aware about the earlier activities of the respondent accused and, therefore, there was data for reasonable belief. Similarly, it is not being challenged by the respondent-accused that Shri Deshpande did not seize the articles from his residential premises as per Exhs. It is clear that besides the secret information which was placed before the Assistant Collector, the department was aware about the earlier activities of the respondent accused and, therefore, there was data for reasonable belief. Similarly, it is not being challenged by the respondent-accused that Shri Deshpande did not seize the articles from his residential premises as per Exhs. 9 and 10 panchanama and inventory respectively, the goods which were found to be contraband. Mr. Natu, the learned Counsel for the complainant Union of India invited our attention to the ruling reported in (Venugopalan v. Unnikutty Panicker and others)3, 1977 Criminal Law Journal 1862 wherein it is observed that "the expression reason to believe finds a place both in section 105 of the customs Act relating to search and also in section 110(1) relating to seizure of goods". It has been held in (Ganeshmul Channilal Gandhi and another v. Assistant Collector Bungalore)4, A.I.R. 1968 Mysore 89 that the 'belief' meant there under is a subjective belief on the grounds which he need not disclose and, which was not subject to judicial review'. In the case reported in (R.S. Seth Gopikisan Agarwal v. R. N. Sen, Assistant Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Raipur and others)5, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1298 their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that section 105 of the Act does not compel him to give reasons. Their Lordships further observed as under : "While it may be advisable, and indeed proper, for him to give reasons, the non-mention of reasons in itself does not vitiate the order. Nor can we agree with the appellant that the particulars of the nature of the goods and of the documents should be given in the authorization. Obviously, no question of giving of particulars arises if he himself makes the search, but if he authorises any officer to do so, he cannot give the particulars of the documents, for they will be known only after the search is made. Doubtless he has to indicate broadly the nature of the documents and the goods in regard to which the Officer authorised by him should make a search, for without that his mandate cannot be obeyed. Doubtless he has to indicate broadly the nature of the documents and the goods in regard to which the Officer authorised by him should make a search, for without that his mandate cannot be obeyed. The authorization issued by the Assistant Collector of Customs in this case clearly mentioned that on information received it appeared that the appellant was in possession of contraband goods and documents relating thereto and also describe the office and the residence premises herein those goods and documents would be found. In the circumstances of the case we are satisfied that the specifications are sufficient to enable the officer authorised to make the search." In the case reported in (Pukhraj v. D.R. Kohli, Collector of Central Excise Madhya Pradesh and Vidarbha and another)6, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1559, their Lordships observed as under :--- "After all, when were are dealing with a question as to whether the belief in the mind of the officer who effected the seizure was reasonable or not, we are not sitting in appeal over the decision of the said officer. That we can consider is whether there is ground which prima facie justifies the said reasonable belief." 20. Mr. Natu the learned Counsel for the appellant complainant also relied on a case reported in (State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Borwal and another)7, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1321. Their Lordship discussed what is "reasonable belief" as follows :--- "Where or not the official concerned has seized the article in the 'reasonable belief' that the goods were smuggled goods is not a question on which the Court can sit in appeal. If prima facie there are grounds to justify the belief the Courts have to accept the officer's belief regardless of the fact whether the Court of its own might or might not have entertained the same belief. Whether or not the officer concerned had entertained reasonable belief under the circumstances is not a matter which can be placed under legal microscope, with an over indulgent eye which sees no evil anywhere within the range of its eye sight. The circumstances have to be viewed from the experience eye which officers who is well equiped to interpret circumstance and to form a reasonable belief in the light of the said circumstances." 21. The circumstances have to be viewed from the experience eye which officers who is well equiped to interpret circumstance and to form a reasonable belief in the light of the said circumstances." 21. Reliance was also placed on the case reported in (Indru Ramchand Bharvani and others v. Union of India and others)8, 1988(4) S.C.C. 1 . The relevant observations regarding 'reasonable belief' are in para 16. Considering the earlier view explained by the Supreme Court, their Lordships further observed as :--- "It must be reiterated that the conclusions arrived at by the fact-finding bodies, the Tribunal or the statutory authorities, on the facts, found that cumulative effect or preponderance of evidence cannot be interfered with where the fact-finding body or authority was acted reasonable upon the view which can be taken by any reasonable man, Courts will be reluctant to interfere in such a situation. Where, however, the conclusions of fact finding authority are based on no evidence then the question of law arises and that may be looked into by the Courts.......In any case, once it is held that there was material relevant and germane, the sufficiency of the material is not open to judicial review." 22. On the contrary Mr. Anjan De the learned Counsel for the respondent-accused relied on a decision reported in (M.A. Rasheed and others v. The State of Kerala)9, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2249. It is not a direct case on the subject matter i.e. "reasonable belief" under section 105 of the Act. However in para 7 their Lordships observed as under : "Where powers are conferred on public authorities to exercise, the same when "they are satisfied" or when 'it appears to them", or when 'in their opinion" a certain state of affairs exists; or when powers enable public authorities to take "such action as they think fit" in relation to a subject matter, the courts will not readily defer to the conclusiveness of an executive authority's opinion as to the existence of a matter of law or fact upon which the validity of the exercise of the power is predicted." 23. Mr. De the learned Counsel for the respondent-accused also relied on the case reported in (Union of India v. S.H. Mumtazudding others)10, 1988(2) Crimes 243 . The facts of the case are altogether different from the case before us. Mr. De the learned Counsel for the respondent-accused also relied on the case reported in (Union of India v. S.H. Mumtazudding others)10, 1988(2) Crimes 243 . The facts of the case are altogether different from the case before us. In that case the document which was alleged to be the letter of authorisation was challenged not being written and signed by the person giving authorisation but different personality. So also it was signed in different ink and the person concerned was not examined. Besides this even the officer who conducted the search was not examined. Considering these facts, benefit was given. Thus it is clear that this case is not at applicable. Though R.S. Seth Gopikisan Agarwal's case, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1298 cited (supra) was relied on, the observations laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court have not been followed in correct perspective. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed in that case was follows : "........Section 105 of the Act confers an unguided and arbitrary power on the Assistant Collector of Customs to make a search, the only condition being of the facts mentioned therein. It is said that the said belief is practically a subjective satisfaction and the section neither lays down any policy nor imposes any effective control on his absolute discretion. So stated the argument is attractive, but a deeper scrutiny of the provisions indicates not only a policy but also effective checks on the exercise of the power to search by the Assistant Collector of Customs. The object of the section is to make a search for the goods liable to be confiscated or the documents secreted in any place which are relevant to any proceeding under the Act. The legislative policy reflected in the section is that the search must be in regard to the two categories mentioned therein, namely goods liable to be confiscated and documents relevant to a proceeding under the Act. No doubt, the power can be abused. But that is controlled by other means. Though under the section the Assistant Collector of Customs need not give the reasons, if the existence of belief is questioned in any collateral proceedings, he has to produce relevant evidence to sustain his belief." 24. Mr. De the learned Counsel for the respondent-accused also relied on a decision reported in (Dr. But that is controlled by other means. Though under the section the Assistant Collector of Customs need not give the reasons, if the existence of belief is questioned in any collateral proceedings, he has to produce relevant evidence to sustain his belief." 24. Mr. De the learned Counsel for the respondent-accused also relied on a decision reported in (Dr. Partap Singh and another v. Director of Enforcement, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and others)11, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 989. Their Lordships have discussed the expressions "reasonable belief" in para 10 as under: "The expression 'reason of believe' is not synonymous with subjective satisfaction of the officer. The belief must be held in good faith; it cannot be merely a pretence. In the same case, it was held that it is open to the Court to examine the question whether the reasons for the belief have a regional connection or a relevant bearing to the formation of the belief and are not extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose of the section. To this limited extent the action of the home Income Tax Officer in starting proceedings under section 34 is open to challenge in a Court of law........ "........" The validity of the authorisation was challenged on the ground of mala fide as also on the ground that the authorisation did not expressly employ the phrase 'reason to believe' occurring in section 105 of the Customs Act. Negativing both the contentions, Subbarao, C.J., speaking for the Court observed that the subject underlying section 105 of the Customs Act which confers power for issuing authorization for search of the premises and seizures of incriminating articles for goods liable to be confiscated or documents secreted any place, which are relevant to any proceeding under the Act. The legislative policy reflected in the section is that the search must be in regard to the two categories mentioned in the section. The Court further observed that though under the section, the officer concerned need not give reasons if the existence of belief is questioned in any collateral proceedings he has to produce relevant evidence to sustain belief." 25. Mr. De, the learned Counsel for the respondent-accused also placed reliance on the case reported in (Assistant Controller of Customs for Prevention and others v. The New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd.)12, A.I.R. 1963 Calcutta 91. Mr. De, the learned Counsel for the respondent-accused also placed reliance on the case reported in (Assistant Controller of Customs for Prevention and others v. The New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd.)12, A.I.R. 1963 Calcutta 91. Their Lordships observed in para 13 as under : "The statutory requirement of reasonable belief, rooted in the information in possession of Customs Officer, is to safeguard the citizen from vexatious proceedings. 'Belief' is a mental operation of accepting a fact as true, so, without any fact, no belief can be formed. It is true that it is not necessary for the Assistant Collector of Customs to state reasons for his belief. But if it is challenged that he had no reasons to believe, in that case he must disclose the materials upon which his belief was formed, as it has been held by the Supreme Court in Sheonath Singh's case, reported in A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2451." 26. Considering the proposition laid down by their Lordship of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the officer concerned, giving authorization for search and seizure of the contraband articles need not give reasons for his satisfaction. If the authorising officer's satisfaction of reasonable belief is questioned in any collateral proceedings then only he has to produce relevant evidence to sustain his belief. In the case before us, at no stage the existence of belief was question i.e. in the adjudication proceedings instituted for confiscation of the goods seized, the proceedings which were before the Additional Collector who passed the order on 4-2-1985 as well as in criminal case. Therefore, the cases referred above do not support the respondent accused at all. We are satisfied that there is sufficient compliance of the provisions of section 105 of the Act. The learned trial Court committed an error as the Court has failed to appreciate the evidence, documents and the provisions of section 105 of the Act in true and correct perspective. 27. The judgment of the learned trial Judge is assailed on the ground that the learned Trial Court has arrived at the wrong conclusion that there is no specific evidence with the prosecution to substantiate that the articles sized from the respondent-accused are smuggled and offending goods. It is further argued that the learned Trial Judge misconstrued the principles of burden of proof. It is further argued that the learned Trial Judge misconstrued the principles of burden of proof. There is a difference in respect of the persecution under the penal and other Acts and the cases under the provisions of the Customs Act. The main requirement before taking action under section 123 of the Act is that it is necessary that proper officer should entertain the belief that the goods are liable to confiscation under the Act. The section does not compel the officer to give reasons for that, appearance of the goods, the inscription thereon, inability of the offender, to give proper explanation for the possession of the seized goods etc. are circumstances to be taken into account by the seizing officers to form a reasonable belief under section 123 of the Act. The section does not provide for any particular mode of proof of the existence of the said belief. The belief meant under section 123(1) is a subjective belief on grounds which the officer concerned need not disclose and which are not subject to judicial review. It is the subjective satisfaction of the concerned officials that decides the burden of proof under section 123(1) in respect of articles mentioned in section 123(2). It means the prosecution has to prove the reasonable belief i.e. subjective satisfaction on the basis of the materials, the appearance of the goods, the inscription thereon and inability of the offender to give proper explanation regarding their manufacture and purchase. In the instant case P.W. 1 Shri V.L. Deshpande Inspector of Central Excise who searched and seized the articles from the residential premises vide Exhs. 9 and 10, Panchanama and inventory of the articles respectively, has given the description with their make in the list of Articles (Exh. 10). The perusal of Exh. 10 i.e. inventory indicates that not a single item appears to be of Indian origin. He deposed in para 5 of his deposition that--- "I was working as an Inspector in the said department at Amravati nearly for 5 and half years. During my tenure at Amravati, I nearly seized or arranged the raid nearly for seventy times for seizing smuggling goods." 28. From the evidence of this witness, it is revealed that whatever goods or articles seized from the residential premises of the respondent-accused are of foreign origin. During my tenure at Amravati, I nearly seized or arranged the raid nearly for seventy times for seizing smuggling goods." 28. From the evidence of this witness, it is revealed that whatever goods or articles seized from the residential premises of the respondent-accused are of foreign origin. In para 3 this witness deposed as under : "Then we started the search of the house of the accused. At the beginning, we took the search of first room. We took the search of the steel cupboard which was in the first room. We saw foreign clothes, wrist watches, belts etc. We seized tape recorders, car cassettes recorders, radio cassettes recorders car sterio players, audio cassettes etc., which were found under the cot. All these articles were imported articles. Then we took the search of second room. In one nylon bag, we noticed 125 foreign wrist watches." In the same para he deposed that--- "In all there are 26 articles. I made enquiry with the accused regarding the documents of import accused did not produce any document to that effect. There is a mark of foreign origin and these articles were found in original import packing along with literature. The quality of the goods itself shows that its quality is super quality than Indian make. From my experience, I can identify whether the said goods are imported goods or not." In para 7 P.W. 1 Mr. V.L. Deshpande deposed that--- "I know the same of National Company. It is known as National Panasonic. It is a Japanees Company. This company manufactures tape recorders. This company has no registration in India." 29. P.W. 1 Mr. V.L. Deshpande's attention was attracted showing articles seized from the residential premises of the respondent-accused to which he deposed that--- "I have shown four watches in item No. 10 of the Panchanama. Those three watches are of Ricoh Company. The name of the country 'Japan' is embossed on the dial. ...... Ricoh is Japan Company. In different Customs cases I had an occasion to see such type of Ricoh watches." Similarly he was asked about Seiko Company and he deposed that it is a Japan Company and the watches of this company are manufactured in Japan. It was suggested to P.W. 1 Mr. V.L. Deshpande that 27 watches shown to him are not manufacture in Japan and they are not smuggled goods he denied the suggestion. It was suggested to P.W. 1 Mr. V.L. Deshpande that 27 watches shown to him are not manufacture in Japan and they are not smuggled goods he denied the suggestion. He further specifically deposed that such type of watches are not manufactured in India. Another Panchanama of 28 watches was shown to him and he replied that it is not true that item No. 4 in the Panchanama (Exh. 10) i.e. Wako Auto casette and some other articles which he said of Japan made. 30. Besides the evidence of P.W. 1 Mr. V.L. Deshpande, earlier to the institution of the criminal case, adjudication proceedings were instituted and the Additional Collector, Nagpur after considering the facts and circumstances, reply and statements of the respondent accused and his Counsel, the goods or articles which were seized from his residential premises held of foreign origin except items 19, 25 and 26 of the inventoryand a penalty of Rs. k2500 was imposed and he paid the fine. The respondent accused did not prefer any appeal against the order though he was apprised about the provisions of appeal. Thus sufficient evidence is on record that the articles seized from the residential premises of the respondent-accused are of foreign origin. 31. Section 123 of the Act reads as under,--- "S. 123. Burden of proof in certain cases.---(1) Where any goods to which this section applies are seized under the Act in the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods, the burden of proving that they are not smuggled goods shall be--- (a) in a case where such seizure is made from the possession of any person:-- (i) on the person from whose possession the goods were seized; and (ii) in any person, other than the person from whose possession the goods were seized, claims to be the owner thereof, also on such other person; (b) in any other case, on the person, if any, who claim to be the owner of the goods so seized. (2) This section shall apply to gold, diamonds, manufactures of gold or diamonds, watches, and any other classes of goods which the Central Government may by notification in the official gazette specify." This section deals with the burden of proof in relation to the goods seized under the Act to which the section applies. (2) This section shall apply to gold, diamonds, manufactures of gold or diamonds, watches, and any other classes of goods which the Central Government may by notification in the official gazette specify." This section deals with the burden of proof in relation to the goods seized under the Act to which the section applies. The section provides that where the goods are seized in the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods, the burden of proving the negative shall be on the person from whose possession the goods were seized and also on the person who claims to be the owner thereof. It means under section 123 of the Act, the burden of proving that the goods confiscated were not smuggled goods lies on the person from whom they were recovered. This section does apply in a criminal case also. 32. Considering the overwhelming evidence on record, we are satisfied that the officers concerned rightly entertained belief that the goods seized were smuggled goods and such the belief was a reasonable belief. The ouns is, thus, not on the prosecution to show that the goods are not of Indian origin. Immediately this burden shifts on the respondent accused to establish that the goods seized are not smuggled goods. It is the duty of the respondent-accused to repel the presumption under section 123 of the Act by adducing evidence to show that the origin was not foreign at all and, therefore, the goods could not be held to be smuggled. The respondent-accused simply in his reply said, as well as suggested in the cross-examination that the goods are not of foreign origin. However, he has made no attempt to show that the goods were covered by the permit or license or they have been purchased by him legally without any knowledge as to their foreign origin. In the circumstances, the respondent-accused must be held to have committed an offence under section 111 of the Customs Act. 33. We are constrained to observe that in spite of overwhelming evidence on record regarding the reasonable belief of the officers of the Customs Department to say that excepting the three items, the other items shown in the inventory (Exh. In the circumstances, the respondent-accused must be held to have committed an offence under section 111 of the Customs Act. 33. We are constrained to observe that in spite of overwhelming evidence on record regarding the reasonable belief of the officers of the Customs Department to say that excepting the three items, the other items shown in the inventory (Exh. 10) are of foreign origin and though the respondent-accused failed to repel the presumption under section 123 of the Act, the learned Trial Judge has erroneously held that the prosecution failed to prove that the articles or goods seized from the respondent-accused are of foreign origin. It also appears that the learned Trial Judge has not construed properly the provisions of section 125 of the Act. Once the prosecution establishes even prima facie that the articles or goods seized are of foreign origin or contraband, immediately the burden shifts on the accused-respondent to prove that they are not of foreign origin. This is nothing but non-application of mind. The observations of the learned trial Court, in this regard, are contrary to the evidence and thus perverse. 34. Mr. De, the learned Counsel for the respondent-accused also attacked the statements recorded by P.W. 1 Mr. V.L. Deshpande and P.W. 5 P.C. Deshpande, both Superintendent of Excise Department on the ground that they are not the competent officers under sections 107 and 108 of the Act. Section 107 and 108 of the Act are produced below: "S. 107 Power to examine persons.---(1)Any officer of customs empowered in this behalf by general or special order of the Collector of Customs may, during the course of any enquiry in connection with the smuggling of any goods, (a) require any person to produce or deliver any document or thing relevant to the enquiry; (2) examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case." Section 108 of the Act is reproduced below : "S. 108 Power to summon person to give evidence and produce documents.---(1) Any Gazetted Officer of customs shall have power to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary either to give evidence or to produce a document or any other thing in any inquiry which such officer is making in connection with the smuggling of any goods. (2) A summons to produce documents or other things may be for the production of certain specified documents or things or for the production of all documents of a certain description in the possession or under the control of the person summoned. (3) All persons so summoned shall be bound to attend either in person or by an authorised agent, as such officer may direct; and all persons so summoned shall be bound to state the truth upon any subject respecting which they are examined or make statements and produce such documents and other things as may be required. Provided that the exemption under section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908(5 of 1908) shall be applicable to any requisition for attendance under this section. (4) Even such inquiry as aforesaid shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 and section 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." 35. It is not disputed that P.W. 1 Mr. V.L. Deshpande and P.W. 5 P.C. Deshpande are the Gazetted Officer of the customs and thereby in view of the provisions of this section they are empowered to summon any person whose attendance they consider necessary either to give evidence or to produce a document or any other thing in any inquiry. Therefore, we do not find any force in this submission. 36. Besides the above evidence discussed in the preceding paras, in the statement of respondent accused recorded by the Superintendent of Customs on 8-6-1983 the respondent accused stated that "the foreign articles were seized by the authorities during the search of my residential house, this day 8-6-83 description of which is as mentioned in the inventory memo attached to the panchanama. This incident is true." In the next para he said that "some articles, out of the foreign watches, tape-recorded, cloth and casettes etc. which were seized this day 8-6-83, are mine and some articles were given to me by a salesman from Bombay for selling." Further he stated that --- "Out of the said seized articles, some watches and car stereo of Waco Company are mine. But I am unable to produce its receipts just now. I will search and produce the same. According to my knowledge the car stereo of Waco Company is Indian made. But I am unable to produce its receipts just now. I will search and produce the same. According to my knowledge the car stereo of Waco Company is Indian made. The foreign cloth (Japan Mills) is of my personal use." In the subsequent para, he stated that --- "Regarding other articles I want to say that a salesman named Abdulbhai from Bombay had given me the articles for selling. I do not know address etc. of Abdulbhai. Salesman, Shri Abdulbhai had not given me receipts." Lastly, he has specified that --- "This aforesaid statement has been recorded as per the answers given to the question asked by you. I have read it and found to be correct, as per my version. I have put my signature on the statement in full consciousness." 37. The statements recorded by the Customs Officer are admissible in evidence because they are not police officers within the meaning of section. This aspect has been dealt with by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a case of (Percy Rustomji Basta v. State of Maharashtra)13, 1971(1) Supreme Court Cases, 847. Their Lordships observed in paras 13 and 14 as follows : "13. This Court had to consider in (Romeshchandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal)14, 1969(2) S.C.R. 461 whether an officer of Customs under the Sea Customs Act, 1878 was a police officer and whether the statement made to him were hit by Article 20(3) of the Constitution and inadmissible in evidence under section 25 of the Evidence Act. A further question the also arose whether an officer of Customs acting under the Act is in any event a police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act and hence the confessional statements made to him were inadmissible in evidence. After a consideration of the scheme of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, this Court held that a Customs Officer does not exercise, when inquiring into a suspected infringement of Sea Customs Act, powers of investigation which a police officer may in investigating the commission of an offence and that he is invested with the power to inquire into infringements of the Act primarily for the purpose of adjudicating about forfeiture and penalty. Further it was held that the said officer has no power to investigate an offence triable by a Magistrate and that he can only make a complaint in writing before a competent Magistrate and hence section 25 the Evidence Act has no application. It was further held that the steps taken by the Customs Officer are for the purpose of holding an inquiry under the Sea Customs Act and for adjudging confiscation of goods dutiable or prohibited and imposing penalties and that the Customs Officer does not at all stage accuse the person suspected of infringing the provisions of the Sea Customs Act with the commission of any offence. Finally, if was held that a person examined under section 171-A of the Customs Act does not stand in the character of an accused person inasmuch as there us no formal accusation made against him by any person at that time and hence any statement made by such a person to a Customs Officer is not hit by Article 20(3) of the Constitution." "14. The scheme of the Act was also considered in the said decision and some points of difference between the Act and the Sea Customs Act, 1878 were noted. But not withstanding the slight difference in the power exercised by Customs Officer under the Act, it was held that Customs Officer under the Act is not a Police Officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act. It was emphasised that the proceedings taken by him are the for the purpose of holding an inquiry into suspected cases of smuggling and that the Customs Officer is for all purposes an officer of the Revenue. It was laid down that the Customs Officer under the Act is not a Police Officer the statement made before him by a person who is arrested or against whom an inquiry is made, are not covered by section 25 of the Evidence Act. It was further laid down that until a complaint is filed before a Magistrate the person against whom an inquiry is commenced under the Sea Customs Act does not stand in the character of a person accused of an offence under section 135. It was further laid down that until a complaint is filed before a Magistrate the person against whom an inquiry is commenced under the Sea Customs Act does not stand in the character of a person accused of an offence under section 135. The discussion on this aspect is wound up by this Court as follows :--- ".......The Customs Officer even under the Act of 1962, continues to remain a Revenue Officer primarily concerned with the detection of smuggling and enforcement and levy of proper duty and prevention of entry into India of dutiable goods without payment of duty and of goods of which the entry is prohibited. He does not on that account become either a police officer, nor does the information conveyed by him when the person guilty of an infraction of the law is arrested, amount to making an accusation of an offence against the person so guilty of infraction. Even under the Act of 1962 a formal accusation can only be deemed to be made when a complaint is made before a Magistrate competent to try the person guilty of the infraction under sections 132, 133, 134 and 135 of the Act. Any statement made under sections 107 and 108 of the Customs Act by a person against whom an inquiry is made by a Customs Officer is not a statement made by a person accused of an offence." 38. From this decision it follows that Customs Officer conducting an inquiry under sections 107 and 108 of the Act is not a police officer and a person against whom an inquiry is made and the statement made by such a person in that inquiry "is not a person accused of an offence." 39. The respondent-accused was called by the Superintendent of Customs and Central Excise, Amravati on 8/9 June 1983 for the inquiry which was in progress under section 108 of the Act. The respondent accused gave his statement knowingly that the inquiry is being held against him. The statement given by the respondent accused is not that of an accused of an offence and a person who gave the statement does not stand in the character of an accused person. The respondent accused gave his statement knowingly that the inquiry is being held against him. The statement given by the respondent accused is not that of an accused of an offence and a person who gave the statement does not stand in the character of an accused person. In view of the decision reported in (Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal) , A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 940, the respondent accused when he has made his statement before the Superintendent of Customs and Central Excise, Amravati was not an "accused person". Similarly the officials of the Excise Department as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, not being the police officer, the statement made by the respondent accused before the Superintendent of Customs and Central Excise in the inquiry, such statements are admissible. Similar view has been taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of (Harbansingh Sardar Lenasingh and another v. The State of Maharashtra and others)16, (1972)3 S.C.C. 775 . The observations also relied upon in a case reported in (M.G. Vanugopalan v. Edavil Veetil Govindan and another)17, 1976 Criminal Law Journal 165. 40. P.W. 5 Mr. P.C. Deshpande recorded the statement of Ramesh Sukhdeosingh Chavan brother of respondent accused on 4-7-1983. In this statement he stated that --- "I know that the authorities of Central Excise Department put raid on the house of my younger brother Shri Ashok Sukhdeosing Chavan who resides in my neighbour and seized the foreign property of about Rs. 58,000/- (Fifty Eight thousand rupees)." He further state that --- "My brother Shri Ashok Chavan does the business of selling foreign articles. As I was knowing this, being his elder brother, I told his number of times for not doing the improper business. But he never agreed to my opinion or advice and continued the some practice. Hence, only he came into trouble, on 8th June, 1983." 41. Thus, taking the prosecution evidence as a whole as discussed above, goes to show that there is substance in the submission made by Mr. Natu, the learned Counsel for the appellant that though the prosecution has proved the case against the respondent accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the learned trial Court disposed of the case casting the burden of proof on the complainant and stating that the complainant did not discharge the onus. Natu, the learned Counsel for the appellant that though the prosecution has proved the case against the respondent accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the learned trial Court disposed of the case casting the burden of proof on the complainant and stating that the complainant did not discharge the onus. The learned trial Court also failed to consider the material items of evidence such as statements of the respondent accused recorded by the officers of the Customs Department. It is thus clear that the learned trial Court's approach was erroneous and illegal and therefore, the judgment and the order of acquittal of the respondent accused is hereby set aside and the respondent accused is convicted for the offence punishable under section 135 of the Customs Act. 42. Regarding the sentence, we have learned Mr. De, the learned Counsel for the respondent accused. He submitted that the respondent accused is a man of family with a young wife and a school going daughter of about 7 years ago. He further submitted that the respondent- accused is the only bread earner for the family. The instant offence is the first offence which was lodged in the Criminal Court. It is also brought to our notice that for the last 7 years he is defending this case and he has closed his small shop. Thereby Mr. Dey submitted that the respondent accused be shown leniency and he should not be sent to jail. The case before us is not a case of a person smuggling any articles for personal use or use of friends were concealed in the residential house of the respondent accused, the goods are intended to be sold and this type of violation of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act and the provisions of the Sea Customs Act is on a commercial scale for purveying these goods at fancy prices in clandestine manner. The laws of this country impose restrictions of import of certain articles and prohibit import of certain others after due consideration of National policies, especially in view of its own foreign trade, currency and exchange position. To permit wholesale violation of these restriction and prohibitions exposes national interests to avoidable risks which no citizen has a right to attempt. Such offences are becoming too common and have in a certain sense transcended the limit. To permit wholesale violation of these restriction and prohibitions exposes national interests to avoidable risks which no citizen has a right to attempt. Such offences are becoming too common and have in a certain sense transcended the limit. The scale on which the law has been violated in the instant case clearly demonstrates that the respondent accused is acting for his own benefit. Considering all the aspects, unless deterrent sentences are given, persons who indulge in this type of activity are not deferred from carrying on such large scales flouting of Customs and import and export regulations, as the economic gain made is on a very large scale compared to the sentence of fine and the penalty that may be levied under the Customs Act. 43. Mr. De, the learned Counsel for the respondent -accused while urging for leniency, has taken us through the citations reported in the case of (Inder v. State of Maharashtra)18, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 311 and (Bachchu Lal v. Union of India)19, 1981 Criminal Law Journal 71. The facts of both the cases are altogether different. In those cases the accused were facing cases for more than 10 years and they were also behind the bar. In the instant case, the respondent accused was never behind the bar. It is true that it was the first criminal case which was lodged by the Customs Department against the respondent accused. But the respondent accused earlier to this incident was apprehended by the Customs officials for dealing in contraband articles and he was fined too. In view of these facts, we are not convinced so far as to release the respondent accused on a fine alone. Such offences are increasing and therefore, taking into consideration all the circumstances, we are reluctant to impose only a sentence or fine on the accused. We feel, the ends of justice would meet if the respondent accused is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months. 44. We, therefore, accept the criminal appeal against the acquittal and set aside the judgment and order of the learned trial Court and convict the respondent accused for the offence punishable under section 135 of the Customs Act. The respondent accused is hereby sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months. The respondent accused to surrender to his bail within a period of two months as on the request of Mr. The respondent accused is hereby sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months. The respondent accused to surrender to his bail within a period of two months as on the request of Mr. De, the learned Counsel for the respondent accused two months time has been granted to the respondent accused to surrender. Order accordingly. -----