Judgment :- These two Civil Revision Petitions arise out of a common order of the special Tribunal, Cooperative Societies, Madurai, in C.M.A. Nos. 161 of 1981 and 89 of 1982 respectively. 2. Though notice was served on the respondents, the Society has not taken any steps to contest the matter. None appears for the respondent-Society. 3. Brief facts leading to the filing of these two Civil Revision Petitions are the following:— The petitioner was the President of Q. 1253 Nagarakudi Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society (hereinafter called ‘the Society’) from 6-3-1968 till it was superseded in December 1977. As per by-Law No. 27 (1) (a) of the Society, the President was also the Treasurer of the Society. By a General Body resolution passed on 12-12-1977, the society was taken over under the control of Ramanathapuram District Co-operative Central Bank from 27-121977. As per the records, a cash balance of Rs. 10,207-03P. was av ailable. But the same was neither handed over nor remitted subsequent to the taking over, by the petitioner. Therefore, the said sum of Rs. 10,207-03. P. was debited against the petitioner. Inspite of repeated notices, the petitioner did not deposit any amount, but only sent replies which were not accepted by the officials. Hence theproceedings under section 7B of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 was initiated against the petitioner. The Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Sivaganga by Droceeedings dated 29-7-1981, held that the respondent-Society has sustained the loss of Rs. 10,207.03 by way of cash balance as on 12-12-1977 and the petitioner was responsible for the said loss. Consequently, an award for a sum of Rs. 14,698-11. P. including interest was passed on 29-7-1981. 4. At this stage, it may be mentioned that on an earlier, occasion, for the deficiency/loss of Rs. 7,748.85. P. and award was passed against the petitioner in proceedings taken under section 71 of the Act by the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Sivaganga, on 19-12-1980. Against that order of the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, an appeal was filed, and the Co-operative Tribunal, by an order dated 29.6.1981 in C.M.A. No. 132 of 1981, has set aside the order of the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies on the ground that no reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner. Against that order of the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, an appeal was filed, and the Co-operative Tribunal, by an order dated 29.6.1981 in C.M.A. No. 132 of 1981, has set aside the order of the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies on the ground that no reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner. After remand, the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, by proceeedings, dated 28.5.1982, found that the proceedings taken on the earlier occasion for recovery of a sum of Rs. 7,748-85. P. has been included in the subsequent recovery/surcharge proceedings for a sum of Rs. 10,207.03. P. and, therefore, no separate order was necessary, and on that ground, the proceedings were closed. Aggrieved by the closing/dismissing of the proceedings under section 71 of the Act, the Society preferred an appeal in C.M.A. No. 89242 of 1982 before the Cooperative Tribunal. The petitioner, aggrieved by the surcharge order for a sum of Rs. 14,698-11. P., has filed C.M.A. No. 161 of 1981. Both the C.M.As were heard and a common order was passed by the Co-operative Tribunal, Madurai. Even thougn the appeal filed by the Society, namely C.M.A. No. 89242 of 1982 was dismissed by the Tribunal, it is not clear how the learned counsel for the petitioner also is not in a position to explain or justify the filing of a Revision (C.R.P. No. 3215242 of 1984) against the decree in C.M.A. No. 89 of 1982. In as much as C.M.A. No. 89242 of 1982 has been decided in favour of the petitioner by dismissing the appeal filed by the Society, C.R.P. No. 3215 of 1984 has been unnecessarily filed without application of mind. No argument was also advanced why as Revision petition has been filed against that. In the circumstances, C.R.P.No 3215 of 1984 is dismissed. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, while challenging the order in C.M.A. No. 161242 of 1981, submitted that the Society having taken steps to proceed under section 71 of the Act, has no right to proceed again under section 73 of the Act. He further submitted that the Tribunal should have allowed the appeal, namely, C.M.A. No. 161 of 1981 upholding the contention of the petitioner that the Secretary of the Society was a necessary party and the proceedings taken against the petitioner alone is bad for non-joinder of proper parties. He further submitted that the Tribunal should have allowed the appeal, namely, C.M.A. No. 161 of 1981 upholding the contention of the petitioner that the Secretary of the Society was a necessary party and the proceedings taken against the petitioner alone is bad for non-joinder of proper parties. He also submitted that in the light of the undisputed facts, namely, that the petitioner has not signed in the cash took either on 30-11-1977 when the alleged deficiency/loss was found in a sum of Rs. 7,748-85. P. or on 12-12-1977 when the alleged deficiency/loss was found in a sum of Rs. 10,207.03. Learned counsel further contended that the view taken by the Tribunal that though the petitioner has not signed in any of the incriminating documents, the petitioner is liable for surcharge as President-cum-Treasurer of the Society, cannot be sustained, in view of the reported cases of this Court in Kunjithapatham v. Thiruvilaiyattam Co-opt. Agrl Credit Society 1 reported in Subbammal alias Bajamml v. president, The Tenkasi Co-op. Urban Bank Ltd 2 , reported in Ramachandran v. The Deputy Registrar, Dairying trichy and two others 3 reported in and Sathyamangalam Co-operative Urban Bank, Limited v. The Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Society and another 4 6. On a perusal of the judgment of the Tribunal, it is seen that the Tribunal has held the petitioner liable for surcharge on the following findings:— Tamil whether the judgment of the Tribunal based on the above conclusions is sustainable or not in the light of the reported cases has to be considered now. 7. In 89 Law Weekly page 641 (supra) Ramanujam. J., after noticing number of earlier cases, has taken the following view:— “ The above decisions clearly indicate that the use of the phrase “wilful negligence in S. 71 of the Act is for the purpose of holding a person in management liable if he has caused loss to the society by his intentional and purposeful omission. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the petitioners is right in his submission that mere negligence, however, gross it may be, may not be sufficient to attract the section”.(Para 10) 8. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the petitioners is right in his submission that mere negligence, however, gross it may be, may not be sufficient to attract the section”.(Para 10) 8. In 1980 (II) M.L.J. page 17 (supra), Ratnavel Pandian, J., as he then was, after noticing the judgments upto that date, has held as follows: — The degree of negligence that is contemplated under section 71 (1) of the Act is not a mere “negligence, but wilful negligence, The word toilful has not been defined in the Act. The word ‘wilfulness’ or Vantonness imports pre-meditation or knowledge and consciousness that an injury or loss is likely to result from the act done or from the omission to act. Thus, the term imports a constructive intention as to the consequences which, entering into the wilful act, the law imputes to the offender and in this way a charge, which other wise would be mere negligence, becomes, by reason of a reckless disregard of probable consequences, wilful wrong. In other words, the conductofa person fo to amount to “wilful negligence must be something more than ordinary negligence. To constitute wilful negligence, the act done or omitted to be done must be intendedor must involve such reckless disregard of security and right as to imply bad faith. The wilful or intentional negligence is something distinct from mere carelessness or intention, however, gross, and consists of a wilful and intentional failure omeglect to perform a duty necessary to protect from harm or loss to any person or property of another. In examiningwhether there is wilful negligence, it has to be seen first whether the person concerned is guilty of negligence, and if so, whether that negligence is wilful and secondly, whether “the said wilful negligence is the proximate cause of the injury or loss sustained. In examiningwhether there is wilful negligence, it has to be seen first whether the person concerned is guilty of negligence, and if so, whether that negligence is wilful and secondly, whether “the said wilful negligence is the proximate cause of the injury or loss sustained. Having regard to the interpretations and discussions in respect of the term ‘wilful’ appearing in various enactments, as found in the case-law decided by the learned English and Indian Judge which serve as a guide to the construction of the term ‘wilful’ used in section 71 (1) of the Act, I am of the view that in order to pass a surcharge order under that section against a person entrusted with the organisation and management of a co-operative societv or an officer or servant thereof such person should have done an actionable wrong, either by commission or omission, in a deliberate and reprehensible manner, with reckless callousness and with a supine indifference (but not by accident or inadvertence) without taking due care and precaution ordinarily expected from a reasonable and prudent man under those existing circumstances, that is to say, not caring what the result of his carelessness would be. To make it explicit, it may be stated that he should haveacted in breachof legal obligations or in a conscious disregard of duty of with an in tentional failure toperform the manifest duty, in the performaance of which the public have an interest, and “that such commission should be the proximate cause of the loss or deficiency in question.” 9. In 1981 T.L.N.J. page 292 (supra), Nainar Sundaram, J. after referring to the judgments of Ramanuiam, J. and Ratnavel Pandian, J. (as he then was), has observed as follows:— “It maybe true that the petitioners failed to discharge the duties enjoined upon them with regard to direct scrutiny of the accounts, examination of the vouchers and the passing of the statements before they signed the minutes book. But this failure by itself cannot come within the expression Vilful negligence which has been construed as meaning something done either by commision or ommission, in a deliberate and reprehensible manner, with reckless callousness and with a supine indifference (but not b y accident or inadvertence), without taking due care and precaution ordinarily expected from a reasonable and prudent man under the existing circumstances. After all, the petitioners filed in the characters of Directors of the third respondent Society. It the relevant point of time. The affairs of the third respondent Society were admittedly manned by “the President, Secretary and the Manager and as stated above that if the petitioners reposed confidence in the said officials and they merely affixed the signatures in the minutes book, that by itself would not constitute wilful negligence so as to bring them within the mischief of section 71 of the Act” 10. On the question whether the shifting of the proceedings from section 71 to section 73 of the Act, was justified and sustainable, the learned counsel relied on a decision of Ramaprasad Rao, C.J. in 1979 (1) M.L.J. page 6 (cited supra). In case, the learned Chief Justice has held as follows:— “ The only question for consideration therefore is whether the surcharge proceedings initiated by the society under section 71 of the Act, ignoring and setting at naught the statutory award passed by the Registrar under section 73 over the same subject matter, can be sustained. I refer to it as “the same subject matter, in the sense that it is common ground that the loss claimed by the society as against Deenadayalu Naidu which was the subject-matter of the decision under Section 73, is the same the claimed in the surcharge proceedings also. It is “in this sense that there is similarity in the subject-matter. This is not disputed before me. One other peculiar feature is that, the audit report rendered, which touched upon and highlighted the loss sustained by the society, which was later traced to certain acts of misconduct of the quandom officers, was the basis for both the proceedings under Section 73 as well as as under section 71 of the Act. This is not disputed before me. One other peculiar feature is that, the audit report rendered, which touched upon and highlighted the loss sustained by the society, which was later traced to certain acts of misconduct of the quandom officers, was the basis for both the proceedings under Section 73 as well as as under section 71 of the Act. If therefore the same audit report propelled the officer s of the society to approach the Registrar for a decision on the question as to who should be mulcted with the responsibility for the loss which accrued to the society, then it appears to me to be unreasonable once again to initiate proceedings under cover of the same subject-matter, but under section 71 of the Act, There is an exhaustion of the power of the society orits officers when they invited a decision from the Registrar under section 73 and when it resulted in an award being passed by the Registrar under the above section. It is that award which is equitable to a decree of a competent Court that can be executed by the society thereafter for realisation of money due and payable by the misconducting officials as per the award rendered by the Registrar. It would be travesty of procedure, if the Board which came into the picture after the previous Board had to quit because of the earlier events which had happened and which had caused loss to the society, could seek to circumvent the executable award available to the society “and seek umbrage under section 71 of the Act, merely because it is an independent provision under the same enactment. It is not strangefor an enactment to contain two or more remedies for the assertion of a common or single right. But unless otherwise provided for inthe statute, if one such available remedy is exhausted, then in my view, the invocation of the other remedy, which is provided for as an ancillary to the first remedy al ready exhausted, cannot be sought for, for that would mean that the authorities in power can at their convenience and pleasure invoke one provision after another in a particular statute for purpose of availing of the remedies at different times. This would not be conducive to an orderly application and understanding of the laws. This would not be conducive to an orderly application and understanding of the laws. In my view, therefore, if there has been an invocation of one or two or more remedies available in law, such an invocation resultsin a decision rendered by the appropriate statu tory authority, then a resurrection of the very same subject matter through another available remedy contemplated in the very same enactment would lead to a violation of principles of natural justice as well as the accepted canons of common law. In this view, though Mr. Rajan is right in his submission that sections 73 and 71 “act independently in the respective fields, yet if one provision is taken advantage of by the society for securing its rights, and if such a reference to the Registrar, as in this case, under section 73, has resulted in an award, it cannot be thrown overboard and by passed by invoking once again the provisions of section 71, as if fresh surcharge proceedings could be initiated by the society which is armed with an award which is executable in the eye of taw. Inthe peculiar circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the award passed by the Registrar under section 73 when the petitioners herein took prompt action under section 73 of the Act against the miscreant and against the Secretary who was in charge of such amounts and brought him to book and secured an award from the statutory authority namely, the Registrar, under section 73 they cannot still be said to be guilty of wilful negligence nor can they be characterised as persons who misappropriated the funds of the society. Even on merits therefore there is no justification for the institution of fresh action against the petitioners.”. 11. In this case, we have alreay noticed that initially steps weretaken to proceed against the petitioner under section 71 of the Act. Subsequently, the proceedings were initiated under section 73 of the Act. The respondents are not represented before this Court to explain the change. Even otherwise, the findings of the Tribunal, as extracted above, are not sufficient to sustain the surcharge, in the light of the various decisions of this Court. Nothing is established to connect the petitioner with the alleged loss/deficiency found at the time of supersession of the Society. The respondents are not represented before this Court to explain the change. Even otherwise, the findings of the Tribunal, as extracted above, are not sufficient to sustain the surcharge, in the light of the various decisions of this Court. Nothing is established to connect the petitioner with the alleged loss/deficiency found at the time of supersession of the Society. Further, the objection of the petitioner that the Secretary should have been impleaded as a party has been lightly disposed of by the Tribunal holding that even if the Secretary had been impleaded as a party, the liability would have been fixed jointly and severally. The petitioner was justified in contending in the facts and circumstances of the case that the Secretary was a necessary party especially in the light of the findings rendered by the Tribunal and also in view of the fact there is no nexus between the petitioner and the alleged loss/deficiency. Accordingly, the order of the Tribunal, confirming the order of the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, is set aside, and C.R.P. No. 3214 of 1984 is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.