ORDER Srinivasan, J. 1. The petitioner is the same in all the three petitions, They have a common history though the prayers are different. The subject matter in W.P. Nos. 3407 of 1985 and 13236 of 1985 is the same relating to same survey numbers while the subject matter in W.P.No. 12608 of 1985 pertains to another set of lands in the same village. All the lands are situated in Palayakayal village, Srivaikuntam Taluk, Tirunelveli District formerly and now Chidambaranar District. It is necessary and convenient to set out the history in order to appreciate and understand the scope of the controversy in these petitions and decide the same. 2. The petitioner appeared in person and argued his case. As the statements in the affidavits and counter affidavits were disputed, I directed the Government Pleader to produce all the concerned files in Court and I perused the original files themselves. The facts which I am setting out hereunder have been culled out by me from the original files. 3. Ramachandrapuram colony is a Harijan hamlet situated in S.No. 196/1, Palayakayal village abutting Thiruchendur-Tuticorin Highway. The Harijans encroached on S.No. 329 classified as odai poromboke and laid salt pans. At their instance, the Government of Tamil Nadu acquired an extent of 3.03 acres in S.Nos. 195/2, 198/2, 199/2, 219/2, 220/2, 221/2, 335/2B, 336/2, 333/2, 339/1, and 339/2 for the purpose of formation of a pathway from Ramachandrapuram to the saltpans of the Harijans in S.No. 329 as per the award No. 16/58-59 dated 7.8.1958. The Government took possession of the lands on 11-8-1958. The owners of the lands filed a suit O.S.No. 197 of 1958 on the file of the District Munsif s Court, Tuticorin questioning the validity of the acquisitions. The suit was decreed and an appeal by the Government in A.S. No. 211 of 1960 in the District Court, Thirunelveli, ended in dismissal. The Government filed S.A. No. 291 of 1961 in this Court which was also dismissed as withdrawn on 7.4.1961. The withdrawal of the second appeal was pursuant to the directions of the Board of Revenue, Madras in B.P. Misc. 338/61 dated 22.3.1961 as the Court took notice of the facts that the acquisition proceedings were on the heal of litigation and there was an alternate pathway through poromboke lands in S.No. 405 etc. 4. Subsequently, proceedings were initiated to launch fresh acquisition proceedings. 338/61 dated 22.3.1961 as the Court took notice of the facts that the acquisition proceedings were on the heal of litigation and there was an alternate pathway through poromboke lands in S.No. 405 etc. 4. Subsequently, proceedings were initiated to launch fresh acquisition proceedings. The owner of S.No. 219/2 filed a suit O.S.No. 309 of 1960 on the file of the District Munsif s Court, Tuticorin challenging the same and the suit was decreed. Again proceedings were taken afresh for acquisition and the matter reached the stage of draft declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act after an enquiry under Section 5-A. Several land owners issued suit notices under Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure. The Government called for a report from the Collector, Tirunelveli who after local inspection submitted a report on 2.7.1964. In that report, reference is made to three pathways. The first is mentioned as southern approach which was a poromboke pathway already in existence in S.No. 405 and cart track emanating from it and leading to the salt pans through S.Nos. 365, 355, 317/7, 317/5 and 345. There was a metal road upto a distance of five furlongs. The length of the road from the highway to the salt pans is stated to be 1 mile and 3 1/2 furlongs. It is also stated that the Panchayat Union of Srivaikuntam had passed a resolution to restore that portion of the road which had been washed away earlier by floods as it would be a real benefit to the fishermen community. The Panchayat Union had a proposal to put up a road through S.Nos. 365, 355, 317 and 345 to the salt pans. The Collector rejected that pathway on the ground that the Harijans were not willing to accept it and that the cost involved would be very high. The second pathway described as central approach is said to run through S.Nos. 195, 198, 199, 219, 221, 235, 333, 335 and 389. That is the one with reference to which the earlier proceedings for acquisition were taken and held to be void by the civil court at the instance of some of the land owners. Hence, that was also rejected by the Collector. The third pathway is described as northern approach through S.Nos. 185, 210, 211, 212, and 224 etc. That is the one with reference to which the earlier proceedings for acquisition were taken and held to be void by the civil court at the instance of some of the land owners. Hence, that was also rejected by the Collector. The third pathway is described as northern approach through S.Nos. 185, 210, 211, 212, and 224 etc. The Collector recommended acquisition of a total extent of 7.14 acres in those lands on the ground that the Harijans wanted it, the cost of formation of road would be less as there was a private metal road and it would be a shorter route to the salt pans. Along with the report the Collector forwarded a draft notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the said land. 5. A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was published in the gazette on 4.11.1964. The survey number of the land in 185 was by mistake shown as 184. An errata was published on 24.2.1965 suitably amending the notification. In the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act held on 19.4.1965, the owner of a portion of S.No. 560/2 prayed for allotment of an alternative land and the owner of S.Nos. 212/1 and 565/2 prayed for payment of compensation. The persons who were shown as owners of S.Nos. 185/1, 224/1 and portion of 560/2 filed a statement that they had nothing to do with those lands. The village Karnam submitted a report that addresses of the owners of several lands were not available. A few persons only appeared at the enquiry and an objection was raised on the ground that a pathway existed through S.No. 405 etc. The Tahsildar placing reliance on the report of the Collector, dated 2.7.1964 (referred to earlier) recommended the acquisition of the lands mentioned in the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The Government accepted the same and a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was published on 11.5.1966. It has to be mentioned that in the declaration the name of the owner of S.No. 185/1 was shown as Narayana Nadar differing from the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. 6. An award was passed on 7.11.1967. It has to be mentioned that in the declaration the name of the owner of S.No. 185/1 was shown as Narayana Nadar differing from the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. 6. An award was passed on 7.11.1967. Though there is not record available in the file with regard to the actual taking of possession by the Government, it is stated in the counter affidavits in the writ petitions that possession was taken on 27.11.1967. That is also the case of the petitioner. A reference is made in the communication Roc. A. 2464/64 dated 28.12.1967 from the Special Tahsildar (H.W.), Tuticorin to the Inspector of Police, Tuticorin Rural (page 509 of Volume I of the files) to the factum of possession having been taken by the Government on 27.11.1967 after giving due notices to the pattadars of the land and due publication of notice in the village. But, there is no record in the files to prove the taking of possession or the issue or publication of notices to the pattadars. The owner of Survey No. 185, who is the fourth respondent in W.P. No. 13236 of 1986, filed a suit on 1.7.1968 in the court of the District Munsiff, Tuticorin for declaration that the land acquisition proceedings in respect of Survey No. 195/1 of an extent of 65 cents were void, illegal and ultra vires the power vested with the State Government and consequently for an injunction restraining the Government from taking any steps in the proceedings or in the alternative to deliver possession of the suit properties with mesne profits, if possession had been recorded by the defendant. The State of Madras represented by the District Collector, Thirunelveli, was the defendant in the suit. After an elaborate trial, in which the plaintiff examined himself and another witness while the defendant examined four witnesses, the District Munsif decreed the suit on 20.12.1971. During the pendency of the suit, an advocate-commissioner was appointed for inspection of the property. He submitted a report dated 27.10.1970. He referred to the existence of a well-formed metal road in S.No. 405 for about four furlongs from the Highway and a cart-track leading therefrom to Survey No. 317. He found that the distance between the Harijan colony and the salt pan through Survey No. 405 was the same as the distance through Survey No. 185. He referred to the existence of a well-formed metal road in S.No. 405 for about four furlongs from the Highway and a cart-track leading therefrom to Survey No. 317. He found that the distance between the Harijan colony and the salt pan through Survey No. 405 was the same as the distance through Survey No. 185. He also found that it would be more costly for the Government to acquire Survey No. 185 and other lands than to extend the existing road through Survey No. 405 etc., upto Survey No. 329 wherein the salt pans were situated. The Government filed objections to the Commissioner's report. After considering the entire evidence on record the District Munsif found that notice under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act had not been properly served on the plaintiff, the Tahsildar who issued notice under Sections 4(1) and 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act was not conferred with the power to perform the functions of a Collector under the Land Acquisition Act at the time of issuing the notice and the reputed owners were not served with notices under Sections 4(1), 5-A, 9(1), 9(3) and 10 of the Land Acquisition Act. As a result of the said findings the suit was decreed as prayed for. The decree restrained the defendant, i.e., the State Government, by an injunction from taking any steps in the land acquisition proceedings including the taking of possession. Thus, the decree was on the basis that possession was with the plaintiff and he should not be disturbed by the State Government. 7. Thereafter, the Government obtained the opinion of the Government Pleader with regard to the advisability of filing an appeal against the judgment of the District Munsif. The Government Pleader opined that it was not a fit case for appeal as the evidence in the case made out that the relevant notices under the Act were not served on the concerned parties. The opinion of the Government Pleader was accepted by the Board of Revenue in B.P. Rt. No. 4188/1, dated 4.7.1972 by deciding that no appeal need be filed against the said judgment. Thus, the decree in the suit became final with the result that the possession of Survey No. 185 continued to be with the fourth respondent in W.P. 13236 of 1986, who was the plaintiff in that suit. 8. No. 4188/1, dated 4.7.1972 by deciding that no appeal need be filed against the said judgment. Thus, the decree in the suit became final with the result that the possession of Survey No. 185 continued to be with the fourth respondent in W.P. 13236 of 1986, who was the plaintiff in that suit. 8. The Government issued a notification of withdrawal of acquisition in respect of Survey No. 185/ 1 and published it in the Gazette dated 19.3.1975. There was also publication of the said notification by tom tom as well as affixture to the notice board in the Panchayat Office as evident from the endorsement of the Village Munsif of Palayakayal village dated 2.5.1975 made on the reverse of the copy of the notification. (Vide page 1590 of Volume III of the files produced by the Government). The District Harijan Welfare Officer wrote to the Special Tahsildar, Harijan Welfare, Tuticorin, under H6. 38021/72, dated 22.4.1975 requesting him to initiate fresh land acquisition proposals with reference to Survey No. 185/1. However, steps were taken to cancel the sub-division of the land in Survey No. 185 in view of the notification of withdrawal of acquisition proceedings. A communication was also issued by the Special Tahsildar for cancellation of the sub-division in the village accounts and to note the name of the pattadar originally entered in the relevant village accounts before the changes due to acquisition were carried out. The owners of other lands which were the subject matter of the award, issued notices under Section 80; Code of Civil Procedure, threatening to file suits challenging the validity of the acquisition proceedings. As those lands were in the possession of the Government, the Tahsildar was directed to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings with respect to Survey No. 185/1. When such proceeding was, initiated, the fourth respondent in W.P No. 13236 of 1986 presented objection petition to the District Revenue Officer, Tirunelveli. The main objections were that there was a plan marked path way through Survey No. 405 to reach the salt pans, that only 17 Harijans of Ramachandrapuram Colony owned salt pans and that the distance between the colony and the salt pans through Survey No. 185/1 would be more than the distance through Survey No. 405. The District Revenue Officer, Tirunelveli, inspected the lands on 26.6.1976. The District Revenue Officer, Tirunelveli, inspected the lands on 26.6.1976. At that time, the Harijans who owned salt pans in Survey No. 329 were present and they represented that the proposed road through Survey No. 185/1, 210/1, etc. was not convenient to them and the proceedings for acquisition could be dropped. They wanted action to be taken for acquiring Survey Nos. 195/3, 198/ 2 etc, to form a road. Hence, the District Revenue Officer expressed his opinion that it would be waste of Government exchequer to acquire Survey No. 185/1. He inspected the road existing in Survey Nos. 405 and other Survey Numbers. He found that the Harijans of Ramachandrapuram could conveniently go to the salt pans through the road and there was no necessity to initiate any acquisition proceedings. 9. The following passage in his report is very important and relevant: ..Kind reference is solicited to the Topo sketch (enclosed). Two decades have lapsed since the initiation of acquisition proceedings in this case. The situation and the topography have much changed since then. A new road has been formed by catholic missionary under "Wheat for work programme" along S.Nos. 405, 365, 366 etc. and it has been "Handed over to the Panchayat Union for Maintenance. It is learnt that the Panchayat Union has addressed the Divisional Engineer (Rural Road Works) to take over the road for maintenance when once this is done the Harijan beneficiaries will have the best available communication with the salt pans. Secondly the Harijans of Ramachanr drapuram when they go for work in the salt pans use the Cart Track along S.No. 195 etc., for which the owners do not object. Thirdly the road along S.No. 185/1 etc., (Private Road) is mostly used by salt Brokers of Tuticorin for transporting salt from the pans to Tuticorin for export and it is not useful to the Harijans. In fact they have admitted before the District Revenue Officer that they do not want that road (Underlining mine). 10. Hence, the Collector recommended that as a road had already been formed, there was no meaning for acquiring the lands for the same purpose and that the lands already acquired may be reconveyed to the owners. Along with the reports, he sent draft release deeds in duplicate and requested for approval of the same. 11. 10. Hence, the Collector recommended that as a road had already been formed, there was no meaning for acquiring the lands for the same purpose and that the lands already acquired may be reconveyed to the owners. Along with the reports, he sent draft release deeds in duplicate and requested for approval of the same. 11. The report of the Collector was accepted and proceedings were taken for reconveying the lands to pattadars other than the owner of survey No. 185/ 1. Consequently, the Special Revenue Inspector met those pattadars for handing over reconveyance deeds on 14.10.1985. In so far as the fourth respondent in W.P. 13236 of 1986 was concerned, it was decided that no reconveyance deed was necessary as he was already in possession. 12. The first of the writ petitions was filed on 8.4.1985. The prayer therein was to issue a mandamus directing the respondents to keep boundary marks (i.e. to plant sub-division boundary stones) and maintain the same without being disturbed, removed and robbed by unsocial elements in the pathway running through poromboke lands such as Survey Nos. 185,210,- 212, etc., The allegation made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition was that the owners of the lands involved voluntarily donated/gifted the pathway - parts of their Survey Fields. It was alleged that as there was no boundary mark, the public found it difficult to use the pathway. It was also alleged that the fourth respondent herein was collecting from the lorry owners charges for passing through his land along the pathway already formed. That writ petition was admitted on 9.4.1985. The Government filed its counter in March, 1986. A detailed reference was made to the earlier acquisition proceedings, which ultimately culminated in the withdrawal notification issued in 1975. Thereafter, the petitioner filed in W.P. No. 13236 of 1986 in November, 1986 praying for quashing the orders passed in the earlier acquisition proceedings and directing the respondents to restore the said pathway to the salt pans. During the course of arguments, the petitioner referred to W.P. No. 3407 of 1985 as an exploratory writ and after getting the further facts when the Government's counter affidavit was filed therein, the second writ petition was filed. He also described W.P. No. 3407 of 1985 as the mother petition and W.P. No. 13236 of 1986 as the daughter. 13. During the course of arguments, the petitioner referred to W.P. No. 3407 of 1985 as an exploratory writ and after getting the further facts when the Government's counter affidavit was filed therein, the second writ petition was filed. He also described W.P. No. 3407 of 1985 as the mother petition and W.P. No. 13236 of 1986 as the daughter. 13. In between the above two writ petitions, the petitioner filed on 2.12.1985 W.P. No. 12608 of 1985 for issue of a writ of mandamus to maintain the status quo of the lands of the pathway passing through Survey Nos. 195, 198, 199, 219, 220, 221, 335, 336, 333 and 339 of Palayakayal village, which prevailed from May, 1958 to 14.10.1985, that is to say, not to cancel the statutory acquisition of the pathway and reconvey or sell the lands to private (sic) but to keep the lands with the Government as had been done till then. In short, the prayer in W.P. No. 12608 of 1985 is to direct the Government to retain the lands acquired under Award No. 16/58-59 dated 7.8.1958 in spite of the decrees of the civil court declaring the said acquisition proceedings to be null and void. Thus, the petitioner by virtue of the three writ petitions seeks a direction from this Court to the Government to provide two pathways, one through Survey No. 185/ 1, 201, 211, etc., and the other through Survey Nos. 195, 198, 199 etc., But, the entire argument was focussed only on Survey No. 185 and the acquisition thereof, No argument was advanced by the petitioner with reference to W.P. No. 12608 of 1985. 14. The first contention of the petitioner is that the decree passed by the court of District Munsif, Tuticorin, in O.S. No. 279 of 1968 is a nullity and the acquisition proceedings taken by the Government which culminated in the award dated 7.11.1967 continued to be valid. The reasons adduced by the petitioner in support of the said contention are as follows: (1) The suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. (2) The suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties viz., Subramania Nadar and Ramachandra Nadar, who were the real owners of the property but who had got the patta transferred in favour of the fourth respondent herein without any consideration therefor. (2) The suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties viz., Subramania Nadar and Ramachandra Nadar, who were the real owners of the property but who had got the patta transferred in favour of the fourth respondent herein without any consideration therefor. (3) The suit was barred by limitation, but the District Munsif had overlooked the same and passed a decree. (4) The award passed in the acquisition proceedings was not proved to be a nullity in the suit. (5) The decree in the suit did not relate to the relevant award, as the plaint gave the date of the award as 10.11.1967 whereas the relevant award was passed on 7.11.1967. (6) There was no prayer in the suit for declaration that the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was void and there was no decree to that effect. (7) Copy of the award was not marked as an exhibit and the crucial witnesses were not examined in that case. 15. The petitioner referred to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Saibesh Chandra Sarkar v. Bijaychand Mohatop Bahadur A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 4, wherein it was held that the Land Acquisition Act created a special jurisdiction and provided a special remedy and a person who was dissatisfied with the award was bound to apply for reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and could not maintain a suit in the ordinary civil court. The petitioner also invited my attention to another judgment of the same court in Jivandas Khimji v. Smt. Narbada Bai. In the case it was held that the plaintiff could not get any relief in the suit for declaration and injunction to restrain the defendant from infringing her right to easement of light and air, as she had not shown the award in the land acquisition proceedings to be a nullity. 16. None of the reasons given by the petitioner is acceptable on the facts of this case. The suit O.S. No. 298 of 1969 was for declaration that the land acquisition proceedings were void, illegal and ultra vires the powers vested in the defendant and for consequential injunction. 16. None of the reasons given by the petitioner is acceptable on the facts of this case. The suit O.S. No. 298 of 1969 was for declaration that the land acquisition proceedings were void, illegal and ultra vires the powers vested in the defendant and for consequential injunction. Even the judgment cited by the petitioner in Jivandas Khimji v. Smt. Narbada Bai had recognised that position and it was held that the existence of special procedure for correcting errors in the award by a reference under Section 18 was no bar to the maintainability of the suit, which was one for declaration and injunction on the basis that the award under the Act was a nullity. The suit filed by the fourth respondent herein was on the basis that the award was a nullity. Hence, the suit was maintainable. None of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act barred the suit as such. The suit was hotly contested by the Government and a decree was passed only after the entire evidence was considered. The alleged failure of the Government to let in sufficient evidence to satisfy the Court that the proceedings were properly conducted, is not a matter which can be canvassed in these writ petitions. Even assuming that the Government failed to place the relevant evidence before the Court, that would not make the decree a nullity and the only way in which the decree could be challenged was to file an appeal against the same. The Government thought fit not to file an appeal on the facts and circumstances of the case. Just because a copy of the award was not filed, the decree would not be a nullity. Nor the fact that a mistake was committed in mentioning the date of the award would vitiate the decree. There can be no doubt whatever that the suit related only to the relevant award pertaining to Survey No. 185. As the entire acquisition proceedings were challenged, there was no necessity for a prayer that the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act should be declared to be invalid. There is no substance in the plea of non-joinder of necessary parties. As the entire acquisition proceedings were challenged, there was no necessity for a prayer that the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act should be declared to be invalid. There is no substance in the plea of non-joinder of necessary parties. The question whether Sivasubramania Nadar and Ramachandra Nadar were the real owners and that the name of the fourth respondent herein was entered in the registers as the owner of the land without his obtaining a proper conveyance thereof cannot be gone into in these proceedings. The files produced by the Government show that the fourth respondent herein was the registered owner of the land. Even at the very first instance Sivasubramania Nadar and Ramachandra Nadar had informed the Officer who conducted the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act that they had nothing to do with the land. In spite of that, the proceedings went on without rectifying the defect and only when a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was made, the name of the fourth respondent herein was included. The judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Saibesh Chandra Sarkar v. Bijoychand Mohatop Bahadur A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 4 has no applicability to this case. The other judgment referred to by the petitioner is really against him. This Court cannot go into the question whether the award was proved to be a nullity or not. The District Munsif, Tuticorin, was competent to decide that question and he had come to a conclusion on the evidence placed before him. The finding of the District Munsif cannot be canvassed in a writ petition and that too after nearly 14 years. 17. The petitioner laid considerable stress on the question of limitation. According to him, the suit which was filed on 1.7.1968 was barred by limitation as it was not filed within a period of three years from 29.9.1964, which was the date of approval by the Government of the draft notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. I do not agree with the said contention. There will be no question of bar of limitation by lapse of three years for a suit for declaration that the entire land acquisition proceeding was nullity. The publication of the notification itself was only on 4.11.1964. I do not agree with the said contention. There will be no question of bar of limitation by lapse of three years for a suit for declaration that the entire land acquisition proceeding was nullity. The publication of the notification itself was only on 4.11.1964. The proceedings which followed were not in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules and that was the ground of challenge in the civil Court. The cause of action for the suit can be said to have arisen only on the making of the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. That declaration was published on 11.5.1966 only. The fourth respondent was aggrieved only by such declaration as it could not be said until then that the Government would acquire his land. Any person whose land is sought to be acquired is notified conclusively by the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act that his land would be acquired and then only he could have a cause of action to question the same. It is only at that stage, he can be said to be affected by the land acquisition proceedings. Hence, by no stretch of imagination it can be contended in this case that the cause of action for the suit arose for the fourth respondent herein even before 11.5.1966. I am of the view that the suit O.S. No. 279 of 1968 was Well within time and did not suffer by bar of limitation. 18. Learned Counsel for the respondents contended that even assuming that the suit was barred by limitation, the decree is not a nullity. He placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey, and Anr. It was held in that case that where a Court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter and over the parties thereto passes a decree, it cannot be treated as a nullity and ignored in subsequent litigation even if the suit was one barred by time. Hence, the contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted. 19. The second contention urged by the petitioner is that the notification of withdrawal of acquisition proceedings issued on 24.2.1975 is not a valid one. It will be necessary to consider this contention only if the first contention of the petitioner is accepted. Hence, the contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted. 19. The second contention urged by the petitioner is that the notification of withdrawal of acquisition proceedings issued on 24.2.1975 is not a valid one. It will be necessary to consider this contention only if the first contention of the petitioner is accepted. Once it is held that the decree passed in the civil suit is not a valid one, the land acquisition proceedings having been declared to be null and void by the said decree, there was no necessity at all for a separate notification by the Government withdrawing the acquisition proceedings. Consequently, it would not be necessary for me to consider this contention also. But, the Government took a precautionary step in making and publishing a notification withdrawing the acquisition proceeding relating to Survey No. 185/1. As detailed arguments have been advanced by the petitioner, I think it better to refer to the same and dispose of that contention also. 20. The reasons given by the petitioner in support of this contention are the following: (1) The Government had no power to withdraw the acquisition proceedings after taking possession of the land on 27.11.1967, in view of the provisions of Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken, except in the case provided for in Section 36. The petitioner's contention is that possession had been taken on 27.11.1967 in this case and the Government had no power to withdraw. I have already referred to the decree in the civil suit filed by the fourth respondent herein restraining the Government by an injunction "from taking any steps in land acquisition proceedings including the taking of possession. I have also referred to the fact that there is no record among the files produced by the Government to prove that possession was actually taken. After the decree in the suit, the Government could proceed only on the footing that possession was with the owner of the land. Hence, the contention that there could be no withdrawal notification as possession had been taken is fallacious. (2) The second reason given by the petitioner is the notification of withdrawal does not contain any reason for withdrawing the proceeding and therefore it is vitiated. Hence, the contention that there could be no withdrawal notification as possession had been taken is fallacious. (2) The second reason given by the petitioner is the notification of withdrawal does not contain any reason for withdrawing the proceeding and therefore it is vitiated. This reason is also unacceptable as there is no provision in the Act that a notification of withdrawal should be supported by reasons apparent on the face of it. On the facts of this case, the reason for issue of withdrawal notification is amply clear. (3) The third reason given by the petitioner is that the notification of withdrawal refers only to the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act published on 4.11.1964 which referred only to Survey No. 184/1 and not Survey No. 185/1. According to the petitioner, inasmuch as the notification of withdrawal has not made any reference to the errata published on 24.2.1965 amending the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act by substituting Survey No. 185 for Survey No. 184, the withdrawal notification cannot be said to relate to the fourth respondent's land in Survey No. 185. There is absolutely no substance in this contention. It is no doubt true that the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act originally mentioned Survey No. 184. When the mistake was discovered, an errata was published in February, 1965 substituting Survey No. 185 for Survey No. 184. The effect of the errata is only that the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act related to Survey No. 185 and not to Survey No. 184. When the notification for withdrawal was published in 1975, it was not necessary to refer to the errata. The reference to the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act would only mean that it referred to the notification as it stood amended after the publication of the errata. (4) The next reason urged by the petitioner is that the particulars mentioned in the schedule to the withdrawal notification dated 24.2.1975 differ from the particulars mentioned in the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act dated 29.9.1964. It is seen that in the original notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, the name of the fourth respondent herein did not find a place. It is seen that in the original notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, the name of the fourth respondent herein did not find a place. His name was introduced only in the declaration under Section 6 of the Act as by that time it was pointed out to the authorities concerned that he was the Owner of the land and not the persons whose names found place in the notification. Hence, there is nothing wrong in including the name of the fourth respondent herein in the schedule to the notification of withdrawal. That will not vitiate the withdrawal notification in any manner. (5) The next contention is that the withdrawal notification is vitiated by mala fides and it was an abuse of power on the part of the Government. The argument is that 18 lands were sought to be acquired and all the owners of 17 of them had consented for the acquisition. The withdrawal was for the purpose of benefiting one individual who was one of the owners of 18 lands viz., Survey No. 185. According to, the petitioner, there was a private road running through Survey No. 185 as well as the other 17 lands sought to be acquired and by excluding Survey No. 185 from the acquisition proceedings, the purpose of the acquisition would be defeated even though the need for acquisition continued to exist as the Harijans of Ramachandrapuram Colony wanted that road for transporting the salt obtained from their salt pans. This reasoning is based on a factual misconception. In the first place it has to be noted that the withdrawal was not a voluntary act on the part of the Government, but it was a consequence to the decree passed by the civil Court. Secondly, there is nothing on record to show that the Harijans of Ramachandrapuram Colony wanted to have this road in particular. On the other hand, the materials on record are to the effect that they wanted only the road going through Survey Nos. 195, 198 etc. Thirdly, a pucca road had been formed through Survey No. 405 by the Catholic Missionary under "Wheat for work Programme" and handed over to the Panchayat Union already. It cannot, therefore, be said that the need for the road through Survey No. 185 and other lands continued to exist when the notification of withdrawal was made. 195, 198 etc. Thirdly, a pucca road had been formed through Survey No. 405 by the Catholic Missionary under "Wheat for work Programme" and handed over to the Panchayat Union already. It cannot, therefore, be said that the need for the road through Survey No. 185 and other lands continued to exist when the notification of withdrawal was made. There is nothing on record to prove that the concerned authorities had acted mala fide. There is no basis for the contention that the withdrawal notification was made to benefit one individual viz., the fourth respondent herein. I have already referred to the fact that when the Government sought to revive the acquisition proceedings, number of land owners objected thereto and that was why the District Revenue Officer was deputed to inspect the land and file a report. It culminated in the report dated 20.11.1976 in which there was a clear recommendation to drop the proceedings for acquisition and reconvey the lands already acquired. As regards the said report itself, the petitioner contended that the report was directly contrary to the report the Collector submitted on 2.7.1964. According to the petitioner, the facts as stated in the report dated 2.7.1964 should be accepted and the later report of 20.11.1976 should be rejected. It is also his contention that the very fact that there is a contradiction between the two reports proves mala fides on the part of the concerned officials. This argument is also unsustainable. There has been a gap of more than 12 years between the two reports. The situation which prevailed in 1964 altered to a large extent in 1976. While in 1964, file road through Survey No. 405 was not fully formed and there was a well formed road only upto a length of four furlongs, in 1976 there was a completed road from the highway to the salt pans formed by the Catholic Missionary and placed at the disposal of the Panchayat Union. Apart from that, it cannot be said that the report dated 2.7.1964 submitted by the Collector of Thirunelveli should be accepted as containing the correct facts as on that date. In the said report, the Collector having suggested against initiating fresh proceedings for the acquisition of Survey Nos. 195, 198 etc., the total extent of which was only 3.03 acres, suggested the acquisition of 7.14 acres approximately in Survey Nos. In the said report, the Collector having suggested against initiating fresh proceedings for the acquisition of Survey Nos. 195, 198 etc., the total extent of which was only 3.03 acres, suggested the acquisition of 7.14 acres approximately in Survey Nos. 185, 210 etc., which was undoubtedly more costly. But, curiously, the report said that the cost of formation of the road would be much less as there was a private road already in existence. That report overlooked the cost of acquisition of a larger extent of land. Moreover, the report also ignored the fact that the distance between Ramachandrapuram Colony and the salt pans via Survey No. 405 etc., was the same as the distance through Survey No. 185 etc. The advocate-Commissioner appointed by the District Munsif, Tuticorin in O.S. No. 279 of 1968 inspected the land on 25.10.1970 and opined that the extension of the road running through Survey No. 405 etc., upto the salt pans would be considerably less expensive than acquisition of lands in Survey No. 185 etc., for forming the road. Hence, it is not possible to accept the Collector's report of the year 1964 as the final word on the subject and hold that the later report of the District Revenue Officer in the year 1976 is vitiated by mala fides. (6) The sixth contention urged by the petitioner is that while the acquisition was for public purpose, the notification of withdrawal helped a private purpose and, therefore, it was bad. This contention is only to be stated to be rejected. There is no merit in the same in view of the facts of the case already referred to. (7) (i) The seventh contention of the petitioner is that the District Harijan Welfare Officer had requested the Special Tahsildar, Harijan Welfare, Tuticorin, to initiate fresh land acquisition proposals with reference to Survey No. 185/1 by his letter dated 22.4.1975 in H6.38021/72 and the District Revenue Officer had no right to recommend in his report dated 20.11.1976 that the proceedings for acquisition should be dropped. This reasoning is also fallacious. The Government is certainly entitled to consider the question whether acquisition proceedings should be initiated once again and for that purpose a report was called for. This reasoning is also fallacious. The Government is certainly entitled to consider the question whether acquisition proceedings should be initiated once again and for that purpose a report was called for. The District Revenue Officer's report refers to the representation made by the Harijans of the Colony that they did not want the road through Survey No. 185, but they were keen only in having the road through Survey No. 195 etc. There is no question of want of jurisdiction on the part of the District Revenue Officer to submit a report as to what he saw and what he heard. (ii) As rightly pointed out by learned Counsel for the respondents, the authority to decide is only the Government and any report of any subordinate official is not binding on the Government. When the Government had decided to drop the acquisition proceedings there is no use of imputation of mala fides as against the subordinate officials. Learned Counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the following decisions: (a) Abdul Hussa in Tayabali etc. v. The State of Gujarat and Ors. , (b) Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v. Governor of Delhi , and (c) The Special Land Acquisition Officer Bombay v. Godrej and Boyce . It has been held in those cases that the Government is the ultimate authority to decide on the question. Of acquisition and it has a discretion in the matter of withdrawal of land acquisition proceedings. Learned Counsel drew my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath Bahl v. The State of Punjab, in which it was held that in a case where the decision rests with the Government, the intention and actions of the Government are to be considered and not that of the subordinate officials. The petitioner relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab and submitted that when a Court is satisfied that there is an abuse or misuse of power, it is incumbent on the Court to afford justice to the individual. I am of the view that the proposition of law does not apply to the facts of this case. I am convinced that there is no abuse or misuse of power by the Government in this case. The petitioner invited my attention to the judgment in Chandra Absi Singh v. State of Bihar . I am of the view that the proposition of law does not apply to the facts of this case. I am convinced that there is no abuse or misuse of power by the Government in this case. The petitioner invited my attention to the judgment in Chandra Absi Singh v. State of Bihar . He placed reliance on paragraphs 8 and 9 of the judgment which read as follows: 8. The sheet anchor of the arguments of the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 9973 of 1983, which is by special leave, was that the entire "acquisition proceedings and the orders passed by the Collector acquiring the land became non est as they were violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was contended that there was no justification for the Government to have released a portion of the land, viz., 40.03 acres. However small a fraction of the main land, it was merely to favour a particular set of individuals, viz., Pandey families, who are alleged to have exercised very great influence on the Government of the time and that was done only to help one single body of persons without any reasonable classification or nexus to the object of the Notification. The release of land belonging to Pandey families was supported by the Government on the ground that as they had put up large buildings with boundary walls in the entire area covered by 4.03 acres, it would have been rather difficult for the Government to demolish the said constructions thereon. In order to repel this argument, unimpeachable materials were produced before us to show that the plea of huge buildings or houses situated on the land of Pandey families was a complete hoax or a false pretext, in order to enable the Collector to "withdraw the acquisition of this particular land. On examining the materials, which have not been denied by the Pandey families, we find that the contentions of the appellants are sound and must prevail. We have been shown photographs of the lands of Pandey families, which appear at page 120 of the Paperbook, which shows that there are no huge buildings or houses but only small hutments, perhaps used for keeping a tubewell to water the fields. The plot in question is No. 3114 which belongs to Pandey families. We have been shown photographs of the lands of Pandey families, which appear at page 120 of the Paperbook, which shows that there are no huge buildings or houses but only small hutments, perhaps used for keeping a tubewell to water the fields. The plot in question is No. 3114 which belongs to Pandey families. On page 121 there is another photograph which shows small hut in the plot owned by the Pandey families. On the other hand, amongst the lands acquired and not withdrawn from acquisition is a plot owned by one Deo Narain Singh, in which stands a two-storyed structure which also is meant for the purpose of keeping cattle or watchmen to look after the field. Even so, if the plea of Pandey families was to be accepted then there was a much superior claim of Deo Narain Singh for release of his land also. 9. Neither the photographs referred to above nor the fact that no structure except the one shown in the photograph which "had been built by the Pandey families, has been disputed before us. It was, therefore, rightly argued by counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 9973 of 1983 that the release of land in favour of the Pandey families was a pure and simple act of favourtism without there being any legal or constitutional justification for the same. The State also was not in a position either to rebut or support the release of the lands in question. We might also mention that although notice had been issued and served on the Pandey families yet they did not appear in this Court to support their claim. Hence, there does not appear to be any serious dispute between the parties that the order of release passed by the Government under Section 48 of the Act was non est as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The facts of this case are entirely different and the ruling of the Court has no bearing in this case. 20. The petitioner cited the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Jai Narin v. The Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi A.I.R. Delhi 166. The facts of this case are entirely different and the ruling of the Court has no bearing in this case. 20. The petitioner cited the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Jai Narin v. The Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi A.I.R. Delhi 166. It was held therein that where after the issue of declaration for acquiring land under Section 6, the Government by subsequent declaration under Section 6 withdraws the land from acquisition under Section 48, the notification under Section 4 on the basis of which the land was being acquired exhausts itself and if the Government wishes to acquire the land again it must act in accordance with the provisions of Sections 4 to 8. I am at a loss to understand how this judgment helps the petitioner in this case. It has no relevance whatever to this case. 21. The petitioner relied on the ruling of the Supreme Court in Stale of Gujarat v. Bhogilal Keshavlal , wherein it was held that when a notification issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was invalid, the Government was not precluded from issuing a second notification by cancelling the earlier invalid notification. He referred also to the judgment of a Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Government Employees Sarvodaya Co-operative House Buildings Society Ltd., New Delhi v. Union of India A.I.R. 1982 Delhi 362. In that case it was held that where the notification for acquisition of land under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act for housing scheme issued by the Government by resorting to Section 17 of the Act and dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A on ground of urgency were declared invalid and illegal on ground that resort to Section 17 was not proper as no urgency was established, there was nothing to stop the Government from reacquiring the land if it was needed for a housing scheme by following the prescribed procedure. Neither of the decisions is applicable to the present case. It is only to be noted that on the facts of those cases, there was a proceeding for reacquisition, the validity of which was upheld. 22. Neither of the decisions is applicable to the present case. It is only to be noted that on the facts of those cases, there was a proceeding for reacquisition, the validity of which was upheld. 22. It is argued by the petitioner that the fourth respondent was collecting toll from lorries which passed through his land for using the private metal road already existing in his land and by the withdrawal of the acquisition proceedings, he was only enabled by the Government to continue to make such collections. This contention has no relevance in the present case. The case with which the petitioner has come to this Court is that the Harijans of Ramachandrapuram Colony have been deprived of the use of a road which is "direct, nearest, easiest and most economical route" to their salt pans and the case stands negatived by the report of the District Revenue Officer dated 20.11.1976 to which I have already made a detailed reference. It is not open to the petitioner to switch over to the case of wealthy industrialists who transport salt in lorries leaving that of the poor Harijans. At one stage of the arguments, the petitioner stated that he did not know as to who collected tolls from the lorry owners. Apart from that, if the validity of the notification of withdrawal of acquisition is upheld, the question whether the fourth respondent will be able to charge a fee from persons who utilise a part of his land as a road, is not a matter with which this Court is concerned. I have already said enough to hold that the notification of withdrawal of acquisition is hot in any way vitiated by any mala fide or abuse of power. 23. The petitioner placed reliance also on the fact that immediately after the award in 1967, the land was shown in the Field Measurement Books and the village accounts as "Padhai punjai patta land" and it continued to be so till 1985. I am of the view that nothing turns on that as the entry in the village account was only consequential to the award. I am of the view that nothing turns on that as the entry in the village account was only consequential to the award. I have already referred to the fact that after the publication of the withdrawal notice, the Special Tahsildar gave instructions by his communication dated 2.5.1975 to note the fact of the cancellation of sub-division in respect of the land in Survey No. 185 in the village accounts and to note the name of the pattadar originally entered before the changes made due to the acquisition proceedings. If the concerned authority had not carried out the changes as directed by the Special Tahsildar, that will not deprive (he fourth respondent of the ownership of the land. 24. The petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Jatadhar Mitra v. State of West Bengal A.I.R. 1970 Cal. 90. It was held in that case that an acquisition for the purpose of putting up quarters for members of the teaching staff in the schools situated adjacent to the land proposed to be acquired was valid, as in the circumstances of the case, the purpose could be said to be a public purpose. That judgment has nothing to do with the present case. 25. The petitioner also cited the following judgments which lay down the general principles of law governing issue of writ of certiorari: (a) T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa ; (b) Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmed Ishaque and Ors. ; (c) Bhargavan v. Abdul Majeed and (d) M.R. Balaji v. The Mysore State Chathada Sri Vaishnava Association. None of the decisions will apply to the facts of this case and hence, I am not making any detailed reference thereto. 26. In the course of arguments, the petitioner submitted that a portion of Survey No. 185 was acquired in 1973 for the purposes of the Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board and no objection was raised by the fourth respondent herein. I do not understand the relevance thereof to the present proceedings. 27. The petitioner has filed W.M.P. Nos. 15743 and 16638 of 1989 for amendment of the prayer in W.P. No. 13236 of 1986. The amendments only reflect the contentions urged by the petitioner in the writ petition. I do not find any reason to reject the applications. I do not understand the relevance thereof to the present proceedings. 27. The petitioner has filed W.M.P. Nos. 15743 and 16638 of 1989 for amendment of the prayer in W.P. No. 13236 of 1986. The amendments only reflect the contentions urged by the petitioner in the writ petition. I do not find any reason to reject the applications. In fact, I directed the, petitioner to argue on the basis that amendment applications have been ordered. The scope of the arguments did not change on account of the amendments. 28. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the writ petitions should be dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in approaching this Court. He placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gian Singh Mann v. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana. In that case, a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was filed about eleven years after the date on which promotions were claimed. The Court held that such inordinate delay could not be overlooked on ground that the petitioner was making successive representations to Department. Learned Counsel drew my attention to the fact that the notification of withdrawal of acquisition was published in the locality by tom tom and affixture in the notice board of the Panchayat Office and submitted that there is no explanation on the part of the petitioner in coming to this Court after a period of ten years and odd. The petitioner's answer to this contention that the notification of withdrawal was in English and the local people are not acquainted with the said language has no substance. When the notification was published by tom in the village, it would have been done only in Tamil in the normal course. There is considerable force in the submission made by learned Counsel for the respondents that the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed on the ground of delay. But, I have already found on the merits that there is no substance in the writ petitions. Hence, it is not necessary for me to rest my conclusion on the delay in filing the writ petitions. 29. But, I have already found on the merits that there is no substance in the writ petitions. Hence, it is not necessary for me to rest my conclusion on the delay in filing the writ petitions. 29. It is next urged by learned Counsel for the respondents that virtually the prayer in the writ petitions is for a direction to the Government to acquire the land belonging to the fourth respondent and such a prayer cannot be entertained. He referred to an unreported judgment of this Court in W.P. No. 1019 of 1965. Kailasam, J. by his judgment dated 30.3.1966 held in that case that the petitioner therein was not entitled to a writ of mandamus directing the Government to proceed with the acquisition as per the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. He also relied oh the judgment of the Supreme Court in The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bombay v. Godrej and Boyce , to which I have already made a reference, wherein it was held that withdrawal from acquisition is entirely in the discretion of the Government. Learned Counsel submitted that the title passes on to the Government only after possession is taken. In support of this proposition, he cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr. G.H. Grant v. The State of Bihar, and the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in The State of Madras v. Vasudevan Pottal 82 L.W. 657. The latter decision has only followed the former one. Learned Counsel also invited my attention to a judgment of this Court in M.R. Gangadhara Mudaliar v. The State of Madras Represented by The Secretary to Government, Industries, Labour and Co-operation, Madras (1905) 1 M.L.J. 374. In that case it was held that from the fact that certain sites are included while others are excluded or that the Government under Section 48 at the last moment withdrew certain sites from acquisition, no unfair discrimination or mala fides on the part of the Government could be inferred. It was pointed out that unless the Court feels that certain improper grounds had influenced, any such decision cannot be struck down as amounting to a fraud of the powers of Eminent Domain. 30. It was pointed out that unless the Court feels that certain improper grounds had influenced, any such decision cannot be struck down as amounting to a fraud of the powers of Eminent Domain. 30. I have held on the facts of this case that the Government had acted bona fide and the notification of withdrawal of acquisition is not in any way vitiated by any of the grounds urged by the petitioner. 31. In the result, the contentions put forward by the petitioner fail and the writ petitions have to be and are hereby dismissed. 32. W.M.P. Nos. 15743 and 16638 of 1989 are allowed. W.M.P. Nos. 20234 of 1986, 17234 of 1987, 14148 of 1988, 13976 of 1989, 13977 of 1989 and 13978 of 1989 are dismissed in view of the dismissal of the main writ petitions. Two of them are really infructuous. 33. W.M.P. No. 15632 of 1989 which is only for permission to file a supplement affidavit by the petitioner, is allowed and the affidavit is taken on file. 34. The parties are directed to bear their respective costs in all the petitions.