JUDGMENT 1. - M/s. Gems Builders, Jaipur and its partners as well as M/s. Pushpendra Investment Co. (Pvt. Ltd.) have challenged the various prohibitory orders issued by non-petitioner No. 2, the Addl. District Magistrate (First), Jaipur, by moving this petition u/S. 482 Cr.P.C. 2. During the course of arguments some important questions of law have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned Public Prosecutor. In order to appreciate the real controversy, it is necessary to detail out the necessary facts in brief, which are as follows (i) A multi storied building popularly known as 'Raisar Plaza' is being constructed by the petitioner Firm M/s. Gems Builders, Jaipur at Baba Harischandra Marg, Jaipur. When RCC roofing slab was being laid on the 7th storey of the building it collapsed when it was in process on 11-6-90. In the said accident/incident 4 labourers died and 10 were injured. It is alleged that the structural design and the structural plans of the building were prepared by M/s. Rahul Patel and Company, New Delhi, while architectural design was prepared by M/s. Varunsen & Associates. The construction was being looked after by the Engineers of the Contractor as well as of the petitioner Firm. (ii) On the same day i.e. 11-6-90 the Addl. Distt. Magistrate (non-petitioner No. 2) issued a prohibitory order by which, the entry of the partners and other persons including that of the shopkeepers, who were having shopping centres in the said premises, was prevented. This prohibitory order was extended from time to time by subsequent orders which were also issued by non-petitioner No. 2 u/S. 144 Cr.P.C. On 31-10-90, the non-petitioner No. 2 again issued a prohibitory order u/S. 141 Cr.P.C. to be in force upto 15th Nov., 1990. (iii) The petitioners filed the present petition on 7-11-90 for quashing the order dated 31-10-90 which is Annx. 2 on the file. On 8-11-90, the matter was listed before this Court and a show cause notice was issued to the non-petitioners. The learned Public Prosecutor appeared in the Court and a copy of the petition was supplied to him. A notice of the petition was also issued to the Addl. District Magistrate (non-petitioner No 2) and the case was ordered to be posted in the Court on 13-11-90. The connected record was also ordered to be summoned from the office of Addl. District Magistrate, Jaipur. A notice of the petition was also issued to the Addl. District Magistrate (non-petitioner No 2) and the case was ordered to be posted in the Court on 13-11-90. The connected record was also ordered to be summoned from the office of Addl. District Magistrate, Jaipur. The notice of the application was served on the Addl. District Magistrate, Jaipur on 9-11-90. When the matter was listed in the Court on 13-11-90 then the P.P. sought two days' time to argue the matter and the case was ordered to be listed on 15-11-90. 3. On 15-11-90, during the pendency of the present petition, a fresh prohibitory order u/S. 144 Cr.P.C. was again issued by the Addl. District Magistrate, non-petitioner No. 2, by which, the prohibitory order was extended upto 30th Nov., 1990. 4. When the matter was listed before this Court on 15-11-90, the learned counsel for the petitioners brought to the notice of this Court about issuance of the aforesaid order dated 15-11-90, a copy of which has been placed on the record on 22-11-10. The matter was argued on 15-11-90 and 16-11-90. 5. The connected record of the case was not made available to the Court by the Addl. District Magistrate, Jaipur in spite of the specific order of this Court. During the course of the arguments, the learned Public Prosecutor made a categorical statement that Addl. District Magistrate, Jaipur who was impleaded as non-petitioner No. 2, neither contacted with him nor made the relevant record available to him. He further pointed out that one legal Assistant had met him after the receipt of the notice by non-petitioner No. 2 and he was given instructions to send the relevant record but thereafter, that Legal Assistant also did not contact nor he brought the record. This is really a sorry state of affair that the concerned Addl. District Magistrate has acted in such irresponsible manner in not making the connected record available either to the Court or to the learned Public Prosecutor. We expect some accountability from higher Administrative Officers specially in such an important matter. The Addl. District Magistrate should know that while issuing orders u/S. 144 Cr.P.C. he is not expected to act arbitrarily but by his aforesaid conduct he has given an impression to this Court that he is absolutely unmindful about the proceedings in a court of law. We expect some accountability from higher Administrative Officers specially in such an important matter. The Addl. District Magistrate should know that while issuing orders u/S. 144 Cr.P.C. he is not expected to act arbitrarily but by his aforesaid conduct he has given an impression to this Court that he is absolutely unmindful about the proceedings in a court of law. I have no hesitation in depricating this irresponsible conduct of the Addl. District Magistrate, Jaipur and I record my displeasure. 6. Be that as it may during the course of the arguments the learned counsel for the petitioners, as well as the learned Public Prosecutor have made the following submissions which involved important questions of law:- (i) That the Magistrate acted arbitrarily and without application of mind in issuing prohibitory order/orders u/S. 144 Cr.P.C. (ii) That the petitioners were not served with the orders and they were not provided a proper opportunity of hearing. (iii) That the Magistrate did not hold an enquiry in a judicial manner when the petitioners appeared before him suo moto and placed material on the record to rescind the order. (iv) That Section does not authorise a Magistrate to pass an order/orders so as to enlarge the duration of the orders beyond the period of two months by passing successive orders or renewing the order at the end of every order. Such a procedure is clearly illegal and amounts to an evasion of the expressed provision of law. 7. According to the learned Public Prosecutor the order/orders passed u/S. 144 Cr.P.C. are administrative orders and not judicial order, as such, this Court has no power to entertain any petition u/S. 482 Cr.P.C., and that the Magistrate while acting u/S. 144 Cr.P.C. is not a court. He further submitted that the present petition is not maintainable. He also argued that in any case the satisfaction is of the Magistrate and the court cannot substitute its own satisfaction in order to set aside the order/orders passed by the learned Magistrate. 8. He further submitted that the present petition is not maintainable. He also argued that in any case the satisfaction is of the Magistrate and the court cannot substitute its own satisfaction in order to set aside the order/orders passed by the learned Magistrate. 8. Before considering the above submissions, it is necessary to reproduce Section 144 Cr.P.C. for ready reference (1) In cases where, in the opinion of a District Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, there is sufficient ground for proceeding under this section and immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable, such Magistrate may, by a written order stating the material facts of the case and served in the manner provided by Section 134, direct any person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with respect to certain property in his possession or under his management, if such Magistrate considers that such direction is likely to prevent, or tends to prevent, obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquility, or a riot, or an affray. (2) An order under this section may, in cases of emergency or in cases where the circumstances do not admit of the serving in due time of a notice upon the person against whom the order is directed, be passed ex-parte. (3) An order under this section may be directed to a particular individual, or to persons residing in a particular place or area, or to the public generally when frequenting or visiting a particular place or area. (4) No order under this sect on shall remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof. Provided that, if the State Government considers it necessary so to do for preventing danger to human life, health or safety or for preventing a riot or any affray, it may, by notification, direct that an order made by a Magistrate under this section shall remain in force for such further period not exceeding six months from the date on which the order made by the Magistrate would have, but for such order expired, as it may specify in the said notification. (5) Any Magistrate may either on his own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved, rescind or alter any order made under this section by himself or any Magistrate subordinate to him or by his predecessor-in-office. (6) The State Government, either on its own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved, rescind or alter any order made by it under the proviso to sub-section (4). (7) Where an application under sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) is received the Magistrate or the State Government, as the case may be, shall afford to the applicant an early opportunity of appearing before him or it, either in person or by pleader and showing cause against the order; and if the Magistrate or the State Government, as the case may be, rejects the application wholly or in part, he or it shall record in writing the reasons for so doing." 9. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid section it makes out the following facts quite clear; (i) that this Sec. provides for temporary orders being passed in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger. Before a Magistrate acts under this Sec., he must be satisfied that immediate prevention or speedy remedy is necessary. In fact, it is the urgency of the case that vests the the Magistrate the jurisdiction to exercise the powers conferred by this Sec. (ii) that the orders should be served in the manner provided by Section 134 Cr.P.C. (iii) the Magistrate is not required to decided the disputes of title or possession or the legality of the construction of a building; (iv) that a Magistrate acting even suo moto under this Sec. is a criminal Court. He is further required to hold an enquiry into the circumstances of the case to see if the order is to be rescinded or altered whenever an application is made before him. (v) Sub-Section (4) of Section 144 Cr.P.C. makes it clear that the maximum life of an order/orders passed by a Magistrate can be for two months. The expressed provision of a law cannot be evaded by successive orders to enlarge the duration of the order beyond the period of two months. 10. First of all I would like to deal with the objections raised by the learned Public Prosecutor. The expressed provision of a law cannot be evaded by successive orders to enlarge the duration of the order beyond the period of two months. 10. First of all I would like to deal with the objections raised by the learned Public Prosecutor. In my opinion the argument of the learned P.P. that the order/orders passed u/S. 144 Cr.P.C. are not judicial orders but are administrative orders and that the Magistrate is not a criminal court while acting under this Sec. is absolutely devoid of any merit. In this connection there remains no doubt after an authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (I) A.I.R. 1971 Supreme Court 2486. in which it has been clearly held that proceedings u/S. 144 Cr.P.C. are judicial proceedings and that the Magistrate acting under this Sec. is a criminal court. It is further clear from the aforesaid authority that the High Court has jurisdiction to interfere in any order passed under this Section if a case of interference is made out. Therefore, I repel the argument of the learned Public Prosecutor about the maintainability of the petition u/S. 482 Cr.P.C. 11. From the facts narrated above it is clear that the initial prohibitory order was passed by the learned Magistrate on 11-6-90 which was extended from time to time by subsequent orders. The last order in this connection has been passed on 15th Nov., 1990 and the same has been extended upto 31st (sic 30th) Nov., 1990. Thus the total duration of the prohibitory order/orders u/S. 144 Cr.P.C. from 11-6-90 to 31-10-90 is beyond the period of two months as provided under sub-Section (4) of Section 144 Cr.P.C. 12. From the various orders which have been brought on the record it does not appear that the petitioners were given notice either prior to passing the orders or subsequent to passing the orders as required under sub-Section (1) of Section 144 Cr.P.C. It further appears from the order dated 17-10-90 that the Superintendent of Police, Jaipur City and the Executive Engineer, Public Works Department had issued no objection certificate in the use of the premises in question. The Superintending Engineer in his letter dated 11-10-90 intimated to the Magistrate that he in spected the site on 9-10-90 and he found that the damaged portion of the RCC folded plates have been removed from the site and there was no objection of technical grounds as far as the entry into the building is concerned. It further appears that the petitioners had also submitted the letters of M/s. Rahul Patel & Co. as well as of the architact M/s. Varun Sen & Associates. However, it appears that the learned Magistrate did not hold any enquiry and extended the prohibitory order upto 31-10 90 vide order dated 17-10-90. It is further noteworthy that the learned Magistrate himself provided permission on 24-8-90 to the various shopkeepers and traders to enter into the premises for performing worship on the occasion of Ganesh Chaturthi'. The building was opened for entry on 18th and 19th October, 1990. When the said order was again extended upto 15th Nov., 1990 and the only reason for extension was given that he still was to be satisfied about the safety of the building technically. Then, the order has been extended upto 30-11-90 in a cursory manner. 13. The powers u/S. 144 Cr.P.C., in its very nature are of great emergency and urgency to be exercised temporarily. While exercising the powers u/S. 144 Cr.P.C. the concerned Magistrate is not required to examine the title of the premises, validity or invalidity of the construction of the building. It is further clear that the Addl. Distinct Magistrate have passed various orders ex parte without any prior notice to the petitioners. It also appears that the petitioners were never served with the orders as provided in Section 134 Cr.P.C. It is also clear that the learned Magistrate did not hold any enquiry and he has been extending the period of prohibitory order from time to time. From all it is clear that the learned Addl. District Magistrate did not act in accordance with the provisions of Section 144 Cr.P.C. He failed to appreciate that he powers to be exercised u/S. 144 Cr.P.C were not administrative powers, and he was required to act in a judicial manner strictly in accordance with law. 14. From all it is clear that the learned Addl. District Magistrate did not act in accordance with the provisions of Section 144 Cr.P.C. He failed to appreciate that he powers to be exercised u/S. 144 Cr.P.C were not administrative powers, and he was required to act in a judicial manner strictly in accordance with law. 14. Apart from all that has been stated above a bare reading of Section 145 Cr.P.C. will show that under its sub-Sec (4) no order under this Sec. shall remain in force for more than two months from the date of miking the order. Sub-Section (4) is prohibitory and provides an injunction that an order passed u/S. 144 Cr.P.C. shall not remain in force for more than two month from the date of making thereof. The total time limit and the duration during which an order passed by the Magistrate remains in force is two months This provision is mandatory in nature and it does not authorise any Magistrate to enlarge the duration of the order beyond the period of two months by passing successive order/orders or by renewing the order at the end of every two months. Such a procedure would be invasion on the expressed provision of law. It is also manifest that the law does permit passing of successive prohibitory orders after every 15 days or so. The procedure, laid down in the section makes it clear that even if an order is passed ex parte in case of emergency the Magistrate is required to serve the said order upon the interested person/persons and if any application is made with a prayer to rescind or alter the said order, then to make an inquiry. While holding the inquiry he has to act in a judicial manner and if necessary to take evidence, and then to decide whether the order is to be rescinded or altered. If successive orders are passed after every 15 days or so then the above procedure becomes meaningless. The Apex Court of this country had an occasion to consider this aspect of the matter in Acharya Jagdishwaranand v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta (1983) 4 Supreme Court Cases 522 and it held as under : "It is not disputed before us that the power conferred under this section is intended for immediate prevention of breach of peace or speedy remedy. An order made under this section is to remain valid for two months from the date of its making as provided in sub-section (4) of Section 144. The proviso to sub-section(4) authorises the State Government in case it considers it necessary so to do for preventing danger to human life, health or safety, or for preventing a riot or any affray, to direct by notification that an order made by the Magistrate would have, but for such order, expired. The effect of the proviso, therefore, is that the State Government would be entitled to give the prohibitory order an additional term of life but that would be limited to six months beyond the two months period in terms of sub-section (4) of Section 144 of the Code. Several decisions of different High Courts have rightly taken the view that it is not legitimate to go on making successive orders after earlier orders have lapsed by efflux of time. A Full Bench consisting of the entire Court of 12 Judges in Gopi Mohun Mullick v. Taramoni Chowdhrani , examining the provisions of Section 518 of the Code of 1861 (Correspondent to present Section 144) took the view that such an action was beyond the Magistrate's powers miking of successive orders was disapproved by the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Bishessur Chuckerbutty v. Emperor. Similar view was taken in Swaminatha Madaliar v. Gopal Krishna Naidu, Taturam Sahu v. State of Orissa , Ram Das Gaur v. City Magistrate, Varanasi, and Ram Narain Sah v. Parmeshar Prasad Sah. We have no doubt that the ratio of these decisions represents sub-section (4) of Section 144 which gives the State Government jurisdiction to extend the prohibitory order for a maximum period of six months beyond the life of the order made by the Magistrate is clearly indicative of the position that Parliament never intended the life of an order under Section 144 of the Code to remain in force beyond two months when made by a Magistrate. The scheme of that section does not contemplate repetitive orders and in case the situation so warrants steps have to be taken under other provisions such as Section 107 or Section 145 of the Code when individual disputes are raised and to meet a situation such as here, there are provisions to be found in the Police Act. The scheme of that section does not contemplate repetitive orders and in case the situation so warrants steps have to be taken under other provisions such as Section 107 or Section 145 of the Code when individual disputes are raised and to meet a situation such as here, there are provisions to be found in the Police Act. If repetitive orders are made it would clearly amount to abuse of the power conferred by Section 144 of the Code". 15. After the aforesaid authoritative judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is clear and definite view that an order u/S. 144 of the Code is not intended to be either permanent or semi-permanent in character. If the order/orders passed u/S. 144 Cr.P.C. by the Magistrate, is in violation of sub-Section (4) then such orders have no legal sanctity and this Court is fully competent to quash and set aside the same as being without jurisdiction. 16. In the result, this petition is allowed. The impugned orders u/S. 144 Cr.P.C. passed by the Addl. District Magistrate on 31-10-90 as well as on 15-11-90 are quashed and set aside as being without jurisdiction. 17. Before parting with, I would like that a copy of this order be sent to the Chief Secretary, State of Rajasthan to bring to his notice about the conduct of the Addl. District Magistrate referred above so that he may take necessary action.Petition Allowed. *******