JUDGMENT R.K. Gulati, J. 1. This is a tenant's writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and arises out of proceedings under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as "the Act." 2. The dispute relates to an accommodation which consists of two bedrooms and a drawing-cum-dining room, alongwith other amenities with a separate lawn and garage in the tenancy of the petitioner in a portion of House No. 7/157-C, Swarup Nagar, Kanpur. The 3rd respondent, L. D. Tandon, (hereinafter referred to as "the landlord") asserting himself to be the Karta of a Joint Hindu Family, consisting of himself, his wife and three sons, filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, for release of the accommodation aforesaid on the ground that the same is required for bona fide needs of his youngest son Dr. Ashok Tandon and his family. At the relevant time when this application was filed, Dr. Ashok Tandon had gone to London for higher studies and training. His wife, Dr. Anita Tandon later, followed her husband to England after obtaining her M. D. Degree in India the application for release was filed on the allegations that Dr. Ashok Tandon with his family intended to return to India in near future and wanted to settle down permanently in Kanpur. It is no longer in dispute that Dr. Ashok Tandon along with his family has returned to India and has settled permanently in Kanpur where he and his wife both are practising medicine. The application for release was granted by the Prescribed Authority on the finding that the need asserted by the landlord was bona fide and the comparative hardship of the landlord was greater than that of the tenant. An appeal against that order was dismissed by the VIIIth Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar. It is in this background that the present writ petition has been filed impugning the orders passed by the courts below. 3. Pending admission of the writ petition, the landlord was served and was required to file counter affidavit. The parties have exchanged their affidavits and are duly represented. The petition is ripe for hearing. With the consent of the parties, this petition is being disposed of finally at the admission stage. 4. 3. Pending admission of the writ petition, the landlord was served and was required to file counter affidavit. The parties have exchanged their affidavits and are duly represented. The petition is ripe for hearing. With the consent of the parties, this petition is being disposed of finally at the admission stage. 4. For the petitioner it is contended that the need for the additional accommodation for Dr. Ashok Tandon and his family is not genuine and bona fide. Further, without considering the real extend of the accommodation in occupation of the landlord in premises No. 7/157-B and also a part accommodation in premises No 7/157-C, the application for release has been granted. Another point put forward was that in considering the question of hardship Rule 16 (I) (d) of the Rules framed under the Act was left out of consideration and, therefore, the impugned orders cannot be sustained. As the controversy raised in this writ petition revolves on the question whether the accommodation at the disposal of the landlord was enough to meet the requirement of Dr. Ashok Tandon, it has become necessary to refer in some detail about the accommodation at the disposal of the landlord and his family. So far as the size of the family is concerned, it consists of the landlord, his wife, three sons Dr. Ravi Tandon, Suresh Tandon and Dr. Ashok Tandon, aged between 43 and 47 years with their wives and seven grand children The landlord is a senior medical practitioner having standing of over 38 years. Dr. Ravi Tandon is a medical practitioner of 15-16 years standing. Suresh Tandon is engaged in wholesale business in medicines and pharmaceuticals. The youngst son Dr. Ashok Tandon and his wife Dr. Anita Tandon are practising medicine at Kanpur from the year 1985 since their return from England. 5. There is not much dispute as regards the accommodation with the landlord. In fact, the accommodation was got verified by the Prescribed Authority through a Commissioner from a map furnished by the landlord. House No. 7/.157-B and adjoining house which is also owned by the landlord and his family has two suites. The accommodation consists of a portico, lab, drawing-cum-dining room, courtyard, verandah, stores, kitchen and bath rooms, dressing rooms besides 5 bedrooms and one consultation room and a lounge. House No. 7/.157-B and adjoining house which is also owned by the landlord and his family has two suites. The accommodation consists of a portico, lab, drawing-cum-dining room, courtyard, verandah, stores, kitchen and bath rooms, dressing rooms besides 5 bedrooms and one consultation room and a lounge. On the first floor there is one room, a bath room, latrine and a store room with an open terrace. It was not disputed before me that the accommodation on the first floor is used as guest room and is reserved for that purpose. The accommodation in this house is in the occupation of the landlord himself and his wife and their eldest son Dr. Ravi Tandon, his wife and their two sons aged 22 and 14 years and a daughter aged 18 years. In House No 7/157-C the portion with the landlord, is in the occupation of Suresh Tandon, his wife and their son and daughter aged 21 and i9 years. The accommodation in this portion is identical to the one which is in the possession of the tenant-petitioner, namely, 2 bedrooms and drawing and dining room along with other amenities with a separate lawn and garage. 6. Sub-section (1) of Section 21 which consists of clauses (a) and (b), four provisos and an Explanation attached thereto, deals with the eviction of a sitting tenant from the building under his tenancy or any specified portion thereof on specified grounds. We are concerned with clause (a1 only which, inter alia, provides that the Prescribed Authority may on an application of the landlord in that behalf order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family either for residential purposes or for purposes of any trade, profession or calling. Under these provisions, the Prescribed Authority is entrusted with the judicial discretion, either to allow or reject the landlord's application for release. Under these provisions, the Prescribed Authority is entrusted with the judicial discretion, either to allow or reject the landlord's application for release. On the requirement of clause (a) being made out that there exists a bona fide need and the conditions laid down in the fourth proviso being satisfied, namely, that the comparative hardship of the landlord is greater than that of the tenant, the Prescribed Authority is obliged to grant the release application, subject of course to the guidelines and limitations provided under Rule 16 (I) of the Rules vide its clauses (a) 10 (g). The material words in clause (a) are "is bona fide required" This expression had been the- subject-matter of consideration before this Court on several occasions, and it has repeatedly been held that the word "bona fide" indicates that the need should be an honest one and not for the purposes to satisfy the landlord's whim or fancy. The expression bona fide has been used in contradiction to mala fide, i.e. that the application for release should not be false and with an oblique motive and should not be a device to evict a tenant. The word "required" signifies that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough, but there should be an element of need and the landlord must show that he genuinely required the accommodation (see Mattu Lai v. Radhey Lai, AIR 1974, SC 1596. To put it differently, the bona fide need of the landlord should be genuine and honest, conceived in good faith and the court must also consider it reasonable to gratify that need. The appellate authority has considered at length the question about the need of Dr Ashok Tandon with reference to the accommodation available with the landlord and the size of his family. The need of Dr. Ashok Tandon has been found to be bona fide and genuine. The appellate authority has dealt with the question of insufficiency of space, desirability of separate units for the members of the family as asserted by the landlord, the requirements of the younger members and grown up children of the family, the status of the landlord and that of his sons and various other attending circumstances. The appellate authority has dealt with the question of insufficiency of space, desirability of separate units for the members of the family as asserted by the landlord, the requirements of the younger members and grown up children of the family, the status of the landlord and that of his sons and various other attending circumstances. It has found that the landlord himself is a prosperous doctor with high social status as is manifest from the proof on record, and so is the social status of his sons who are all assessed to income tax and wealth tax. Further, the landlord is accustomed to certain style of living having a lounge, garrage, verandah, lawn and other amenities in addition to bedroom and drawing-cum dining room etc In rejecting the case that there is sufficient accommodation available to the landlord for a comfortable living of Dr. Ashok Tandon in House No, 7/157-B or House 7/157-C the appellate authority has remarked as under : ".........The idea of his (i e. landlord) accommodating his son Dr. Ashok Tandon and his family who is himself an eminent foreign return doctor of high social status in the accommodation in houses No. 7/157-B or 7/157-C itself highly repugnant. In house No. 7/157-B the landlord is living with his son Dr. Ravi Tandon and his grown up children and this house has five bed rooms besides other amenities as described above. If two bed rooms, bath or latrine are made available to Dr. Ashok Tandon, then I find that considering his status it will not be at all, sufficient for his need and it would definitely put the remaining occupants of this house in congestion because a lounge can be used as a lounge and veranda or dressing room can be used as a verandah or dressing room only and the persons like landlord and his sons cannot be compelled to use them as bed rooms or living rooms Similar is the position if accommodation of Dr Ashok Tandon is considered in house No 7/157-C with the landlord's son .Suresh Tandon and his family " Learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to advance any convincing argument to assail the various findings of fact recorded by the appellate authority. He could not dispute the social status of the landlord and that of his sons as discussed by the courts below. He could not dispute the social status of the landlord and that of his sons as discussed by the courts below. Nothing was brought to my notice that in reaching its conclusion, the appellate authority has left out of its consideration any piece of evidence or material. 7. In a particular situation whether a need is reasonable or bona fide, is to be fudged from the objective view point and not merely by assertions or denial or the parties This is what the appellate authority has done in the instant case. In fact, the assumption that two out of five bedrooms could be spared for Dr. Ashok Tandon, to say the least, is the result of very liberal thinking on the part of the appellate authority and in doing so, it has erred in favour of the petitioner. Out of five bed-rooms one is necessarily required for the landlord and his wife, another room for Dr. Ravi Tandon and his wife, one for the grown-up daughter of Ravi Tandon aged 18 years and at least one for the two sons who are aged between 18 to 24 years. This barely leaves one bed-room for Dr. Ashok Tandon and bis family which consists of himself, his wife and two children who are now sufficiently grown-up The accommodation of one bed-room cannot by any standard be considered as sufficient for a comfortable living. There is no denial of the fact that Dr. Ashok Tandon and his wife Anita Tandon both are highly qualified doctors and their long stay in England shows that they and their children must be accustomed to a high standard of living. There are findings of fact recorded to this effect, which are well supported by evidence that was placed before the courts below. It is also well known that a bedroom alone does not constitute the requirement for a comfortable living From the affidavits filed before the courts below by the landlord, it has come on record that the landlord is having a common kitchen with Dr; Ravi Tandon and his family members which is marked as QLMN in the map but the landlord also maintains a separate small kitchen for cooking non-vegetarian food or for snacks for the purposes of any guest and visitors of the landlord or Dr. Ravi Tandon. Ravi Tandon. The necessity of running a vegetarian kitchen separately is on account of the fact that the wife of the landlord is vegetarian and she objects to cooking of non-vegetarian food in that kitchen. It is also established from the record that Suresh Tandon is maintaining his own kitchen in a portion of house no. 7/156-C and is living independently of the landlord and his other brothers. 8. In my opinion the appellate authority committed no error of law when it held that the need of the landlord was bona fide on account of the size of his family. There was no adequate accommodation for the comfortable living of Dr. Ashok Tandon and his family. Availability of small accommodation of a room or two does not effect the bona fides of the landlord, though it is a circumstance which may not be totally ignored. The landlord is entitled to make himself comfortable in his property and the plea for living in a more convenient or congenial atmosphere cannot be called unreasonable. On the material brought on record, that need or requirement pleaded by the landlord is genuine, then the landlord must be left free to satisfy the needs or requirements in the manner most suitable to him according to the exigencies and circumstances indicated by him in the case. The only requirement of law is that need must be bona fide and the landlord must not have any oblique motive in getting the tenant evicted. Unless it is established that the petition is motivated or intended to harass the tenant or to let out the disputed accommodation to some other person, the requirement cannot be said to be not bona fide. Once the factum of bona fide need is established, the court cannot be required to act as the rationing authority in the matter of accommodation nor this is the function of the Court under the Act. In order to succeed it is not necessary for the landlord to show that the need is absolute (see Smt. Gindori Devi v. Second Addl. District Judge, 1979 UPRCC 599 and Jayant Kumar v. Prescribed Authority, 1979 UPRCC 132. As held by this Court in Dr. In order to succeed it is not necessary for the landlord to show that the need is absolute (see Smt. Gindori Devi v. Second Addl. District Judge, 1979 UPRCC 599 and Jayant Kumar v. Prescribed Authority, 1979 UPRCC 132. As held by this Court in Dr. B. N Joshi v. II additional District Judge, Allahabad, 1985 (2) ARC 206, need for accommodation is inevitably co-related in appreciable measure to the status of the person concerned, that adds to the number of visitors, clients or guests and the legitimate need to make them comfortable. The social requirement of the family thus cannot be overlooked. The landlord cannot be expected to live nor can he be required to mould his needs according to the wishes of the tenant In the instant case it has to be remembered that both Dr. Tandon and his wife have their own social status besides being eminent doctors. They are bound to have visitors friends and clients. They have school going children- Young students necessarily need proper accommodation for comfortable living and place to sit apart and to devote time to their studies. One or two room accommodation in such circumstances cannot be held to be sufficient. 9. From the consideration of the orders passed by the courts below it is quite apparent that apart from the insufficiency of the space, the anxiety of the landlord is also to provide a separate living unit to each of his sons and their family who have grown up children and are independent in their earnings as well as their professional establishments. In my opinion, no exception can be taken to the desire of the landlord. Having regard to the prevailing social order, the concept of joint family, it is well known, is losing ground day by day. Now a days when children grow up and have their own families and status, it is often seen, that they have common links, but in the same house they live as a separate units and have separate messings as well. This help to maintain a cordial relationship and fosters peace and harmony amongst the family members. 10. The findings returned by the appellate authority that the need is bona fide on the facts of the present case, is justified both on facts and in law. This help to maintain a cordial relationship and fosters peace and harmony amongst the family members. 10. The findings returned by the appellate authority that the need is bona fide on the facts of the present case, is justified both on facts and in law. The conclusions are in consonance with the judicial pronouncements of this Court some of which have been referred above. The existence of a bona fide need of the landlord is essentially a question of fact and except for exceptional or cogent grounds it is not open for this Court to interfere in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The view taken by the appellate authority is a plausible one. It has not been shown that the findings of fact sought to be challenged are either arbitrary or perverse, or the relevant provisions of law have either been misinterpreted or misapplied. The findings that the need of landlord is bona fide and he required the accommodation in dispute genuinely are well founded, and in my opinion, cannot be disturbed. The first submission is accordingly rejected. It was next contended that the courts below left out of their consideration the applicability of Rule 16 (1) (d) of the Rules framed under the Act. This rule concerns itself with residential buildings, when an application is made for release thereof under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act. Rule 16 (2) deals with non-residential buildings with which we are not concerned. Rule 16 (1) provides that in considering the requirement of personal occupation for the purposes of residence by the landlord or any member of his family, the Prescribed Authority shall, also have regard to such factors as are mentioned in clauses (a) to (g) of that sub-rule. Rule 16 (1) (d) reads as under : "Where the tenant's need would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under tenancy and the landlord's need would be served by releasing the other part, the Prescribed Authority shall release only the latter part of the building " 11. Rule 16 (1) (d) reads as under : "Where the tenant's need would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under tenancy and the landlord's need would be served by releasing the other part, the Prescribed Authority shall release only the latter part of the building " 11. The above rule directs the statutory authority that where the tenant's need would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the accommodation under the tenancy and the landlord's need would be served by releasing the other part, the authority concerned shall release only the latter part of the building. It may be mentioned at the outset that the plea now raised in these proceedings was never canvassed before the courts below. However, the omission to raise such a plea is of no consequence in view of a decision of the Supreme Court in Smt Raj Rani Mehrotra v. The 2nd Additional District Judge, 1980 ARC 311, where the court observed : "It is clear that under the relevant rule, it is a duty of the Court to take into account that aspect while considering the requirement of personal occupation of the landlord." 12. In the present case, the rule laid down by the Supreme Court would apply. Learned counsel for the parties agree that the entire material for consideration, whether Rule 16 (1) (d) has any application or not on the facts of the present case, is available on the record of the writ petition and this Court may consider the contention on merits. Accordingly I proceed to deal with the respective contentions put forward by the contending parties before this Court. The consideration of Rule 16 (1) (d) of the Act comes into picture after the bona fide need of the landlord has been established and when the question of comparative hardship is considered by the court. Under the fourth proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 21 of the Act, one of the requirements of law is that hardship likely to be caused by the refusal or grant of the application for release to the landlord and tenant must also be compared. It is only when the comparative hardship of the landlord is greater than that of the tenant that the former is liable to succeed in getting an order of release in his favour. 13. It is only when the comparative hardship of the landlord is greater than that of the tenant that the former is liable to succeed in getting an order of release in his favour. 13. Sri K. M. Dayal, learned counsel appearing for the contesting landlord respondent urged that the petitioner is not entitled to seek consideration of the applicability of Rule 16 (1) (d) in view of the provisions contained in the explanation attached to sub-Section (1) of Section 21 of the Act. The explanation relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent landlord reads as under : - "Explanation :-In the case of a residential buildings (i) Where the tenant or any member of his family who has been normally residing with or is wholly dependent on him. has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area, no object on by the tenant against an application under this sub-Section shall be entertained; Note : For the purposes of this clause a person shall be deemed to have otherwise acquired a building if he is occupying a public building for residential purposes as a tenant, allottee or licensee". 14. From the above it is clear that if the case of a tenant falls within the mischief contemplated in the explanation aforesaid, the tenant is debarred from raising any objection to the landlords application for release. He is also not permitted to adduce any evidence to challenge the needs of the landlord. Learned counsel for the respondent referred to paragraph 11 of the affidavit filed in support of an application dated September 19, 987, moved by the petitioner before the Prescribed Authority. The relevant part of that paragraph reads as under : ".....accommodation of flat no. 9 of premises No. 118/354, Kausalpuri, Kanpur vacated by Sardar Jaswant Singh was/is not at all suitable to the need of the deponent (i.e. the petitioner) or his family members or looking to his social status specially when the deponent is an income tax asses see in last 40 years and has got a reputation/social status in the City of Kanpur and the social status of the deponent is admittedly greater than that of the petitioner landlord in all respects". ' 15. ' 15. It appears that the petitioner is the owner and landlord of the flat mentioned in the preceding paragraph and it is located in the city of Kanpur. The flat was vacated by the sitting tenant in the year 19?6 during the pendency of the release application against the petitioner. Instead of seeking release of the flat premises in his favour, the petitioner nominated and consented for its being let out to another person. IT is in this background that learned counsel for the landlord respondent has put forward the objection relting upon the explanation to sub-Section (1) of Section 21 of the Act. 16. The defence of the petitioner that he had consented for letting out the flat as the accommodation was not suitable for his requirement has not found favour with the courts below. In this respect the appellate authority has recorded its finding as under : "......the documentary evidence filed by the respondent (i.e. landlord) shows that the appellant (petitioners) did not apply for release of flat No. 9 in premises No. 118/354 Ram Vihar, Kausbalpuri, Kanpur instead the appellant nominated one Sant Singh Khanuja on 24-6-1986 for allotment of the said premises which consisted of two big rooms, two small rooms, bath rooms, latrine and store, etc. In my view in these circumstances, the appellant cannot claim greater hardship. The appellant has tried to explain his action by saying that the accommodation in the flat was not suitable to him, I disagree with him because the appellant has a very small limited family consisting of his wife, one son and one daughter" No attempt, whatsoever, was made to challenge the above findings of fact and therefore they are to be accepted as correct. It is quite evident that the petitioner came in possession and had acquired or got vacated a residential building in "vacant state" in the same city and municipal limits of Kanpur where the disputed accommodation is located. There is no escape from the conclusion that the case of the petitioner is covered by the explanation attached to sub-Section (1) of Section 21 of the Act, and his objection to the application of the landlord is barred and cannot be considered. It follows that the petitioner is not entitled to ask for consideration of the applicability of Rule 16 (a) (d) referred earlier. It follows that the petitioner is not entitled to ask for consideration of the applicability of Rule 16 (a) (d) referred earlier. There is another aspect which disentitles the petitioner to get the benefit of Rule 16 (I) (d). Before the Prescribed Authority it was the petitioner's own case that the accommodation under his tenancy was insufficient for his needs- Learned counsel for the landlord respondent referred to paragraph 28 of the affidavit filed by the petitioner himself before the Prescribed Authority, a copy whereof is Annexure IV to the writ petition. There the petitioner, inter alia, stated as under : "That the contents of para 26 of the affidavit under reply are admitted to the extent that the family of the tenant opposite party is consisting of four members The son of the opposite party (wrongly stated petitioner landlord) is a Chartered Accountant and is also of marriageable age but for want of paucity of accommodation the tenant opposite party is unable to perform the marriage of his son and also is negotiating for the same as such in case of eviction the tenant opposite party shall be put to greater hardship and inconvenience in comparison to the hardship likely to be caused to the petitioner landlord". 17. This Court was informed at the Bar by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner's son has since been married and has also a child. It does not stand to reason that if the entire accommodation was insufficient for the needs of the petitioner and his family how would a part release of the accommodation advance the case of the petitioner. A part release would necessarily result in reduction of accommodation to a considerable extent, and the reduced accommodation may not serve the purpose of the petitioner. The question of applying Rule 16 (1) (d) in these circumstances is meaningless, inasmuch as out of the two bedrooms with the petitioner, one would at least be required by his married son and his wife. The petitioner has also a grown up daughter of 27 years The petitioner, his wife and his daughter cannot have a comfortable living in one bed room accommodation if our of the two bed rooms, one were to be released in favour of the landlord applying the principles contained in Rule 16 (1) (d). The petitioner has also a grown up daughter of 27 years The petitioner, his wife and his daughter cannot have a comfortable living in one bed room accommodation if our of the two bed rooms, one were to be released in favour of the landlord applying the principles contained in Rule 16 (1) (d). The release of one bed room accommodation will not even serve the purpose of the landlord. In Surendra Kumar Chandani v. District Judge, Saharanpur, 1983 (?) ARC 267, Honourable Mr. Justice N. p. Ojha (as his Lordship then was) held : "Rule 16 (1) (d) on its plain language applies only when the tenants need would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building. When the petitioner's own case was that his need could not be adequately met even if the release application was allowed in part and one of the two rooms was left with him, it is not open to him to take up the plea now under Article 226 of the Constitution that the authorities below have committed an error in not giving effect to Rule 16 (1) (d)". 18. The position obtaining in the instant case is the same. On the facts no case is made out for grant of any relief under Rule 16 (1) (d) of the Rules. There is yet another ground which needs mention. Learned counsel for the respondent landlord referred to the site map which has been filed as one of the annexures to the writ petition. From the map it is clear that the disputed accommodation cannot be divided in meets and bounds The structure of the accommodation is such that it can only be used as a unit as a whole. 19. For all these reasons the second submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner is without any merit and is accordingly rejected. 20. At the end of the argument learned counsel for the petitioner made a praver that the petitioner may be permitted a reasonable time to vacate the disputed premises and to handover peaceful possession to the contesting respondent landlord. This request in my opinion, is reasonable and is accordingly granted subject to the following conditions. 20. At the end of the argument learned counsel for the petitioner made a praver that the petitioner may be permitted a reasonable time to vacate the disputed premises and to handover peaceful possession to the contesting respondent landlord. This request in my opinion, is reasonable and is accordingly granted subject to the following conditions. (i) The order of eviction shall not be executed for a period of four months from today on the condition that the petitioner files an undertaking before the Prescribed Authority within a month from today to the following effect; (a) that the petitioner will handover the vacant and peaceful possession of the disputed premises to the respondent-landlord on or before the expiry of four months; (b) that the petitioner will pay to the respondent landlord the arrears of rent, if any, within a period of one month from today; (c) that the petitioner will not induct any other person in the premises in question; and (d) that in the event of any default in compliance of any one or more of the aforesaid conditions, or if the undertaking is not filed as required by this order within the stipulated time, the decree shall became executable forthwith. No other point was pressed before me. 21. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.